General Papers
| At Least Do No Harm | Abstract |
| Alvaro Sandroni* |
| Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking | Abstract Paper |
| Martin Szydlowski* |
| Manipulable Tests and the Axioms of Probability. | Abstract |
| Luciano Pomatto*, Alvaro Sandroni, Nabil Al-Najjar |
| Optimal Delay in Committees | Abstract Paper |
| Hao Li*, Ettore Damiano, Wing Suen |
| Revenue Management by a Patient Seller | Abstract Paper |
| Artyom Shneyerov* |
| Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules | Abstract Paper |
| Tilman Borgers*, Doug Smith |
| Strategic Information Transmission | Abstract Paper |
| Sergei Severinov*, Rossella Argenziano, Francesco Squintani |
| Surplus Maximization and Optimality | Abstract Paper |
| Edward Schlee* |
*Presenter of paper