Philipp Strack (University of Bonn)

Optimal Stopping with Private Information (joint with Thomas Kruse)

Tuesday, September 17 2013 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1025  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Ettore Damiano

Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University)

Non-Bayesian Rationality (two papers) (joint with John Hillas)

Tuesday, September 24 2013 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1025  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee

Mehmet Ekmekci (University of Pittsburgh)

Information in tender offers with a large shareholder (joint with Nenad Kos)

Tuesday, October 1 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Marcin Pęski

Wing Suen (The University of Hong Kong)

Multi-sender disclosure of verifiable information.

Tuesday, October 8 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Ettore Damiano

Antonio Penta (University of Wisconsin - Madison)

Strategic Thinking and Value of Reasoning: Theory and Applications to Five Little Treasures of Game Theory (joint with Larbi Alaoui)

Tuesday, October 15 2013 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1025  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee

Alexey Kushnir (University of Zurich)

A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design

Tuesday, October 22 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency, Organizer: Xianwen Shi

Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)

Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall

Tuesday, October 29 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Ettore Damiano

Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture

Tuesday, November 5 2013 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1025  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac, Ettore Damiano, and Byung Soo Lee

Roberto Serrano (Brown University)

The Appeal of Information Transactions (joint with Antonio Cabrales and Olivier Gossner)

Tuesday, November 19 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Gabor Virag

Rohan Dutta (McGill University)

Inferring Rationales from Choice: Identification for Rational Shortlist Methods (joint with Sean Horan)

Tuesday, November 26 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Rahul Deb

Takuo Sugaya (Stanford GSB)

TBA

Tuesday, December 3 2013 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Marcin Pęski

Philip Reny (University of Chicago)

Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Tuesday, December 10 2013 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1025  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee

Ryan Webb (New York University)

Rationalizing Context-Dependent Preferences: Divisive Normalization and Neurobiological Constraints (joint with Paul W. Glimcher (NYU) and Kenway Louie (NYU))

Tuesday, February 4 2014 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Victor Aguirregabiria

Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University and New York University)

Complex Questionnaires (joint with Jacob Glazer)

Tuesday, February 25 2014 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1030  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Martin J. Osborne

Daniel Quint (University of Wisconsin)

Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry (joint with Ken Hendricks)

Tuesday, March 4 2014 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room 127  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee

Filip Matějka (CERGE-EI)

Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices: A New Foundation for the Multinomial Logit Model (joint with Alisdair McKay)

Tuesday, March 11 2014 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Jordi Mondria

Alexander Wolitzky (Stanford University)

Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application to Bilateral Trade

Wednesday, March 19 2014 16:10–17:30, Rotman, room LL1025  

Series: Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory, Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Ettore Damiano

Jidong Zhou (NYU Stern)

Competitive Bundling

Tuesday, March 25 2014 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Xianwen Shi

Balazs Szentes (London School of Economics)

Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result

Tuesday, April 1 2014 16:10–17:30, Max Gluskin House, room 106  

Series: Economic theory, Organizer: Marcin Pęski