Tilman Borgers* and Doug Smith, Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules

Tymofiy Mylovanov* and Thomas Troeger, Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The private values quasilinear case

Ben Lester*, Ludo Visschers, and Ronald Wolthoff, Asking Prices and Inspection Goods

Artyom Shneyerov*, Revenue Management by a Patient Seller

Luciano Pomatto*, Alvaro Sandroni, and Nabil Al-Najjar, Manipulable Tests and the Axioms of Probability.

Alvaro Sandroni*, At Least Do No Harm

Michael Peters*, Reciprocal Contracting

Martin Szydlowski*, Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking

Hao Li*, Ettore Damiano, and Wing Suen, Optimal Delay in Committees

Maciej Kotowski* and Matthew Leister, Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation

Santiago Oliveros and Felix Vardy*, Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters' Choice of News Media

Sergei Severinov*, Rossella Argenziano, and Francesco Squintani, Strategic Information Transmission

Maria Goltsman* and Gregory Pavlov, Communication in Cournot Oligopoly

Tai-Wei Hu* and Mamoru Kaneko, Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability

Wojciech Olszewski* and Rakesh Vohra, Team selection problem

Edward Schlee*, Surplus Maximization and Optimality

Simon Board* and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Competitive Insurance Markets with Limited Commitment

Licun Xue*, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, and David Pérez-Castrillo, Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

Rene Kirkegaard*, Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch

Marcin Peski and Thomas Wiseman*, A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes

Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang*, Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and Private Monitoring

Charles Zheng*, Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Resale

Wei Li*, Hao Li, and Anton Kolotilin, Optimal Limited Authority for Principal

Nabil Al-Najjar* and Jonathan Weinstein, A Bayesian Model of Risk and Uncertainty

Sean Horan*, A Simple Model of Two-Stage Maximization

Vikram Manjunath*, A market approach to fractional matching

Norovsambuu Tumennasan*, John Kennes, and Daniel Monte, The Daycare Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem

Stephan Lauermann* and Asher Wolinsky, Common Values Procurement Auctions with Bidder Solicitation

Ming Li* and Arianna Degan, Information transmission in political campaigns.

Massimo Morelli and Richard Van Weelden*, Ideology and Information in Policymaking