# VIII: Macro- and Structural Changes in the European Economy, 1500 – 1750

A. Population: Demographic Movements and Changes,

c. 1500 – c. 1750

revised 11 January 2012

PART II:		SECOND SEMESTER: JANUARY TO APRIL 2012
Week no., Wednesday Dates, and Suggested Readings	Lect- ure No.	LECTURE TOPICS to be covered
13. 11 January 2012  Brady, ch. 1 (de Vries); ch. 2 (Wiesner); Davis, ch. 6; Cipolla, chs. 5, 10 (pp. 234-37); de Vries, ch. 1; Musgrave, chs. 1-3  ET 6	14	MACRO-ECONOMIC CHANGES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES: Population Growth in the 'Price Revolution era' (ca. 1520-1640): a Malthusian Crisis?  Population Stagnation/Decline during the 'General Crisis' era (1640-1750); on the Eve of the 'Vital' and 'Industrial' Revolutions.  [Mid-year voluntary take-home test: due on 18 January 2012]

#### MAJOR ECONOMIC & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

A. THE MEDIEVAL 'COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION' ERA: RAPID POPULATION GROWTH:

ca. 1100 - ca. 1320 (Phase A)

B. LATE MEDIEVAL 'GREAT DEPRESSION': DEMOGRAPHIC CATASTROPHE

ca. 1320 - ca. 1460 (strong Phase B)

C. ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC RECOVERIES

ca. 1460 - ca. 1520 (mild Phase A)

D. THE 'PRICE REVOLUTION' ERA: STRONG DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH

ca. 1520 - ca. 1640 (strong Phase A)

E. THE 'GENERAL CRISIS' ERA of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century: DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE OR STAGNATION

ca. 1640 [or 1620] - ca. 1740 (mild phase B)

F. THE INDUSTRIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC ('VITAL') REVOLUTIONS

ca. 1740 - ca. 1820 (strong Phase A)

## Demographic Changes from 1500 to 1750: Introduction

- (1) To the eve of the Industrial Revolution
- this Revolution was accompanied by a 'Vital Revolution': an unprecedented growth in population in England and Wales
- from 1760 to 1810: English/Welsh population doubled from about 6 to 12 million
- from 1810 to 1910: it tripled again to 36 million
- Continental Europe's population also grew far more rapidly from 1760s than ever before – if not at the same rate as England's population

## Demographic Changes from 1500 to 1750: Introduction 2


- (2) Recovery from the late-medieval demographic crises: a population decline of about 40% in 14<sup>th</sup> & 15<sup>th</sup> centuries
- causes of that decline involved both mortality & fertility
   -- and not just the Black Death
- (3) did recovery begin in mid-15<sup>th</sup> century?
- a) Italy was probably the first region to experience any renewed population growth
- b) Florence's population fell from ca. 120,000 in 1338 to 37,144 in 1427 (almost 70%) )
- - c) no signs of recovery in Florence until the 1460s
- - then more substantial growth: see table for Florence
- c) in north west Europe: no recovery until ca. 1520

## **Population of Florence (Tuscany)**

Date	Estimated Urban Population
1300	120,000
1349	36,000?
1352	41, 600
1390	60,000
1427	37,144
1459	37,369
1469	40,332
1488	42,000
1526 (plague year)	70,000

#### The Population of Europe

1300 - 1800, in millions




## Demographic Changes from 1500 to 1750: Introduction 3

- (3) The Confusing Case of England:
- -a) our estimate of English demographic recovery and subsequent growth depends on conflicting population estimates for 1300:
- - J C Russell (1948): 3.75 million (in 1347)
- Michael Postan (1966, 1972) and most other historians after him: a maximum of 6 million in 1300
- - Hallam (1988): argued for 7 million (or more) in 1290s
- - Jan de Vries (1994): 3.7 million as in Russell
- - Bruce Campbell and Pamela Nightingale (1996): from 4.0 to 4.5 million (probably closer to 4.0 million)
- - b) English population estimate for 1520 (the end of the demographic decline and stagnation): 2.25 to 2.50 million (England + Wales)
- so even the Campbell estimate for 1300 means a demographic decline of 50%!
- - c) Southern Low Countries: also reached demographic nadir ca. 1500-10

### **ENGLISH POPULATION ESTIMATES**

1088 - 1523: in Millions



#### Population Decline and Poverty in the Duchy of Brabant, 1437 - 1496 Number of Family Hearths (Households) and Percentage of Total Hearths without Taxable Income ('Poor Hearths'): 1437, 1480, and 1496

Area of Census	1437: no. of hearths in census	1437: per- cent poor hearths	1480: no. of hearths in census	1480: per- cent poor hearths	1496: no. of hearths in census	1496: no. of poor hearths	Percent Change from 1437 to 1496
Brussels	6,376	10.5	7,414	7.9	5,750	17.1	-9.82%
Antwerp	3,440	13.5	5,450	10.5	6,586	12.5	91.45%
Leuven	3,579	7.6	3,933	18.3	3,069	n.a.	-14.25%
s'Hertogen- bosch	2,883	10.4	2,930	7.9	3,456	n.a.	19.88%
Sub-total Large Towns	16,278	10.5	19,727	14.8	18,861	11.8.	15.87%
Small Towns	14,159	9.2	12,216	28.1	10,600	11.8.	-25.14%
Villages	62,301	29.7	54,540	31.6	45,882	n.a.	-26.35%
Total Duchy	92,738	23.4	86,483	27.3	75,343	n.a.	-18.76%
Percentage Change from 1437			-6.74%		-18.76%		

#### EUROPEAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS, 1000 - 1450 A.D.

Area	1000 A.D.	1320 A.D.	1450 A.D.
Mediterranean: Greece, Balkans, Italy,	17.0	25.0	19.0
Iberia (Spain and Portugal)	(44%)	(34%)	(38%)
West-Central: Low Countries, France,	12	35.5	22.5
Germany, Scandinavia, British Isles	(31%)	(48%)	(45%)
Eastern Europe: Russia, Poland-	9.5	13.0	9.5
Lithuania, Hungary, Bohemia	(25%)	(18%)	(19%)
TOTALS:	38.5	73.5	51


Source: J.C. Russell, 'Population in Europe, 500 - 1500', in Carlo Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of Europe, Vol. I: The Middle Ages, 900-1500 (London, 1972), pp. 25-70: Table 1, p. 19.


## **Demographic Recovery Factors 1**

- (1) Diminution of Warfare:
- end of Hundred Years War (1337-1453)
- wars continued, but on a far smaller scale, and more localized geographically
- (2) Diminution of the plague:
- less frequent, more geographically localized,
- with lower mortalities

### **Demographic Recovery Factors 2**

- (3) Economic recovery: preceding demographic recoveries
- a) English cloth trade and rise of the Antwerp market: 1420s to the 1460s
- b) restoration of long-distance continental trade: from Venice via Alps through South Germany, Frankfurt, down the Rhine to the Brabant Fairs: from 1440s
- c) the South German-Central European silver-copper mining boom, from the 1460s to the 1530s: diverting silver from Venice to Antwerp
- d) supremacy of the Antwerp market: ca. 1460 ca. 1550:
- based on the TRIPOD of English woollens, South German metals, Portuguese-Asian spices (last: from 1500)





### **European Marriage Pattern**

- 1) Low Pressure Demographic System: with potentially low birth and also low death rates →
- permitted far greater variance or elasticity in birth rates, so that BR became the dynamic variable
- as opposed to Universal Marriage Pattern: high pressure system with high (maximum) birth and high death rates, so that DR was always the dynamic variable
- 2) If EMP operative in NW Europe by 15<sup>th</sup> century, perhaps rising real incomes promoted much higher birth rates:
- thus: → earlier marriages → larger families (since women far more fertile in early 20s than later).
- also increased proportion of women who married (i.e., reduced the extent of female celibacy)

## Price Revolution Era: Population changes, ca. 1520 – ca. 1640

- (1) From early 16<sup>th</sup> to mid 17<sup>th</sup> century: most of Europe experienced dramatic demographic recovery and growth: in some place surpassing the medieval peak (but in England?)
- (2) Total European population grew: from perhaps 60.9 in 1500 to 97.10 million in 1750: about 60%
- (3) Important regional shifts: from 1500 to 1800
- - NW Europe: grew from 12.5% to 20.7% of total
- Mediterranean Europe: declined from 30.0% to 25.5%
- (4) Not just European: Islamic North Africa & Asia also experienced dramatic recovery & growth.


#### The Populations of Europe, by Regions, 1500 - 1800 in millions

Region	1500	1550	1600	1650	1700	1750	1800
North West	7.6	9.5	11	14.25	15.1	17.4	25.3
NW % of Europe	12.5%	13.6%	14.1%	19.2%	18.1%	17.9%	20.7%
Central Europe	29	33.75	36.9	33.5	38.2	43.8	53.5
Cent % of Europe	47.6%	48.3%	47.4%	45.0%	45.7%	45.1%	43.8%
Mediter- ranean	18.3	20	22.3	19.6	22.8	26.5	31.2
Med: % of Europe	30.0%	28.6%	28.6%	26.3%	27.3%	27.3%	25.5%
Eastern Europe	6	6.6	7.7	7.1	7.4	9.4	12.2
Eastern: % of Europe	9.9%	9.5%	9.9%	9.5%	8.9%	9.7%	10.0%
TOTAL	60.9	69.85	77.9	74.45	83.5	97.1	122.2

Source: Jan De Vries, 'Population', in T.A. Brady, H.A. Oberman, and J.D. Tracy, eds., Handbook of European History, 1400-1600, Vol. I: Structures and Assertions (Leiden, 1994), p. 13

#### The Population of Europe

1300 - 1800, in millions



**★** Estimate 1 (Russell) **←** Estimate 2 (Various)

## European Cities: 1500 - 1750 (1)

- (1) Change from 1300: when Europe's largest cities were all in Mediterranean: then accounting for only 8% of total population
- Constantinople (now Istanbul): 200,000 300,00
- Venice and Milan: about 150,00: Florence: 120,000
- Paris: largest in north: 50,000 or 300,000?
- (2) 1500 1600: despite late-medieval demographic decline, Europe now had 5 cities over 100,000:
- Paris and esp. Naples (latter: 281,000 by 1600): now the largest, with Constantinople (capital of Ottoman Empire)
- how did they grow? from rural immigration (because DR exceeded BR)

## European Cities: 1500 - 1750 (2)

- (3) 1600 great urban leap forward: to 14 cities from 50,000 – 100,000; 12 cities over 100,00, plus another 3 cities over 400,000
- London: the largest about 500,000
- - Paris and Constantinople: next largest
- - despite demographic shift to north, Mediterranean basin still more urbanized: 17% of total, vs. 10% north of the Alps (towns of 5,000+)
- (4) 1750: Europe now had 512 cities between 50,000 100,000;
- 43 from 100,000 400,00; 4 over 400,000:
- urban population now 12% of total: denser now in north.

#### **Number of Cities in the Indicated Population Range**

YEAR	50,000- 100,000	100,000 400,000	Over 400,000
1300	4	3 - 4	0
1500	5	5	0
1650	14	12	3
1750	512	43	4

### **European Urbanization**

- (5) Urban growth: again from rural immigration: WHY?
- (6) Economic Importance of Growing Cities
- (a) now engines of economic growth: as centres of trade, finance, and more industry
- (b) Large, efficient, concentrated markets → savings on transaction costs (scale economies)
- (c) skilled labour: better education & training →
  greater, more productive division of labour
- (d) better access to commercial & financial facilities

## Feeding Early Modern Towns (1)

- (1) Rising agricultural productivity: lectures on English & Dutch agriculture: from 1400 to 1700, productivity doubled
- (2) New grain-producing settlements in eastern Europe: East Elbia: Prussia and Poland
- growth promoted by Hanseatic & Dutch shipping (from Danzig: estuary of Vistula)
- (3) Greater commercialization of agriculture


## Feeding Early Modern Towns (2)

- (4) Overseas discoveries & colonizations: in the New World
- North Atlantic (Newfoundland) cod fisheries
- New crops introduced from Americas:
- - maize (corn): from North America into S. Europe
- potatoes: from South America into N. Europe (1600)
- sugar, tea, coffee: from New World and Asia
- But new crops not widely grown, and new beverages not widely consumed until later 17<sup>th</sup> century
- Americas and Asia: also not a major source of grains before the later 19<sup>th</sup> century (see ECO 303Y)

## Was there an incipient Malthusian crisis by early 17<sup>th</sup> century?


- Some statistical evidence of Malthusian problems:
- (1) rising real food prices (i.e., relative to other commodity prices): possible evidence of diminishing returns in European agriculture?
- (2) declining real wages: at least for industrial workers paid time rates (how many?)
- (3) rising mortality and falling birth rates: at least in England
- (4) evidence of increased frequencies of famines:
- in France (to 1789); but not England, after ca. 1610-20






#### **POPULATION: ENGLAND & WALES 1541-1741**

in millions, by decades



Population in Millions — Birth Rate per 1000 — Death Rate per 1000



RWI = NWI/CPI

The Real Wage Index = Nominal Wage Index divided by the Consumer Price Index

Peter Lindert, 'English Population, Wages, and Prices: 1541 - 1913', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 15 (Spring 1985), 614.




Figure 3. Real Wage Trends and the Crude First Marriage Rate in England. Both in 25-year moving averages.

Real Wage Rate: Construction wage rates deflated by an index of the cost of consumables. Crude First Marriage Rate: Marriages per 1000 population, excluding re-marriages.





Figure 11.6: England in the late sixteenth century


Note: Net migration = immigration less emigration

#### **English Commodity Prices 1501 - 1675**

PBH Indexes in 5 yr means: 1451-75=100





## English Price Indexes, 1451-1750 grain, livestock, industrial, composite




#### **England: Phelp Browns & Hopkins Index**


Prices: 1451 - 1750 (1451-75=100)









## Brabant: Price Indexes, 1451-1700 grain, livestock, industrial, composite




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
#### England: Prices & Wages, 1501-1675 5 yr means: 1501-10=100



#### Prices and Wages in England, 1451-1750 Quinquennial means: 1451-75=100




## Prices and Wages in Brabant, 1451-1670 5 yr means: mean 1451-75=100



#### Masons' Real Wages: Antwerp & England

real wages: consumer baskets 1401-1670



Antwerp Masons: real wage



### The KUZNETS CURVE: 1


- 1) The U-Curve: a new perspective on the relationship between population growth, economic growth, and living standard
- a new look at the early-modern Malthusian problem
- 2) Simon Kuznets (1901-85): Russian-born US economist who won Nobel Prize in Economics in 1971: 'for his empirically founded interpretation of economic growth'

#### The KUZNETS CURVE: 2


- 1) Modern economic growth and industrialization: begins by shifting incomes and wealth from lower to upper economic strata: from wage-earners to profit/rent earning entrepreneurs
- 2) Entrepreneurs use such wealth accumulations to create new wealth → economic growth → while reducing real incomes of lower classes: i.e., with more highly skewed income distributions

### The KUZNETS CURVE: 3

- 3) Fruits of modern economic growth → ∆
  increased productivity → raising real incomes
  for all of society, including lower classes
- 4) Applicability to Price Revolution era (1520-1640)?: No evidence of any turn to rising real wages – which continue to fall
- because of Kuznets or Malthusian curves?
- 5) No such rise in RW until 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of Industrial Revolution era, from the 1840s (or more, from the 1870s): examined in ECO 303Y



#### **Kuznets Curve**



### **Lorenz Curve: Income Distribution**




FIGURE 6-2

## The Era of the General Crisis: ca. 1620 – ca. 1750


- 1) Neither demographic nor economic growth continued from the Price Revolution era into the era of the modern Industrial Revolution
- 2) An intervening era known as the 'General Crisis' era: ca. 1620 ca. 1750
- 3) Main Economic Features:
- a) demographic decline or stagnation
- b) increased warfare (30 Yrs War) → commercial crises → industrial declines
- c) deflation or price stagnation
- d) but evidence of rises in real wages: wage stickiness

#### **Hobsbawm & the General Crisis 1**

- 1) Eric Hobsbawm (b. 1917): British Marxist historian who put forward his Marxist thesis of a 'General Crisis' in the 17<sup>th</sup> century (ca. 1620 – 1750) to explain origins of modern capitalism
- 2) Hobsbawm opposed both demographic and monetary explanations for the General Crisis
  - that is true of almost all Marxist historians

#### **Hobsbawm & the General Crisis 2**

- 3) Chief features of Hobsbawm's 'Crisis': -involving 'internal contradictions', crises →
  resolutions (promoting capitalism), in:
- a) the Feudal capitalist economy: chiefly of Italy
- b) the Home Market (in western Europe):
- c) The Eastern Markets: East of the Elbe (eastern Germany, Bohemia, Poland, Russia, etc)
- d) The Overseas Markets: the Crisis of 'Old Colonialism' → producing 'New Colonialism'



MAP I The 'General Crisis'

## 'General Crisis' Era: Demographic Reverses, c. 1620 – c. 1740

- (1) Evidence for demographic reverses: decline or stagnation from the 1620s:
- - Germany & Central Europe: lost perhaps 30%-35%: but population flights from 30 Yrs War (1619-1648)?
- - Italy and Spain: from 20% to 30% losses
- - France: up to 20%, especially in war-afflicted areas
- even England and Netherlands lost some population: see graphs
- England: decline from 5.6 million (1650) to 5.3 million (1590): no sustained growth until 1740s
- most European regions had recovered from any losses by the 1740s: hardly comparable to late Middle Ages






Fig. 1. Population decrease in the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War. (After G. Franz.)


#### **POPULATION: ENGLAND & WALES 1541-1741**

in millions, by decades





Graph 3.6. Estimated Total Population of Holland, 1514-1795.



Graph 3.2. Urban Population of Holland, 1514-1795.

## **Causes of Demographic Reverses?**

- (1) Increased Malthusian Factors?
- (2) Warfare → famines → increased mortality from diseases – and adverse climate changes??
- (3) Role of Climate: the 'Little Ice Age'
- a) causes not fully known:
- b) sun-spot cycles: the 'Maunder Minimum'?




Figure 2. Corrected reconstruction with 95% confidence intervals. Data for this graph is online at <a href="http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/AGW/Loehle/">http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/AGW/Loehle/</a>




Figure 1. Mean of temperature data for 18 series.

Data archived at http://www.ncasi.org/programs/areas/climate/LoehleE&E2007.csv




Figure 3. Random selection of 14 data sets at a time without duplicates, repeated 18 times, then overlaid, showing robustness of the pattern.

### **Demographic Reverses: Climate**

- c) Economic Consequences of Climate Changes:
- negative impact on agriculture: shortened growing season + lower outputs per acre
- increased costs of food + fuel consumption
- effects on fisheries? not known
- increased famines + malnutrition → reduced resistance to diseases
- ecological + biological impact on bacteria + viruses?? yet to be fully explored

## **Demographic Crises: Warfare**

- 1) Thirty Years War (1618 1648): involving most of Germany, Poland, Sweden, Russia, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and the Low Countries (north & south)
- instigating civil wars, anarchy, brigandage, emigration
- evidence of depopulation in Germany + Central Europe: possibly mass flights of refugees rather than net population decline
- -2) effect of sustained, chronic warfare: disrupting food production + distribution; malnutrition; spreading diseases
- 3) demographic effects seemed to have delayed consequences: in generation following 1648 (Peace of Westphalia)

## **Demographic Crises: Diseases 1**

- a) Bubonic Plagues: revival 1630s to 1670s
- b) Syphilis: 'The French Disease':
- from French invasions of Italy: 1494 1559
- Did Columbus (1492) bring it back from the Americas (see lecture notes)?
- probable origin: Portuguese slave trade
- from West Africa, from 1440s: mutation of African yaws

## Demographic Crises: Diseases 2

- syphilis: far more virulent and far more contagious (not just sexually) than now: most diseases mutate into milder forms
- c) small pox: probably the most virulent killer
- Spanish conquests of Americas: their small pox wiped out most of the indigenous population (those not killed with guns)
- d) Others: pneumonia, typhus, tuberculosis, amoebic dysentery (cholera: not till 1820s)

## **Demographic Crises: Diseases 3**

- (d) Bacteria & water-borne diseases
- bacterial transmission of diseases unknown before discoveries of Koch (1876) and Pasteur (1878)
- Miasma theory held sway for centuries: diseases spread by atmospheric vapours
- - Koch + Pasteur discoveries → water purification systems
- e) alternatives to water & milk as beverages
- medieval: beer and wine
- early-modern: introduction of tea & coffee (Asian)
- f) negative impact of Δ urbanization: increased urban pollution (water, etc) and contagion: so that urban death rates always exceeded birth rates, before late 19<sup>th</sup> century

# European Marriage Pattern: Fertility Problems 1


- (1) Falling Birth Rates: and the EMP
- birth rates fell before death rates rose
- England: birth rate fell from 37.8/1000 in 1540s to 31.50 in 1590s to 25.74 in 1650s
- (2) Changes in European Marriage Pattern:
- increased female celibacy: higher proportion of women who never married

# European Marriage Pattern: Fertility Problems 2

- (3) Service in Husbandry, EMP, and birth rates:
- agrarian institution: farmers hired young women as both farm and household labour, as virtual members of the family household (necessarily unmarried)
- food, board, annual cash payments (later used as dowries)
- such women often worked to late 20s
- hence later average age of first marriage + higher celibacy rates
- (4) Industrial Revolution: offering better paid
   employment → rapid decline of this institution → lower
   age of 1<sup>st</sup> marriage → reduced celibacy rates → higher
   birth rates + larger families

#### **POPULATION: ENGLAND & WALES 1541-1741**

in millions, by decades



#### Demographic Profile of Colyton, 1560 - 1837

Period	Average Age of First Marriage for:		Completed Period Family Size of		L i f e Expectancy Both Sexes
	Males	Females	Women married under 3		at Birth
1560-1646	27	27	6.4	1538-1624	43 years
1647-1719	28	30	4.2	1625-1699	37
1720-1769	26	27	4.4	1700-1774	42
1770-1837	27	25	5.9		


Sources:

E.A. Wrigley, 'Family Limitation in Pre-Industrial England', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser. 19 (1966), 82-109; E.A. Wrigley, *Population and History* (1969), p. 87.

#### Marriages, Births, and Deaths in Colyton, Devonshire, 1550 - 1830

#### Rates per thousand, in nine-year moving averages

E. A. Wrigley, 'Family Limitation in Pre-Industrial England', Economic History Review, 2<sup>nd</sup> ser., 19 (1966).



#### Changing Demography of Colyton, Devonshire (England)

#### Average (Mean) Age of First Marriage, 1560-1837

Period	Men	Women
1560 - 99	28.1 years	27.0 years
1600 - 29	27.4	27.3
1630 - 46	25.8	26.5
1647 - 59	26.9	30.0
1660 - 99	27.6	28.8
1700 - 19	28.1	30.7
1720 - 49	26.2	27.2
1750 - 69	25.0	26.3
1770 - 99	27.6	26.4
1800 - 24	25.6	24.9
1825 - 37	25.9	23.3

#### Mean Age of First Marriage, i.e., in Bachelor-Spinster Marriages

#### in England (various counties, over time), in ten-year intervals

DECADE	MALES	FEMALES
1590 - 99	29.30	25.60
1600 - 09	28.30	25.70
1610 - 19	27.50	25.60
1620 - 29	27.60	25.20
1630 - 39	27.30	25.20
1640 - 49	27.40	25.70
1650 - 59	27.50	25.60
1660 - 69	27.40	25.90
1670 - 79	28.00	26.20
1680 - 89	27.70	25.80
1690 - 99	27.10	25.90
1700 - 09	27.40	26.00
1710 - 19	27.30	26.30
1720 - 29	27.00	25.90
1730 - 39	26.90	25.50
1740 - 49	26.50	24.80
1750 - 59	26.10	25.00
1760 - 69	25.90	24.50




Figure 5.2 Mean age at first marriage: bachelor/spinster marriages (quinquennial and decennial data)

*Note*: each reading refers to the decade or quinquennium beginning in the year indicated: hus the 1620 reading refers to 1620–5 or 1620–9 as appropriate.


#### **Other Demographic Factors**


- (4) Contraception: more significant in 17<sup>th</sup> century? – condoms from sheep membranes
- (5) English Emigration: especially to North American + Caribbean colonies
- Wrigley: emigration was the major factor in population dip of the 1670s
- (6) Dutch Emigration to East Indies: VOC –
   high proportion of Dutch sailors died also

- (1) The End of the Bubonic Plague:
- a) last outbreaks:
- - England: 1665: London plague
- - France: 1720: Marseilles plague
- Italy: 1733: Messina plague (NE Sicily)
- Ottoman Turkish & Russian Empires: plague remained endemic to 1820s: ended there by quarantine measures

- 2) End of the Plague: Helleiner's rat theory (CEH, IV)
- arrival of a newcomer, the brown (Rattus norvegicus) rat displaced the black rat (Rattus rattus), the traditional culprit: in carrying the plague-bearing fleas (bacillus: Yersinia pestis)
- that brown rat was 'ecologically superior' and did not host plague fleas
- 3) Problems with this theory: for the brown rats
- (a) brown rat came too late: not till 1720s & 1730s in England & France
- (b) did not displace black rats: cohabited with them
- (c) they also hosted the rat fleas with Yersinia pestis

- 4) Quarantine Measures?
- strict medical isolation of travellers for 40 days (with cordon sanitaire at frontiers)
- supposedly ended plagues in France, Russian, and Turkish Empires
- - but not used for London plague of 1665: not effective till 17<sup>th</sup> century
- British failed in using quarantines in 20<sup>th</sup>-century India (1896-1947): where penicillin proved effective after WWII (today: major drug is tetracycline)





- 5) Appleby's Biological-Genetic Theory:
- that surviving rats developed an immunity to plague:
- perhaps because of genetic changes in plague bacillus or in the fleas
- so that rat fleas did not desert their hosts to sub-optimize by feeding on humans
- Appleby never explained clearly how this worked: no real proof

- 6) disappearance of bubonic plague (2<sup>nd</sup> Pandemic): remains a mystery not yet fully explained
- 7) But disappearance of plagues is important:
- meant that changes in birth rates now became the more important demographic variable
- even if other diseases and other mortality
   factors cannot be discounted as Wrigley does
   (ECO 303Y)

#### English and French Population, 1681 - 1821 in millions:

Year	England and Wales	England only	France	England as % of France
1681	5.28	4.93	22.4	22%
1821	12.31	11.49	30.2	38%

#### Growth Rates of English, French, and Dutch Populations from 1681 to 1821 (% per annum)

Country	% per annum	Overall % growth
England	0.95%	133%
France	0.28%	39%
Netherlands	0.06%	8%




FIGURE 2 CRUDE BIRTH RATES IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND, 1740–1869




FIGURE 3
CRUDE DEATH RATES IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND, 1740–1869