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CV
There is a PDF here. It might be up to date, or it might not.
Refereed publications
Robust Contracting under Double Moral Hazard (with Lukas Bolte)
Theoretical Economics 18 (4), 2023, 1623-1663
A General Framework for Robust Contracting Models (with Daniel Walton) [ online appendix ]
Econometrica 90 (5), 2022, 2129-2159
Formerly titled "When Are Robust Contracts Linear?" [ earlier version ]
Strategic Communication with Minimal Verification (with Georgy Egorov) [ more extensive earlier version ]
Econometrica 87 (6), 2019, 1867-1892
Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition
Journal of Economic Theory 181, 2019, 382-420
Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities (with Ilya Segal) [ online appendix ]
Review of Economic Studies 86 (4), 2019, 1527-1555
On
Mechanisms Eliciting Ordinal Preferences
Theoretical Economics 13 (3), 2018, 1275-1318
Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening [ online appendix ]
Econometrica 85 (2), 2017, 453-488
Robust Contracting with Additive Noise (with Delong Meng)
Journal of Economic Theory 166, 2016, 586-604
Informationally Robust Trade and Limits to Contagion
Journal of Economic Theory 166, 2016, 334-361
Formerly titled "Informationally Robust Trade Under Adverse Selection"
Locally Robust Contracts for Moral Hazard (with Delong Meng)
Journal of Mathematical Economics 62, 2016, 36-51
Robustness and Linear Contracts
American Economic Review 105 (2), 2015, 536-563
A General
Equivalence Theorem for Allocation of Indivisible
Objects
Journal of Mathematical
Economics 51, 2014, 163-177
When are Local Incentive
Constraints Sufficient? [ online appendix ]
Econometrica 80 (2),
2012, 661-686
An Efficiency Theorem
for Incompletely Known Preferences
Journal of Economic
Theory 145 (6), 2010, 2463-2470
Optimal Defaults and
Active Decisions (with James J. Choi, David Laibson,
Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick) [ online
appendix ]
Quarterly Journal
of Economics 124 (4), 2009, 1639-1674
Surveys and expository writing
Contract Theory
Chapter to appear in Online and Matching-Based Market Design (eds. Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica, Vijay V. Vazirani), Cambridge University Press, 2021
Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting
Annual Review of Economics 11, 2019, 139-166
Design for Weakly Structured Environments
In The Future of Economic Design (eds. Jean-François Laslier, Hervé Moulin, M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker), Springer, 2019, 27-33
Robust Incentives for Effort
SIGecom Exchanges 12 (2), 2013, 32-35
Working papers
Is Equal Opportunity Different from Welfarism?
Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments [ online appendix ]
Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms
Languishing papers
A Complexity Result for Undominated-Strategy Implementation
A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules [ online appendices ]
The Efficiency-Incentive Tradeoff in Double Auction Environments
Efficient Random Assignment with Constrained Rankings
Classes
Winter 2024
ECO2201: Microeconomic Theory II (PhD); second half [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
ECO317: Concepts of Fairness in Economics (undergraduate) [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Fall 2023
ECO317: Concepts of Fairness in Economics (undergraduate) [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Winter 2023
ECO2201: Microeconomic Theory II (PhD); second half [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
ECO351: Principles of Fair Decisions (undergraduate) [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Fall 2022
ECO351: Principles of Fair Decisions (undergraduate) [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Winter 2022
ECO2201: Microeconomic Theory II (PhD); second half [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
ECO351: Principles of Fair Decisions (undergraduate) [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Fall 2021
ECO351: Principles of Fair Decisions (undergraduate) [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Winter 2021
ECO2030: Microeconomic Theory II (PhD); second half [ syllabus | Quercus site ]
Older
The following are classes that I have taught at Stanford from 2013 to 2020. Syllabi, and potentially other materials, are available upon request.
Econ 50: Economic Analysis I (undergraduate, with Christopher Makler and Matthew O. Jackson)
Econ 180: Honors Game Theory (undergraduate)
Econ 220: Political Economy I (PhD, with James Fearon / with Fuhito Kojima)
Econ 221: Political Economy II (PhD, with James Fearon)
Econ 286: Game Theory (PhD)
Other things
Reading list on modeling in mechanism design
(Mostly, but not entirely, superseded by the Annual Reviews survey)
How to find me
By email: zgabriel.zcarroll@zutoronto.zca, but without the z's.
In person: Max Gluskin House, #306.
By telephone: +1 416-978-4181.