Canadian Economic Theory Conference
General Papers
| A Bayesian Model of Risk and Uncertainty | Abstract |
| Nabil Al-Najjar*, Jonathan Weinstein |
| A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes | Abstract Paper |
| Marcin Peski, Thomas Wiseman* |
| A market approach to fractional matching | Abstract Paper |
| Vikram Manjunath* |
| A Simple Model of Two-Stage Maximization | Abstract Paper |
| Sean Horan* |
| Asking Prices and Inspection Goods | Abstract |
| Ben Lester*, Ludo Visschers, Ronald Wolthoff |
| At Least Do No Harm | Abstract |
| Alvaro Sandroni* |
| Bargaining with Uncertain Commitment: On the Limits of Disagreement | Abstract Paper |
| Rohan Dutta* |
| Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and Private Monitoring | Abstract Paper |
| Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang* |
| Common Values Procurement Auctions with Bidder Solicitation | Abstract |
| Stephan Lauermann*, Asher Wolinsky |
| Communication in Cournot Oligopoly | Abstract Paper |
| Maria Goltsman*, Gregory Pavlov |
| Competitive Insurance Markets with Limited Commitment | Abstract |
| Simon Board*, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn |
| Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability | Abstract Paper |
| Tai-Wei Hu*, Mamoru Kaneko |
| Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters' Choice of News Media | Abstract |
| Santiago Oliveros, Felix Vardy* |
| Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Resale | Abstract Paper |
| Charles Zheng* |
| Ideology and Information in Policymaking | Abstract Paper |
| Massimo Morelli, Richard Van Weelden* |
| Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking | Abstract Paper |
| Martin Szydlowski* |
| Information transmission in political campaigns. | Abstract Paper |
| Ming Li*, Arianna Degan |
| Manipulable Tests and the Axioms of Probability. | Abstract |
| Luciano Pomatto*, Alvaro Sandroni, Nabil Al-Najjar |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The private values quasilinear case | Abstract |
| Tymofiy Mylovanov*, Thomas Troeger |
| Optimal Delay in Committees | Abstract Paper |
| Hao Li*, Ettore Damiano, Wing Suen |
| Optimal Limited Authority for Principal | Abstract Paper |
| Wei Li*, Hao Li, Anton Kolotilin |
| Ranking Asymmetric Auctions: Filling the Gap between a Distributional Shift and Stretch | Abstract Paper |
| Rene Kirkegaard* |
| Reciprocal Contracting | Abstract Paper |
| Michael Peters* |
| Revenue Management by a Patient Seller | Abstract Paper |
| Artyom Shneyerov* |
| Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules | Abstract Paper |
| Tilman Borgers*, Doug Smith |
| Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues | Abstract Paper |
| Licun Xue*, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo |
| Strategic Information Transmission | Abstract Paper |
| Sergei Severinov*, Rossella Argenziano, Francesco Squintani |
| Surplus Maximization and Optimality | Abstract Paper |
| Edward Schlee* |
| Team selection problem | Abstract Paper |
| Wojciech Olszewski*, Rakesh Vohra |
| The Daycare Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem | Abstract Paper |
| Norovsambuu Tumennasan*, John Kennes, Daniel Monte |
| Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation | Abstract Paper |
| Maciej Kotowski*, Matthew Leister |
*Presenter of paper