Schedule

Conference locations

  • Bahen Centre, 40 St. George Street, room 1210 (Friday)

  • Rotman South, 149 College Street, room 209 (Saturday and Sunday)

Conference schedule

Version suitable for printing

Friday May 4, 2012
All sessions on Friday are in room 1210, Bahen Centre, 40 St. George Street
8:30 am Breakfast
Chair of morning sessions: Martin Osborne
9:00 am
Tilman Borgers* and Doug Smith, Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules
9:30 am
Tymofiy Mylovanov* and Thomas Troeger, Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The private values quasilinear case
10:00 am Break
10:15 am
Ben Lester*, Ludo Visschers, and Ronald Wolthoff, Asking Prices and Inspection Goods
10:45 am
Artyom Shneyerov*, Revenue Management by a Patient Seller
11:15 am Break
11:30 am
Luciano Pomatto*, Alvaro Sandroni, and Nabil Al-Najjar, Manipulable Tests and the Axioms of Probability.
12:00 pm
Alvaro Sandroni*, At Least Do No Harm
12:30 pm Lunch
Chair of afternoon sessions: Ettore Damiano
2:00 pm
Michael Peters*, Reciprocal Contracting
2:30 pm
Martin Szydlowski*, Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking
3:00 pm Break
3:15 pm
Hao Li*, Ettore Damiano, and Wing Suen, Optimal Delay in Committees
3:45 pm
Maciej Kotowski* and Matthew Leister, Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation
4:15 pm Break
4:30 pm
Santiago Oliveros and Felix Vardy*, Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters' Choice of News Media
5:00 pm
Sergei Severinov*, Rossella Argenziano, and Francesco Squintani, Strategic Information Transmission
5:30 pm
Maria Goltsman* and Gregory Pavlov, Communication in Cournot Oligopoly

Saturday May 5, 2012
All sessions on Saturday are in room 209, Rotman South, 149 College St.
8:30 am Breakfast
Chair of morning sessions: Marcin Peski
9:00 am
Tai-Wei Hu* and Mamoru Kaneko, Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability
9:30 am
Wojciech Olszewski* and Rakesh Vohra, Team selection problem
10:00 am Break
10:15 am
Edward Schlee*, Surplus Maximization and Optimality
10:45 am
Simon Board* and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Competitive Insurance Markets with Limited Commitment
11:15 am Break
11:30 am
Licun Xue*, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, and David Pérez-Castrillo, Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
12:00 pm
Rene Kirkegaard*, Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch
12:30 pm Lunch
Chair of afternoon sessions: Carolyn Pitchik
2:00 pm
Marcin Peski and Thomas Wiseman*, A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes
2:30 pm
Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang*, Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and Private Monitoring
3:00 pm Break
3:15 pm
Charles Zheng*, Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Resale
3:45 pm
Wei Li*, Hao Li, and Anton Kolotilin, Optimal Limited Authority for Principal
4:15 pm Break
4:30 pm
Nabil Al-Najjar* and Jonathan Weinstein, A Bayesian Model of Risk and Uncertainty
5:00 pm
Sean Horan*, A Simple Model of Two-Stage Maximization
7:30 pm Conference dinner (by invitation)

Sunday May 6, 2012
All sessions on Sunday are in room 209, Rotman South, 149 College St.
8:30 am Breakfast
Chair of morning sessions: Gabor Virag
9:00 am
Vikram Manjunath*, A market approach to fractional matching
9:30 am
Norovsambuu Tumennasan*, John Kennes, and Daniel Monte, The Daycare Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem
10:00 am Break
10:15 am
Stephan Lauermann* and Asher Wolinsky, Common Values Procurement Auctions with Bidder Solicitation
10:45 am
Ming Li* and Arianna Degan, Information transmission in political campaigns.
11:15 am
Massimo Morelli and Richard Van Weelden*, Ideology and Information in Policymaking

* Presenter of paper.