Canadian Economic Theory Conference
General Papers
| A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms | Abstract Paper |
| Michael Peters*, Christian Troncoso Valverde |
| Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model | Abstract Paper |
| Gabor Virag*, Stephan Lauermann, Wolfram Merzyn |
| But Who Will Monitor the Monitor? | Abstract Paper |
| David Rahman* |
| Clearly biased experts | Abstract Paper |
| Archishman Chakraborty*, Rick Harbaugh |
| Communication equilibria in all-pay auctions | Abstract Paper |
| Gregory Pavlov* |
| Communication with Two-sided Asymmetric Information | Abstract Paper |
| Ying Chen* |
| Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach | Abstract Paper |
| Daniel Garrett, Alessandro Pavan* |
| Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps | Abstract Paper |
| René Kirkegaard* |
| Game-theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium | Abstract Paper |
| Manolis Galenianos*, Philipp Kircher |
| Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection | Abstract Paper |
| Takashi Kunimoto*, Olivier Tercieux |
| Information and Human Capital Management | Abstract Paper |
| Heski Bar-Isaac*, Ian Jewitt, Clare Leaver |
| Information and Intertemporal Signal Garbling in Relational Contract | Abstract Paper |
| Yuk-fai Fong*, Jin Li |
| Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies | Abstract Paper |
| Yusuke Kamishiro, Roberto Serrano* |
| Informed Principal Problems in Generalized Private Values Environments | Abstract Paper |
| Tymofiy Mylovanov*, Thomas Tröger |
| Learning under Bounded Memory | Abstract Paper |
| Daniel Monte* |
| Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Bias as a Memory Kludge | Abstract Paper |
| Sandeep Baliga, Jeffrey C. Ely* |
| Moral hazard and equilibrium matchings in a market for partnerships | Abstract Paper |
| Ayça Kaya*, Galina Vereschagina |
| Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation | Abstract Paper |
| Bingyong Zheng*, Jimmy Chan |
| Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Committment | Abstract Paper |
| Craig Brett, John A. Weymark* |
| Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism | Abstract Paper |
| Itai Sher* |
| Political Competition Between Differentiated Candidates | Abstract Paper |
| Stefan Krasa*, Mattias Polborn |
| Reputation Formation with Hidden Investment | Abstract Paper |
| Simon Board, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn* |
| Reputation with Long-run Players | Abstract Paper |
| Alp Atakan*, Mehmet Ekmekci |
| Revealed Attention | Abstract Paper |
| Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima*, Erkut Ozbay |
| Search with Adverse Selection | Abstract Paper |
| Stephan Lauermann*, Asher Wolinsky |
| Self-Deception and Choice | Abstract Paper |
| Igor Kopylov, Jawwad Noor* |
| The Evolutionary Optimality of Decision and Experienced Utility | Abstract Paper |
| Larry Samuelson, Arthur Robson* |
| The principal-agent approach to testing experts | Abstract Paper |
| Wojciech Olszewski*, Marcin Peski |
| Turnout and power sharing | Abstract Paper |
| Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli* |
| Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information | Abstract Paper |
| Yaron Azrieli*, Roee Teper |
| Wage Posting Without Full Commitment | Abstract Paper |
| Matthew Doyle*, Jacob Wong |
*Presenter of paper