Martin J. Osborne, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, Colin Stewart, "Information aggregation with costly reporting", Economic Journal 130 (2020), 208–232. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Models in Microeconomic Theory, Open Book Publishers, Cambridge, 2020. (Freely available.)
Sean Horan, Martin J. Osborne, M. Remzi Sanver, "Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives", International Economic Journal 60 (2019), 1489–1504. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne and Matthew Turner, "Cost benefit analyses versus referenda", Journal of Political Economy 118 (1) (2010), 156–187.
Martin J. Osborne, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, Matthew Turner, "Meetings with Costly Participation: Reply", American Economic Review 95 (4) (2005), 1351–1354.
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003.
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting", Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003), 434–441. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne, "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by political candidates", Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000), 41–62. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, Matthew Turner, "Meetings with Costly Participation", American Economic Review 90 (4) (2000), 927–943. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players", American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834–847. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne, "A Note on 'The Early History of the Theory of Strategic Games from Waldegrave to Borel' by Robert W. Dimand and Mary Ann Dimand", History of Political Economy 28 (1996), 81–82. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne and Al Slivinski, "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates", Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996), 65–96. (Freely available.)
Jean-Pierre Benoît and Martin J. Osborne, "Crime, Punishment, and Social Expenditure", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151 (1995), 326–347. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne, "Spatial Models of Political Competition Under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take", Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1995), 261–301. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.
Martin J. Osborne, "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition", Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993), 133–151. (Freely available.)
Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein, "Noncooperative Models of Bargaining", in Handbook of Game Theory (Volume 1) (edited by R.J. Aumann and S. Hart), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1992, 179–225.
Martin J. Osborne, "Signaling, Forward Induction, and Stability in Finitely Repeated Games", Journal of Economic Theory 50 (1990), 22–36.
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Bargaining and markets, Academic Press, San Diego, 1990. (Freely available.)
Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik, "Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity", International Economic Review 28 (1987), 413–428.
Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik, "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition", Econometrica 55 (1987), 911–922.
Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik, "Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly", Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 238–260.
Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik, "The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model", International Economic Review 27 (1986), 223–237.
Martin J. Osborne, "The Role of Risk Aversion in a Simple Bargaining Model", in Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (edited by Alvin E. Roth), Cambridge University Press, 1985, 181–213.
Martin J. Osborne, "Capitalist-Worker Conflict and Involuntary Unemployment", Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984), 111–127.
Martin J. Osborne, "Why Do Some Goods Bear Higher Taxes Than Others?", Journal of Economic Theory 32 (1984), 301–316.
Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik, "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry", European Economic Review 22 (1983), 59–74.