Friday May 15, 2009 |
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Chair: Ettore Damiano | |
9:00 am |
Michael Peters* and Christian Troncoso Valverde, A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms
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9:30 am |
Tymofiy Mylovanov* and Thomas Tröger, Informed Principal Problems in Generalized Private Values Environments
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10:00 am |
David Rahman*, But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?
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10:30 am | Break |
11:00 am |
Yusuke Kamishiro and Roberto Serrano*, Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies
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11:30 am |
Wojciech Olszewski* and Marcin Peski, The principal-agent approach to testing experts
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12:00 pm |
Takashi Kunimoto* and Olivier Tercieux, Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection
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12:30 pm | Lunch |
Chair: Ron Harstad | |
2:00 pm |
Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan*, Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach
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2:30 pm |
Bingyong Zheng* and Jimmy Chan, Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation
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3:00 pm |
Matthew Doyle* and Jacob Wong, Wage Posting Without Full Commitment
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3:30 pm | Break |
4:00 pm |
Manolis Galenianos* and Philipp Kircher, Game-theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium
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4:30 pm |
Stephan Lauermann* and Asher Wolinsky, Search with Adverse Selection
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5:00 pm |
Gabor Virag*, Stephan Lauermann, and Wolfram Merzyn, Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model
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Saturday May 16, 2009 |
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Chair: Carolyn Pitchik | |
9:00 am |
Larry Samuelson and Arthur Robson*, The Evolutionary Optimality of Decision and Experienced Utility
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9:30 am |
Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima*, and Erkut Ozbay, Revealed Attention
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10:00 am |
Igor Kopylov and Jawwad Noor*, Self-Deception and Choice
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10:30 am | Break |
10:45 am |
Yaron Azrieli* and Roee Teper, Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
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11:15 am |
Craig Brett and John A. Weymark*, Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Committment
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11:45 am | Break |
12:00 pm |
Sandeep Baliga and Jeffrey C. Ely*, Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Bias as a Memory Kludge
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12:30 pm |
Daniel Monte*, Learning under Bounded Memory
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1:00 pm | Lunch |
Chair: Li, Hao | |
2:30 pm |
Yuk-fai Fong* and Jin Li, Information and Intertemporal Signal Garbling in Relational Contract
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3:00 pm |
Ying Chen*, Communication with Two-sided Asymmetric Information
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3:30 pm |
Archishman Chakraborty* and Rick Harbaugh, Clearly biased experts
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4:00 pm | Break |
4:30 pm |
Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli*, Turnout and power sharing
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5:00 pm |
Stefan Krasa* and Mattias Polborn, Political Competition Between Differentiated Candidates
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5:30 pm |
Heski Bar-Isaac*, Ian Jewitt, and Clare Leaver, Information and Human Capital Management
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Sunday May 17, 2009 |
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Chair: Martin Osborne | |
9:00 am |
Alp Atakan* and Mehmet Ekmekci, Reputation with Long-run Players
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9:30 am |
Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn*, Reputation Formation with Hidden Investment
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10:00 am |
René Kirkegaard*, Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps
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10:30 am | Break |
11:00 am |
Ayça Kaya* and Galina Vereschagina, Moral hazard and equilibrium matchings in a market for partnerships
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11:30 am |
Gregory Pavlov*, Communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
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12:00 pm |
Itai Sher*, Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism
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* Presenter of paper.