General Papers
| A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity | Abstract |
| John Quah*, Natalia Lazzati, Koji Shirai |
| Ambiguous Persuasion | Abstract |
| Jian Li*, Ming Li |
| “LEARNING-BY-SHIRKING” IN RELATIONAL CONTRACTS | Abstract |
| Arijit Mukherjee*, Jin Li, Luis Vasconcelos |
| Cheap Talk with Fixed Agenda | Abstract |
| Elliot Lipnowski*, Doron Ravid |
| Collusion Constrained Equilibrium | Abstract |
| Rohan Dutta*, David Levine, Salvatore Modica |
| Costly Advice, Protests and Nonbinding Voting | Abstract |
| Mehmet Ekmekci*, Stephan Lauermann |
| On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders | Abstract |
| Peter Norman*, Fei Li |
| Optimal Dynamic Matching | Abstract |
| Maria Baccara*, SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv |
| Subjective utilitarianism: Decisions in a social context | Abstract |
| Shiri Alon*, Ehud Lehrer |
*Presenter of paper