

# **VIII. Macro-economic changes in the early-modern European economy**

## **C. Price Movements during the Price Revolution and 'General Crisis' eras**


**revised 26 January 2012**

<b>Week no., Wednesday Dates, and Suggested Readings</b>	<b>Lecture No.</b>	<b>LECTURE TOPICS to be covered</b>
<p>15. <b>25 January 2012</b></p> <p><b>Brady</b>, ch. 5 (Munro); ch. 4 (Yun); <b>Davis</b>, chs. 6, 9, 12;  <b>Cipolla</b>, ch. 10 (pp. 234-59);  <b>de Vries</b>, ch. 1;  <b>Musgrave</b>, chs. 1-3;  <b>ET 6, 7</b></p>	<p>16</p>	<p><b>THE COURSE OF PRICES AND ECONOMIC TRENDS:</b></p> <p><b>The Debates About the 16th Century ‘Price Revolution’ era (1520 - 1640) and the 17th-Century ‘General Crisis’ era (1640 - 1740).</b></p> <p><b>Hamilton’s ‘Profit Inflation’ Thesis;</b> and changes in factor costs with inflation and deflation.</p>


# Price Revolution: Introduction

- **(1) Historical significance:**
- - **while inflationary & deflationary cycles are a constant theme of European economic history**, from the 12<sup>th</sup> century to present day, **the Price Revolution era is unique:**
- - **longest sustained period of inflation ever recorded,**
- - **importance: changes in both the price level (CPI) and changes in relative prices often had very major impacts on economic changes and economic growth:**
- **especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors:** in early modern Europe (from ca. 1500 to 1750: eve of Industrial Revolution)
- **I will later contend that most technological innovations** were in response to changes in relative factor costs

# Price Revolution in England



The Movement of Prices in England and the Low Countries, 1400 - 1700  
 annual indexes and moving averages (13 years): mean of 1471-75 = 100




Grafiek I: Gewogen nominaal prijsindex van een pakket essentiële verbruiksgoederen in West-Brabant en Zuid-Engeland, 1400-1700: jaarlijkse indices en voortschrijdende interkwartiele medianen over 13 jaar (semi-logaritmische schaal).

Weighted price index of a basket of essential household goods in West Brabant (Antwerp-Lier region) and southern England, 1400 - 1700: annual indexes and 13-year moving averages (inter-quartile medians), on a semi-logarithmic scale.

# Price Indexes: England, Brabant, Spain

1451 - 1650: 5 yr means (1501-10 = 100)




Spain Price Index: Silver

Brabant Composite Price Index

England Composite Price Index

Spain Price Index (Vellon from 1598)

Fig. 1 Real Wages, Prices, and Population in England and Wales, 1541-1913



$$RWI = NWI/CPI$$

The Real Wage Index = Nominal Wage Index divided by the Consumer Price Index

Peter Lindert, 'English Population, Wages, and Prices: 1541 - 1913', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 15 (Spring 1985), 614.

# Price Revolution: Introduction (2)

- (2) **Debate about causes of the Price Revolution**
- (a) **The Real School**: that demographic factors (population growth) provided the primary (or even sole) cause – as suggested in the Lindert graph
- - **in my view, this thesis is badly mistaken:**
- - confuses micro-economics with macro-economics; and
- - **confuses changes in relative prices with changes in the price level (CPI)**

# Price Revolution: Introduction (3)

- (2) **Debate about causes of the Price Revolution**
- (b) **The Monetary School**: that inflation & deflation are essentially monetary phenomena
  - - **What is the more important**: changes in stocks (money supplies) or in flows (income velocity)?
  - - **not, however, purely a monetary phenomenon**: -
  - - **demographic factors probably played some role** in income-velocity changes: to be demonstrated later
  - - **changes in aggregate output (NNI) = 'y'**: endogenous or exogenous to population growth?
- (c) **how and why are modern inflations different**: in nature & form, from World War I?

**Price Levels and Price Trends in England, 1450-1749 Mean Price Indices\* and Mean Annual Rates of Price Changes, for 25-Year Periods.**

**Mean of Price Indices for 1451-1475 = 100 (Base)\***

<b>Quarter Century</b>	<b>Mean Price Index:* 1451-75=100</b>	<b>Mean Annual Percentage Change in Price Index</b>	<b>Standard Deviation (s.d.)</b>	<b>Coefficient of Variation (s.d./Mean)</b>
<b>1450-74</b>	101.4	+0.08%	7.68	7.6
<b>1475-99</b>	104.6	+0.06%	18.52	17.7
<b>1500-24</b>	115.5	+1.47%	19.21	16.6
<b>1525-49</b>	168.8	+1.56%	29.57	17.5
<b>1550-74</b>	287.2	+0.20%	41.45	14.4
<b>1575-99</b>	401.6	+2.26%	94.71	23.6
<b>1600-24</b>	505.3	+0.69%	47.94	9.5
<b>1625-49</b>	595.6	+0.95%	81.48	13.7
<b>1650-74</b>	631.6	-0.42%	72.26	11.4
<b>1675-99</b>	616.7	+0.48%	74.01	12.0
<b>1700-24</b>	617.8	-0.09%	81.03	13.1
<b>1725-49</b>	587.6	-0.17%	51.00	8.7

\* The Phelps Brown and Hopkins Price Index.

# Quantity Theories of Money 1

- (1) **Fisher Identity: Equation of Exchange:**  
 **$M.V. = P.T$** 
  - based on the **transactions** velocity of money
  - **fault:** impossibility of measuring transactions
- (2) **Friedman Version:**      **$M.V = P.y$** 
  - based on the **income velocity** of money
  - **y** = Net National Income - deflated by CPI
- - **in both:** distinguish between **monetary stocks (M)** and **monetary flows (V)**

# Quantity Theories of Money 2

- (3) **Cambridge Cash Balances (modernized)**
- -  **$M = k.P.y$**
- - in which 'k' measures that proportion of NNI (P.y) that the public chooses to hold in active cash balances (with no investment yield):
- **so that M = the quantity of money necessary to satisfy that equation**
- - **Cambridge 'k': also seen as the propensity to hoard (without earning investment income)**

# Quantity Theories of Money - 3

- (4) **Keynes: Liquidity Preference:**
- the component factors explaining 'k': to hold active cash balances (instead of spending or investing)
- - **transactions motive**
- - **precautionary motive** (for a 'rainy day')
- - **investment + speculative motive**
- **opportunity cost of 'k'**: forgoing income earned from investing those same funds
- - **Cambridge 'k' = reciprocal of Friedman 'V'**: i.e, the Income Velocity of Money
- ➔  **$k = 1/V; V = 1/k$**

# Quantity Theories of Money - 4

- (5) **Basic Assumptions involved in both Quantity Theories:**
- a) **Classical Quantity Theories → Fisher Identity:**
- i) **That economies always operate at Full Employment ('the norm') → so that  $T$  (i.e,  $Y$ ) is at its maximum, while  $V$  is fixed (short term)**
- ii) **Thus, an increase in  $M$  must lead to a proportional increase in  $P$  (inflation): if  $T$  and  $V$  are fixed**

# Quantity Theories of Money - 5

- b) **Keynes' Liquidity Preference Theory:**
- an increase in  $M$  will lead to a fall in Fisher's  $V$  (velocity) = a rise in Cambridge  $k$ , for two reasons:
- i) **Both  $V$  and  $k$  ( $V = 1/k$ ) reflect society's ability to economize on its use of money:** if  $M$  is more plentiful, more money will be kept as cash balances ( $\Delta k$ ) = decline in  $V$
- ii) **An increase in  $M$ , with LP constant, will result in a fall in interest rates**  $\rightarrow$  increase in ' $k$ ' (i.e., reduction in opportunity cost) and also in ' $y$ '
- iii) **The economy was/is rarely, if ever, at Full Employment**

626 The importance of money in the circular flow





Fig. 43.1 The Keynesian model. (i) The consumption function (ii) The transactions demand for money ( $T$ ) varies with the level of income ( $Y$ ) (iii) The speculative and precautionary demand for money ( $LP$ ) varies with the rate of interest ( $r$ ) (iv) Investment ( $MEI$ ) varies with the rate of interest ( $r$ )

# Keynes: Liquidity Preference & interest rates



# Quantity Theories of Money - 6

- (6) **My views on anticipated changes from  $\Delta M$**
- - a) **some possible decrease in  $V$**   $\rightarrow$  a rise in 'k'
- - b) **some increased investment** - from a fall in interest rates  $\rightarrow$  an increase in Friedman 'y'
- **N.B.:  $Y = NNI = NNP$ : is a 'real' variable (not monetary)**
- -c) **some increase in  $P$  (CPI: price level)**: but never proportionate to the increase in  $M$

# Quantity Theories of Money - 7

- -d) **possible exception: coinage debasements**, increasing  $M$ , **may** also increase  $V$  (= fall in  $k$ ): as a 'flight from money' into real assets
- - **but not during Henry VIII's 'Great Debasement' (1542-51)**
- - **also not so during 15<sup>th</sup> century Flemish debasements**
- (7) **Changes in Friedman's 'y' (NNI = NNP): 'real' variable**
- - an endogenous or exogenous variable?
- - what was the impact of population growth and technological changes on 'y'?

## Debasements and Inflation in Medieval and Early Modern Europe

### Relationships between the debasements of the Flemish

#### silver penny groot and changes in the Consumer Price Index in Flanders, 1409 - 1484

Consumer Price Index: base 1451-75 = 100

Years	Silver Content of the Flemish silver penny in grams	percentage change from previous coinage	Value of 1 kg fine silver in £ groot Flemish	percentage change from previous coinage	Year 1	Year 3	Price Index in Year 1	Price Index in Year 3	Percentage Change 2 years
1409	1.182		3.524						
1416	0.958	-18.95%	4.349	23.39%	1416	1418	118.916	92.239	-22.43%
1418	0.850	-11.30%	4.903	12.75%	1418	1420	92.239	98.118	6.37%
1428	0.749	-11.91%	5.566	13.53%	1428	1430	112.317	125.849	12.05%
1433	0.814	8.80%	5.116	-8.09%	1433	1435	139.210	108.046	-22.39%
1466	0.703	-13.67%	5.926	15.83%	1466	1468	95.930	96.153	0.23%
1467	0.677	-3.77%	6.158	3.92%	1467	1469	102.146	96.000	-6.02%
1474	0.597	-11.79%	6.981	13.37%	1474	1476	108.208	92.370	-14.64%
1477	0.522	-12.50%	7.979	14.29%	1477	1479	98.775	149.327	51.18%
1482	0.466	-10.71%	8.936	12.00%	1482	1484	193.932	120.307	-37.96%

**Relationships between the debasements of the English  
sterling silver penny and changes in the Consumer Price Index in England, 1346 - 1544**

**Consumer Price Index: base 1451-75 = 100**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Silver Content of the English silver penny in grams</b>	<b>percentage change from previous coinage</b>	<b>Value of 1 kg fine silver in £ sterling English</b>	<b>percentage change from previous coinage</b>	<b>Year 1</b>	<b>Year 3</b>	<b>Price Index in Year 1</b>	<b>Price Index in Year 3</b>	<b>Percentage Change 2 years</b>
<b>1346</b>	1.199		3.476						
<b>1351</b>	1.079	-10.00%	3.862	11.11%	<b>1351</b>	<b>1353</b>	128.695	132.567	3.01%
<b>1412</b>	0.899	-16.67%	4.634	20.00%	<b>1412</b>	<b>1414</b>	103.557	107.673	3.97%
<b>1464</b>	0.719	-19.99%	5.793	25.00%	<b>1464</b>	<b>1466</b>	88.062	105.511	19.81%
<b>1526</b>	0.639	-11.11%	6.517	12.50%	<b>1526</b>	<b>1528</b>	137.120	184.364	34.45%
<b>1542</b>	0.491	-23.14%	8.479	30.11%	<b>1542</b>	<b>1544</b>	174.939	180.847	3.38%

Formula to relate the percentage change in the silver content of the coin (reduction by debasement) and the increase in the money-of-account value of fine silver: i.e., the expected rate of increase in the money supply and of inflation:

$$\Delta T = [1/(1 - x)] - 1$$

$\Delta T$  = % change in the money-of-account value of the silver **traite**: per pound or kg of fine silver

$x$  = % change (reduction) in the silver content of the penny (as a decimal)

# Quantity Theories of Money - 8

- (8) **Monetarists and Keynesian views on  $V$  and  $k$  ( $V = 1/k$ ):**
- - **Monetarists:** believe that  $V$  ( $1/k$ ) is fixed or relatively stable, at least in the short-run
- - **Keynesians:** believe the opposite:
- that  $V$  is very flexible in the short run
- - **Keynesians also believe that  $k = 1/V$  is very responsive to changes in interest rates:** that it will rise when interest rates fall

# Recent Canadian Monetary Experience - 1

- (1) **Behaviour of  $V = 1/k$ : 1975 to 2011**
- -  **$V$  (based on  $M$  as  $M1+$  Gross):**
- - has ranged from a low of 2.843 in 2011 ( $k = 0.342$ ) to the previous high of 7.228 in 1981 ( $k = 0.138$ )
- -  $V$  had risen from 1975 (and earlier) to this 1981 peak:
- - **Note the considerable expansion in the money supply ( $M1+$ ) -- and Keynes proposition:** that  $V$  will fall (' $k$ ' with a rise in  $M$ : also seen in Mayhew's table).

### Money Supply, GDP, Interest Rates, and Prices in Canada, 1975 - 2011: Annual Means of monthly data

Year	M MI+ Gross \$ billions	V = Y/M Income Velocity of MI+ Gross	k =1/V Cambridge cash balances	P CPI 2002=100	y = Y/CPI Real GDP: \$ billions in 2002 dollars	GDP = Y Gross Domestic Product in \$ billions at current market prices	Population Canadian population in millions	Inflation: Percent Change in CPI	Bank Rate Bank Rate (percent)	Real GDP p.c. Real GDP per capita in 2002 dollars
1975	34.913	4.973	0.20109	28.96	599.591	173.6210	23,102,980	10.68%	8.500	25,952.96
1976	35.719	5.599	0.17860	31.14	642.211	199.9940	23,414,365	7.55%	9.292	27,428.10
1977	39.682	5.569	0.17958	33.63	656.984	220.9730	23,694,035	8.01%	7.708	27,727.83
1978	42.886	5.710	0.17513	36.65	668.229	244.8770	23,935,651	8.95%	8.979	27,917.74
1979	44.782	6.243	0.16018	39.99	699.065	279.5770	24,170,445	9.13%	12.104	28,922.30
1980	51.033	6.161	0.16232	44.05	713.637	314.3900	24,471,129	10.16%	12.891	29,162.40
1981	49.873	7.228	0.13836	49.53	727.771	360.4710	24,785,059	12.43%	17.931	29,363.30
1982	55.175	6.885	0.14525	54.88	692.151	379.8590	25,083,479	10.80%	13.958	27,593.90
1983	62.592	6.573	0.15215	58.10	708.123	411.3860	25,336,505	5.86%	9.553	27,948.74
1984	70.527	6.375	0.15687	60.60	741.943	449.5820	25,577,353	4.30%	11.312	29,007.80
1985	89.427	5.431	0.18411	63.00	771.009	485.7140	25,813,854	3.96%	9.647	29,868.03
1986	102.767	4.987	0.20050	65.63	780.952	512.5410	26,068,353	4.18%	9.214	29,957.87
1987	108.522	5.151	0.19415	68.48	816.218	558.9490	26,399,956	4.34%	8.403	30,917.38
1988	116.428	5.266	0.18990	71.25	860.441	613.0940	26,754,940	4.05%	9.686	32,160.06
1989	125.911	5.224	0.19143	74.81	879.187	657.7280	27,219,748	4.99%	12.293	32,299.60
1990	128.499	5.291	0.18899	78.40	867.246	679.9210	27,638,583	4.76%	13.045	31,378.10
1991	134.510	5.095	0.19626	82.80	827.738	685.3670	27,987,829	5.62%	9.034	29,574.92
1992	139.841	5.009	0.19964	84.00	833.905	700.4800	28,319,473	1.49%	6.783	29,446.34
1993	151.501	4.800	0.20834	85.60	849.514	727.1840	28,648,235	1.86%	5.088	29,653.28
1994	156.280	4.933	0.20273	85.70	899.502	770.8730	28,958,270	0.16%	5.766	31,062.00
1995	160.398	5.053	0.19792	87.60	925.144	810.4260	29,262,649	2.17%	7.308	31,615.18
1996	179.464	4.663	0.21445	88.90	941.354	836.8640	29,570,577	1.58%	4.531	31,834.15
1997	197.601	4.467	0.22385	90.40	976.475	882.7330	29,868,726	1.62%	3.521	32,692.21
1998	205.509	4.452	0.22461	91.30	1,002.161	914.9730	30,125,715	0.99%	5.104	33,265.97
1999	221.764	4.430	0.22573	92.90	1,057.525	982.4410	30,369,575	1.73%	4.917	34,821.87

Year	M M1+ Gross \$ billions	V = Y/M Income Velocity of M1+ Gross	k =1/V Cambridge cash balances	P CPI 2002=100	y = Y/CPI Real GDP: \$ billions in 2002 dollars	GDP = Y Gross Domestic Product in \$ billions at current market prices	Population Canadian population in millions	Inflation: Percent Change in CPI	Bank Rate (percent)	Real GDP p.c. Real GDP per capita in 2002 dollars
2000	231.436	4.652	0.21497	95.38	1,128.783	1,076.577	32,352,977	2.70%	5.771	34,889.62
2001	254.823	4.348	0.22997	97.78	1,133.170	1,108.048	31,129,298	2.52%	4.313	36,402.05
2002	282.192	4.086	0.24477	100.00	1,152.905	1,152.905	31,446,719	2.27%	2.708	36,662.17
2003	296.506	4.092	0.24440	102.75	1,180.706	1,213.175	31,734,093	2.75%	3.188	37,206.22
2004	322.897	3.998	0.25013	104.66	1,233.452	1,290.906	32,038,401	1.86%	2.500	38,499.17
2005	344.243	3.991	0.25057	106.98	1,284.267	1,373.845	32,352,977	2.21%	2.917	39,695.49
2006	371.124	3.908	0.25588	109.12	1,329.220	1,450.405	32,690,242	2.00%	4.313	40,661.06
2007	402.631	3.799	0.26323	111.45	1,372.444	1,529.589	33,048,782	2.14%	4.604	41,527.83
2008	436.712	3.672	0.27236	114.09	1,405.373	1,603.418	33,448,916	2.37%	3.208	42,015.50
2009	491.771	3.109	0.32163	114.43	1,336.140	1,528.985	33,856,945	0.30%	0.650	39,464.28
2010	551.750	2.944	0.33962	116.47	1,394.908	1,624.608	34,254,344	1.78%	0.850	40,722.09
2011	599.765	2.843	0.35173	119.86	1,422.668	1,705.181	34,605,346	2.91%	1.250	41,111.22

# Recent Canadian Monetary Experience - 2

- 2) **Cambridge 'k' and the Bank Rate:**
- - **Keynes also predicted that 'k' will vary inversely with the bank rate:**
- **Why? Because holding cash balances has an opportunity cost: foregoing investment income**
- **in 1981, Bank Rate was at its high – 17.931% and Cambridge 'k' was at that low of 0.138**
- - **in 2010: Bank Rate = 0.850% and  $k = 0.340$  (but 0.352 in 2011, when Bank Rate rose to 1.250%)**

**Mayhew's Estimates of Money Supplies, Velocity, Prices, and National Income  
in England, 1300 - 1670**

<b>Date</b>	<b>1300</b>	<b>1470</b>	<b>1526</b>	<b>1546</b>	<b>1561</b>	<b>1600</b>	<b>1643</b>	<b>1670</b>
<b>Money Supply in millions of £ sterling</b>	0.900	0.900	1.400	1.450	1.450	3.500	10.000	12.000
<b>Velocity (Income V)</b>	5.178	3.889	3.571	5.517	9.310	6.286	3.500	3.407
<b>Price Level: PBH Index</b>	104.800	104.600	135.100	172.300	289.300	478.300	597.800	635.700
<b>National Income Y in millions £ st.</b>	4.660	3.500	5.000	8.000	13.500	22.000	35.000	40.880
<b>Population in millions</b>	6.000	2.300	2.300	2.900	3.000	4.100	5.100	5.000

Source: Nicholas J. Mayhew, 'Population, Money Supply, and the Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300-1700', *Economic History Review*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ser. 48:2 (May 1995), p. 244.

# Recent Canadian Experience - 3

- (3) **Relationship between M and Price level**
- a) **Money supply (M1+)**: grown from \$34.913 billion in 1975 to \$599.765 billion in 2011: a 17.178 fold increase (= 1617.88%)
- b) **The CPI (2002=100)**: has increased from 28.96 in 1975 to 119.86 in 2011: only a 4.138 fold increase (= 313.88%)
- c) **Real GDP (2002 dollars)**: has grown from \$599.591 billion in 1975 to \$1,422.668 billion in 2011 (+137.27%)
- d) **Population**: grown from 23.102 million in 1975 to 34.605 million in 2011 (1.498 fold increase = 49.79%)

# Recent Canadian Experience - 3

- 4) **Conclusions on the Quantity Theory:**
- a) **the expansion in M was offset by:**
  - - a fall in V (= rise in 'k')
  - - an expansion in  $y = \text{NNP}$  (here: real GDP)
- b) **importance of population growth:** contributed to growth in GDP, thus offsetting inflationary force of  $\Delta M$
- c) **Growth in Real GDP per capita (\$2002):** from \$25,953 in 1975 to \$41,111 in 2011 (1.584 fold increase = 58.40% increase)


# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution era (1520 – 1650) - 1

- (1) **Basic premise of the Real School is a fallacy**: that population growth itself 'caused' the Price Revolution:
- a) **Note: inflation began before the demographic recovery**:
- - **inflation**: from about 1515 (in England & Low Countries)
- - **demographic growth**: from the 1520s (in same regions)
- b) **this Real model confuses micro- and macro-economics**:
- i) **Yes: population growth** can produce an increase in individual, **relative prices** -- for grains, lumber, fuels, etc.,
- ii) **But: population growth by itself cannot cause a rise in the general price level: in the CPI**

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution era (1520 – 1650) - 2


- c) **micro-economics**: rise in prices of necessities (whose production subject to diminishing returns) would lead, in context of family budget constraints, to reduced demand and → relative fall (real fall) in prices of other commodities
- d) **key factor**: differences in supply & demand elasticities, in the longer run (see graphs)

# Relative price changes with population growth



# English Prices 1501-1770 (1451-75=100)


## Grain, Livestock, Industrial Prices



- Grain Prices
- Livestock Prices
- ▲ Composite Price Index
- Industrial Prices

# Brabant: Price Indexes, 1451-1700

## grain, livestock, industrial, composite



—□— Grain Price Index

—△— meat & fish price index

—◇— Industrial price index

—●— Composite Index 1451-75=100

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (3)


- (2) **Keynesian Aggregate Demand: Population growth and inflation:**
- a) **If we shift the aggregate demand curve upwards, on basis of population growth**, and we see a rise in the price level, what are we missing in this model?
- b) **the fact that prices in the model are measured in terms of a silver-based money-of-account**
- i) **note that with a rise in price level from  $P(1)$  to  $P(2)$** , the value of  $PQ(1)$  rises from £17,220 to £122,960 for the value of  $PQ(2)$ :
- ii) **where does all that extra money come from: an increase in  $M$  or an increase in  $V$ , or both??**

# AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND AGGREGATE DEMAND:

## POPULATION, MONEY, AND PRICES


A. Price Level 1:  $D_1 \cdot S_1 = 42 \cdot 410 = \text{£}17,220 (P_1, Q_1)$

B. Price Level 2:  $D_4 \cdot S_4 = 106 \cdot 1160 = \text{£}122,960 (P_2, Q_2)$




# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (4)

- (3) **The Phillips Curve (1958 article):** demonstrating a negative correlation between changes in unemployment rates and the price level, 1861 - 1913
- **the closer an economy reached full employment, the higher rose the price level**
- - conversely: the higher the unemployment, the more stable was the price level-
- **note difference from the Keynesian L-shaped national income diagram:  $Y = C+I+G+(X-M)$**




(a) Aggregate expenditures-domestic output approach

FIGURE 10-8 Recessionary and inflationary gaps



(a) Recessionary gap



(b) Inflationary gap

# The Phillips Curve: relating unemployment and money wage rates





Fig.1. 1861 - 1913


# KEYNES AND PHILLIPS

## Inflation with Full Employment: the Keynes L-Shaped Relation (Inverted)



## The Inverted Phillips Curve:

degrees of inflation with unemployed and then fully employed resources



# Keynes: the General Theory (1936)

- It is probable that the general level of prices will not rise very much as output increases, so long as there are available efficient unemployed resources of every type.
- **But as soon as output has increased sufficiently to begin to reach the ‘bottle necks’, there is likely to be a sharp rise in the prices of certain commodities.**

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (5)

- (1) The potential effects on population growth on money, output, and prices:
- a) **On Supply Side:**
    - i) **fuller employment** of existing resources
    - ii) **→ diminishing returns and rising marginal costs** in agriculture and natural-resource (extraction) industries

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (6)

(1) The potential effects on population growth on money, output, and prices: cont'd

b) **On the Demand Side:**

- i) **increased demand for money** (increased 'k') → reduce inflationary impact from  $\Delta M$
- ii) **changes in structure of demand** with more urbanization (Goldstone effect)
- iii) **changes in population's age pyramid** → larger families with more children per adult → further changes in aggregate demand (Lindert effect)

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (7)

- (2) **The Goldstone Velocity Theory of Inflation:**
- -a) **the case of England:** rapid population growth produced disproportionate urbanization, with far more complex, more fully monetized market structures (agriculture + industry)-
- **accompanied by growth of commercial + financial institutions:** → much more credit used
- “in occupationally specialized linked networks, the potential velocity of circulation of coins grows as the square of the size of the network”


# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (8): Velocity A

- b) **Major Problems with the Goldstone thesis:**
- i) **in both England and Low Countries, Price Revolution began before 1520 (ca. 1515) – before any signs of significant population growth (as stressed earlier)**
- ii) **Note the similarity of the degree of inflation in both countries:**
- but Low Countries had become far more urbanized, commercialized, and more advanced in these more complex networks a century before England

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (9): Velocity A

- b) **Major Problems with the Goldstone thesis:**
- iv) **pretends that velocity is a demographic variable:**
  - it is of course a **monetary** variable –  $V = 1/k$ .
- iii) **ignores all the evidence on vast increases in the money supply** in both countries: as presented in last lecture, for England & Low Countries

The Movement of Prices in England and the Low Countries, 1400 - 1700  
 annual indexes and moving averages (13 years): mean of 1471-75 = 100




Grafiek 1: Gewogen nominaal prijsindex van een pakket essentiële verbruiksgoederen in West-Brabant en Zuid-Engeland, 1400-1700: jaarlijkse indices en voortschrijdende interkwartiele medianen over 13 jaar (semi-logaritmische schaal).

Weighted price index of a basket of essential household goods in West Brabant (Antwerp-Lier region) and southern England, 1400 - 1700: annual indexes and 13-year moving averages (inter-quartile medians), on a semi-logarithmic scale.

# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (10): Velocity B

- (3) **The Lindert Velocity Model:**
- **How population growth may have led to an increase in the income velocity of money:**
- a) **by raising the cost of living:** especially in food prices + fuel → reduction in demand for idle balances, inducing dishoarding
- b) **by increasing family size and thus ratio of dependent children (non-earners) to adults** → similarly reducing cash balances, inducing dishoarding
- c) **but how long could this have been sustained?**

Fig. 2 Income Velocity of Money, England and Wales, 1526-1913 (UK after 1873)



# The Role of Population in the Price Revolution (11): Velocity C

- (4) **Nicholas Mayhew on Income Velocity of Money in England:**
- a) **agrees with Lindert, Goldstone, Miskimin:** that the income velocity of money ( $V$ ) rose during the Price Revolution era (1520 – 1650)
- b) **But, before and after, he agrees with Keynes:** that increases in the money supply → fall in income velocity of money = rise in 'k': primarily because of a fall in real interest rates (Keynes LP schedule)
- c) **Changed composition of the coinage supply:**
- **shift from gold to silver**, with a far higher transactions & income velocity for silver coins:

**Mayhew's Estimates of Money Supplies, Velocity, Prices, and National Income  
in England, 1300 - 1670**

<b>Date</b>	<b>1300</b>	<b>1470</b>	<b>1526</b>	<b>1546</b>	<b>1561</b>	<b>1600</b>	<b>1643</b>	<b>1670</b>
<b>Money Supply in millions of £ sterling</b>	0.900	0.900	1.400	1.450	1.450	3.500	10.000	12.000
<b>Velocity (Income V)</b>	<b>5.178</b>	<b>3.889</b>	<b>3.571</b>	<b>5.517</b>	<b>9.310</b>	<b>6.286</b>	<b>3.500</b>	<b>3.407</b>
<b>Price Level: PBH Index</b>	104.800	104.600	135.100	172.300	289.300	478.300	597.800	635.700
<b>National Income Y in millions £ st.</b>	4.660	3.500	5.000	8.000	13.500	22.000	35.000	40.880
<b>Population in millions</b>	6.000	2.300	2.300	2.900	3.000	4.100	5.100	5.000

**ENGLAND: SILVER AND GOLD COINAGE OUTPUTS:**

**in kg. fine metal and in £ sterling values  
in quinquennial means: 1501-05 to 1596-1600**


<b>Year</b>	<b>SILVER Total kilograms</b>	<b>SILVER Value £ sterling</b>	<b>GOLD Total kilograms</b>	<b>GOLD Value £ sterling</b>	<b>TOTAL VALUES in £ sterling</b>	<b>Percent Silver</b>	<b>Percent Gold</b>
1501-05	4,313.544	24,988.026	516.604	33,392.271	58,380.297	<b>42.80%</b>	<b>57.20%</b>
1506-10	3,633.212	21,046.916	1,523.115	98,451.267	119,498.183	<b>17.61%</b>	<b>82.39%</b>
1511-15	1,089.012	6,308.562	694.599	44,897.564	51,206.126	<b>12.32%</b>	<b>87.68%</b>
1516-20	79.145	458.481	743.656	48,068.530	48,527.011	<b>0.94%</b>	<b>99.06%</b>
1521-25	3,148.207	18,237.317	442.136	28,578.780	46,816.096	<b>38.96%</b>	<b>61.04%</b>
1526-30	9,244.701	60,248.025	736.422	54,079.255	114,327.280	<b>52.70%</b>	<b>47.30%</b>
1531-35	4,616.832	30,088.071	189.160	13,890.972	43,979.043	<b>68.41%</b>	<b>31.59%</b>
1536-40	5,684.094	37,043.459	406.719	29,826.052	66,869.511	<b>55.40%</b>	<b>44.60%</b>
1541-45	5,707.032	100,776.324	963.792	79,997.508	180,773.832	<b>55.75%</b>	<b>44.25%</b>
1546-50	22,029.731	402,892.436	1,992.083	188,860.922	591,753.358	<b>68.08%</b>	<b>31.92%</b>
1551-55	9,428.855	121,874.569	136.583	16,023.336	137,897.905	<b>88.38%</b>	<b>11.62%</b>
1556-60	4,152.477	36,023.662	137.533	23,955.867	59,979.529	<b>60.06%</b>	<b>39.94%</b>
1561-65	24,263.303	210,873.247	255.828	24,682.712	235,555.960	<b>89.52%</b>	<b>10.48%</b>
1566-70	11,097.432	96,429.852	236.160	22,790.897	119,220.749	<b>80.88%</b>	<b>19.12%</b>
1571-75	8,806.166	76,520.164	102.633	9,934.572	86,454.736	<b>88.51%</b>	<b>11.49%</b>
1576-80	8,071.535	70,489.334	76.197	7,416.226	77,905.560	<b>90.48%</b>	<b>9.52%</b>
1581-85	16,056.314	139,852.039	337.318	32,770.995	172,623.034	<b>81.02%</b>	<b>18.98%</b>
1586-90	6,405.349	55,658.544	185.206	17,957.031	73,615.575	<b>75.61%</b>	<b>24.39%</b>
1591-95	18,653.363	162,086.240	178.498	17,306.684	179,392.924	<b>90.35%</b>	<b>9.65%</b>
1596-00	7,461.690	64,837.491	131.637	12,736.568	77,574.058	<b>83.58%</b>	<b>16.42%</b>

# Monetary, Demographic, and Price Trends, 1348 - 1750

- (1) **1348 – 1370s: Era of the Black Death**
- - severe demographic crises & rapid population decline (40%)
- - but also severe inflation
- (2) **1370s – 1490s: late-medieval ‘Great Depression’: second phase**
- - continued demographic decline & stagnation
- - two ‘bullion famines’ → severe deflation (except during major wars + debasement)
- (3) **1490s – 1520s: monetary expansion**, commercial-economic recovery, but no inflation
- (4) **1520s – 1640s: era of Price Revolution**: monetary, economic, then demographic expansion, with sustained inflation
- (5) **1640s – 1740s: era of the ‘General Crisis’ with:**
- - **monetary contraction** → deflation (except during wartime)
- - **demographic decline** or stagnation

# England & Flanders: Price Indexes

CPI in quinquennial means, 1346-1500



English CPI


Flemish CPI 1451-75=100

# Money, Population, Prices: before and during the Price Revolution era


- (1) **the South German-Central European mining boom: c. 1460 – c. 1540:**
- -a) **ended late-medieval ‘bullion famines’** -- with a five-fold expansion in European silver + copper supplies
- - b) **rise of the Antwerp Market, from 1460s:** based on tripod of **English woollens, German metals (& banking), Portuguese Asian spices**
- c) **note that this monetary and economic expansion** well preceded the demographic recovery & expansion (from 1520s)
- in both England and Low Countries (not before 1520)
- if somewhat earlier in Italy and South Germany

# THE NETHERLANDS UNDER CHARLES V 1506-55

Scale 1: 4,000,000 (64 miles = 1 inch)



-  Territories formerly held by Burgundy
-  Territories added by Charles V
-  Church Lands
- 1543 Year of acquisition




# Money, Population, Prices: before and during the Price Revolution era (2)

- (2) **Why was there no Price Revolution from 1460s to ca. 1520?**
- a) **Major expansion in Central European mining came after 1516:** opening of Joachimsthal silver mines (Bohemia)
- b) **Venetian wars with Turks from 1490s:** curbed trade with & silver exports to Levant
- - **1517: Ottoman conquest of Mamluk Egypt and Syria + the new Portuguese trade with Asia:** severe drop in Venetian silver + copper exports → more German silver and copper going to Antwerp market
- - **but somewhat offset by Portuguese silver exports to Asia**
- c) **changes in aggregate supplies:** elastic before 1510?

# German-Central European Silver Mining

## silver outputs in kg: 1471/5 - 1546/50



—◆— Saxony

—●— Bohemia: Joachimsthal


—×— Hungary

—+— Total Silver Outputs in kg (est)

—⊠— Thuringia


—⊠— Slovakia: Fuggers

—■— Tyrol: Schwaz




**GROWTH of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE**  
 Scale 1:20,000,000 (320 miles = 1 inch)  
 Statute Miles  
 0 50 100 200 300

Ottoman lands in 1307  
 " " " 1359  
 " " " 1451  
 Conquests of Mohammed II 1451-1481  
 " " " Selim I. 1512-1520 (including small gains of Bajazet II.)  
 Conquests of Solymn the Magnificent 1520-1566  
 Conquests from 1566-1683  
 Dependent states are shown in bands of colour



**(B)**  
 Scale 1:30,000,000 (480 miles = 1 inch)  
 Statute Miles  
 0 150 300

East from Greenwich



**Central European Copper Production and Exports: in Kilograms of Fine Copper  
with exports to Venice and Antwerp, in quinquennial means: 1491-95 to 1536-40**

	<b>Total Outputs</b>	<b>Exports: Total</b>	<b>To Venice</b>	<b>To Venice</b>	<b>To Antwerp</b>	<b>To Antwerp</b>
	<b>Estimated in kg</b>	<b>kg</b>	<b>kg</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>kg</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>1491-95</b>	1,980,746					
<b>1496-00</b>	2,704,948	1,390,392.3	446,742.2	32.13%	72,545.1	5.22%
<b>1501-05</b>	3,041,820	1,403,347.5	409,357.8	29.17%	453,686.4	32.33%
<b>1506-10</b>	4,770,333	1,627,847.0	184,642.0	11.34%	819,753.4	50.36%
<b>1511-15</b>	5,654,047	1,659,584.9	60,358.6	3.64%	968,521.4	58.36%
<b>1516-20</b>	5,203,097	1,388,953.7	29,544.6	2.13%	606,520.0	43.67%
<b>1521-25</b>	5,341,702	1,434,963.1	66,809.2	4.66%	488,633.1	34.05%
<b>1526-30</b>	5,275,248	1,062,740.6	54,876.6	5.16%	625,457.9	58.85%
<b>1531-35</b>	4,628,886	1,008,644.5	111,652.6	11.07%	543,443.9	53.88%
<b>1536-40</b>	4,336,708	1,207,783.7	150,544.0	12.46%	593,242.8	49.12%

# Money, Population, Prices: before and during the Price Revolution era (3)

- c) **Lessons from the Philips curve:**
- - **there were so many unemployed resources** (land, labour, capital) from the late-phase of the 'Great Depression' era, that economic recovery & growth took place with elastic supplies of inputs, without rising MC → so no price increases
- **that 'bottlenecks' and rising marginal costs not encountered** before ca. 1515-1520: still much 'slack' in the economy
- - **problem:** no significant population growth in NW Europe before the 1520s

# Money & Population during the Price Revolution era, c. 1520 – 1640 (4)

- (3) **Money supplies: more rapid expansion**
- a) **height of the Central European mining boom:** ca. 1520 – ca. 1540
- b) **influx of gold, then silver from Spanish America,** especially from 1550s
- c) **coinage debasements:** England + Low Countries: but not in Spain
- (2) **Credit: financial revolution in negotiable credit instruments + negotiable public debts:** from 1520s
- (3) **Population growth:** from the 1520s: effects of  $\Delta$  urbanization on income velocity of money?

# Monetary Approach to Balance of Payments (1)


- 1) **Read lectures:** for today and last week
- 2) **Problem 1: suppositions of Classical School on international trade and inflation**
  - a) **favourable balance of trade** (export revenues > imports)  
→ bullion influx →  $\Delta M$  → inflation
  - b) **unfavourable trade balance** → bullion outflow → fall in M → deflation
- 3) **Problem 2: Inflation was European-wide, but**
  - a) **Not all countries could have had a continuous favourable** trade balances
  - b) **especially with  $\Delta$  bullion outflows in trade** with Levant, southern Asia, Baltic zone

# Monetary Approach to Balance of Payments (2)

- (4) **Solution: Monetary Approach to Balance of Payments:** Prof. Harry Johnson
- a) **world bullion stocks determine overall world price level** (in terms of silver)
- b) **'law of one price' in international trade (arbitrage):** will establish same commensurate price level in each country
- c) **each country's money supply adjusts** to accommodate that increased price level

# Price Indexes: England, Brabant, Spain

1451 - 1650: 5 yr means (1501-10 = 100)



— Spain Price Index: Silver


— Brabant Composite Price Index

— England Composite Price Index

— Spain Price Index (Vellon from 1598)

# POPULATION: ENGLAND & WALES 1541-1741

in millions, by decades



—●— Population in Millions    —□— Birth Rate per 1000    —▲— Death Rate per 1000

# Consequences of Inflation: Impact on Factor Costs of Production - 1

- (1) **Hamilton's Thesis of 'Profit Inflation': on lagging real wages and 16<sup>th</sup> century industrialization**
- a) **his most famous role: Quantity Theory of money** in explaining Price Revolution
- b) **also important for his thesis on the origins of modern industrial capitalism**
- - contended that during the Price Revolution, wages lagged behind consumer prices, providing entrepreneurs with growing profits
- - argued that industrial entrepreneurs invested those **extra profits** in more capital-intensive, larger scale forms of industry

# Consequences of Inflation: Impact on Factor Costs of Production - 2

- -c) **that this was much more true of England than of Spain or France:** → hence a major reason why England became homeland of the Industrial Revolution
- -d) **his 'profit inflation' thesis was warmly endorsed by J. M. Keynes** (who actually coined the phrase).
- - e) **Note: historically, during periods of inflation, wages do indeed lag behind consumer prices (irrespective of demographic changes): so that real wages necessarily fall [RWI = NWI/CPI]**

# Consequences of Inflation: Impact on Factor Costs of Production - 3


- f) **problems with Hamilton's 'profit inflation' thesis:**
- i) **what prices? Hamilton never clear on this crucial issue:** the CPI, agricultural or industrial prices?
- if the CPI, heavily weighted with food prices, rose, how would falling real wages benefit entrepreneurs?  
**[RWI = NWI/CPI]**
- - **rising food + fuel prices would, with budget constraints, curb much of the market demand for industrial goods from wage earners**
- - **though impact would have been somewhat offset by rising real incomes for agricultural producers**

# Consequences of Inflation: Impact on Factor Costs of Production - 4

- f) **problems with Hamilton's 'profit inflation' thesis:**
- ii) **the true issue must be: did industrial wages lag behind the wholesale prices for the same industrial products?**
- iii) **even if wages did lag, did entrepreneurs encounter other rising input or factor costs during Price Revolution era?**
- iv) **Even if industrial entrepreneurs did earn increased profits, why would they choose to invest them in more capital intensive forms of larger scale industry, if labour was becoming relatively cheaper?**

# Spain: Price & Wage Indexes 1501-1650


## Price, Nominal, Real Wage Indexes



- ×— Price Index (Silver based)
- ▲— Money Wage Index
- Grain Price Index
- Price Index (vellon from 1598)
- ▲— Real Wage Index (NWI/CPI)

# English Prices 1501-1770 (1451-75=100)


## Grain, Livestock, Industrial Prices



- Grain Prices
- Livestock Prices
- ▲ Composite Price Index
- Industrial Prices

# English Prices and Wages, 1401-1750


Price & Wage Indices: 1451=75=100



- PBH Composite Price Index
- Real Wage Index (Masons)
- Nominal Wage Index (Masons)

# England: Prices & Wages, 1501-1675

5 yr means: 1501-10=100



■ Doughty Wage:IndPrice Ratio

■ England Composite Price Index

▲ Real Wage Index (harmonic)


+ PBH Ind Price Index

■ PBH Money Wage:Ind Price Ratio

■ Doughty Ind Price Index

# Money Wages and Industrial Prices

England, 1451 - 1750




— Industrial Prices (1451-75=100)

— Composite Price Index (1451-75=100)

— Mason's Wages (1451-75=100)

# Brabant: Price Indexes, 1451-1700

## grain, livestock, industrial, composite



—□— Grain Price Index


—△— meat & fish price index

—◇— Industrial price index

—●— Composite Index 1451-75=100

# Brabant Price & Wage Indexes 1451-1670


## Industrial Prices, CPI, Nominal Wages



- x— Nominal Wage Index: Master Builders
- Composite Price Index
- ▲— Industrial Price Index

# Prices & Wages in England & Brabant

1501 - 1670: 5 yr means (1501-10=100)



England CPI

England Ind Price Index

England Real Wage Index

England Ind Price Wage Ratio

Brabant CPI

Brabant Ind Price Index

Brabant Real Wage Index

Brabant Ind Price Wage Ratio

# Consequences of Inflation: Impact on Factor Costs of Production (5)

- (2) **Land Rents: did they rise with agricultural prices?**
- - **English agriculture: customary (servile) rents did not rise:** fixed by custom, in money-of-account terms
- - **Agriculture & Enclosures:**
- - incentives for landlords to evict customary tenants, to re-capture 'economic rent' on land, with rising grain prices
- - **leasehold lands:**
- - **rents were fixed** for the period of contractual leases,
- so that those renting such lands (farmers, industrial entrepreneurs) benefited from rising prices of products produced on those leasehold lands

# Consequences of Inflation: Impact on Factor Costs of Production (6)

- (3) **Other land-based factor costs: rising costs of wood-based fuels in particular** → led **John Nef** (Hamilton's Chicago colleague) to offer his alternative thesis on origins of modern industrial capitalism in Price Revolution era, in Tudor-Stuart England
- - **we will deal with the Nef thesis in the final lecture on Tudor Stuart 'Industrial Revolution'**
- (4) **Capital and Interest: did inflation cheapen capital costs? YES: it did cheapen the costs of previously borrowed capital**

## Investment in a Blast Furnace During Inflation

### Hypothetical Example, with 5% annual inflation (compounded)

**Loan Contract: £1,000 principal to be repaid in full in ten years, with annual interest payments of 10% (£100) paid each year for ten years.**

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>INTEREST</b>	<b>VALUE OF OUTPUT</b>
1	£100	£500.00
2	£100	£525.00
3	£100	£551.25
4	£100	£578.81
5	£100	£607.75
6	£100	£638.14
7	£100	£670.05
8	£100	£703.55
9	£100	£738.73
10	£100	£775.66

# Deflation during the 'General Crisis' era, c. 1650 – c. 1740: 1

- (1) **Deflation from the 1650s to the 1740s:** except for the war-torn 1690s
- (2) **Possible Causes? last day's lecture:**
  - a) **monetary contraction:** as **outflows** of silver to Baltic, Levant, East Asia **exceeded** the declining influx from the Americas
  - b) **demographic contractions or slumps**
  - c) **declines in the income velocity of money?**

# Deflation during the 'General Crisis' era, c. 1650 – c. 1740: 2

- 3) **Problems: with and from deflation:**
- a) **raised the real and relative factor costs of production:**
- i) **wage stickiness:** nominal wages remain flat → real wages rise with deflation
- ii) **land rent contracts: fixed by leases for many years** (up to 99 years): fixed nominal rents thus → rising real burden of rent with deflation
- iii) **interest rates by longer-term contracts:** similar situation with nominal rents → rising real rates

# Deflation during the 'General Crisis' era, c. 1650 – c. 1740: 3

- b) **deflation hurts credit and curbs investment**
- i) **fear of non-repayment**: paper credit generally contracts more than the coined money supplies
- ii) **reluctance to borrow**: with anticipated rises in real interest rates
- iii) **economic pessimism**: reduces incentives to produce and invest