A Rational Inattention Theory of Echo Chamber
Last modified: 2022-04-17
Abstract
Finite players gather information about an uncertain state before making
decisions. Each player allocates his limited attention capacity between biased
sources and the other players, and the resulting stochastic attention network
facilitates the transmission of information from primary sources to him either
directly or indirectly through the other players. The scarcity of attention leads
the player to focus on his own-biased source, resulting in occasional cross-
cutting exposures but most of the time a reinforcement of his predisposition.
It also limits his attention to like-minded friends who, by attending to the
same primary source as his, serve as secondary sources in case the information
transmission from the primary source to him is disrupted. A mandate on
impartial exposures to all biased sources disrupts echo chambers but entails
ambiguous welfare consequences. Inside an echo chamber, even a small amount
of heterogeneity between players can generate fat-tailed distributions of public
opinion, and factors a ecting the visibility of sources and players could have
unintended consequences for public opinion and consumer welfare.