Presentations and authors


Last name A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z All
Track:
 

General Papers

A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games Abstract
Aggey Semenov*, David Martimort, Lars Stole
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Peace Abstract
Charles Zheng*
A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity Abstract
John Quah*, Natalia Lazzati, Koji Shirai
Ambiguous Persuasion Abstract
Jian Li*, Ming Li
Asymmetric Legislative Bargaining Abstract
Jernej Copic*
“LEARNING-BY-SHIRKING” IN RELATIONAL CONTRACTS Abstract
Arijit Mukherjee*, Jin Li, Luis Vasconcelos
Bounded Rationality and Learning: A Framework and a Robustness Result Abstract
J. Aislinn Bohren, Daniel N Hauser*
Cheap Talk with Fixed Agenda Abstract
Elliot Lipnowski*, Doron Ravid
Collusion Constrained Equilibrium Abstract
Rohan Dutta*, David Levine, Salvatore Modica
Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games Abstract
Yu Awaya*, Vijay Krishna
Costly Advice, Protests and Nonbinding Voting Abstract
Mehmet Ekmekci*, Stephan Lauermann
Dominant Strategy Implementability, Zero Length Cycles, and Affine Maximizers Abstract
Paul H. Edelman, John A. Weymark*
Dynamic (In)Consistency and the Value of Information Abstract
Alexander Jakobsen*
Dynamic common-value contests Abstract
Toomas Hinnosaar*
Framing and Salience: Regional Preference Abstract
Andrew Ellis*, Yusufcan Masatlioglu
Incentives for quality with costly inspections Abstract
Peter A Wagner*
Incentives in team contests Abstract
Nicolas Sahuguet*, Benoit Crutzen, Sabine Flamand
Investment and Matching with Cheap Talk and Incomplete Information Abstract
Seungjin Han*
Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima Abstract
Takashi Kunimoto*, Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong
On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders Abstract
Peter Norman*, Fei Li
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION WITH EX-POST VERIFICATION AND LIMITED PENALTIES Abstract
Tymofiy Mylovanov*
Optimal Dynamic Matching Abstract
Maria Baccara*, SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv
Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring Abstract
Felipe Varas*, Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz
Relational Contracts with Learning Abstract
Aditya V Kuvalekar*, Rumen Kostadinov
Revealed Price Preference: Theory and Stochastic Testing Abstract
John Quah*, Rahul Deb, Yuichi Kitamura, Jorg Stoye
Structural rationality in dynamic games Abstract
Marciano Siniscalchi*
Subjective utilitarianism: Decisions in a social context Abstract
Shiri Alon*, Ehud Lehrer
The Dimensions of Consensus Abstract
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi*
The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure Abstract
Yingni Guo*, Eran Shmaya
Truthful Continuous Implementation Abstract
Yi-Chun Chen, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Mallesh Pai*

*Presenter of paper