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All seminars in Economic theory

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Tuesday, 2 October 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
John Morgan (University of Toronto)
An Analysis of Stock Recommendations
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Thursday, 11 October 2001 16:10–17:30
Macroeconomics/Economic theory
Francisco Gonzalez (University of British Columbia)
Asymmetric Labor Adjustment, Organizational Capital, and Aggregate Job Flows (with A. Johri)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Diego Restuccia
 
Tuesday, 16 October 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marcel Boyer (Universite de Montreal)
Organizational Inertia and Dynamic Incentives
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 30 October 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Francesco Squintani (University of Rochester)
Verifiability, Generalized Information Correspondences, and Optimal Contracts
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Wednesday, 7 November 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yianis Sarafidis (INSEAD)
CANCELLED
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Thursday, 8 November 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Peter Marbach (University of Toronto)
Pricing in Peer to Peer Networks
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Michael Peters
 
Tuesday, 13 November 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Wouter Dessein (University of Chicago GSB)
Authority and Communications in Organizations
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Monday, 19 November 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Dino Gerardi (Yale University)
Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 20 November 2001 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Diego Puga (University of Toronto)
Knowledge creation and control in organizations
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Nadia Soboleva
 
Tuesday, 27 November 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Aldo Rustichini (Minnesota)
TBA
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Wednesday, 28 November 2001 16:00–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Rob Clark (University of Western Ontario)
Advertising and Coordination in Markets with Consumption Scale Effects (joint with Ig Horstmann)
Rotman, room 142 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Tuesday, 4 December 2001 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marco Battaglini (Princeton)
Self control in peer groups
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 5 March 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jim Schummer (Northwestern)
An Ascending Auction for Heterogeneous Objects
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 12 March 2002 16:10–17:30
Macroeconomics/Economic theory
Shouyong Shi (Indiana)
Friedman Meets Hosios: Efficiency in Search Models of Money
(joint with Alexander Berentsen and Guillaume Rocheteau)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Arthur J. Hosios
 
Tuesday, 16 April 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
(visiting Harvard)
Self-perpetuation of Biased Beliefs
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 30 April 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Nadia Soboleva (University of Toronto)
International trade and capital markets: entry, exit and selection of firms
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 7 May 2002 3:10– 4:30
Economic theory
Muriel Niederle (Harvard)
Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Friday, 10 May 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Chang-tai Hsieh (Princeton University)
When Schools Compete, How Do They Compete: An Assessment of Chile's Nationwide School Voucher Program
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Dwayne Benjamin
 
Tuesday, 14 May 2002 4:10– 5:30
Economic theory
Seungjin Han (Toronto)
Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 1 October 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern University)
Expected Utility with Multiple (Individually) Unique Priors
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Friday, 4 October 2002 1:30– 3:00
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Peter Zemsky (INSEAD)
Strategy Dynamics through a Demand-Based Lens: The evolution of market boundaries, resource rents and competitive positions
Rotman, room 147 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Tuesday, 8 October 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Bradley Ruffle (Ben-Gurion University)
Does Religious Ritual Promote Cooperation? Field Experiments on Israeli Religious and Secular Kibbutzim
(joint with Richard Sosios)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 October 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Seungjin Han (University of Toronto)
Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 22 October 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Levent Kockesen (Columbia University)
Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 29 October 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
Monopoly with Resale
(joint with Giacomo Calzolari)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 5 November 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ilya Segal (Stanford University)
The Communication Complexity of Efficient Allocation Problems
(joint with Noam Nisan)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Friday, 8 November 2002 12:30–14:00
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Scott Stern (Northwestern)
Climbing Atop the Shoulders of Giants: the Economics of Cumulative Knowledge Hubs
Rotman, room 157 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Tuesday, 12 November 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Xiaodong Zhu (University of Toronto)
Sharing Catastrophe Risk under Model Uncertainty
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 12 November 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
CANCELED
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 19 November 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Development economics
Nathan Nunn (University of Toronto)
Renk seeking, underdevelopment, and colonialism
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Wednesday, 20 November 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Roger Lagunof (Georgetown University)
On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation
(joint with Matt Haag)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 26 November 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University)
When is Reputation Bad?
(joint with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 3 December 2002 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jim Bergin (Queen's University)
Optimal Monopolistic Selling Procedures with Uniform Pricing
(joint with Lin Zhou)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 4 March 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Sergei Izmalkov (MIT)
Multi-unit open ascending price efficient auction
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 11 March 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Srihari Govindan (UWO)
Stable Outcomes in Outside Option Games and Signalling Games
(joint with Robert Wilson)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 18 March 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Sergei Severinov (Duke University)
Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude?
(joint with Raymond Deneckere)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Wednesday, 19 March 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Daniel Sturm (University of Munich)
Term limits and electoral accountability
(joint with Michael Smart)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 25 March 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Rene Kirkegaard (University of Aarhus)
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand
(joint with Per Baltzer Overgaard)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 1 April 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Arthur Robson (UWO)
Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views
(joint with Phil Reny)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Thursday, 3 April 2003 0:00– 6:15
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Ed Leamer (UCLA)
Episodic Forecasting of the US Economy: What Episode Now?
Rotman, room 134 Organizer: Frank Mathewson
 
Tuesday, 8 April 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mattias Polborn (UWO)
Robust Political Equilibria under Plurality and Runoff Rule
(joint with Matthias Messner)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 April 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Atsu Amegashie (University of Guelph)
A Theory of Bargaining Deals: Quantity Bonus as an Example
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 22 April 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Konstantin Rybakov (University of Toronto)
Equilibrium flows of buyers to markets: sequential strategy iteration and properties of the surplus functional
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 29 April 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jonathan Levin (Stanford University)
POSTPONED to MAY 6
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Wednesday, 30 April 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Markus Mobius (Harvard University)
CANCELED
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Thursday, 1 May 2003 14:10–15:30
Economic theory
Kim-Sau Chung (Northwestern)
On the Bayesian foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 6 May 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jonathan Levin (Stanford University)
CANCELED
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Monday, 8 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Will Strange (University of Toronto)
Agglomeration, Opportunism and the Organization of Production
Rotman, room 133 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Monday, 15 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Mihkel Tombak (University of Toronto)
Marketing of Innovations: Discrimination vs. Bargaining Power
Rotman, room 133 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Monday, 22 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Mark Israel (Northwestern)
Consumer Learning About Established Firms: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Johannes Van Biesebroeck
 
Tuesday, 23 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Charles Zheng (Northwestern)
Optimal search auctions
(joint with Jacques Cremer and Yossef Spiegel)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Friday, 26 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Luis Garicano (Chicago GSB)
Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy
Rotman, room 151 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Monday, 29 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Thomas Hubbard (Chicago GSB)
Hierarchies and the Organization of Specialization
(joint with Luis Garicano)
Rotman, room 133 Organizer: Ignatius Horstmann
 
Tuesday, 30 September 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto)
First in Village or Second in Rome?
(joint with Li, Hao and Wing Suen)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 14 October 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jimmy Chan (Johns Hopkins University)
Admission Impossible? Self Interest and Affirmative Action
(joint with Erik Eyster)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 21 October 2003 16:00–17:30
Economic theory
Debraj Ray (New York University)
Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement
(joint with Kfir Eliaz, Ronny Razin)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Monday, 27 October 2003 16:10–17:30
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Gunter Hitsch (Chicago GSB)
An Empirical Model of Advertising Dynamics
(joint with Jean-Pierre Dube and Puneet Manchanda)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Eugene Choo
 
Tuesday, 28 October 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alessandro Lizzeri (New York University)
Dynamic Agency with Limited Liability: the Role of Information Revelation
(joint with Meg Meyer and Nicola Persico)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 4 November 2003 16:00–17:30
Economic theory
Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal)
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets
(joint with Jordi Masso)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 11 November 2003 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Balazs Szentes (University of Chicago)
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
(joint with Peter Eso)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 25 November 2003 16:10–15:30
Economic theory
Claudio Mezzetti (University North Carolina)
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations
Front Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 2 December 2003 16:00–17:30
Economic theory
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics/New York University)
Undescribable Events
(joint with Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 9 December 2003 16:00–17:30
Economic theory
Silvia Martinez (University of Toronto)
The Gender Division of Labor under Heterogeneity and Non-random Matching
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Hao Li
 
Friday, 9 January 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tomas Sjostrom (Pennsylvania State University)
Arms races and negotiation
(joint with S. Baliga)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Monday, 19 January 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Industrial organization
Gabor Virag (Princeton University)
Repeated Common Value Auctions
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 3 February 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Industrial organization
Jing Li (University of Wisconsin)
Unawareness
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Wednesday, 4 February 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Industrial organization
Jun Xue (Pennsylvania State University)
Endogenous Timing and Efficiency in Coordination Games with Incomplete Information
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Arthur J. Hosios
 
Monday, 9 February 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Industrial organization
Navin Kartik (Stanford University)
Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Arthur J. Hosios
 
Monday, 8 March 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Industrial organization
Simon A Board (Stanford University)
Dynamic Monopoly
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Robert McMillan
 
Tuesday, 9 March 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Travis KaHo NG (University of Toronto)
Repeated Corruption Deals
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Wednesday, 17 March 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Industrial organization
Peter Norman (University of Wisconsin)
An efficiency rationale for bundling of public goods
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 23 March 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Hideo Konishi (Boston College)
Credible Group-Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
(joint with M. Utku Unver)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 30 March 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tim Van Zandt (INSEAD)
Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
(joint with Xavier Vives)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 20 April 2004 13:30–15:00
Economic theory
Jonathan Levin (Stanford)
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions
(joint with Susan Athey and Enrique Seira)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 14 September 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
In-Koo Cho (University of Illinois)
Rationalizability and monotonicity in large uniform price and double auctions
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 21 September 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Andrea Wilson (Chicago)
Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 28 September 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Hamid Sabourian (University of Cambridge)
Complexity and Competition
(joint with Douglas Gale)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Andreas Park
 
Tuesday, 19 October 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Bart Lipman (Boston University)
Temptation-Driven Preferences
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Saturday, 23 October 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Rod Garratt (University College London)
Auctions with Resale
(joint with Thomas Troger)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Matthew Turner
 
Tuesday, 9 November 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Seungjin Han (McMaster University)
Equalizing Differences and Endogenous Two-Sided Characteristic Decisions
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 16 November 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Konstantin Rybakov (University of Toronto)
An N-lateral Matching Model with Simultaneous Decisions
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 23 November 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Rod Garratt (UCSB)
Auctions with Resale
(joint with Thomas Troger)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Matthew Turner
 
Friday, 26 November 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Lones Smith (University of Michigan)
The Demand for Information: More Heat than Light
(joint with Jussi Keppo, Giuseppe Moscarini)
Front Conference Room Organizer: Andreas Park
 
Tuesday, 30 November 2004 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yuk-fai Fong (Northwestern University)
Bribing to Cooperate
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Thursday, 24 February 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Antoni Calvo (Autonoma)
Who is Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
(joint with C. Ballester and Y. Zenou)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 8 March 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Steve Cheung (University of Toronto)
Why some monarchs agree to establish constitutions
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 15 March 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ed Hopkins (Edinburgh)
Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker married to Spence
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 22 March 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Roger D. Lagunoff (Georgetown University)
The dynamic reform of political institutions
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 29 March 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret
(joint with Karl Schlag)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 5 April 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mihkel Tombak (Rotman)
All firms are not created equal: Location and Price competition with cost asymmetries
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Joanne K. Roberts
 
Tuesday, 12 April 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Stefan Krasa (UIUC)
The Simple Analytics of Informed Finance
(joint with Dan Bernhardt)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 13 September 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jim Peck (Ohio State)
Dynamic Competition with Random Demand and Costless Search: A Theory of Price Posting
(joint with Raymond Deneckere)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 20 September 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)
Vote buying
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 27 September 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marcin Peski (University of Chicago)
Relation Learning
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 4 October 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto)
Competing for Talents
(joint with Li, Hao and Wing Suen)
Coach House Conference Room Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 11 October 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Simon Board (University of Toronto)
Monopolistic Group Design with Peer Effects
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 18 October 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Zvika Neeman (Boston University)
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
(joint with Heifetz)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 25 October 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Muhamet Yildiz (MIT)
Generic Uniqueness and Continuity of Rationalizable Strategies
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 1 November 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
The Efficiency of Rationing and Resale
(joint with Ian Gale)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 8 November 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mike Peters (UBC)
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Directed Search
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 November 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Christoph Kuzmics (Kellogg School of Management)
The Evolution of Morality
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Andreas Park
 
Tuesday, 22 November 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yianis Sarafidis (Yale University)
Inter-temporal Price Discrimination with Time-inconsistent Consumers
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 29 November 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mingxiao Ye (University of Toronto)
Creating Artificial Demand: Monopoly Profit Extraction
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Monday, 5 December 2005 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Dino Gerardi (Yale University)
TBA
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Monday, 13 February 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Kim-Sau Chung (Northwestern University)
Loopholes
(joint with Lance Fortnow)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Monday, 27 February 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Peter Norman (University of British Columbia)
To Bundle or Not to Bundle
(joint with Hanming Fang)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Wednesday, 1 March 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Charles Z Zheng (Northwestern University)
Core Equivalence Theorem with Production
(joint with Siyang Xiong)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Thursday, 16 March 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tom Wiseman (University of Texas)
Reputation and Impermanent Types
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 21 March 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University)
Testing Probabilistic Theories
(joint with Alvaro Sandroni)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Monday, 3 April 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Lars LNesheim (UCL)
TBA
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Thursday, 13 April 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tracy Lewis (Duke University)
The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Hao Li
 
Friday, 21 April 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Larry Epstein (University of Rochester)
Cognitive Dissonance and Choice
(joint with Igor Kopylov)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Andreas Park
 
Tuesday, 12 September 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Peter Eso (Northwestern University)
Credible Deviations from Signaling
(joint with James Schummer)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 19 September 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Simon Board (University of Toronto)
Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 26 September 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Travis KaHo Ng (University of Toronto)
Strategic Spitefulness: A Solution to Holdup
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 3 October 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto)
Seminar Postponed
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Friday, 6 October 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Hector Chade (Arizona State University)
Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences
(joint with P. Prokopovych and L. Smith)
Sidney Smith, room 2128 Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Tuesday, 10 October 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
David Cooper (Case Western Reserve University)
An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure
(joint with Jordi Brandts)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Friday, 13 October 2006 12:30–14:00
Economic theory
Silvia Martinez Gorricho (University of Toronto)
Quality Signals, Competition and Consumer Fraud
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 17 October 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Emre Ozdenoren (University of Michigan)
Durable Goods and Conformity
(joint with Christopher House)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 24 October 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alp Atakan (Northwestern)
Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search and Incomplete Information
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 31 October 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jan Eeckhout (Penn)
Local Supermodularity and Unique Assortative Matching
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Friday, 10 November 2006 12:30–14:00
Economic theory
Vangelis Markakis (University of Toronto)
Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Microeconomics
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 14 November 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Huseyin Yildirim (Duke)
Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 21 November 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Elena Capatina (University of Toronto)
TBA
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 28 November 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Peter Coles (Harvard Business School)
Signaling in Matching Markets
(joint with Muriel Niederle)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 5 December 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Dino Gerardi (Yale University)
Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication
(joint with Roger Myerson)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Friday, 8 December 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mattias Polborn (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Majority-efficiency and competition-efficiency in a binary policy model
(joint with Stefan Krasa)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 12 December 2006 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)
A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Media Competition
(joint with Jimmy Chan)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Hao Li
 
Friday, 15 December 2006 12:30–14:00
Economic theory
Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Toronto)
Competing Through Information
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Monday, 22 January 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Emel Filiz (Columbia University)
Incorporating Unawareness into Contract Theory (Please note different seminar room)
Sidney Smith, room 3130 Organizer: Hao Li
 
Thursday, 25 January 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (Sap Ag)
Mixed Bundling Auctions
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Friday, 26 January 2007 12:30–14:00
Economic theory
Matthew A Mitchell (University of Iowa)
Market Structure and the Direction of Technological Change
(joint with Andy Skrzypacz )
Rotman, room 127 Organizer: Simon Board
 
Monday, 29 January 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ricardo Alonso (Northwestern University)
Shared Control and Strategic Communication
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Andreas Park
 
Wednesday, 31 January 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ron Siegel (Stanford University)
All-Pay Contests
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Thursday, 1 February 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Colin B Stewart (Yale University)
Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 6 February 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Satoru Takahashi (Harvard University)
Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play*
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Monday, 12 February 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
S. Nageeb Ali (Stanford University)
A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting
(joint with Navin Kartik)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Monday, 12 March 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Xianwen Shi (Yale University)
Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Hao Li
 
Tuesday, 20 March 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Federico Echenique (CalTech)
Supermodularity and Preferences
(joint with Chris Chambers)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 27 March 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
David Ahn (UC Berkeley)
Framing Contingencies
(joint with Haluk Ergin)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 3 April 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Lars Nesheim (UCL)
Nonlinear Hedonic Pricing: Finding Equilibria through Linear Programming
(joint with Robert McCann)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 10 April 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Maria Goltsman (UWO)
Mediated Cheap Talk
(joint with Johannes Horner, Gregory Pavlov, Francesco Squintani)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Friday, 18 May 2007 12:30–14:00
Economic theory
Simon Board (University of Toronto)
Relational Contracts with On-the-Job Search
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Simon Board
 
Tuesday, 18 September 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Andrea Mattozzi (Caltech)
'Personal influence': Social context and political competition
(joint with Andrea Galeotti)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 25 September 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tymofiy Mylovanov (University of Bonn)
Stochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: Regular Case
(joint with Eugen Kovac)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 2 October 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
In-Koo Cho (UIUC)
Perishable Durable Goods
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 9 October 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Navin Kartik (UCSD)
Opinions as Incentives
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Andreas Park
 
Tuesday, 9 October 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Navin Kartik (UCSD)
Opinions as Incentives
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer:
 
Tuesday, 16 October 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Johannes Hrner (Kellogg School of Management)
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
(joint with Nicolas Vieille)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Tuesday, 23 October 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Olivier Tercieux (PSE)
Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
(joint with Daisuke Oyama)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 30 October 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Pohan Fong (Concordia University)
Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
(joint with Daniel Diermeier)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Tuesday, 6 November 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton University)
Leadership, Coordination and Mission-Driven Management
(joint with Patrick Bolton and Laura Veldkamp)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Monday, 12 November 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Christophe Chamley (Boston University and Paris-Jourdan Sciences conomiques )
Complementarities in Information Acquisition With Short-term Trades
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Tuesday, 13 November 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Kunio Tsuyuhara (University of Toronto)
An Advice Game with Reputational and Career Concern
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Tuesday, 20 November 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jing Li (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania )
Beliefs under Unawareness
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 27 November 2007 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Arvind Magesan (University of Toronto)
Sequential Analysis in Groups
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ekaterina Malinova
 
Tuesday, 18 March 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jakub Steiner (University of Edinburgh)
Learning and Reversibility in Coordination Problems
(joint with Eugen Kovac)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 25 March 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Eduardo Faingold (Yale University)
Uniform Topology on Types and Strategic Convergence
(joint with Alfredo Di Tillio)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 1 April 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Haluk Ergin (Washington University )
A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation
(joint with Todd Sarver)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Thursday, 17 April 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ben Polak (Yale University)
Mean-Dispersion Preferences
(joint with Simon Grant)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Friday, 12 September 2008 14:10–15:30
Economic theory
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University and New York University)
A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
(joint with Jacob Glazer)
Rotman, room 157 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 23 September 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Fuhito Kojima (Harvard University)
ASYMPTOTIC EQUIVALENCE OF PROBABILISTIC SERIAL AND RANDOM PRIORITY MECHANISMS
(joint with Yeon-Koo Che)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 30 September 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University)
Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring
(joint with Olivier Gossner, Johannes Horner and Kyna Fong)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 7 October 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
David Miller (UCSD)
Enforcing cooperation in networked societies
(joint with Nageeb Ali)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 14 October 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Matt Mitchell (University of Toronto)
Incentives and the structure of teams
(joint with April Franco and Galina Vereshchagina)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 21 October 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford University)
Beliefs and Private Monitoring
(joint with Chris Phelan)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 28 October 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University)
Robustness to incomplete information in repeated and dynamic games
(joint with Satoru Takahashi)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 4 November 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)
Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 11 November 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
John Wooders (University of Arizona)
Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 18 November 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Gregory Pavlov (UWO)
How to Talk to Multiple Audiences
(joint with Maria Goltsman)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 2 December 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Vasiliki Skreta (New York University)
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission
(joint with Mikhail Golosov (MIT), Aleh Tsyvinski (Harvard), and Andrea Wilson (NYU))
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 9 December 2008 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Axel Z Anderson (Geogetown University)
Durable Information Monopolist
(joint with Lones Smith)
Sidney Smith, room 5017A Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 10 March 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Maxim Ivanov (McMaster University)
Communication via a Biased Mediator
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 17 March 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Braz Camargo (University of Western Ontario)
CANCELLED
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 24 March 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Archishman Chakraborty (York University)
Clearly Biased Experts
(joint with Rick Harbaugh)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 31 March 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Johanna Goertz (University of Guelph)
On the Informational Efficiency of Simple Scoring Rules
(joint with Francois Maniquet)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 7 April 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marco Ottaviani (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management)
Intermediary Commissions and Kickbacks
(joint with Roman Inderst)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 21 April 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Kunio Tsuyuhara (University of Toronto)
Repeated Moral Hazard with Worker Mobility via Directed On-the-Job Search
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 September 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mariagiovanna Baccara (New York University)
Similarity and Polarization in Groups
(joint with Leeat Yariv)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 22 September 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University)
Critical Types
(joint with Marcin Peski)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 29 September 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)
Limited Records and Reputation
(joint with Andrzej Skrzypacz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 6 October 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Nicolas Sahuguet (HEC Montreal)
Audits and Tax Evasion: An Application to Labor Taxes in Italy
(joint with Nicola Persico and Edoardo di Porto)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 20 October 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Andreas Blume (University of Pittsburgh)
Language Barriers
(joint with Oliver Board)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 27 October 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jonathan Weinstein (Northwestern University)
Robustness and Higher-Order Beliefs
(joint with Muhamet Yildiz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 3 November 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Willie Fuchs (UC Berkeley)
Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility
(joint with Vinicius Carrasco)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 17 November 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Xianwen Shi (University of Toronto)
Search, Recall and Scale: Firms in Frictional Matching Markets
(joint with Aloysius Siow)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 24 November 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Toronto)
Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Monday, 30 November 2009 12:30–13:30
Economic theory
Irene Valsecchi (Faculty of Statistics University of Milano - Bicocca)
"Repeated Cheap Talk Games of Common Interest between an Opinionated Expert and an Ignorant Decision-Maker" (A work in progress).
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 1 December 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Hanna Halaburda (Harvard Business School)
Limiting Choice as Strategic Differentiation
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 8 December 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Peter Achim Wagner (University of Toronto)
Delegated Experimentation
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 15 December 2009 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Archishman Chakraborty (York University)
Consensus, Control and Corporate Boards
(joint with Bilge Yilmaz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 9 March 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan)
When Are Signals Complements or Substitutes?
(joint with Angel Hernando-Veciana and Daniel Krahmer)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 16 March 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marcin Peski (University of Texas at Austin)
Anti-folk theorems in repeated games with private rich monitoring and finite past
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 23 March 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alvin E. Roth (Harvard University)
Recent developments in kidney exchange
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Martin J. Osborne and Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 30 March 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Kareen Rozen (Yale University)
Monitoring with Collective Memory
(joint with David Miller)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 6 April 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University)
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 13 April 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Eran Shmaya (Northwestern University)
Describable tests need not be manipulable
(joint with Tai-Wei Hu)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Thursday, 9 September 2010 12:10–13:00
Industrial organization/Economic theory
Jimmy Teng (Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica Taiwa)
The Bayesian Theory of Games:: A Statistical decision theoretic based analysis of strategic interactions
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Frank Mathewson and Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 21 September 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Public economics
Stephen Coate (Cornell University)
Property Taxation, Zoning and Efficiency: A Dynamic Analysis
Max Gluskin House, room 100 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 28 September 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (Department of Economics, UCLA)
The Robustness of Robust Implementation
(joint with Stephen Morris)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 5 October 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Stephen Morris (Princeton University)
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
(joint with Dirk Bergemann and Satoru Takahashi)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 12 October 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ignacio Esponda (New York University)
Information aggregation, learning, and non-strategic behavior in voting environments
(joint with Demian Pouzo)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 26 October 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Charles Zheng (University of Western Ontario)
A bidding cooperative for the financially constrained
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 2 November 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Colin Stewart (University of Toronto)
Price distortions with high-frequency trading
(joint with Jakub Steiner)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 9 November 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tanjim Hossain (Rotman School of Management)
The Binarized Scoring Rule of Belief Elicitation
(joint with Ryo Okui)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 16 November 2010 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Price Inference in Small Markets
(joint with Marek Weretka)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 23 November 2010 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Marcin Peski (University of Texas)
AXIOMATIC FOUNDATIONS OF HARSANYIíS TYPE SPACE AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS
(joint with Jeff Ely)
Rotman, room 142 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 30 November 2010 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Marciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern University)
Recursive Vector Expected Utility
Rotman, room 142 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 7 December 2010 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Adam Brandenburger (New York Universtity (STERN))
Epistemic Game Theory
Rotman, room 142 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 14 December 2010 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Ed Green (Pennsylvania State University)
TBA
Rotman, room 142 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Wednesday, 15 December 2010 12:10–13:30
Economic theory
Wing Suen (The University of Hong Kong)
Does simple majority rule produce hasty decisions?
(joint with Jimmy Chan)
Max Gluskin House, room 100 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Friday, 14 January 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marcin Peski (UT Austin)
Spontaneous discrimination
(joint with Balazs Szentes (LSE))
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Monday, 17 January 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Willemien Kets (U.C. Irvine; Stanford;)
Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 18 January 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Paulo Natenzon (Princeton University)
Random Choice and Learning
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 1 March 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Career Patterns and Career Concerns
(joint with Johannes Hörner)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 8 March 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Archishman Chakraborty (York University)
Elite Media and Downsian Competition
(joint with Parikshit Gosh)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 March 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Bart Lipman (Boston University)
Costly Self Control and Random Self Indulgence
(joint with Eddie Dekel)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 22 March 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Tai-Wei Hu (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
Complexity and Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 5 April 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms
(joint with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Monday, 11 April 2011 15:30–16:50
Economic theory/Business economics
Simon Board (University of California, Los Angeles)
Revenue Management with Forward Looking Buyers
(joint with Andy Skrzypacz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Matthew Mitchell
 
Tuesday, 19 April 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
James Campbell (University of Toronto)
Signaling to a Network
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 26 April 2011 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan)
TBA
Rotman, room 127 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Wednesday, 29 June 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ron Siegel (Northwestern University)
Asymmetric Contests with Interdependent Valuations and Incomplete Information
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 20 September 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marie-Luise Viero (Queen's University)
“Reverse Bayesianism”: A Choice-Based Theory of Growing Awareness
(joint with Edi Karni)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 27 September 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Tymofiy Milovanov (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
Irrelevant? When does the principal's private information matter?
(joint with Thomas Troger)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 4 October 2011 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Amanda Friedenberg (Arizona State University)
Iterated Dominance Revisited
(joint with H. Jerome Keisler)
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 11 October 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Geoffroy De Clippel (Brown University)
Implementation and Bounded Rationality
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 18 October 2011 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
David Ahn (University of California at Berkeley)
Combinatorial Voting/The Condorcet Juries Theorem
(joint with Santiago Oliveros)
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 25 October 2011 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Maher Said (Washington University St. Louis)
TBA
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 8 November 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Konrad Mierendorff (University of Zürich)
Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design with Deadlines
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 15 November 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mallesh M. Pai (University of Pennsylvania)
Subsidies, Set-asides, and Optimal Auctions: How to Support Disadvantaged Bidders in Auctions.
(joint with Rakesh Vohra)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 22 November 2011 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Joe Halpern (Cornell University)
TBA
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 29 November 2011 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Matias Iaryczower (Princeton University)
Choosing Leaders: Learning from Past Decisions in a Changing Environment
(joint with Andrea Mattozzi)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 6 December 2011 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Leeat Yariv (Caltech)
Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency
(joint with Matthew O. Jackson)
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 28 February 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mihai Manea (MIT Department of Economics)
Bargaining In Dynamic Markets With Multiple Populations
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 13 March 2012 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Antonio Penta (University of Wisconsin)
A Robustly Efficient Auction
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 20 March 2012 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Tomasz Sadzik (New York University)
Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Method
(joint with Ennio Stacchetti)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 3 April 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
John Quah (Oxford University)
Aggregating the Single Crossing Property
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 10 April 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Juuso Välimäki (Aalto School of Economics)
Delay and Information Aggregation in Stopping Games with Private Information
(joint with Pauli Murto)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 18 September 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jeroen Swinkels (Northwestern University)
TBA
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Gabor Virag
 
Tuesday, 25 September 2012 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Pietro Ortoleva (California Institute of Technology)
Allais, Ellsberg, and Preferences for Hedging
(joint with Mark Dean)
Rotman, room 147 Organizer: Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 9 October 2012 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London)
Competitive Framing
Rotman, room 147 Organizer: Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 16 October 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
SangMok Lee (University of Pennsylvania)
Incentive Combatibility Of Large Centralized Matching Markets
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 23 October 2012 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Johannes Horner (Yale University)
Recursive methods in dynamic Bayesian games
(joint with S. Takahashi and N. Vieille)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 30 October 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
CANCELLED [due to Hurricane Sandy]
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 6 November 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marco Battaglini (Princeton University)
Optimal Dynamic Contracting
(joint with Rohit Lamba)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 20 November 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Myrna H Wooders (Vanderbilt University)
Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game
(joint with Parkash Chander)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Carolyn Pitchik
 
Tuesday, 27 November 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Peter Achim Wagner (University of Toronto)
Learning from strangers: Public experimentation and signalling
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Martin J. Osborne and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 4 December 2012 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Debraj Ray (New York University)
Poverty and self control
(joint with B. Douglas Bernheim, Sevin Yeltekin)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Monday, 14 January 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Terri Kneeland (University of British Columbia)
Rationality and Consistent Beliefs: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Wednesday, 16 January 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
David Freeman (University of British Columbia)
Revealed Preference Foundations of Expectations-Based Reference-Dependence
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 5 March 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Stable matching with incomplete information
(joint with Qingmin Liu, Andrew Postlewaite, and Larry Samuelson)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 12 March 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Andres Carvajal (Department of Economics, Western)
Arbitrage Pricing in Noncompetitive Markets (Email Rahul for a preliminary copy of the paper)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 19 March 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Juuso Toikka (MIT)
Mechanisms for Repeated Bargaining
(joint with Andrzej Skrzypacz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 2 April 2013 15:00–16:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures
(joint with Stephen Morris)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 17 September 2013 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Philipp Strack (University of Bonn)
Optimal Stopping with Private Information
(joint with Thomas Kruse)
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 24 September 2013 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University)
Non-Bayesian Rationality (two papers)
(joint with John Hillas)
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 1 October 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Mehmet Ekmekci (University of Pittsburgh)
Information in tender offers with a large shareholder
(joint with Nenad Kos)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 8 October 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Wing Suen (The University of Hong Kong)
Multi-sender disclosure of verifiable information.
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 October 2013 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Antonio Penta (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Strategic Thinking and Value of Reasoning: Theory and Applications to Five Little Treasures of Game Theory
(joint with Larbi Alaoui)
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 22 October 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Alexey Kushnir (University of Zurich)
A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 29 October 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 5 November 2013 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)
Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac, Ettore Damiano, and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 19 November 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Roberto Serrano (Brown University)
The Appeal of Information Transactions
(joint with Antonio Cabrales and Olivier Gossner)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Gabor Virag
 
Tuesday, 26 November 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Rohan Dutta (McGill University)
Inferring Rationales from Choice: Identification for Rational Shortlist Methods
(joint with Sean Horan)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 3 December 2013 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Takuo Sugaya (Stanford GSB)
TBA
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 10 December 2013 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Philip Reny (University of Chicago)
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 4 February 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ryan Webb (New York University)
Rationalizing Context-Dependent Preferences: Divisive Normalization and Neurobiological Constraints
(joint with Paul W. Glimcher (NYU) and Kenway Louie (NYU))
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Victor Aguirregabiria
 
Tuesday, 25 February 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University and New York University)
Complex Questionnaires
(joint with Jacob Glazer)
Rotman, room LL1030 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 4 March 2014 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Daniel Quint (University of Wisconsin)
Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry
(joint with Ken Hendricks)
Rotman, room 127 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 11 March 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Filip Matějka (CERGE-EI)
Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices: A New Foundation for the Multinomial Logit Model
(joint with Alisdair McKay)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Jordi Mondria
 
Wednesday, 19 March 2014 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Alexander Wolitzky (Stanford University)
Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application to Bilateral Trade
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 25 March 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jidong Zhou (NYU Stern)
Competitive Bundling
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 1 April 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Balazs Szentes (London School of Economics)
Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 30 September 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Lixin Ye (Ohio State University)
Competitive Nonlinear Income Taxation Revisited
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 7 October 2014 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Mark Dean (Brown University)
Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb
 
Tuesday, 14 October 2014 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Eran Shmaya (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University)
Learning and Fundamentals in a Stationary Environment
(joint with Nabil Al-Najjar)
Rotman, room LL1065 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 21 October 2014 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University)
Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sampling
(joint with Drew Fudenberg and Philipp Strack)
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb
 
Tuesday, 28 October 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT)
Monitoring in Strategic Experimentation
(joint with Johannes Horner)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 4 November 2014 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Christopher Cotton (Queen's University)
Financial exaggeration and the allocation of capital
(joint with Raphael Boleslavsky and Bruce Carlin)
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 11 November 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Deniz Dizdar (University of Montreal)
Efficient matching under incomplete information: on uniform sharing rules and on bidding equilibria
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Xianwen Shi and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 25 November 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Kota Saito (California Institute of Technology)
Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations
(joint with Federico Echenique and Taisuke Imai)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 2 December 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Ming Yang (Duke University)
Security Design in a Production Economy with Flexible Information Acquisition
(joint with Yao Zeng)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 16 December 2014 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yiyang Wu (University of Toronto)
Mechanism Design with Stopping Problems
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 3 March 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Songzi Du (Simon Fraser University)
Rigidity of Transfers and Unraveling in Matching Markets
(joint with Yair Livne)
Rotman, room LL1065 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 10 March 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Joyee Deb (Yale University)
Reputation and Attention
(joint with Heski Bar-Isaac)
Rotman, room LL1065 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 17 March 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Gonzalo Cisternas (MIT)
Two-sided learning and moral hazard
Rotman, room LL1025 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 24 March 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)   Cancelled
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money
(joint with Johannes Horner)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 31 March 2015 16:10–17:30
Macroeconomics/Economic theory
Philipp Kircher (University of Edinburgh)
Assortative Matching with Large Firms: Span of Control over More versus Better Workers
(joint with Jan Eeckhout)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ronald Wolthoff
 
Tuesday, 7 April 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Alex Frankel (Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago)
Muddled Information
(joint with Navin Kartik)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 15 September 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Tai-Wei Hu (Northwestern University)
Learnability in Simple and Complex Environments
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 22 September 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Helios Herrera (HEC, Montreal)
The Marginal Voter's Curse
(joint with Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Joseph McMurray)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 6 October 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown University)   Cancelled
TBA
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 13 October 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University)
Search Design and Broad Matching
(joint with Ran Spiegler)
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 20 October 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Fei Li (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Discriminatory Persuasion: How to Convince Voters
(joint with Jimmy Chan, Yun Yang)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 27 October 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Huseyin Yildirim (Duke University)
TBA
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Colin Stewart and Gabor Virag
 
Tuesday, 3 November 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money
(joint with Johannes Horner)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 17 November 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Sean Horan (University of Montreal)
Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 24 November 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University)
Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 1 December 2015 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Yuval Salant (Northwestern University)
Statistical Inference in Games
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb
 
Tuesday, 8 December 2015 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Marek Pycia (UCLA)
Allocation without Transfers: Ordinal and Cardinal Mechanisms
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Friday, 26 February 2016 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Empirical microeconomics
Yoram Halevy (University of British Columbia)
Parametric Recovery Methods: A Comparative Experimental Study
(joint with Lanny Zrill)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 1 March 2016 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Nageeb Ali (Pennsylvania State University)
Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
(joint with Doug Bernheim and Xiaochen Fan)
Rotman, room 151 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 8 March 2016 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin)
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Wednesday, 16 March 2016 14:10–15:00
Economic theory/Econometrics
Alfred Galichon (New York University)
Topics in Equilibrium Transportation
Fields Institute (222 College Street) Organizers: Ismael Mourifié and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 22 March 2016 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Jean Guillaume Forand (University of Waterloo)
The Demand and Supply for Favours in Dynamic Relationships
(joint with Jan Zapal)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 29 March 2016 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples
(joint with Thanh Nguyen)
Rotman, room LL1065 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 5 April 2016 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)
Common Value Auction with state Dependent Participation
Rotman, room LL1065 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 19 April 2016 16:10–17:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Juan Dubra (Universidad de Montevideo)
A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization
(joint with Jean-Pierre Benoît)
Rotman, room 142 Organizers: Matthew Mitchell and Colin Stewart
 
Thursday, 26 May 2016 12:10–13:10
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Laurent Lamy (Paris School of Economics)
On the benefits of set-asides
(joint with Philippe Jehiel)
Rotman, room 570 Organizers: Heski Bar-Isaac and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 13 September 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Annie Liang (Microsoft Research)
Games of Incomplete Information Played by Statisticians
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 20 September 2016 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Doron Ravid (University of Chicago)
Bargaining with Rational Inattention
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 27 September 2016 11:10–12:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Ignacio Esponda (Washington University in St. Louis)
Equilibrium in Misspecified Markov Decision Processes
(joint with Demian Pouzo)
Rotman, room LL1010 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 4 October 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Juan Ortner (Boston University)
Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion and Crime
(joint with Sylvain Chassang)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 11 October 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Edward J. Green (Pennsylvania State University)
A parsimonious theory of evidence-based choice
(joint with Fatemeh Borhani)
Rotman, room 157 Organizer: Martin J. Osborne
 
Tuesday, 18 October 2016 16:10–17:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)   Cancelled
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 25 October 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Marina Halac (Columbia University)
Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification
(joint with Pierre Yared)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Ettore Damiano
 
Tuesday, 1 November 2016 11:10–12:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Andrew Caplin (New York University)
Rationally Inattentive Behavior: Characterizing and Generalizing Shannon Entropy
(joint with Mark Dean and John Leahy)
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Colin Stewart and Ryan Webb
 
Tuesday, 8 November 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
Optimal Sequential Decisions with Limited Attention
(joint with Konrad Mierendorff)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 15 November 2016 11:10–12:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Sergei Severinov (University of British Columbia)
Optimal Mechanism with Budget Constraint Bidders
Rotman, room 157 Organizer: Gabor Virag
 
Tuesday, 22 November 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology)
On Multiple Discount Rates
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 6 December 2016 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Laura Doval (Yale University)
Whether or not to open Pandora's box
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Byung Soo Lee and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 7 March 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Victor Aguiar (University of Western Ontario)
Stochastic Dynamic Revealed Preferences for Non-linear Budget Constraints
(joint with Nail Kashaev)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 14 March 2017 11:10–12:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Navin Kartik (Columbia University)
Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions
(joint with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport)
Rotman, room 157 Organizers: Ettore Damiano and Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 21 March 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Luciano Pomatto (California Institute of Technology)
Testable Forecasts
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 28 March 2017 11:10–12:30
Foundational models of human agency/Economic theory
Burkhard Schipper (University of California, Davis)
Self-Confirming Games: Unawareness, Discovery, and Equilibrium
Rotman, room LL1065 Organizer: Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 4 April 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Ennio Stacchetti (New York University)
Reputation and Information Design
(joint with Laurent Mathevet and David Pearce)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 11 April 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Shengwu Li (Havard University)
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 19 September 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
Credible Mechanism Design
(joint with Shengwu Li)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 3 October 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Phil Reny (University of Chicago)
Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Byung Soo Lee
 
Tuesday, 10 October 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Ben Brooks (University of Chicago)
Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
(joint with Songzi Du)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 17 October 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Luis Rayo (University of Utah)
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship
(joint with Drew Fudenberg)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 24 October 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Caroline Thomas (University of Texas at Austin)
The Design of Credit Information Systems
(joint with V Bhaskar)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 31 October 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Tibor Heumann (HEC Montréal)
An Ascending Auction with Multidimensional Signals
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 14 November 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Dotan Persitz (Tel Aviv University)
Social Clubs and Social Networks
(joint with Chaim Fershtman)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Yoram Halevy
 
Tuesday, 28 November 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Michigan)
Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration
(joint with Yingni Guo)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 5 December 2017 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Ying Chen (Johns Hopkins University)
When to Ask for an Update — Timing in Strategic Communication
(joint with Atara Oliver)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Friday, 9 February 2018 16:10–17:30
Business economics/Economic theory
Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania)
Bounded Rationality and Learning: A Learning Framework and a Robustness Result
(joint with Daniel N. Hauser)
Rotman, room 127 Organizers: Matthew Mitchell and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 6 March 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 13 March 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
David Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania)
Additive-Belief-Based Preferences
(joint with Collin Raymond)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Yoram Halevy
 
Tuesday, 27 March 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Nicolas Klein (University of Montreal)
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games
(joint with Johannes Hörner and Sven Rady)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 3 April 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Juuso Toikka (MIT)
Robust Incentives for Teams
(joint with Tianjiao Dai (MIT))
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 11 September 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford GSB)
Test Design and Minimum Standards
(joint with Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 25 September 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn)
Bargaining and Competition in Thin Markets
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 2 October 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago)
Quantifying information and uncertainty
(joint with Alexander Frankel)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 9 October 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Yusufcan Masatlioglu (University of Maryland)   Cancelled
Behavioral Influence
(joint with C. P. Chambers and T. Cuhadaroglu)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 16 October 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Simone Galperti (UC San Diego)   Cancelled
Belief Meddling in Social Networks: An Information-Design Approach
(joint with Jacopo Perogo)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 30 October 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Sofia Moroni (University of Pittsburg)
Multi-dimensional communication with limited commitment
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 13 November 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University)
Competing Models
(joint with Jose Montiel Olea, Mallesh Pai, Andrea Prat)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 27 November 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Huilan Xu (University of Toronto)
The Direction of Experimentation
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 4 December 2018 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Mike Peters (University of British Columbia)
Unobserved Mechanisms
(joint with Hao Li)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Xianwen Shi and Gabor Virag
 
Monday, 28 January 2019 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Kevin He (Harvard University)
Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler’s Fallacy in Optimal-Stopping Problems
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Wednesday, 30 January 2019 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Julia Salmi (Aalto University)
Endogenous Learning from Incremental Actions
(joint with Tuomas Laiho and Pauli Murto)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Colin Stewart
 
Tuesday, 5 February 2019 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Michigan)
Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information
(joint with Doron Ravid, Balazs Szentes)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 26 February 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Yusufcan Masatlioglu (University of Maryland)
Behavioral Influence
(joint with Christopher P. Chambers and Tugce Cuhadaroglu)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 5 March 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Ron Siegel (Penn State University)
Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation
(joint with Nima Haghpanah)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 19 March 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Miguel Ballester (University of Oxford)
Multi-parametric random utility models for the joint treatment of risk and time preferences
(joint with Jose Apestiguia, Angelo Gutierrez)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Yoram Halevy and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 26 March 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Harry Di Pei (Northwestern)
Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Tuesday, 2 April 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Chiara Margaria (Boston University)
Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff: Intra-household Earning Distribution and Marriage Durability
(joint with Andrew Newman)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Monday, 13 May 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Foundational models of human agency
Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University)
Proportional Allocation across Fields, Demand Relativity, and Benchmarking
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizer: Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 17 September 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University)
Evaluating Ambiguous Random Variables and Updating by Proxy
(joint with Faruk Gul)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 24 September 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University)
Utility Happens
(joint with Matthew Rabin, Sarah Ridout)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 1 October 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Joao Ramos (USC Marshall)
Partnership with Persistence
(joint with Tomasz Sadzik)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 8 October 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Mira Frick (Yale University)
Stability and Robustness in Misspecified Learning Models
(joint with Ryota Iijima and Yuhta Ishii)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 15 October 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Rami Abou-Seido (University of Toronto)   Cancelled
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 22 October 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Philipp Strack (Yale University)   Cancelled
The Cost of Information
(joint with Luciano Pomatto and Omer Tamuz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 29 October 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Weijie Zhong (Yale University and Stanford University)
Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Wednesday, 20 November 2019 12:10–13:30
Economic theory/Political economy
Marco Battaglini (Cornell University)
Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Gustavo Bobonis and Yoram Halevy
 
Tuesday, 26 November 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Attila Ambrus (Duke University)
Investments in social ties, risk sharing and inequality
(joint with Matt Elliott)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 3 December 2019 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Zhou Zhen (Tsinghua University)
Timely Persuasion
(joint with Deepal Basak)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Friday, 17 January 2020 16:10–17:30
Economic theory
Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University)
Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Gustavo Bobonis and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 25 February 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Leeat Yariv (Princeton University)
Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities
(joint with Evgenii Safonov and Pietro Ortoleva)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 10 March 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Philipp Strack (Yale University)
The Cost of Information
(joint with Luciano Pomatto and Omer Tamuz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 24 March 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Philipp Sadowski (Duke University)   Cancelled
An Evolutionary Perspective on Updating Risk and Ambiguity Preferences
(joint with Todd Sarver)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Yoram Halevy, and Xianwen Shi
 
Tuesday, 15 September 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and UCL)
Cheating with (recursive) models
(joint with Kfir Eliaz and Yair Weiss)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 29 September 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Martin Cripps (University College London)
Divisible updating
Online Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 6 October 2020 10:10–11:30
Economic theory
Debasis Mishra (ISI, Delhi)
Selling two identical objects
(joint with Sushil Bikhchandani)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 13 October 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Erik Eyster (UC Santa Barbara)
Non-Common Priors, Private Information and Trade
(joint with Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch, Matthew Rabin)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 20 October 2020 10:10–11:30
Economic theory
Philipp Sadowski (Duke)
An Evolutionary Perspective on Updating Risk and Ambiguity Preferences
(joint with Todd Sarver)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 27 October 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Bram De Rock (Université libre de Bruxelles)   Cancelled
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Yoram Halevy
 
Tuesday, 27 October 2020 12:40–14:00
Economic theory
Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn)
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice
(joint with Andreas Kleiner)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 3 November 2020 10:10–11:30
Economic theory
Sven Rady (University of Bonn)
Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games
(joint with Johannes Horner and Nicolas Klein)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 17 November 2020 10:10–11:30
Economic theory
Nina Bobkova (Rice University)
Diversity and Evidence in Minipublics
(joint with Arjada Bardhi)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 24 November 2020 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Thomas Tröger (University of Mannheim)
Optimal testing and social distancing of individuals with private health signals
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 1 December 2020 10:10–11:30
Economic theory
Satoru Takahashi (National University of Singapore)
Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games
Online Organizer: Marcin Pęski
 
Tuesday, 2 March 2021 12:40–14:00
Economic theory
Alexander M. Jakobsen (University of Calgary)
Coarse Bayesian Updating
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 16 March 2021 12:40–14:00
Economic theory
Shaowei Ke (University of Michigan)
Learning from a Black Box
(joint with Chen Zhao (University of Hong Kong), Brian Wu (Michigan Ross))
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 30 March 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Chen Zhao (University of Hong Kong)
Behavioral Neural Networks
(joint with Shaowei Ke, Zhaoran Wang and Sung-lin Hsieh)
Online Organizers: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 5 October 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Paula Onuchic (Oxford University)
Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects
Online Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 12 October 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Gustavo Manso (Berkeley Haas)
Recommendations with Feedback
Online Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 19 October 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Joyee Deb (Yale SOM)
Aiming for the Goal: Pricing and Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding
(joint with Aniko Öry and Kevin Williams)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 26 October 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Ben Golub (Northwestern University)
Supply Network Formation and Fragility
(joint with Matthew Elliott, Matthew V. Leduc)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 2 November 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Jidong Zhou (Yale SOM)
Personalized Pricing and Privacy Choice
(joint with Andrew Rhodes)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 16 November 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Ruizhi Zhu (University of Toronto)
Bargaining with Learning of a Varying Type
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 23 November 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Xiaosheng Mu (Princeton University)
Monotone Additive Statistics
(joint with Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz)
Online Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 30 November 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Luciano Pomatto (California Institute of Technology)
Background Risk and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion
(joint with Xiaosheng Mu, Philipp Strack, and Omer Tamuz)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 7 December 2021 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University, W.P. Carey School of Business)
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
(joint with S. Nageeb Ali and Navin Kartik)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 18 January 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Modibo Camara (Northwestern University)
Computationally Tractable Choice
Online Organizer: Rahul Deb
 
Friday, 21 January 2022 10:10–11:30
Financial economics/Economic theory
Ji Hee Yoon (Wisconsin/UCL)
Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Synthetic Products vs. Trading Technology
(joint with Marzena Rostek)
Online Organizer: Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 1 March 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Amanda Friedenberg (University of Arizona)
Two Approaches to Iterated Reasoning in Games
(joint with Adam Brandenburger and Terri Kneeland)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 15 March 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Nicolas Vieille (HEC Paris)   Cancelled
TBD
Online Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 22 March 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Roland Strausz (HU Berlin)
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence
(joint with Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 29 March 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
John Quah (Johns Hopkins and National University of Singapore)
Comparative statics with linear objectives: normal demand, monotone marginal costs, and ranking multi-prior beliefs
(joint with Pawel Dziewulski)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 5 April 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Matt Weinberg (Princeton University)
Survey of Mechanism Design challenges in Cryptocurrencies
Online Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 12 April 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Wei Li (UBC)
Strategic Influencer of Naïve Agents
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Wednesday, 13 April 2022 12:10–13:30
Economic theory
Hao Li (UBC)
Unobserved Mechanism Design: Targeted Offers
(joint with Mike Peters)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 20 September 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Alex Smolin (TSE (Toulouse School of Economics))
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 27 September 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory/Macroeconomics
Jan Eeckhout (UPF Barcelona)
Are Managers Paid for Market Power?
(joint with Renjie Bao and Jan de Loecker)
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb, Anne-Katrin Roesler, and Ronald Wolthoff
 
Tuesday, 18 October 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Tommaso Denti (Cornell University)
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 25 October 2022 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Dirk Bergemann (Yale)
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 14 March 2023 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Kareen Rozen (Brown University)
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
Tuesday, 21 March 2023 11:10–12:30
Economic theory
Omer Tamuz (Caltech)
TBD
Max Gluskin House, room 106 Organizers: Rahul Deb and Anne-Katrin Roesler
 
413 seminars found