Tuesday, 2 October 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
John Morgan (University of Toronto) | |
An Analysis of Stock Recommendations | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Thursday, 11 October 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Macroeconomics/Economic theory | |
Francisco Gonzalez (University of British Columbia) | |
Asymmetric Labor Adjustment, Organizational Capital, and Aggregate Job Flows (with A. Johri) | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Diego Restuccia |
Tuesday, 16 October 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marcel Boyer (Universite de Montreal) | |
Organizational Inertia and Dynamic Incentives | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 30 October 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Francesco Squintani (University of Rochester) | |
Verifiability, Generalized Information Correspondences, and Optimal Contracts | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Wednesday, 7 November 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yianis Sarafidis (INSEAD) | |
CANCELLED | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Thursday, 8 November 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Peter Marbach (University of Toronto) | |
Pricing in Peer to Peer Networks | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Michael Peters |
Tuesday, 13 November 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wouter Dessein (University of Chicago GSB) | |
Authority and Communications in Organizations | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Monday, 19 November 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Dino Gerardi (Yale University) | |
Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 20 November 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Diego Puga (University of Toronto) | |
Knowledge creation and control in organizations | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Nadia Soboleva |
Tuesday, 27 November 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Aldo Rustichini (Minnesota) | |
TBA | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Wednesday, 28 November 2001 | 16:00–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Rob Clark (University of Western Ontario) | |
Advertising and Coordination in Markets with Consumption Scale Effects (joint with Ig Horstmann) | |
Rotman, room 142 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Tuesday, 4 December 2001 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marco Battaglini (Princeton) | |
Self control in peer groups | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 5 March 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jim Schummer (Northwestern) | |
An Ascending Auction for Heterogeneous Objects | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 12 March 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Macroeconomics/Economic theory | |
Shouyong Shi (Indiana) | |
Friedman Meets Hosios: Efficiency in Search Models of Money | |
(joint with Alexander Berentsen and Guillaume Rocheteau)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Arthur J. Hosios |
Tuesday, 16 April 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
(visiting Harvard) | |
Self-perpetuation of Biased Beliefs | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 30 April 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Nadia Soboleva (University of Toronto) | |
International trade and capital markets: entry, exit and selection of firms | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 7 May 2002 | 3:10– 4:30 |
Economic theory | |
Muriel Niederle (Harvard) | |
Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Friday, 10 May 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Chang-tai Hsieh (Princeton University) | |
When Schools Compete, How Do They Compete: An Assessment of Chile's Nationwide School Voucher Program | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Dwayne Benjamin |
Tuesday, 14 May 2002 | 4:10– 5:30 |
Economic theory | |
Seungjin Han (Toronto) | |
Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 1 October 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern University) | |
Expected Utility with Multiple (Individually) Unique Priors | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Friday, 4 October 2002 | 1:30– 3:00 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Peter Zemsky (INSEAD) | |
Strategy Dynamics through a Demand-Based Lens: The evolution of market boundaries, resource rents and competitive positions | |
Rotman, room 147 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Tuesday, 8 October 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Bradley Ruffle (Ben-Gurion University) | |
Does Religious Ritual Promote Cooperation? Field Experiments on Israeli Religious and Secular Kibbutzim | |
(joint with Richard Sosios)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 October 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Seungjin Han (University of Toronto) | |
Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 22 October 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Levent Kockesen (Columbia University) | |
Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 29 October 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University) | |
Monopoly with Resale | |
(joint with Giacomo Calzolari)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 5 November 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ilya Segal (Stanford University) | |
The Communication Complexity of Efficient Allocation Problems | |
(joint with Noam Nisan)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Friday, 8 November 2002 | 12:30–14:00 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Scott Stern (Northwestern) | |
Climbing Atop the Shoulders of Giants: the Economics of Cumulative Knowledge Hubs | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Tuesday, 12 November 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Xiaodong Zhu (University of Toronto) | |
Sharing Catastrophe Risk under Model Uncertainty | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 12 November 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) | |
CANCELED | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 19 November 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Development economics | |
Nathan Nunn (University of Toronto) | |
Renk seeking, underdevelopment, and colonialism | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Wednesday, 20 November 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Roger Lagunof (Georgetown University) | |
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation | |
(joint with Matt Haag)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 26 November 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University) | |
When is Reputation Bad? | |
(joint with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 3 December 2002 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jim Bergin (Queen's University) | |
Optimal Monopolistic Selling Procedures with Uniform Pricing | |
(joint with Lin Zhou)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 4 March 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Sergei Izmalkov (MIT) | |
Multi-unit open ascending price efficient auction | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 11 March 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Srihari Govindan (UWO) | |
Stable Outcomes in Outside Option Games and Signalling Games | |
(joint with Robert Wilson)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 18 March 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Sergei Severinov (Duke University) | |
Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? | |
(joint with Raymond Deneckere)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Wednesday, 19 March 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Daniel Sturm (University of Munich) | |
Term limits and electoral accountability | |
(joint with Michael Smart)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 25 March 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Rene Kirkegaard (University of Aarhus) | |
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand | |
(joint with Per Baltzer Overgaard)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 1 April 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Arthur Robson (UWO) | |
Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views | |
(joint with Phil Reny)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Thursday, 3 April 2003 | 0:00– 6:15 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Ed Leamer (UCLA) | |
Episodic Forecasting of the US Economy: What Episode Now? | |
Rotman, room 134 | Organizer: Frank Mathewson |
Tuesday, 8 April 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mattias Polborn (UWO) | |
Robust Political Equilibria under Plurality and Runoff Rule | |
(joint with Matthias Messner)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 April 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Atsu Amegashie (University of Guelph) | |
A Theory of Bargaining Deals: Quantity Bonus as an Example | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 22 April 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Konstantin Rybakov (University of Toronto) | |
Equilibrium flows of buyers to markets: sequential strategy iteration and properties of the surplus functional | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 29 April 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jonathan Levin (Stanford University) | |
POSTPONED to MAY 6 | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Wednesday, 30 April 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Markus Mobius (Harvard University) | |
CANCELED | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Thursday, 1 May 2003 | 14:10–15:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kim-Sau Chung (Northwestern) | |
On the Bayesian foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 6 May 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jonathan Levin (Stanford University) | |
CANCELED | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Monday, 8 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Will Strange (University of Toronto) | |
Agglomeration, Opportunism and the Organization of Production | |
Rotman, room 133 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Monday, 15 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Mihkel Tombak (University of Toronto) | |
Marketing of Innovations: Discrimination vs. Bargaining Power | |
Rotman, room 133 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Monday, 22 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Mark Israel (Northwestern) | |
Consumer Learning About Established Firms: Evidence from Automobile Insurance | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Johannes Van Biesebroeck |
Tuesday, 23 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Charles Zheng (Northwestern) | |
Optimal search auctions | |
(joint with Jacques Cremer and Yossef Spiegel)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Friday, 26 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Luis Garicano (Chicago GSB) | |
Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy | |
Rotman, room 151 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Monday, 29 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Thomas Hubbard (Chicago GSB) | |
Hierarchies and the Organization of Specialization | |
(joint with Luis Garicano)
|
|
Rotman, room 133 | Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann |
Tuesday, 30 September 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto) | |
First in Village or Second in Rome? | |
(joint with Li, Hao and Wing Suen)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 14 October 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jimmy Chan (Johns Hopkins University) | |
Admission Impossible? Self Interest and Affirmative Action | |
(joint with Erik Eyster)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 21 October 2003 | 16:00–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Debraj Ray (New York University) | |
Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement | |
(joint with Kfir Eliaz, Ronny Razin)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Monday, 27 October 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Gunter Hitsch (Chicago GSB) | |
An Empirical Model of Advertising Dynamics | |
(joint with Jean-Pierre Dube and Puneet Manchanda)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Eugene Choo |
Tuesday, 28 October 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alessandro Lizzeri (New York University) | |
Dynamic Agency with Limited Liability: the Role of Information Revelation | |
(joint with Meg Meyer and Nicola Persico)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 4 November 2003 | 16:00–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal) | |
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets | |
(joint with Jordi Masso)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 11 November 2003 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Balazs Szentes (University of Chicago) | |
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction | |
(joint with Peter Eso)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 25 November 2003 | 16:10–15:30 |
Economic theory | |
Claudio Mezzetti (University North Carolina) | |
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations | |
Front Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 2 December 2003 | 16:00–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics/New York University) | |
Undescribable Events | |
(joint with Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 9 December 2003 | 16:00–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Silvia Martinez (University of Toronto) | |
The Gender Division of Labor under Heterogeneity and Non-random Matching | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Hao Li |
Friday, 9 January 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tomas Sjostrom (Pennsylvania State University) | |
Arms races and negotiation | |
(joint with S. Baliga)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Monday, 19 January 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Industrial organization | |
Gabor Virag (Princeton University) | |
Repeated Common Value Auctions | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 3 February 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Industrial organization | |
Jing Li (University of Wisconsin) | |
Unawareness | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Wednesday, 4 February 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Industrial organization | |
Jun Xue (Pennsylvania State University) | |
Endogenous Timing and Efficiency in Coordination Games with Incomplete Information | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Arthur J. Hosios |
Monday, 9 February 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Industrial organization | |
Navin Kartik (Stanford University) | |
Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Arthur J. Hosios |
Monday, 8 March 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Industrial organization | |
Simon A Board (Stanford University) | |
Dynamic Monopoly | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Robert McMillan |
Tuesday, 9 March 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Travis KaHo NG (University of Toronto) | |
Repeated Corruption Deals | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Wednesday, 17 March 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Industrial organization | |
Peter Norman (University of Wisconsin) | |
An efficiency rationale for bundling of public goods | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 23 March 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Hideo Konishi (Boston College) | |
Credible Group-Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems | |
(joint with M. Utku Unver)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 30 March 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tim Van Zandt (INSEAD) | |
Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities | |
(joint with Xavier Vives)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 20 April 2004 | 13:30–15:00 |
Economic theory | |
Jonathan Levin (Stanford) | |
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions | |
(joint with Susan Athey and Enrique Seira)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 14 September 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
In-Koo Cho (University of Illinois) | |
Rationalizability and monotonicity in large uniform price and double auctions | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 21 September 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Andrea Wilson (Chicago) | |
Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 28 September 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Hamid Sabourian (University of Cambridge) | |
Complexity and Competition | |
(joint with Douglas Gale)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Andreas Park |
Tuesday, 19 October 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Bart Lipman (Boston University) | |
Temptation-Driven Preferences | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Saturday, 23 October 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Rod Garratt (University College London) | |
Auctions with Resale | |
(joint with Thomas Troger)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Matthew Turner |
Tuesday, 9 November 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Seungjin Han (McMaster University) | |
Equalizing Differences and Endogenous Two-Sided Characteristic Decisions | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 16 November 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Konstantin Rybakov (University of Toronto) | |
An N-lateral Matching Model with Simultaneous Decisions | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 23 November 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Rod Garratt (UCSB) | |
Auctions with Resale | |
(joint with Thomas Troger)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Matthew Turner |
Friday, 26 November 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Lones Smith (University of Michigan) | |
The Demand for Information: More Heat than Light | |
(joint with Jussi Keppo, Giuseppe Moscarini)
|
|
Front Conference Room | Organizer: Andreas Park |
Tuesday, 30 November 2004 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yuk-fai Fong (Northwestern University) | |
Bribing to Cooperate | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Thursday, 24 February 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Antoni Calvo (Autonoma) | |
Who is Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player | |
(joint with C. Ballester and Y. Zenou)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 8 March 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Steve Cheung (University of Toronto) | |
Why some monarchs agree to establish constitutions | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 15 March 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ed Hopkins (Edinburgh) | |
Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker married to Spence | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 22 March 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Roger D. Lagunoff (Georgetown University) | |
The dynamic reform of political institutions | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 29 March 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) | |
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret | |
(joint with Karl Schlag)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 5 April 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mihkel Tombak (Rotman) | |
All firms are not created equal: Location and Price competition with cost asymmetries | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts |
Tuesday, 12 April 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Stefan Krasa (UIUC) | |
The Simple Analytics of Informed Finance | |
(joint with Dan Bernhardt)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 13 September 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jim Peck (Ohio State) | |
Dynamic Competition with Random Demand and Costless Search: A Theory of Price Posting | |
(joint with Raymond Deneckere)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 20 September 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University) | |
Vote buying | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 27 September 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marcin Peski (University of Chicago) | |
Relation Learning | |
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 4 October 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto) | |
Competing for Talents | |
(joint with Li, Hao and Wing Suen)
|
|
Coach House Conference Room | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 11 October 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Simon Board (University of Toronto) | |
Monopolistic Group Design with Peer Effects | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 18 October 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Zvika Neeman (Boston University) | |
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design | |
(joint with Heifetz)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 25 October 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) | |
Generic Uniqueness and Continuity of Rationalizable Strategies | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 1 November 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) | |
The Efficiency of Rationing and Resale | |
(joint with Ian Gale)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 8 November 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mike Peters (UBC) | |
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Directed Search | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 November 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Christoph Kuzmics (Kellogg School of Management) | |
The Evolution of Morality | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Andreas Park |
Tuesday, 22 November 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yianis Sarafidis (Yale University) | |
Inter-temporal Price Discrimination with Time-inconsistent Consumers | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 29 November 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mingxiao Ye (University of Toronto) | |
Creating Artificial Demand: Monopoly Profit Extraction | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Monday, 5 December 2005 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Dino Gerardi (Yale University) | |
TBA | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Monday, 13 February 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kim-Sau Chung (Northwestern University) | |
Loopholes | |
(joint with Lance Fortnow)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Monday, 27 February 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Peter Norman (University of British Columbia) | |
To Bundle or Not to Bundle | |
(joint with Hanming Fang)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Wednesday, 1 March 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Charles Z Zheng (Northwestern University) | |
Core Equivalence Theorem with Production | |
(joint with Siyang Xiong)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Thursday, 16 March 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tom Wiseman (University of Texas) | |
Reputation and Impermanent Types | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 21 March 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University) | |
Testing Probabilistic Theories | |
(joint with Alvaro Sandroni)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Monday, 3 April 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Lars LNesheim (UCL) | |
TBA | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Thursday, 13 April 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tracy Lewis (Duke University) | |
The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests | |
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Hao Li |
Friday, 21 April 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Larry Epstein (University of Rochester) | |
Cognitive Dissonance and Choice | |
(joint with Igor Kopylov)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Andreas Park |
Tuesday, 12 September 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Peter Eso (Northwestern University) | |
Credible Deviations from Signaling | |
(joint with James Schummer)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 19 September 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Simon Board (University of Toronto) | |
Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 26 September 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Travis KaHo Ng (University of Toronto) | |
Strategic Spitefulness: A Solution to Holdup | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 3 October 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto) | |
Seminar Postponed | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Friday, 6 October 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Hector Chade (Arizona State University) | |
Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences | |
(joint with P. Prokopovych and L. Smith)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 2128 | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Tuesday, 10 October 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
David Cooper (Case Western Reserve University) | |
An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure | |
(joint with Jordi Brandts)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Friday, 13 October 2006 | 12:30–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Silvia Martinez Gorricho (University of Toronto) | |
Quality Signals, Competition and Consumer Fraud | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 17 October 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Emre Ozdenoren (University of Michigan) | |
Durable Goods and Conformity | |
(joint with Christopher House)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 24 October 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alp Atakan (Northwestern) | |
Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search and Incomplete Information | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 31 October 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jan Eeckhout (Penn) | |
Local Supermodularity and Unique Assortative Matching | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Friday, 10 November 2006 | 12:30–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Vangelis Markakis (University of Toronto) | |
Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Microeconomics | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 14 November 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Huseyin Yildirim (Duke) | |
Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 21 November 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Elena Capatina (University of Toronto) | |
TBA | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 28 November 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Peter Coles (Harvard Business School) | |
Signaling in Matching Markets | |
(joint with Muriel Niederle)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 5 December 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Dino Gerardi (Yale University) | |
Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication | |
(joint with Roger Myerson)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Friday, 8 December 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mattias Polborn (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) | |
Majority-efficiency and competition-efficiency in a binary policy model | |
(joint with Stefan Krasa)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 12 December 2006 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong) | |
A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Media Competition | |
(joint with Jimmy Chan)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Hao Li |
Friday, 15 December 2006 | 12:30–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Toronto) | |
Competing Through Information | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Monday, 22 January 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Emel Filiz (Columbia University) | |
Incorporating Unawareness into Contract Theory (Please note different seminar room) | |
Sidney Smith, room 3130 | Organizer: Hao Li |
Thursday, 25 January 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (Sap Ag) | |
Mixed Bundling Auctions | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Friday, 26 January 2007 | 12:30–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Matthew A Mitchell (University of Iowa) | |
Market Structure and the Direction of Technological Change | |
(joint with Andy Skrzypacz )
|
|
Rotman, room 127 | Organizer: Simon Board |
Monday, 29 January 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ricardo Alonso (Northwestern University) | |
Shared Control and Strategic Communication | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Andreas Park |
Wednesday, 31 January 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ron Siegel (Stanford University) | |
All-Pay Contests | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Thursday, 1 February 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Colin B Stewart (Yale University) | |
Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 6 February 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Satoru Takahashi (Harvard University) | |
Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play* | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Monday, 12 February 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
S. Nageeb Ali (Stanford University) | |
A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting | |
(joint with Navin Kartik)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Monday, 12 March 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Xianwen Shi (Yale University) | |
Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Hao Li |
Tuesday, 20 March 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Federico Echenique (CalTech) | |
Supermodularity and Preferences | |
(joint with Chris Chambers)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 27 March 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
David Ahn (UC Berkeley) | |
Framing Contingencies | |
(joint with Haluk Ergin)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 3 April 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Lars Nesheim (UCL) | |
Nonlinear Hedonic Pricing: Finding Equilibria through Linear Programming | |
(joint with Robert McCann)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 10 April 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Maria Goltsman (UWO) | |
Mediated Cheap Talk | |
(joint with Johannes Horner, Gregory Pavlov, Francesco Squintani)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Friday, 18 May 2007 | 12:30–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Simon Board (University of Toronto) | |
Relational Contracts with On-the-Job Search | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Simon Board |
Tuesday, 18 September 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Andrea Mattozzi (Caltech) | |
'Personal influence': Social context and political competition | |
(joint with Andrea Galeotti)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 25 September 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tymofiy Mylovanov (University of Bonn) | |
Stochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: Regular Case | |
(joint with Eugen Kovac)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 2 October 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
In-Koo Cho (UIUC) | |
Perishable Durable Goods | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 9 October 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Navin Kartik (UCSD) | |
Opinions as Incentives | |
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Andreas Park |
Tuesday, 9 October 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Navin Kartik (UCSD) | |
Opinions as Incentives | |
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: |
Tuesday, 16 October 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Johannes Hrner (Kellogg School of Management) | |
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons | |
(joint with Nicolas Vieille)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Tuesday, 23 October 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Olivier Tercieux (PSE) | |
Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors | |
(joint with Daisuke Oyama)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 30 October 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Pohan Fong (Concordia University) | |
Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration | |
(joint with Daniel Diermeier)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Tuesday, 6 November 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton University) | |
Leadership, Coordination and Mission-Driven Management | |
(joint with Patrick Bolton and Laura Veldkamp)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Monday, 12 November 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Christophe Chamley (Boston University and Paris-Jourdan Sciences conomiques ) | |
Complementarities in Information Acquisition With Short-term Trades | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Tuesday, 13 November 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kunio Tsuyuhara (University of Toronto) | |
An Advice Game with Reputational and Career Concern | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Tuesday, 20 November 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jing Li (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania ) | |
Beliefs under Unawareness | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 27 November 2007 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Arvind Magesan (University of Toronto) | |
Sequential Analysis in Groups | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova |
Tuesday, 18 March 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jakub Steiner (University of Edinburgh) | |
Learning and Reversibility in Coordination Problems | |
(joint with Eugen Kovac)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 25 March 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Eduardo Faingold (Yale University) | |
Uniform Topology on Types and Strategic Convergence | |
(joint with Alfredo Di Tillio)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 1 April 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Haluk Ergin (Washington University ) | |
A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation | |
(joint with Todd Sarver)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Thursday, 17 April 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ben Polak (Yale University) | |
Mean-Dispersion Preferences | |
(joint with Simon Grant)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Friday, 12 September 2008 | 14:10–15:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University and New York University) | |
A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach | |
(joint with Jacob Glazer)
|
|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 23 September 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Fuhito Kojima (Harvard University) | |
ASYMPTOTIC EQUIVALENCE OF PROBABILISTIC SERIAL AND RANDOM PRIORITY MECHANISMS | |
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 30 September 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University) | |
Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring | |
(joint with Olivier Gossner, Johannes Horner and Kyna Fong)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 7 October 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
David Miller (UCSD) | |
Enforcing cooperation in networked societies | |
(joint with Nageeb Ali)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 14 October 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Matt Mitchell (University of Toronto) | |
Incentives and the structure of teams | |
(joint with April Franco and Galina Vereshchagina)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 21 October 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford University) | |
Beliefs and Private Monitoring | |
(joint with Chris Phelan)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 28 October 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University) | |
Robustness to incomplete information in repeated and dynamic games | |
(joint with Satoru Takahashi)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 4 November 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University) | |
Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 11 November 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
John Wooders (University of Arizona) | |
Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab | |
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 18 November 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Gregory Pavlov (UWO) | |
How to Talk to Multiple Audiences | |
(joint with Maria Goltsman)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 2 December 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Vasiliki Skreta (New York University) | |
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission | |
(joint with Mikhail Golosov (MIT), Aleh Tsyvinski (Harvard), and Andrea Wilson (NYU))
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 9 December 2008 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Axel Z Anderson (Geogetown University) | |
Durable Information Monopolist | |
(joint with Lones Smith)
|
|
Sidney Smith, room 5017A | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 10 March 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Maxim Ivanov (McMaster University) | |
Communication via a Biased Mediator | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 17 March 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Braz Camargo (University of Western Ontario) | |
CANCELLED | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 24 March 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Archishman Chakraborty (York University) | |
Clearly Biased Experts | |
(joint with Rick Harbaugh)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 31 March 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Johanna Goertz (University of Guelph) | |
On the Informational Efficiency of Simple Scoring Rules | |
(joint with Francois Maniquet)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 7 April 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marco Ottaviani (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management) | |
Intermediary Commissions and Kickbacks | |
(joint with Roman Inderst)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 21 April 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kunio Tsuyuhara (University of Toronto) | |
Repeated Moral Hazard with Worker Mobility via Directed On-the-Job Search | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 September 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mariagiovanna Baccara (New York University) | |
Similarity and Polarization in Groups | |
(joint with Leeat Yariv)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 22 September 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University) | |
Critical Types | |
(joint with Marcin Peski)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 29 September 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Limited Records and Reputation | |
(joint with Andrzej Skrzypacz)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 6 October 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Nicolas Sahuguet (HEC Montreal) | |
Audits and Tax Evasion: An Application to Labor Taxes in Italy | |
(joint with Nicola Persico and Edoardo di Porto)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 20 October 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Andreas Blume (University of Pittsburgh) | |
Language Barriers | |
(joint with Oliver Board)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 27 October 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jonathan Weinstein (Northwestern University) | |
Robustness and Higher-Order Beliefs | |
(joint with Muhamet Yildiz)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 3 November 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Willie Fuchs (UC Berkeley) | |
Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility | |
(joint with Vinicius Carrasco)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 17 November 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Xianwen Shi (University of Toronto) | |
Search, Recall and Scale: Firms in Frictional Matching Markets | |
(joint with Aloysius Siow)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 24 November 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Toronto) | |
Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Monday, 30 November 2009 | 12:30–13:30 |
Economic theory | |
Irene Valsecchi (Faculty of Statistics University of Milano - Bicocca) | |
"Repeated Cheap Talk Games of Common Interest between an Opinionated Expert and an Ignorant Decision-Maker" (A work in progress). | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 1 December 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Hanna Halaburda (Harvard Business School) | |
Limiting Choice as Strategic Differentiation | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 8 December 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Peter Achim Wagner (University of Toronto) | |
Delegated Experimentation | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 15 December 2009 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Archishman Chakraborty (York University) | |
Consensus, Control and Corporate Boards | |
(joint with Bilge Yilmaz)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 9 March 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan) | |
When Are Signals Complements or Substitutes? | |
(joint with Angel Hernando-Veciana and Daniel Krahmer)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 16 March 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marcin Peski (University of Texas at Austin) | |
Anti-folk theorems in repeated games with private rich monitoring and finite past | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 23 March 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alvin E. Roth (Harvard University) | |
Recent developments in kidney exchange | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 30 March 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kareen Rozen (Yale University) | |
Monitoring with Collective Memory | |
(joint with David Miller)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 6 April 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University) | |
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 13 April 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Eran Shmaya (Northwestern University) | |
Describable tests need not be manipulable | |
(joint with Tai-Wei Hu)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Thursday, 9 September 2010 | 12:10–13:00 |
Industrial organization/Economic theory | |
Jimmy Teng (Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica Taiwa) | |
The Bayesian Theory of Games:: A Statistical decision theoretic based analysis of strategic interactions | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Frank Mathewson and Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 21 September 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Public economics | |
Stephen Coate (Cornell University) | |
Property Taxation, Zoning and Efficiency: A Dynamic Analysis | |
Max Gluskin House, room 100 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 28 September 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (Department of Economics, UCLA) | |
The Robustness of Robust Implementation | |
(joint with Stephen Morris)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 5 October 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Stephen Morris (Princeton University) | |
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability | |
(joint with Dirk Bergemann and Satoru Takahashi)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 12 October 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ignacio Esponda (New York University) | |
Information aggregation, learning, and non-strategic behavior in voting environments | |
(joint with Demian Pouzo)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 26 October 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Charles Zheng (University of Western Ontario) | |
A bidding cooperative for the financially constrained | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 2 November 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Colin Stewart (University of Toronto) | |
Price distortions with high-frequency trading | |
(joint with Jakub Steiner)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 9 November 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tanjim Hossain (Rotman School of Management) | |
The Binarized Scoring Rule of Belief Elicitation | |
(joint with Ryo Okui)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 16 November 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin - Madison) | |
Price Inference in Small Markets | |
(joint with Marek Weretka)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 23 November 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Marcin Peski (University of Texas) | |
AXIOMATIC FOUNDATIONS OF HARSANYIíS TYPE SPACE AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS | |
(joint with Jeff Ely)
|
|
Rotman, room 142 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 30 November 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Marciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern University) | |
Recursive Vector Expected Utility | |
Rotman, room 142 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 7 December 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Adam Brandenburger (New York Universtity (STERN)) | |
Epistemic Game Theory | |
Rotman, room 142 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 14 December 2010 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Ed Green (Pennsylvania State University) | |
TBA | |
Rotman, room 142 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Wednesday, 15 December 2010 | 12:10–13:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wing Suen (The University of Hong Kong) | |
Does simple majority rule produce hasty decisions? | |
(joint with Jimmy Chan)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 100 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Friday, 14 January 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marcin Peski (UT Austin) | |
Spontaneous discrimination | |
(joint with Balazs Szentes (LSE))
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Monday, 17 January 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Willemien Kets (U.C. Irvine; Stanford;) | |
Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 18 January 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Paulo Natenzon (Princeton University) | |
Random Choice and Learning | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 1 March 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan School of Management) | |
Career Patterns and Career Concerns | |
(joint with Johannes Hörner)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 8 March 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Archishman Chakraborty (York University) | |
Elite Media and Downsian Competition | |
(joint with Parikshit Gosh)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 March 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Bart Lipman (Boston University) | |
Costly Self Control and Random Self Indulgence | |
(joint with Eddie Dekel)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 22 March 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Tai-Wei Hu (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) | |
Complexity and Mixed Strategy Equilibria | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 5 April 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) | |
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms | |
(joint with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Monday, 11 April 2011 | 15:30–16:50 |
Economic theory/Business economics | |
Simon Board (University of California, Los Angeles) | |
Revenue Management with Forward Looking Buyers | |
(joint with Andy Skrzypacz)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Matthew Mitchell |
Tuesday, 19 April 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
James Campbell (University of Toronto) | |
Signaling to a Network | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 26 April 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan) | |
TBA | |
Rotman, room 127 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Wednesday, 29 June 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ron Siegel (Northwestern University) | |
Asymmetric Contests with Interdependent Valuations and Incomplete Information | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 20 September 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marie-Luise Viero (Queen's University) | |
“Reverse Bayesianism”: A Choice-Based Theory of Growing Awareness | |
(joint with Edi Karni)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 27 September 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tymofiy Milovanov (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) | |
Irrelevant? When does the principal's private information matter? | |
(joint with Thomas Troger)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 4 October 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Amanda Friedenberg (Arizona State University) | |
Iterated Dominance Revisited | |
(joint with H. Jerome Keisler)
|
|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 11 October 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Geoffroy De Clippel (Brown University) | |
Implementation and Bounded Rationality | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 18 October 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
David Ahn (University of California at Berkeley) | |
Combinatorial Voting/The Condorcet Juries Theorem | |
(joint with Santiago Oliveros)
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|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 25 October 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Maher Said (Washington University St. Louis) | |
TBA | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 8 November 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Konrad Mierendorff (University of Zürich) | |
Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design with Deadlines | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 15 November 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mallesh M. Pai (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Subsidies, Set-asides, and Optimal Auctions: How to Support Disadvantaged Bidders in Auctions. | |
(joint with Rakesh Vohra)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 22 November 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Joe Halpern (Cornell University) | |
TBA | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 29 November 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Matias Iaryczower (Princeton University) | |
Choosing Leaders: Learning from Past Decisions in a Changing Environment | |
(joint with Andrea Mattozzi)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 6 December 2011 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Leeat Yariv (Caltech) | |
Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency | |
(joint with Matthew O. Jackson)
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|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 28 February 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mihai Manea (MIT Department of Economics) | |
Bargaining In Dynamic Markets With Multiple Populations | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 13 March 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Antonio Penta (University of Wisconsin) | |
A Robustly Efficient Auction | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 20 March 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Tomasz Sadzik (New York University) | |
Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Method | |
(joint with Ennio Stacchetti)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 3 April 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
John Quah (Oxford University) | |
Aggregating the Single Crossing Property | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 10 April 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Juuso Välimäki (Aalto School of Economics) | |
Delay and Information Aggregation in Stopping Games with Private Information | |
(joint with Pauli Murto)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 18 September 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jeroen Swinkels (Northwestern University) | |
TBA | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Gabor Virag |
Tuesday, 25 September 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Pietro Ortoleva (California Institute of Technology) | |
Allais, Ellsberg, and Preferences for Hedging | |
(joint with Mark Dean)
|
|
Rotman, room 147 | Organizer: Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 9 October 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London) | |
Competitive Framing | |
Rotman, room 147 | Organizer: Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 16 October 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
SangMok Lee (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Incentive Combatibility Of Large Centralized Matching Markets | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 23 October 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Johannes Horner (Yale University) | |
Recursive methods in dynamic Bayesian games | |
(joint with S. Takahashi and N. Vieille)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 30 October 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania) | |
CANCELLED [due to Hurricane Sandy] | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 6 November 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marco Battaglini (Princeton University) | |
Optimal Dynamic Contracting | |
(joint with Rohit Lamba)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 20 November 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Myrna H Wooders (Vanderbilt University) | |
Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game | |
(joint with Parkash Chander)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik |
Tuesday, 27 November 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Peter Achim Wagner (University of Toronto) | |
Learning from strangers: Public experimentation and signalling | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Martin J. Osborne and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 4 December 2012 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Debraj Ray (New York University) | |
Poverty and self control | |
(joint with B. Douglas Bernheim, Sevin Yeltekin)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Monday, 14 January 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Terri Kneeland (University of British Columbia) | |
Rationality and Consistent Beliefs: Theory and Experimental Evidence | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Wednesday, 16 January 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
David Freeman (University of British Columbia) | |
Revealed Preference Foundations of Expectations-Based Reference-Dependence | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 5 March 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Stable matching with incomplete information | |
(joint with Qingmin Liu, Andrew Postlewaite, and Larry Samuelson)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 12 March 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Andres Carvajal (Department of Economics, Western) | |
Arbitrage Pricing in Noncompetitive Markets (Email Rahul for a preliminary copy of the paper) | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 19 March 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Juuso Toikka (MIT) | |
Mechanisms for Repeated Bargaining | |
(joint with Andrzej Skrzypacz)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 2 April 2013 | 15:00–16:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) | |
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures | |
(joint with Stephen Morris)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 17 September 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Philipp Strack (University of Bonn) | |
Optimal Stopping with Private Information | |
(joint with Thomas Kruse)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 24 September 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University) | |
Non-Bayesian Rationality (two papers) | |
(joint with John Hillas)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 1 October 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mehmet Ekmekci (University of Pittsburgh) | |
Information in tender offers with a large shareholder | |
(joint with Nenad Kos)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 8 October 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wing Suen (The University of Hong Kong) | |
Multi-sender disclosure of verifiable information. | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 October 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Antonio Penta (University of Wisconsin - Madison) | |
Strategic Thinking and Value of Reasoning: Theory and Applications to Five Little Treasures of Game Theory | |
(joint with Larbi Alaoui)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 22 October 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Alexey Kushnir (University of Zurich) | |
A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 29 October 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University) | |
Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 5 November 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University) | |
Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture | |
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac, Ettore Damiano, and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 19 November 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Roberto Serrano (Brown University) | |
The Appeal of Information Transactions | |
(joint with Antonio Cabrales and Olivier Gossner)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Gabor Virag |
Tuesday, 26 November 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Rohan Dutta (McGill University) | |
Inferring Rationales from Choice: Identification for Rational Shortlist Methods | |
(joint with Sean Horan)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 3 December 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Takuo Sugaya (Stanford GSB) | |
TBA | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 10 December 2013 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Philip Reny (University of Chicago) | |
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games | |
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 4 February 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ryan Webb (New York University) | |
Rationalizing Context-Dependent Preferences: Divisive Normalization and Neurobiological Constraints | |
(joint with Paul W. Glimcher (NYU) and Kenway Louie (NYU))
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Victor Aguirregabiria |
Tuesday, 25 February 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University and New York University) | |
Complex Questionnaires | |
(joint with Jacob Glazer)
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|
Rotman, room LL1030 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 4 March 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Daniel Quint (University of Wisconsin) | |
Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry | |
(joint with Ken Hendricks)
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|
Rotman, room 127 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 11 March 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Filip Matějka (CERGE-EI) | |
Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices: A New Foundation for the Multinomial Logit Model | |
(joint with Alisdair McKay)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Jordi Mondria |
Wednesday, 19 March 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Alexander Wolitzky (Stanford University) | |
Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application to Bilateral Trade | |
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 25 March 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jidong Zhou (NYU Stern) | |
Competitive Bundling | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 1 April 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Balazs Szentes (London School of Economics) | |
Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 30 September 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Lixin Ye (Ohio State University) | |
Competitive Nonlinear Income Taxation Revisited | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 7 October 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Mark Dean (Brown University) | |
Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition | |
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb |
Tuesday, 14 October 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Eran Shmaya (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University) | |
Learning and Fundamentals in a Stationary Environment | |
(joint with Nabil Al-Najjar)
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|
Rotman, room LL1065 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 21 October 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University) | |
Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sampling | |
(joint with Drew Fudenberg and Philipp Strack)
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|
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb |
Tuesday, 28 October 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT) | |
Monitoring in Strategic Experimentation | |
(joint with Johannes Horner)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 4 November 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Christopher Cotton (Queen's University) | |
Financial exaggeration and the allocation of capital | |
(joint with Raphael Boleslavsky and Bruce Carlin)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 11 November 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Deniz Dizdar (University of Montreal) | |
Efficient matching under incomplete information: on uniform sharing rules and on bidding equilibria | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Xianwen Shi and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 25 November 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kota Saito (California Institute of Technology) | |
Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations | |
(joint with Federico Echenique and Taisuke Imai)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 2 December 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ming Yang (Duke University) | |
Security Design in a Production Economy with Flexible Information Acquisition | |
(joint with Yao Zeng)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 16 December 2014 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yiyang Wu (University of Toronto) | |
Mechanism Design with Stopping Problems | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 3 March 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Songzi Du (Simon Fraser University) | |
Rigidity of Transfers and Unraveling in Matching Markets | |
(joint with Yair Livne)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1065 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 10 March 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Joyee Deb (Yale University) | |
Reputation and Attention | |
(joint with Heski Bar-Isaac)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1065 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 17 March 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Gonzalo Cisternas (MIT) | |
Two-sided learning and moral hazard | |
Rotman, room LL1025 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 24 March 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
|
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money | |
(joint with Johannes Horner)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 31 March 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Macroeconomics/Economic theory | |
Philipp Kircher (University of Edinburgh) | |
Assortative Matching with Large Firms: Span of Control over More versus Better Workers | |
(joint with Jan Eeckhout)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ronald Wolthoff |
Tuesday, 7 April 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alex Frankel (Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago) | |
Muddled Information | |
(joint with Navin Kartik)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 15 September 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Tai-Wei Hu (Northwestern University) | |
Learnability in Simple and Complex Environments | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 22 September 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Helios Herrera (HEC, Montreal) | |
The Marginal Voter's Curse | |
(joint with Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Joseph McMurray)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 6 October 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
|
TBA | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 13 October 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University) | |
Search Design and Broad Matching | |
(joint with Ran Spiegler)
|
|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 20 October 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Fei Li (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) | |
Discriminatory Persuasion: How to Convince Voters | |
(joint with Jimmy Chan, Yun Yang)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 27 October 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Huseyin Yildirim (Duke University) | |
TBA | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Colin Stewart and Gabor Virag |
Tuesday, 3 November 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Yingni Guo (Northwestern University) | |
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money | |
(joint with Johannes Horner)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 17 November 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Sean Horan (University of Montreal) | |
Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 24 November 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University) | |
Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 1 December 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Yuval Salant (Northwestern University) | |
Statistical Inference in Games | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb |
Tuesday, 8 December 2015 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Marek Pycia (UCLA) | |
Allocation without Transfers: Ordinal and Cardinal Mechanisms | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Friday, 26 February 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Empirical microeconomics | |
Yoram Halevy (University of British Columbia) | |
Parametric Recovery Methods: A Comparative Experimental Study | |
(joint with Lanny Zrill)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 1 March 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Nageeb Ali (Pennsylvania State University) | |
Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining | |
(joint with Doug Bernheim and Xiaochen Fan)
|
|
Rotman, room 151 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 8 March 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin) | |
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Wednesday, 16 March 2016 | 14:10–15:00 |
Economic theory/Econometrics | |
Alfred Galichon (New York University) | |
Topics in Equilibrium Transportation | |
Fields Institute (222 College Street) | Organizers: Ismael Mourifié and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 22 March 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Waterloo) | |
The Demand and Supply for Favours in Dynamic Relationships | |
(joint with Jan Zapal)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 29 March 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples | |
(joint with Thanh Nguyen)
|
|
Rotman, room LL1065 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 5 April 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University) | |
Common Value Auction with state Dependent Participation | |
Rotman, room LL1065 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 19 April 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Juan Dubra (Universidad de Montevideo) | |
A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization | |
(joint with Jean-Pierre Benoît)
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|
Rotman, room 142 | Organizers: Matthew Mitchell and Colin Stewart |
Thursday, 26 May 2016 | 12:10–13:10 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Laurent Lamy (Paris School of Economics) | |
On the benefits of set-asides | |
(joint with Philippe Jehiel)
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|
Rotman, room 570 | Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 13 September 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Annie Liang (Microsoft Research) | |
Games of Incomplete Information Played by Statisticians | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 20 September 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Doron Ravid (University of Chicago) | |
Bargaining with Rational Inattention | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 27 September 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Ignacio Esponda (Washington University in St. Louis) | |
Equilibrium in Misspecified Markov Decision Processes | |
(joint with Demian Pouzo)
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|
Rotman, room LL1010 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 4 October 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Juan Ortner (Boston University) | |
Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion and Crime | |
(joint with Sylvain Chassang)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 11 October 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Edward J. Green (Pennsylvania State University) | |
A parsimonious theory of evidence-based choice | |
(joint with Fatemeh Borhani)
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|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizer: Martin J. Osborne |
Tuesday, 18 October 2016 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
|
|
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 25 October 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Marina Halac (Columbia University) | |
Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification | |
(joint with Pierre Yared)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Ettore Damiano |
Tuesday, 1 November 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Andrew Caplin (New York University) | |
Rationally Inattentive Behavior: Characterizing and Generalizing Shannon Entropy | |
(joint with Mark Dean and John Leahy)
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|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb |
Tuesday, 8 November 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) | |
Optimal Sequential Decisions with Limited Attention | |
(joint with Konrad Mierendorff)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 15 November 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Sergei Severinov (University of British Columbia) | |
Optimal Mechanism with Budget Constraint Bidders | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizer: Gabor Virag |
Tuesday, 22 November 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology) | |
On Multiple Discount Rates | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 6 December 2016 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Laura Doval (Yale University) | |
Whether or not to open Pandora's box | |
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 7 March 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Victor Aguiar (University of Western Ontario) | |
Stochastic Dynamic Revealed Preferences for Non-linear Budget Constraints | |
(joint with Nail Kashaev)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 14 March 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Navin Kartik (Columbia University) | |
Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions | |
(joint with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport)
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|
Rotman, room 157 | Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 21 March 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Luciano Pomatto (California Institute of Technology) | |
Testable Forecasts | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 28 March 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory | |
Burkhard Schipper (University of California, Davis) | |
Self-Confirming Games: Unawareness, Discovery, and Equilibrium | |
Rotman, room LL1065 | Organizer: Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 4 April 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Ennio Stacchetti (New York University) | |
Reputation and Information Design | |
(joint with Laurent Mathevet and David Pearce)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 11 April 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Shengwu Li (Havard University) | |
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 19 September 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford Graduate School of Business) | |
Credible Mechanism Design | |
(joint with Shengwu Li)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 3 October 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Phil Reny (University of Chicago) | |
Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Byung Soo Lee |
Tuesday, 10 October 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Ben Brooks (University of Chicago) | |
Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach | |
(joint with Songzi Du)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 17 October 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Luis Rayo (University of Utah) | |
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship | |
(joint with Drew Fudenberg)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 24 October 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Caroline Thomas (University of Texas at Austin) | |
The Design of Credit Information Systems | |
(joint with V Bhaskar)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 31 October 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Tibor Heumann (HEC Montréal) | |
An Ascending Auction with Multidimensional Signals | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 14 November 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Dotan Persitz (Tel Aviv University) | |
Social Clubs and Social Networks | |
(joint with Chaim Fershtman)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Yoram Halevy |
Tuesday, 28 November 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Michigan) | |
Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration | |
(joint with Yingni Guo)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 5 December 2017 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Ying Chen (Johns Hopkins University) | |
When to Ask for an Update — Timing in Strategic Communication | |
(joint with Atara Oliver)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Friday, 9 February 2018 | 16:10–17:30 |
Business economics/Economic theory | |
Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Bounded Rationality and Learning: A Learning Framework and a Robustness Result | |
(joint with Daniel N. Hauser)
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|
Rotman, room 127 | Organizers: Matthew Mitchell and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 6 March 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Larry Samuelson (Yale University) | |
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 13 March 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
David Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania) | |
Additive-Belief-Based Preferences | |
(joint with Collin Raymond)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Yoram Halevy |
Tuesday, 27 March 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Nicolas Klein (University of Montreal) | |
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games | |
(joint with Johannes Hörner and Sven Rady)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 3 April 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Juuso Toikka (MIT) | |
Robust Incentives for Teams | |
(joint with Tianjiao Dai (MIT))
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 11 September 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford GSB) | |
Test Design and Minimum Standards | |
(joint with Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 25 September 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn) | |
Bargaining and Competition in Thin Markets | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 2 October 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago) | |
Quantifying information and uncertainty | |
(joint with Alexander Frankel)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 9 October 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
|
Behavioral Influence | |
(joint with C. P. Chambers and T. Cuhadaroglu)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 16 October 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
|
|
Belief Meddling in Social Networks: An Information-Design Approach | |
(joint with Jacopo Perogo)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 30 October 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Sofia Moroni (University of Pittsburg) | |
Multi-dimensional communication with limited commitment | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 13 November 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University) | |
Competing Models | |
(joint with Jose Montiel Olea, Mallesh Pai, Andrea Prat)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 27 November 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Huilan Xu (University of Toronto) | |
The Direction of Experimentation | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 4 December 2018 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Mike Peters (University of British Columbia) | |
Unobserved Mechanisms | |
(joint with Hao Li)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Xianwen Shi and Gabor Virag |
Monday, 28 January 2019 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kevin He (Harvard University) | |
Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler’s Fallacy in Optimal-Stopping Problems | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Wednesday, 30 January 2019 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Julia Salmi (Aalto University) | |
Endogenous Learning from Incremental Actions | |
(joint with Tuomas Laiho and Pauli Murto)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Colin Stewart |
Tuesday, 5 February 2019 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Michigan) | |
Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information | |
(joint with Doron Ravid, Balazs Szentes)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 26 February 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Yusufcan Masatlioglu (University of Maryland) | |
Behavioral Influence | |
(joint with Christopher P. Chambers and Tugce Cuhadaroglu)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 5 March 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ron Siegel (Penn State University) | |
Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation | |
(joint with Nima Haghpanah)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 19 March 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Miguel Ballester (University of Oxford) | |
Multi-parametric random utility models for the joint treatment of risk and time preferences | |
(joint with Jose Apestiguia, Angelo Gutierrez)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 26 March 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Harry Di Pei (Northwestern) | |
Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Tuesday, 2 April 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Chiara Margaria (Boston University) | |
Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff: Intra-household Earning Distribution and Marriage Durability | |
(joint with Andrew Newman)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Monday, 13 May 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency | |
Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University) | |
Proportional Allocation across Fields, Demand Relativity, and Benchmarking | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizer: Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 17 September 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) | |
Evaluating Ambiguous Random Variables and Updating by Proxy | |
(joint with Faruk Gul)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 24 September 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University) | |
Utility Happens | |
(joint with Matthew Rabin, Sarah Ridout)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 1 October 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Joao Ramos (USC Marshall) | |
Partnership with Persistence | |
(joint with Tomasz Sadzik)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 8 October 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Mira Frick (Yale University) | |
Stability and Robustness in Misspecified Learning Models | |
(joint with Ryota Iijima and Yuhta Ishii)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 15 October 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
|
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 22 October 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
|
The Cost of Information | |
(joint with Luciano Pomatto and Omer Tamuz)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 29 October 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Weijie Zhong (Yale University and Stanford University) | |
Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Wednesday, 20 November 2019 | 12:10–13:30 |
Economic theory/Political economy | |
Marco Battaglini (Cornell University) | |
Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Gustavo Bobonis and Yoram Halevy |
Tuesday, 26 November 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Attila Ambrus (Duke University) | |
Investments in social ties, risk sharing and inequality | |
(joint with Matt Elliott)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 3 December 2019 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Zhou Zhen (Tsinghua University) | |
Timely Persuasion | |
(joint with Deepal Basak)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Friday, 17 January 2020 | 16:10–17:30 |
Economic theory | |
Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University) | |
Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Gustavo Bobonis and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 25 February 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Leeat Yariv (Princeton University) | |
Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities | |
(joint with Evgenii Safonov and Pietro Ortoleva)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 10 March 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Philipp Strack (Yale University) | |
The Cost of Information | |
(joint with Luciano Pomatto and Omer Tamuz)
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|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 24 March 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
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An Evolutionary Perspective on Updating Risk and Ambiguity Preferences | |
(joint with Todd Sarver)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi |
Tuesday, 15 September 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and UCL) | |
Cheating with (recursive) models | |
(joint with Kfir Eliaz and Yair Weiss)
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|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 29 September 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Martin Cripps (University College London) | |
Divisible updating | |
Online | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 6 October 2020 | 10:10–11:30 |
Economic theory | |
Debasis Mishra (ISI, Delhi) | |
Selling two identical objects | |
(joint with Sushil Bikhchandani)
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|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 13 October 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Erik Eyster (UC Santa Barbara) | |
Non-Common Priors, Private Information and Trade | |
(joint with Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch, Matthew Rabin)
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|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 20 October 2020 | 10:10–11:30 |
Economic theory | |
Philipp Sadowski (Duke) | |
An Evolutionary Perspective on Updating Risk and Ambiguity Preferences | |
(joint with Todd Sarver)
|
|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 27 October 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
|
|
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Yoram Halevy |
Tuesday, 27 October 2020 | 12:40–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn) | |
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice | |
(joint with Andreas Kleiner)
|
|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 3 November 2020 | 10:10–11:30 |
Economic theory | |
Sven Rady (University of Bonn) | |
Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games | |
(joint with Johannes Horner and Nicolas Klein)
|
|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 17 November 2020 | 10:10–11:30 |
Economic theory | |
Nina Bobkova (Rice University) | |
Diversity and Evidence in Minipublics | |
(joint with Arjada Bardhi)
|
|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 24 November 2020 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Thomas Tröger (University of Mannheim) | |
Optimal testing and social distancing of individuals with private health signals | |
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 1 December 2020 | 10:10–11:30 |
Economic theory | |
Satoru Takahashi (National University of Singapore) | |
Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games | |
Online | Organizer: Marcin Pęski |
Tuesday, 2 March 2021 | 12:40–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Alexander M. Jakobsen (University of Calgary) | |
Coarse Bayesian Updating | |
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 16 March 2021 | 12:40–14:00 |
Economic theory | |
Shaowei Ke (University of Michigan) | |
Learning from a Black Box | |
(joint with Chen Zhao (University of Hong Kong), Brian Wu (Michigan Ross))
|
|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 30 March 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Chen Zhao (University of Hong Kong) | |
Behavioral Neural Networks | |
(joint with Shaowei Ke, Zhaoran Wang and Sung-lin Hsieh)
|
|
Online | Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 5 October 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Paula Onuchic (Oxford University) | |
Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects | |
Online | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 12 October 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Gustavo Manso (Berkeley Haas) | |
Recommendations with Feedback | |
Online | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 19 October 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Joyee Deb (Yale SOM) | |
Aiming for the Goal: Pricing and Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding | |
(joint with Aniko Öry and Kevin Williams)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 26 October 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ben Golub (Northwestern University) | |
Supply Network Formation and Fragility | |
(joint with Matthew Elliott, Matthew V. Leduc)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 2 November 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Jidong Zhou (Yale SOM) | |
Personalized Pricing and Privacy Choice | |
(joint with Andrew Rhodes)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 16 November 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Ruizhi Zhu (University of Toronto) | |
Bargaining with Learning of a Varying Type | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 23 November 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Xiaosheng Mu (Princeton University) | |
Monotone Additive Statistics | |
(joint with Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz)
|
|
Online | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 30 November 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Luciano Pomatto (California Institute of Technology) | |
Background Risk and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion | |
(joint with Xiaosheng Mu, Philipp Strack, and Omer Tamuz)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 7 December 2021 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University, W.P. Carey School of Business) | |
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information | |
(joint with S. Nageeb Ali and Navin Kartik)
|
|
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 18 January 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Modibo Camara (Northwestern University) | |
Computationally Tractable Choice | |
Online | Organizer: Rahul Deb |
Friday, 21 January 2022 | 10:10–11:30 |
Financial economics/Economic theory | |
Ji Hee Yoon (Wisconsin/UCL) | |
Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Synthetic Products vs. Trading Technology | |
(joint with Marzena Rostek)
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Online | Organizer: Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 1 March 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Amanda Friedenberg (University of Arizona) | |
Two Approaches to Iterated Reasoning in Games | |
(joint with Adam Brandenburger and Terri Kneeland)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 15 March 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
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TBD | |
Online | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 22 March 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Roland Strausz (HU Berlin) | |
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence | |
(joint with Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 29 March 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
John Quah (Johns Hopkins and National University of Singapore) | |
Comparative statics with linear objectives: normal demand, monotone marginal costs, and ranking multi-prior beliefs | |
(joint with Pawel Dziewulski)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 5 April 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Matt Weinberg (Princeton University) | |
Survey of Mechanism Design challenges in Cryptocurrencies | |
Online | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 12 April 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Wei Li (UBC) | |
Strategic Influencer of Naïve Agents | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Wednesday, 13 April 2022 | 12:10–13:30 |
Economic theory | |
Hao Li (UBC) | |
Unobserved Mechanism Design: Targeted Offers | |
(joint with Mike Peters)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 20 September 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Alex Smolin (TSE (Toulouse School of Economics)) | |
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 27 September 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory/Macroeconomics | |
Jan Eeckhout (UPF Barcelona) | |
Are Managers Paid for Market Power? | |
(joint with Renjie Bao and Jan de Loecker)
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Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb, Anne-Katrin Roesler, and Ronald Wolthoff |
Tuesday, 18 October 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Tommaso Denti (Cornell University) | |
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 25 October 2022 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Dirk Bergemann (Yale) | |
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 14 March 2023 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Kareen Rozen (Brown University) | |
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |
Tuesday, 21 March 2023 | 11:10–12:30 |
Economic theory | |
Omer Tamuz (Caltech) | |
TBD | |
Max Gluskin House, room 106 | Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler |