A party in power can address only a limited number of issues in an election cycle. What issues to address - the party's agenda - has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. What is the optimal agenda in the presence of dynamic concerns? How do bargaining rules affect the agenda? What are the efficiency implications? We address these questions in a stylized model in which the incumbent in any period addresses one issue among several issues and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that distortions can happen in the form of preemption or steering. In preemption, the incumbent gives priority to the issue that is most pressing for the opposition party to prevent the opposition from addressing it if the opposition comes in power. In steering, the incumbent gives priority to a less pressing issue to direct the opposition party's agenda towards addressing the most pressing issue for the incumbent. Although preemption can still be efficient, steering is necessarily inefficient. We show that steering happens only when the polarization between the parties is not too high. Furthermore, under partisan preferences, steering does not take place under majority rule, but is possible under unanimity and supermajority.