Conferences at Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2024

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Dynamic Network Influence: The Art of Strategic Messaging

Wei Li*, Xu Tan

Building: Rotman School of Management
Room: Room 1065
Last modified: 2024-05-02

Abstract


Strategic influencers send costly messages over time to persuade agents in a network. Each influencer maximizes her total discounted payoff, which decreases in the agents' opinion deviations from her agenda.  Agents update opinions by taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions and messages from the influencers. In a single influencer benchmark, early messages are more extreme to hasten agenda adoption, followed by moderate messages to align opinions with her agenda. The single influencer is worse off in networks where weights agents attach to their own opinions are farther apart from the weights agents attach to their neighbors' opinions. With multiple  influencers, if they have the same impact on agents, consensus emerges in any network as the average agenda of the influencers. If they have different impacts, in symmetric networks, consensus still emerges but it is closer to the agenda of the more impactful influencer. In asymmetric networks, influencers with different impacts often target different subgroups with differing intensity, generating perpetual disagreement and polarization.

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