Canadian Economic Theory Conference
General Papers
| A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games | Abstract |
| Aggey Semenov*, David Martimort, Lars Stole |
| A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Peace | Abstract |
| Charles Zheng* |
| A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity | Abstract |
| John Quah*, Natalia Lazzati, Koji Shirai |
| Ambiguous Persuasion | Abstract |
| Jian Li*, Ming Li |
| Asymmetric Legislative Bargaining | Abstract |
| Jernej Copic* |
| “LEARNING-BY-SHIRKING” IN RELATIONAL CONTRACTS | Abstract |
| Arijit Mukherjee*, Jin Li, Luis Vasconcelos |
| Bounded Rationality and Learning: A Framework and a Robustness Result | Abstract |
| J. Aislinn Bohren, Daniel N Hauser* |
| Cheap Talk with Fixed Agenda | Abstract |
| Elliot Lipnowski*, Doron Ravid |
| Collusion Constrained Equilibrium | Abstract |
| Rohan Dutta*, David Levine, Salvatore Modica |
| Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games | Abstract |
| Yu Awaya*, Vijay Krishna |
| Costly Advice, Protests and Nonbinding Voting | Abstract |
| Mehmet Ekmekci*, Stephan Lauermann |
| Dominant Strategy Implementability, Zero Length Cycles, and Affine Maximizers | Abstract |
| Paul H. Edelman, John A. Weymark* |
| Dynamic (In)Consistency and the Value of Information | Abstract |
| Alexander Jakobsen* |
| Dynamic common-value contests | Abstract |
| Toomas Hinnosaar* |
| Framing and Salience: Regional Preference | Abstract |
| Andrew Ellis*, Yusufcan Masatlioglu |
| Incentives for quality with costly inspections | Abstract |
| Peter A Wagner* |
| Incentives in team contests | Abstract |
| Nicolas Sahuguet*, Benoit Crutzen, Sabine Flamand |
| Investment and Matching with Cheap Talk and Incomplete Information | Abstract |
| Seungjin Han* |
| Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima | Abstract |
| Takashi Kunimoto*, Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong |
| On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders | Abstract |
| Peter Norman*, Fei Li |
| OPTIMAL ALLOCATION WITH EX-POST VERIFICATION AND LIMITED PENALTIES | Abstract |
| Tymofiy Mylovanov* |
| Optimal Dynamic Matching | Abstract |
| Maria Baccara*, SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv |
| Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring | Abstract |
| Felipe Varas*, Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz |
| Relational Contracts with Learning | Abstract |
| Aditya V Kuvalekar*, Rumen Kostadinov |
| Revealed Price Preference: Theory and Stochastic Testing | Abstract |
| John Quah*, Rahul Deb, Yuichi Kitamura, Jorg Stoye |
| Structural rationality in dynamic games | Abstract |
| Marciano Siniscalchi* |
| Subjective utilitarianism: Decisions in a social context | Abstract |
| Shiri Alon*, Ehud Lehrer |
| The Dimensions of Consensus | Abstract |
| Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi* |
| The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure | Abstract |
| Yingni Guo*, Eran Shmaya |
| Truthful Continuous Implementation | Abstract |
| Yi-Chun Chen, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Mallesh Pai* |
*Presenter of paper