General Papers
| A Battle of Informed Traders and the Market Game Foundations for Rational Expectations Equilibrium | Abstract Paper |
| James Peck* |
| A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior | Abstract Paper |
| Philip J Reny* |
| A Unified Approach to Revealed Preference Theory: The Case of Rational Choice | Abstract Paper |
| John K.-H. Quah*, Hiroki Nishimura, Efe Ok |
| Aggregate uncertainty and the structure of utility functions | Abstract |
| Nabil Al-Najjar*, Luciano Pomatto |
| An Optimal Auction with Moral Hazard | Abstract Paper |
| Romans Pancs*, Arina Nikandrova |
| Arbitrage Pricing in Noncompetitive Markets | Abstract |
| Andrés Carvajal*, Marek Weretka |
| Conditional Beliefs and Higher-order Preferences | Abstract Paper |
| Byung Soo Lee* |
| Consumers on a Leash: Advertised Sales and Intertemporal Price Discrimination | Abstract Paper |
| Aniko Oery* |
| Coordinating by Not Committing: Efficiency as the Unique Outcome | Abstract Paper |
| Rohan Dutta*, Ryosuke Ishii |
| Coordination with independent private values: Why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other | Abstract Paper |
| Christoph Kuzmics* |
| Costly Search with Adverse Selection: Solicitation Curse vs. Accelerating Blessing | Abstract Paper |
| Kyungmin Kim*, Marilyn Pease |
| Discriminatory Information Disclosure | Abstract Paper |
| Hao Li, Xianwen Shi* |
| Dynamic choice over menus | Abstract Paper |
| Alejandro Francetich* |
| Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations | Abstract Paper |
| Heng Liu* |
| Freedom as Control | Abstract |
| Itai Sher* |
| Implementation with Contingent Contracts | Abstract Paper |
| Rahul Deb*, Debasis Mishra |
| Informative Cheap Talk in Elections | Abstract |
| Richard Van Weelden*, Navin Kartik |
| Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation | Abstract Paper |
| Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann* |
| Mechanism Design with Ex-Post Verification and No Transfers | Abstract Paper |
| Tymofiy Mylovanov*, Andriy Zapechelnyuk |
| Multi-stage unmediated communication in a sender-receiver model | Abstract |
| Gregory Pavlov*, Yi Chen, Maria Goltsman, Johannes Horner |
| Non-supermodular price-setting games | Abstract Paper |
| Gabor Virag*, Eray Cumbul |
| On Asymmetric Reserve Prices | Abstract Paper |
| Maciej H. Kotowski* |
| Partitional Signals in Persuasion | Abstract |
| Maxim Ivanov* |
| Political Bargaining in a Changing World | Abstract Paper |
| Juan Ortner* |
| Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining | Abstract Paper |
| S. Nageeb Ali*, B. Douglas Bernheim, Xiaochen Fan |
| Preferences for Information and Ambiguity | Abstract Paper |
| Jian Li* |
| Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté | Abstract Paper |
| Aviad Heifetz, Willemien Kets* |
| Sense and Suspense: Implementation by Gradual Revelation | Abstract Paper |
| Gorkem Celik* |
| Social Learning With Costly Search | Abstract Paper |
| Manuel Mueller Frank, Mallesh Pai* |
| Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games | Abstract Paper |
| Nicolas Klein*, Johannes Hörner, Sven Rady |
| The Prudent Principal | Abstract Paper |
| Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné*, Sandrine Spaeter |
| The Transitive Core: Inference of Welfare from Nontransitive Preference Relations | Abstract Paper |
| Hiroki Nishimura* |
*Presenter of paper