Schedule

All sessions will be held in Max Gluskin House, 150 St. George Street, Room 100.

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Friday May 15, 2009
Chair: Ettore Damiano
9:00 am
Michael Peters* and Christian Troncoso Valverde, A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms
9:30 am
Tymofiy Mylovanov* and Thomas Tröger, Informed Principal Problems in Generalized Private Values Environments
10:00 am
David Rahman*, But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?
10:30 am Break
11:00 am
Yusuke Kamishiro and Roberto Serrano*, Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies
11:30 am
Wojciech Olszewski* and Marcin Peski, The principal-agent approach to testing experts
12:00 pm
Takashi Kunimoto* and Olivier Tercieux, Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection
12:30 pm Lunch
Chair: Ron Harstad
2:00 pm
Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan*, Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach
2:30 pm
Bingyong Zheng* and Jimmy Chan, Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation
3:00 pm
Matthew Doyle* and Jacob Wong, Wage Posting Without Full Commitment
3:30 pm Break
4:00 pm
Manolis Galenianos* and Philipp Kircher, Game-theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium
4:30 pm
Stephan Lauermann* and Asher Wolinsky, Search with Adverse Selection
5:00 pm
Gabor Virag*, Stephan Lauermann, and Wolfram Merzyn, Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model

Saturday May 16, 2009
Chair: Carolyn Pitchik
9:00 am
Larry Samuelson and Arthur Robson*, The Evolutionary Optimality of Decision and Experienced Utility
9:30 am
Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima*, and Erkut Ozbay, Revealed Attention
10:00 am
Igor Kopylov and Jawwad Noor*, Self-Deception and Choice
10:30 am Break
10:45 am
Yaron Azrieli* and Roee Teper, Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
11:15 am
Craig Brett and John A. Weymark*, Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Committment
11:45 am Break
12:00 pm
Sandeep Baliga and Jeffrey C. Ely*, Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Bias as a Memory Kludge
12:30 pm
Daniel Monte*, Learning under Bounded Memory
1:00 pm Lunch
Chair: Li, Hao
2:30 pm
Yuk-fai Fong* and Jin Li, Information and Intertemporal Signal Garbling in Relational Contract
3:00 pm
Ying Chen*, Communication with Two-sided Asymmetric Information
3:30 pm
Archishman Chakraborty* and Rick Harbaugh, Clearly biased experts
4:00 pm Break
4:30 pm
Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli*, Turnout and power sharing
5:00 pm
Stefan Krasa* and Mattias Polborn, Political Competition Between Differentiated Candidates
5:30 pm
Heski Bar-Isaac*, Ian Jewitt, and Clare Leaver, Information and Human Capital Management

Sunday May 17, 2009
Chair: Martin Osborne
9:00 am
Alp Atakan* and Mehmet Ekmekci, Reputation with Long-run Players
9:30 am
Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn*, Reputation Formation with Hidden Investment
10:00 am
René Kirkegaard*, Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps
10:30 am Break
11:00 am
Ayça Kaya* and Galina Vereschagina, Moral hazard and equilibrium matchings in a market for partnerships
11:30 am
Gregory Pavlov*, Communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
12:00 pm
Itai Sher*, Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism

* Presenter of paper.