General Papers
A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity | Abstract |
John Quah*, Natalia Lazzati, Koji Shirai |
Ambiguous Persuasion | Abstract |
Jian Li*, Ming Li |
“LEARNING-BY-SHIRKING” IN RELATIONAL CONTRACTS | Abstract |
Arijit Mukherjee*, Jin Li, Luis Vasconcelos |
Cheap Talk with Fixed Agenda | Abstract |
Elliot Lipnowski*, Doron Ravid |
Collusion Constrained Equilibrium | Abstract |
Rohan Dutta*, David Levine, Salvatore Modica |
Costly Advice, Protests and Nonbinding Voting | Abstract |
Mehmet Ekmekci*, Stephan Lauermann |
On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders | Abstract |
Peter Norman*, Fei Li |
Optimal Dynamic Matching | Abstract |
Maria Baccara*, SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv |
Subjective utilitarianism: Decisions in a social context | Abstract |
Shiri Alon*, Ehud Lehrer |
*Presenter of paper