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Seminars in 2015-2016 in Economic theory
Tai-Wei Hu (Northwestern University)
Learnability in Simple and Complex Environments
Tuesday, September 15 2015 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 157  

Helios Herrera (HEC, Montreal)
The Marginal Voter's Curse (joint with Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Joseph McMurray)
Tuesday, September 22 2015 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  
Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Martin J. Osborne

Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown University)   Cancelled
TBA
Tuesday, October 6 2015 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  
Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Colin Stewart

Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University)
Search Design and Broad Matching (joint with Ran Spiegler)
Tuesday, October 13 2015 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 157  

Fei Li (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Discriminatory Persuasion: How to Convince Voters (joint with Jimmy Chan, Yun Yang)
Tuesday, October 20 2015 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Huseyin Yildirim (Duke University)
TBA
Tuesday, October 27 2015 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 157  

Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money (joint with Johannes Horner)
Tuesday, November 3 2015 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Sean Horan (University of Montreal)
Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making
Tuesday, November 17 2015 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University)
Tuesday, November 24 2015 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 157  

Yuval Salant (Northwestern University)
Statistical Inference in Games
Tuesday, December 1 2015 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 157  

Marek Pycia (UCLA)
Allocation without Transfers: Ordinal and Cardinal Mechanisms
Tuesday, December 8 2015 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  
Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Marcin Pęski

Yoram Halevy (University of British Columbia)
Friday, February 26 2016 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Nageeb Ali (Pennsylvania State University)
Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining (joint with Doug Bernheim and Xiaochen Fan)
Tuesday, March 1 2016 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 151  

Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin)
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game
Tuesday, March 8 2016 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  
Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Marcin Pęski

Alfred Galichon (New York University)
Topics in Equilibrium Transportation
Wednesday, March 16 2016 14:10–15:00, Fields Institute (222 College Street)  

Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Waterloo)
The Demand and Supply for Favours in Dynamic Relationships (joint with Jan Zapal)
Tuesday, March 22 2016 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  
Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Colin Stewart

Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
Tuesday, March 29 2016 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1065  
Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee

Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)
Common Value Auction with state Dependent Participation
Tuesday, April 5 2016 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1065  

Juan Dubra (Universidad de Montevideo)
A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization (joint with Jean-Pierre Benoît)
Tuesday, April 19 2016 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 142  

Laurent Lamy (Paris School of Economics)
On the benefits of set-asides (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
Thursday, May 26 2016 12:10–13:10, Rotman, room 570  

20 seminars found