Why do politicians sometimes espouse views during electoral campaigns that are non-congruent with the majority of their electorate?  Can non-congruent statements credibly convey information to voters about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements?  We consider a model in which a representative voter is unsure whether candidates' preferences are congruent with the voter or not.  Once elected into office, reputational pressures imply that a politician of either type will pander to signal congruence.  When reputational concerns are sufficiently strong, pandering leads to non-monotonic voter welfare in her belief about the politician's congruence. This non-monotonicity allows for (partially-)informative non-binding communication during an election, even when candidates are primarily office-motivated.  A non-congruent candidate can credibly reveal his policy preferences through cheap talk, and has the incentive to do so, because this endogenously serves as a credible commitment to not pander if elected.  We find that an equilibrium with informative communication exists for a larger set of prior beliefs about candidates' congruence when post-election reputational pressures are stronger. Moreover, informative communication can either increase or decrease voter welfare relative to equilibria with  uninformative communication.