Michael Peters* and Christian Troncoso Valverde, A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms

Tymofiy Mylovanov* and Thomas Tröger, Informed Principal Problems in Generalized Private Values Environments

David Rahman*, But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?

Yusuke Kamishiro and Roberto Serrano*, Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies

Wojciech Olszewski* and Marcin Peski, The principal-agent approach to testing experts

Takashi Kunimoto* and Olivier Tercieux, Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection

Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan*, Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach

Bingyong Zheng* and Jimmy Chan, Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation

Matthew Doyle* and Jacob Wong, Wage Posting Without Full Commitment

Manolis Galenianos* and Philipp Kircher, Game-theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium

Stephan Lauermann* and Asher Wolinsky, Search with Adverse Selection

Gabor Virag*, Stephan Lauermann, and Wolfram Merzyn, Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model

Larry Samuelson and Arthur Robson*, The Evolutionary Optimality of Decision and Experienced Utility

Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima*, and Erkut Ozbay, Revealed Attention

Igor Kopylov and Jawwad Noor*, Self-Deception and Choice

Yaron Azrieli* and Roee Teper, Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information

Craig Brett and John A. Weymark*, Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Committment

Sandeep Baliga and Jeffrey C. Ely*, Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Bias as a Memory Kludge

Daniel Monte*, Learning under Bounded Memory

Yuk-fai Fong* and Jin Li, Information and Intertemporal Signal Garbling in Relational Contract

Ying Chen*, Communication with Two-sided Asymmetric Information

Archishman Chakraborty* and Rick Harbaugh, Clearly biased experts

Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli*, Turnout and power sharing

Stefan Krasa* and Mattias Polborn, Political Competition Between Differentiated Candidates

Heski Bar-Isaac*, Ian Jewitt, and Clare Leaver, Information and Human Capital Management

Alp Atakan* and Mehmet Ekmekci, Reputation with Long-run Players

Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn*, Reputation Formation with Hidden Investment

René Kirkegaard*, Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps

Ayça Kaya* and Galina Vereschagina, Moral hazard and equilibrium matchings in a market for partnerships

Gregory Pavlov*, Communication equilibria in all-pay auctions

Itai Sher*, Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism