Schedule

All sessions will be held in Ivey Spencer Leadership Centre, Oak Room.

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Thursday May 7, 2015
7:00 pm Dinner: On own.  (Dinner and bar available in conference centre at own expense.)

Friday May 8, 2015
8:30 am Coffee: (Full breakfast is also available in conference centre at own expense.)
9:00 am
Fei Li* and Francesc Dilme, Revenue Management Without Commitment
9:30 am
Ilwoo Hwang*, Collapsing Confidence: Dynamic Trading with Developing Adverse Selection
10:00 am Coffee
10:15 am
Songzi Du* and Haoxiang Zhu, Bilateral Trading in Divisible Double Auctions
10:45 am
Rodney Garratt and Marek Pycia*, Efficient Bilateral Trade
11:15 am Coffee
11:30 am
Michael Peters*, Can Mechanism Designers Exploit Buyers' Market Information
12:00 pm
Seungjin Han*, Competing Mechanism Design with Frictions
12:30 pm Lunch: (Available in conference centre at own expense.)
2:00 pm
Sangram V. Kadam and Maciej H. Kotowski*, Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets
2:30 pm
Deniz Dizdar*, Two-sided investments and matching with multi-dimensional cost types and attributes
3:00 pm Coffee
3:15 pm
Hugo Hopenhayn* and Maryam Saeedi, Dynamic Bidding in Second Price Auction
3:45 pm
George Georgiadis* and Jaksa Cvitanic, Reducing Free-riding in Dynamic Contribution Games
4:15 pm
David Rahman*, The Dilemma of the Cypress and the Oak Tree
4:45 pm Coffee
5:00 pm
Rene Kirkegaard*, Contracting with Private Rewards
5:30 pm
Wojciech Olszewski* and Ron Siegel, Effort-maximizing contests
7:00 pm Dinner: On own.  Options:  (a) Dinner and bar available in conference centre at own expense.  (b) Free 17-seat shuttle heading downtown at 6:15 and 6:45.

Saturday May 9, 2015
8:00 am Coffee: (Full breakfast is also available in conference centre at own expense.)
8:30 am
Dipjyoti Majumdar*, Lars Ehlers, Debasis Mishra, and Arunava Sen, Continuous Cardinal Incentive Compatible Mechanisms are Ordinal
9:00 am
Willemien Kets* and Alvaro Sandroni, A belief-based theory of homophily
9:30 am Coffee
9:45 am
Hongyi Li* and Keiichi Kawai, Policy Complexity
10:15 am
Pei Cheng Yu*, Optimal Taxation with Non-sophisticated Agents
10:45 am
Ying Chen* and Hulya Eraslan, Dynamic Agenda Setting
11:15 am Coffee
11:30 am
Itai Sher*, Evaluating Allocations of Freedom
12:00 pm
Yaron Azrieli*, The price of `One Person, One Vote'
12:30 pm Lunch: (Available in conference centre at own expense.)
2:00 pm
Joshua Scottt Cherry* and Yuval Salant, Generalized Sampling Equilibrium
2:30 pm
Sean Horan* and Yves Sprumont, Welfare Criteria from Choice: the Sequential Solution
3:00 pm Coffee
3:15 pm
Jay Lu*, Random Choice and Private Information
3:45 pm
John K.-H. Quah, Matthew Polisson*, and Ludovic Renou, Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty
4:15 pm
Jian Li* and Junjie Zhou, Blackwell's Informativeness Ranking with Uncertainty Averse Preferences
4:45 pm Coffee
5:00 pm
Asen Kochov*, Stationary Cardinal Utility
5:30 pm
Edi Karni and Marie-Louise Viero*, Awareness of Unawareness: A Theory of Decision Making in the Face of Ignorance
7:00 pm Conference Dinner: Bertoldi's Restaurant, Richmond and Pall Mall, downtown London.  (By invitation.  Free 17-seat shuttle heading downtown at 6:15 and 6:45.)

Sunday May 10, 2015
8:00 am Coffee: (Full breakfast is also available in conference centre at own expense.)
8:30 am
Xin Zhao*, Mechanism Design by an Informed Seller
9:00 am
Jernej Copic*, Disagreement, Information, and Welfare
9:30 am Coffee
9:45 am
Laurent Mathevet* and Elliot Lipnowski, Psychological Persuasion
10:15 am
Simone Galperti*, Hide or Surprise? Persuasion without Common-Support Priors
10:45 am
Anton Kolotilin*, Ming Li, Tymofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
11:15 am Coffee
12:00 pm
Catherine Gendon-Saulnier and Sidartha Gordon*, On Information Choice and Diversity: the Role of Strategic Complementarities
12:30 pm Lunch: (Available in conference centre at own expense.)

* Presenter of paper.