General Papers
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games | Abstract |
Aggey Semenov*, David Martimort, Lars Stole |
“LEARNING-BY-SHIRKING” IN RELATIONAL CONTRACTS | Abstract |
Arijit Mukherjee*, Jin Li, Luis Vasconcelos |
Collusion Constrained Equilibrium | Abstract |
Rohan Dutta*, David Levine, Salvatore Modica |
Framing and Salience: Regional Preference | Abstract |
Andrew Ellis*, Yusufcan Masatlioglu |
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION WITH EX-POST VERIFICATION AND LIMITED PENALTIES | Abstract |
Tymofiy Mylovanov* |
Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring | Abstract |
Felipe Varas*, Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz |
The Dimensions of Consensus | Abstract |
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi* |
Truthful Continuous Implementation | Abstract |
Yi-Chun Chen, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Mallesh Pai* |
*Presenter of paper