Barriers to Entry and Regional Economic Growth in China

By Loren Brandt, Gueorgui Kambourov and Kjetil Storesletten

November 07, 2018
Barriers to Entry and Regional Economic Growth in China*

Loren Brandt†  Gueorgui Kambourov‡  Kjetil Storesletten§
University of Toronto  University of Toronto  University of Oslo

Abstract

The non-state manufacturing sector has been the engine of China’s economic transformation. Up through the mid-1990s, the sector exhibited large regional differences; between 1995 and 2004 we observe rapid convergence in terms of productivity, wages, and new firm start-up rates. To analyze the drivers of this behavior, we construct a Hopenhayn (1992) model that incorporates location-specific capital wedges, output wedges, and a novel entry barrier. Using Chinese Industry Census data we estimate these wedges and examine their role in explaining differences in performance across prefectures and over time. Entry barriers turn out to be the salient factor explaining performance differences. We investigate the empirical covariates of these entry barriers and find that barriers are causally related to the size of the state sector. Thus, the downsizing of the state sector after 1997 may be important in explaining the regional convergence and manufacturing growth after 1995.

Keywords: Chinese economic growth; SOEs; firm entry; entry barriers; capital wedges; output wedges; SOE reform.


†University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 150 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7, Canada. E-mail: brandt@chass.utoronto.ca.
‡University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 150 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7, Canada. E-mail: g.kambourov@utoronto.ca.
§University of Oslo, Department of Economics, 0317 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: kjetil.storesletten@econ.uio.no.
1 Introduction

Since the onset of economic reform in the late 1970s, China has gone from one of the poorest economies in the world to being a middle-income country. The main source of this growth has been the expansion of the non-state sector (Zhu (2012)), especially in manufacturing. While the non-state sector has experienced a rapid expansion at the national level, the growth has been highly uneven with significant differences across regions and localities. By the mid-1990s, this was reflected in sizable local differences in productivity, wages, and the number and size of non-state enterprises (NSOE). Subsequently, these differences between localities in the non-state sector began to disappear, and from the mid-1990s we observe a remarkably rapid economic convergence between localities, not only in value added per worker in non-state firms, but also in TFP, capital per worker, and wage rates.

The purpose of this paper is to examine this convergence process through the lens of a macroeconomic model where the distribution and selection of firms matter for productive efficiency. In particular, we use this framework as an accounting device to determine which factors drove the initial dispersion across locations and the subsequent changes. The theoretical framework is motivated by the empirical observation that the creation and selection of new firms in China’s non-state sector have been the most important source of productivity and output growth in the manufacturing sector (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012)). In principle, any one of a number of factors might be responsible for differences in new firm creation and growth between regions. In addition to differences in local endowments – e.g. human capital and market access – distortions in local capital and output markets might also be important. Indeed, differences in access to capital and the distortions, taxes, and subsidies imposed by local governments figure prominently in many narratives about China’s development (cf. Huang (2003)). Differences across firms and, possibly, locations in the distribution of distortions are also the focus of the literature arguing that misallocation of factor inputs can explain an important share of differences in productivity across countries and firms (Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)).

To quantify the role of various channels we construct a Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) model, extended to allow three distortions. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009) we allow for capital and output wedges. These wedges are prefecture-specific. In addition, we introduce a novel entry barrier which may differ across locations. This entry barrier takes the form of a probability that potential entrepreneurs who would like to enter will be allowed to operate. We solve the general equilibrium model analytically and show that the model aggregates. Namely, the underlying wedges can be derived using data on average wage rates and aggregate allocations of output, capital, and employment in a prefecture. Thus, by construction these wedges can account for the observed aggregate allocations in a given prefecture.

The three distortions affect the economy through different mechanisms. Increasing any of the distortions will lower the equilibrium wage rate in a prefecture. The mechanism is that larger distortions will lower the entry rate of new firms and thereby lower the demand for workers. However, the distortions have differential effects on aggregate prefecture TFP. Larger output and capital distortions imply that only the most productive firms will choose to operate. This positive selection of entrants induces an increase in aggregate TFP. In contrast, larger entry barriers will lower the productivity threshold for entering firms due to lower equilibrium wage. This creates negative selection and, hence, lower aggregate TFP. Thus, the entry barrier is the only distortion that can cause a positive correlation between wages and aggregate TFP across locations and over time. This turns out to be a key feature of the data.

We measure the theoretical wedges using firm-level data from the Chinese Industrial Census (CIC) for 1995, 2004, and 2008. We construct data on value added, employment, capital, and
average wage rates for each prefecture in China by aggregating the firm-level data. Focusing on aggregate allocations and distortions at the prefectural level – as opposed to the firm level – makes the analysis robust to measurement error at the firm level. To our knowledge our paper is the first to quantify distortions driving regional growth in China and the first to address measurement error in firm-level data in the presence of time-varying distortions. The CIC data have some clear advantages. First, national account data are not available at the prefectural level. Second, the CIC data allow us to study theoretical predictions about the number of firm entrants and the firm size distribution since these data cover the whole manufacturing industry, not only large firms.

We use this framework to explore what factors are salient for understanding prefecture-level growth in China. To this end we document which wedges are most important for accounting for the aggregate allocations. We find that the entry barrier is the main driver of the initial (1995) dispersion and the subsequent convergence in wages and TFP across locations in China. Thus, the influence of capital or output market distortions, which in the Chinese context have also been identified as important (Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011)) seems to be secondary for explaining the regional convergence of the non-state sectors in China. Instead we conclude that local variations in the dynamics of entry barriers are the culprit for explaining the regional economic patterns.

We use the accounting framework to do two exercises. First, we study the measured entry barriers in greater detail and show, in the spirit of Cheremukhin, Golosov, Guriev and Tsyvinski (2017a,b), that these theoretical distortions can be tied to auxiliary empirical evidence for distortions. In particular, our measured entry barriers match up closely with measures of the costs of starting a business in China reported in the “Doing Business in China 2008” report by the World Bank (2008) for provincial cities in China. This provides valuable external validation for our estimates. Moreover, using data on actual creation of new firms – data which we did not target when estimating the wedges – we show that firm creation is primarily explained by the entry barrier.

The second exercise is to use prefecture-level information – beyond data on aggregate allocations in non-state manufacturing sector – to investigate the empirical drivers of the wedges. We are able to systematically link the size of these entry barriers and their changes to the size of China’s state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, and to several variables reflecting local fiscal capacity. In the mid-1990s, entry barriers were sizably larger in localities with a larger presence of SOEs. More than half of the differences in the size of the entry barriers is explained by the size of the state sector in a prefecture. As it turns out, in almost every dimension – the rate of start-up of new firms, size of firms, TFP, and wages – we find that new NSOE firms are weaker where the SOEs are more dominant. However, after the mid-1990s the fortune turned to the better for prefectures which originally had a large state sector: on average, output per worker, TFP, wages, and capital per worker in non-state firms grew faster in these prefectures than elsewhere. This process is consistent with our finding that entry barriers are related to the presence of state-owned firms. Indeed, we find that the prefectures that experienced large reductions in entry barriers also tended to experience large reductions in state sector employment.

These results are robust to potential concerns about endogeneity and omitted variables. We address such concerns with a Bartik (1991) instrumental variable approach. In a major policy change in 1997, the Chinese government allowed SOEs to be crowded out by non-state firms in some but not all industrial sectors. Interacting the initial local sectoral distribution of SOEs with the industry-specific decline in SOE employment at the national level predicts very accurately the reduction in local SOE employment. Using the 1995 SOE distribution as a Bartik instrument we find that the 1995-2004 reduction in SOE employment is systematically related to the reduction in entry barriers: larger predicted declines in SOE employment are associated with larger reductions in entry barriers. To study the link between entry barriers and SOE employment in the cross-
section of prefectures we also apply an alternative instrumental variable approach for the initial level of SOE employment, based on various lagged variable instruments. The results confirm the findings using the Bartik instrument.

To motivate the empirical correlation between observed entry barriers and the size of the SOE sector, we develop a simple political economy model of local governments’ incentives to influence the three wedges. In the model, the local authorities, or cadre, face pressure to promote state-owned firms. Since non-state firms compete for resources with SOEs, the government uses these wedges to distort NSOE’s behavior in order to help SOEs. If local cadre care about the profits of local entrepreneurs, then restricting NSOE entry provides the best trade-off between ensuring that SOEs remain sufficiently competitive and supporting the NSOE profits.

Finally, we extend the benchmark model to allow for firm-specific capital and output wedges. We reestimate the model and find that the entry barriers continue to account for most of the regional convergence in wages and TFP. Moreover, the entry barriers estimated from the extended model are highly correlated with those of the benchmark model.

Our paper makes a number of contributions. First, we provide an analytical framework that can be used as an accounting device to identify distortions that inhibit or stimulate growth in a development context. Second, we use this framework to provide new insights for understanding growth dynamics in China. We identify new firm behavior and the removal of barriers to entry as the driver of regional wages and TFP growth. Third, we document an important set of new empirical facts on regional economic development in China, emphasizing the strong convergence in wages, TFP, and capital per worker across regions after the mid-1990s. Fourth, we study the empirical determinants of the prefecture-specific barriers to entry. We document a novel and important channel: the presence of state-owned firms causes larger entry barriers for non-state firms. This finding points to an important side effect of the reforms of the state-owned sector of the late 1990s: as SOEs were scaled back the entry barriers for private firms came down. This in turn paved the way for the subsequent rapid economic growth.

Our paper builds on and contributes to several literatures. There exists an extensive literature analyzing the rise of Chinese manufacturing during the great transformation (see e.g. Brandt, Rawski and Sutton (2008), Young (2003), Zhu (2012), and references therein). Several papers emphasize the role of the reform of the state sector in the late 1990s for understanding this growth (Hsieh and Song (2015), Song et al. (2011)).

Our paper builds on the literature using wedge analysis to infer sources of distortion for understanding economic growth (see e.g. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), Cole and Ohanian (2004), and, in a developing economy context, Cheremukhin et al. (2017b,a)). A large literature emphasizes distortions and misallocation of resources for understanding cross-country differences in economic development (see e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). This literature identifies a number of distortions that may be important, including implicit taxes on capital, labor, and output. In the Chinese context the literature has emphasized both capital market distortions (Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Song et al. (2011), Brandt and Zhu (2010)) and labor market distortions (Tombe and Zhu (2017)). Similar to Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011), we also emphasize the role of entry barriers for new firms in accounting for TFP differences, although they focus on dispersion across countries while we focus on regional convergence in China.

Finally, our paper contributes to the large macroeconomic literature studying growth and convergence across countries and regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991); Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)). To our knowledge ours is the first paper using wedge analysis to analyze cross-region convergence in output, wages, and TFP.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 empirically documents the economic development across more than 300 prefectures. Section 3 lays out a version of the Hopenhayn
(1992) and Melitz (2003) model extended to incorporate a novel entry barrier. The use of entry barriers is rationalized through a political economy model in Section 4. Section 5 uses the entry barrier model to measure the distortions across prefectures. Section 6 studies the empirical drivers of the prefecture-specific measured entry barriers while Section 7 studies an extension of the model that allows for firm heterogeneity in wedges. Section 8 concludes.

2 Empirical Evidence

2.1 Data description

Chinese Industrial Census. Our main data source is the 1995, 2004, and the 2008 Chinese Industrial Census (CIC) carried out by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The CIC covers all of the manufacturing sector and provides firm-level data on gross output, value added, employment, the gross capital stock, depreciation, total wage bill, as well as information on firm year of establishment, ownership type, and main sector of business. For these three years, we have firm-level records on 0.53, 1.37 and 2.08 million firms, respectively.

In order to make these data comparable across the three census years, we have addressed a number of issues related to changes that occurred in China’s industrial classification system, ownership categories, and prefecture boundaries. We draw on concordances described in Brandt et al. (2012) for ownership types and industrial sectors, and extend the concordance on prefecture boundaries in Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner and Zhang (2017) to cover all prefectures. We also utilize deflators developed by Brandt et al. (2012) for the purposes of constructing real measures of industrial output and estimates of the real capital stock (see Appendix A).

Our main focus is productivity and wages in NSOEs. Using the CIC data on firm type by ownership, we identify non-state-owned firms as all firms except firms listed as state-owned, state solely-funded limited liability companies, and shareholding companies. We have experimented with alternative definitions of NSOEs. In general, our results – both in the cross-section and over time – are robust to these alternative definitions. See Appendix A for details.

2.2 Regional dispersion and convergence

We start by documenting the initial dispersion and subsequent convergence across locations in a set of salient economic variables: the average wage per worker, the aggregate value added per worker, the aggregate capital per worker, and the aggregate TFP, all measured on the prefecture level.

Figure 1 and Table 1 document the dispersion across prefectures in 1995 and the dynamics of the aggregate variables between 1995 and 2004. Each panel is a scatter plot of the level of a variable (on a log scale on the x-axis) against the growth in the variable over the 1995-2004 period. Figure B-1 in Appendix B documents the corresponding statistics for the 2004-2008 period.

The first observation is that there is large dispersion across prefectures in these aggregate outcomes. The top left panel of Figure 1 documents output per worker, which we denote labor productivity, across prefectures. In 1995 the ratio of output per worker for the firms at the 90th and 10th percentiles was 4.4 (cf. Table 1) and the ratio of average labor productivity for the top ten percent of prefectures and the bottom ten percent was 7.2. The second and most important

---

1We also draw on firm-level data for 1992 on all independent accounting units (0.39 million), which covers a slightly smaller subset of firms than the CIC and has information on a smaller set of variables.

2The 2004 and 2008 CIC also provide data for the service sector, but unfortunately similar information was not collected in 1995.

3The firm-level records are not exhaustive, but cover upwards of 90 percent of industrial activity.
Figure 1: Convergence in the NSOE sector, 1995-2004.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture, and the solid red line is the fitted regression line.

Table 1: Dispersion and Rates of Convergence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>labor productivity $\beta$-convergence</th>
<th>wage rate $w$</th>
<th>capital per worker $K$-convergence</th>
<th>Solow residual $Z$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annualized rate of $\beta$-convergence 1995-2004</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized rate of $\beta$-convergence 2004-2008</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-10 ratio in 1995</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-10 ratio in 2004</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-10 ratio in 2008</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the 90-10 dispersion and annualized rates of $\beta$-convergence in aggregate outcomes across prefectures in China. The annualized $\beta$-convergence coefficient between times $t_0$ and $t_0+T$ for variable $x$ is estimated from the regression

\[
\left(\frac{1}{T}\right) \ln \left(\frac{x_{p,t_0+T}}{x_{p,t_0}}\right) = a - \frac{1}{T} (1 - e^{-\beta T}) \ln(x_{p,t_0}) + \varepsilon_{pt_0},
\]

where $\varepsilon_{pt_0}$ is an error term.

observation is that there was substantial convergence in labor productivity between 1995 and 2004. The fact that the regression line in the top left panel is downward sloping implies that the 1995-2004 growth in labor productivity was larger in prefectures with low initial labor productivity. The annualized rate of $\beta$-convergence was 10.2% (cf. Table 1), implying that it only takes about seven years to cut the difference in labor productivity between any two prefectures by half. The annualized rate of convergence across regions in labor productivity falls slightly to 7.9 percent over the 2004-2008 time period, suggesting that the process of regional labor productivity convergence remained strong even after 2004.
To put the magnitude of this rate of convergence in context, it is useful to compare it with the rate of convergence in GDP per capita across regions in other countries. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) document that the annualized rate of convergence has been about 2 percent across states in the US (1880-1988), across 73 regions in Europe (1950-1985), and across large industrialized countries (USA, Japan, and five Western European countries). We conclude that the regional convergence in labor productivity in Chinese non-state manufacturing sectors during this period was exceptional, even from historical and international perspectives.

Consider now the dynamics of wages per worker in non-state manufacturing, documented in the top right panel of Figure 1. Note first that the 1995 dispersion in average wage rates is large, albeit less dispersed than labor productivity: the 90-10 difference across prefectures is 2.3 in 1995. The annualized rate of β-convergence was also very large – 8.7 percent – suggesting that it took about eight years to reduce average wage differences between two prefectures by 50 percent. However, after 2004 the rate of regional convergence in wages falls substantially to a mere 2.5 percent.

The regional dispersion in capital per worker in non-state manufacturing firms is documented in the bottom left panel of Figure 1. Both the initial 1995 regional dispersion and the rate of convergence are large, with an annualized β-convergence 14.4 percent. After 2004 the annualized rate of regional convergence in capital per worker falls to 3.3 percent.

The bottom right panel of Figure 1 documents the dispersion and dynamics in aggregate TFP in each prefecture. Following the standard growth accounting practice we define aggregate TFP as the Solow residual, \( Z \), resulting from a production function that takes aggregate capital and labor as inputs; \( Y = ZF(K, N) \), where \( Y, K, \) and \( N \) are aggregate production, capital, and labor, respectively. In line with standard practice in growth accounting we assume that \( F \) is a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function with a technological labor-income share \( x \) and a capital-income share \( 1 - x \). The 1995 dispersion in aggregate TFP is very large (a 90-10 ratio of 3.1). Moreover, aggregate TFP exhibits a rapid rate of regional convergence between 1995 and 2004 (3.8 percent), and an even faster rate of convergence after 2004.

Finally, we note that between 1995 and 2004 the β-convergence is so strong that even the overall cross-sectional dispersion in productivity, wages, and capital per worker fell: Table 1 shows that the 90-10 dispersion in these variables is lower in 2004 than in 1995, indicating σ-convergence. After 2004 the overall cross-sectional dispersion in these variables tended to increase. Indeed, in the presence of shocks, the dispersion in, for example, productivity can increase even if there is conditional convergence (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) for a discussion).

**Employment growth and wages.** The left panel of Figure 2 plots the growth in non-state manufacturing employment against average initial wages paid in non-state manufacturing in each prefecture. The figure establishes that NSOE manufacturing employment grew almost everywhere – 87 percent of the prefectures experienced positive growth. Moreover, this growth was larger in prefectures that initially paid higher wages. This employment growth captures privatization, structural change from agriculture to manufacturing, and migration from low-wage to high-wage prefectures. Despite the restrictions on migration enforced through the hukou system, there was substantial internal migration in China during this period (see Chan (2012)).

The right panel of Figure 2 provides a similar figure for growth in total manufacturing employment (SOE plus NSOE). In prefectures with low initial wages, the growth in total employment is weaker than the growth in NSOE employment, and total manufacturing employment increased in just 44 percent of the prefectures.

\(^4\)We allow the weight \( x \) to differ across prefectures, reflecting differences in the industrial structure across prefectures. We return to the calculation of these shares in detail in Section 5.1.
Co-movements between TFP, wages, and new firm entry. For our main analysis it is useful to study how average wages and aggregate TFP co-move across prefectures and over time, and how these variables are correlated with the rate of new NSOE firm entry. Table 2 documents the correlation matrix in levels and growth for these variables. We define the entry rate of new private firms in a prefecture, \( \Gamma \), as the share of employment in young NSOE firms, i.e., firms established during the last two years, relative to total employment in manufacturing in the prefecture. We interpret this statistic as a measure of firm entry. As is clear from Table 2, all variables are positively correlated. This holds true in the cross section in 1995 as well as in changes over the 1995-2004 or 1995-2008 periods.

Table 2: Comovements in Wages, TFP, and Firm Entry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \ln W )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>( \Delta \ln W )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \ln TFP )</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \ln \Gamma )</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the correlations between log wages, log TFP, and log firm entry in 1995 as well as the correlations between the changes in log wages, log TFP, and log firm entry in 1995-2004 or 1995-2008.

2.3 The size of the state sector and the performance of the non-state sector

The purpose of this paper is to understand the drivers of the regional performance of non-state manufacturing firms that we documented above. A key observation is that the patterns of non-state manufacturing performance across prefectures are strongly correlated with the size of the state sector in those prefectures, measured by the share of state-owned firms of value added aggregate...
employment. In this section we treat these patterns as mere correlations. However, in Section 6 we revisit this issue and argue that there is indeed a causal relationship between the size of the state sector and the economic performance of the non-state sector. We start by analyzing the performance of non-state firms (NSOE) in the 1995 cross section of prefectures. We then turn to the 1995-2004 and 2004-2008 changes.

2.3.1 The 1995 cross section

We continue to focus on average wages paid by NSOE and aggregate labor productivity, aggregate capital per worker, aggregate TFP, and new firm entry rate for each prefecture. To illustrate the role of the state sector, we sort prefectures according to the importance of state firms in the local manufacturing sectors. To this end we let $s_p$ denote the size of the state sector in prefecture $p$ and define it as the fraction of output in manufacturing produced by state firms. Our results are essentially the same if we use the fraction of workers employed by state firms as our measure of the size of the state sector.

The 1995 CIC cross-section reveals two interesting patterns: in prefectures with high $s_p$, there were relatively fewer NSOE entrants and NSOE entrants were weaker in multiple dimensions – they paid lower wages and had lower total factor productivity, lower value added per worker, and lower capital per worker.

**Firm entry in the NSOE sector.** We first document that prefectures with high $s_p$ have substantially less subsequent entry of NSOE firms. The left panel in Figure 3 plots the number of new firms in a prefecture — those established between 1993 and 1995 — as a share of all new firms. Clearly, most of the new NSOE entrants were established in prefectures in which the state sector was less prominent in 1992. The right panel in Figure 3 measures employment in new NSOE firms as a fraction of total employment in that prefecture in 1992. Again, most of the new NSOE employment originates in the low $s_p$ prefectures in 1992.

**Figure 3: NSOE Firm Entry in 1995.**

![Graph showing NSOE Firm Entry in 1995](image)

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture, and the solid red line is the fitted regression line.

**Wages, TFP, value added per worker, and capital per worker of NSOE entrants.** Figure 4 studies aggregate outcomes for new NSOE firms across prefectures. The figure reveals that new
entrants in prefectures with a large state presence in 1995 (high \( s_p \) prefectures) pay lower wages, have lower TFP, lower value added per worker, and less capital per worker.\(^5\)\(^6\) On the basis of simple OLS regressions, the SOE output share in 1995 accounts for 12% of the variation in wages across prefectures, 40% of the variation in aggregate TFP (i.e., the Solow residual), 39% of the variation in value added per worker, and 9% of the variation in capital per worker.

Figure 4: Characteristics of NSOE Entrants in 1995.

Figure B-2 in Appendix B shows that the same patterns hold up for all non-state firms, i.e., when including also incumbent NSOE firms.

One concern is that the negative relationship between the size of the state sector and productivity in the non-state sectors is a product of unobserved heterogeneity at the prefecture level. State owned enterprises might be located in more “backward” prefectures where endowments of human capital are lower. If this was the case, the relationship between the size of the state sector and productivity in the non-state sector might disappear once human capital is controlled for. We examine the role of omitted variable bias through the lens of wages in the non-state sector. For 1995, we have information on both wages and human capital – measured as the average years of education of workers at the firm level. We aggregate this information to the prefecture-level and run simple regressions of the log of the average prefecture wage in the non-state sector on the size of the state sector with and without controlling for human capital in the two sectors. Wages in the non-state sector are positively (negatively) related to human capital levels in the non-state (state) sector. However, in the two sets of regressions, the effect of the state sector on non-state sector wages remains strongly negative and statistically significant, and nearly identical in magnitude.

---

\(^5\)Figure B-2 in Appendix B shows that the same patterns hold up for all non-state firms, i.e., when including also incumbent NSOE firms.

\(^6\)One concern is that the negative relationship between the size of the state sector and productivity in the non-state sectors is a product of unobserved heterogeneity at the prefecture level. State owned enterprises might be located in more “backward” prefectures where endowments of human capital are lower. If this was the case, the relationship between the size of the state sector and productivity in the non-state sector might disappear once human capital is controlled for. We examine the role of omitted variable bias through the lens of wages in the non-state sector. For 1995, we have information on both wages and human capital – measured as the average years of education of workers at the firm level. We aggregate this information to the prefecture-level and run simple regressions of the log of the average prefecture wage in the non-state sector on the size of the state sector with and without controlling for human capital in the two sectors. Wages in the non-state sector are positively (negatively) related to human capital levels in the non-state (state) sector. However, in the two sets of regressions, the effect of the state sector on non-state sector wages remains strongly negative and statistically significant, and nearly identical in magnitude.
2.3.2 The non-state sector growth between 1978-2008

**Divergence: 1978-1995 growth in the non-state sector.** Our main analysis focuses on the time period 1995-2008. However, it is insightful to contrast non-state sector performance across regions during this period with that during the preceding two decades. For this period we do not have firm-level data. Instead, we rely on province-level data on industrial output collected by the NBS for the period 1978-1995. The NBS reports annual nominal and real gross value of industrial output (GVIO), and separate totals for the state and non-state sectors. The disaggregation by ownership allows us to construct estimates of rate of growth separately for the two sectors.

Figure 5 shows that the annual rate of growth in industrial output in the non-state sector between 1978 and 1995 differed sizeably across Chinese provinces. Ranking all provinces on the basis of the fraction of industrial output that was produced in the state-owned sector in 1978, we observe that the annual growth was as high as 30\% in the low SOE share provinces and as a low as 15\% in the high SOE share provinces.\(^7\) The right panel in Figure 5 shows also the regression lines capturing the annualized growth rate of state sector manufacturing output and the growth rate in total manufacturing output, respectively. The figure indicates that the substantially lower growth rates in the non-state sector translate into lower growth rates in total industrial output in the province.

**Figure 5: Annual Output Growth: 1978-1995.**

![Industrial NSOE GDP Growth Rate, 1978-1995](image1)

![Industrial GDP Growth Rate, 1978-1995](image2)

Notes: The left panel in the figure plots the annualized growth rate of output in the non-state sector in 1978-1995, and the solid red line is the fitted regression line. Each dot represents a province. The growth rates are based on province-level annual data between 1978-1995 on the value of industrial output (GVIO) that are collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The right panel plots the corresponding annualized growth rates: overall (blue short-dash), state sector (green dash), and non-state sector (solid red). The 1978 SOE output share in a province is on the horizontal axis.

Unfortunately, the 1978-1995 provincial data do not contain information needed to compute statistics related to output per worker. However, the 1992 and 1995 CIC firm-level data allow us to examine the relationship between NSOE growth and the presence of SOEs towards the end of the 1978-1995 time window. The results for 1992-1995, shown in the top panels of Figure 6, convey a message in line with that of the 1978-1995 provincial data. Namely, between 1992 and 1995 the growth in non-state labor productivity was higher in prefectures with a low share of output

\(^7\)A similar picture emerges using total GDP in the province rather than just industrial output. These results are available upon request.
in 1992 produced in the state-owned sector. Moreover, prefectures with lower 1992-1995 non-state productivity growth experienced lower overall productivity growth in manufacturing (i.e., including the state sector).


Notes: The left panels in the figure plot the annualized growth rate in output per worker in the non-state sector in 1992-1995 (upper panel) and 1995-2004 (lower panel), and the solid red line is the fitted regression line. Each dot represents a prefecture. The right panels plot the corresponding annualized growth rates: overall (blue short-dash), state sector (green dash), and non-state sector (solid red). The 1992 (1995) SOE output share in a prefecture is on the horizontal axis for the 1992-1995 (1995-2004) period.

Convergence: 1995-2008 growth in the non-state sector. The economic performance across prefectures after 1995 is markedly different than the one observed between 1978 and 1995. Most notably, we observe a reversal of fortune: prefectures with a large SOE presence in 1995 (high s share) experienced faster growth in NSOE labor productivity. The lower panels in Figure 6 show that growth in output per worker between 1995 and 2004 in the non-state sector in the high s_p prefectures is higher than in the low s_p prefectures. As a result, output per worker in the non-state sector converges across prefectures. This reversal and convergence continues during the 2004-2008 period.
period, as seen in Figure B-3 in Appendix B. The bottom right panel in Figure 6 reveals that the convergence in the non-state sector translates into convergence in total prefecture output per worker. The reason is that the growth in the state sector is very similar across prefectures.

3 A Hopenhayn-Melitz Model of Heterogeneous Entrepreneurs

This section lays out a theory of private (non-state) firms across locations. The main purpose is to derive predictions about the (aggregate) firm performance in each location. Since the geographic unit of measurement in the subsequent empirical work will be a prefecture, we often refer to a location as a prefecture.

3.1 Environment

The economy consists of a set of locations. Each location is a small open economy where labor is location specific and capital can be allocated freely across locations. Labor is supplied inelastically. In the main analysis we take the labor supply offered to private firms in location $j$, $N_j$, as exogenous and abstract from state firms.

Firms produce a homogenous good with decreasing returns to scale. The production function is Cobb-Douglas,

$$y_i = z_i^{1-\eta} (k_i^{1-\alpha} n_i^\alpha)^{\eta},$$

where $y_i$ is the firm’s value added, $k_i$ is the firm’s capital stock, $n_i$ is the firm’s employment, $z_i$ is the firm’s total factor productivity. The parameter $\eta \in (0, 1)$ captures the decreasing returns. We allow the parameter $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ to differ across locations, reflecting heterogeneity in the technological labor income share $\alpha \eta$. Firms pay a common rental rate ($r + \delta$) on capital and face a location-specific wage rate $w$. In addition, firms face standard distortions on output and capital given by $\tau_y$ and $\tau_k$. These wedges are common for all firms in the location. There is a fixed cost $\nu$ for operating a firm. This cost is constant across all locations.

Following Melitz (2003) the model is static, comprising two stages: a firm entry stage and a production stage. Each location has a measure $M$ of potential entrepreneurs. Each potential entrepreneur can operate one firm and this firm is endowed with a productivity $z$. The distribution of productivities of potential entrepreneurs is given by a p.d.f. $f(z)$. We assume that $z$ is Pareto distributed, i.e., that $f(z) = z^{-\xi} \xi \geq 1, z \geq 1,$ and $z \in [z_1^{1/\xi}, \infty)$.

A key source of heterogeneity across locations is that they differ in the effective number of potential entrepreneurs. In particular, we assume that a location-specific fraction $\psi$ of entrepreneurs who want to produce will not obtain a license to operate and will therefore be barred from entering. This is why we have reported the figures in terms of output per worker. However, the 1995, 2004, and 2008 CIC data have information on value added, and Figure B-4 in Appendix B report the growth rates in value added per worker over the 1995-2004 and 2004-2008 periods. The results in terms of value added per worker are similar to those reported for output per worker.

10We interpret these wedges as implicit taxes, where these taxes are not recorded as costs and thus do not affect the measured value added $y_i$. Moreover, following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we abstract from labor wedges, as labor wedges cannot be separately identified from capital and output wedges. Assuming zero labor wedges amounts to assuming that there is no labor market friction for private firms within a location. Note, however, that our analysis differs crucially from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) in that we allow wages to differ across locations.

11In Section 7 we extend the analysis to allow for firm-specific capital and output wedges. As we shall see, our quantitative findings and the main message of the paper remain robust to this extension.
We refer to the fraction of potential entrepreneurs who have the option to operate, \(1 - \psi\), as the \textit{gross entry barrier}. This entry barrier can be interpreted as a lottery over licenses. It is important that this barrier is independent of the firm’s productivity. As we shall see below, this feature will induce negative selection of entering firms in locations with a large \(\psi\).

### 3.2 The Firm problem

We start by analyzing the production stage and then study the entry decision.

**Profit maximization.** For convenience we drop the firm subscript \(i\). Firms maximize profits and take as given the wedges and prices. The firms’ objective, conditional on operating, is given by:

\[
\Pi^* = \max_{k,n} \{ (1 - \tau_y) y - wn - (1 + \tau_k)(r + \delta)k \}. \tag{2}
\]

The firm’s optimal choices are given by,

\[
y^* = z \cdot \bar{y} (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w) \tag{3}
\]

\[
k^* = z(1 - \alpha) \eta \frac{(1 - \tau_y)}{(1 + \tau_k)(r + \delta)} \cdot \bar{y} (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w)
\]

\[
n^* = z\alpha \eta \frac{(1 - \tau_y)}{w} \cdot \bar{y} (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w)
\]

\[
\Pi^* = (1 - \tau_y)(1 - \eta) z \cdot \bar{y} (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w),
\]

where

\[
\bar{y} (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w) \equiv [(1 - \tau_y) \eta]^{\frac{1 - \eta}{\eta - 1}} \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{(1 + \tau_k)(r + \delta)} \right)^{(1-\alpha)\eta} \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha \eta}{1 - \eta}}.
\]

**The entry decision.** Given the vector of distortions and prices \((\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w)\), there exists a cutoff \(z^* = z^* (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w)\) such that all potential entrepreneurs with \(z \geq z^*\) will choose to operate firms. Given the profit function \(\Pi\), this cutoff \(z^*\) is determined by the condition \(\nu = (1 - \tau_y)(1 - \eta) \cdot z^* \cdot \bar{y} (\tau_y, \tau_k, r, w)\), implying

\[
z^* = \frac{\nu}{(1 - \tau_y)^{\eta - \eta} \eta^{1 - \eta} (1 - \eta)} \left( \frac{(1 + \tau_k)(r + \delta)}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{(1 - \alpha)\eta} \left( \frac{w^\alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\eta - \eta}. \tag{4}
\]

### 3.3 Equilibrium

We can now compute the equilibrium wage \(w\) and the associated aggregate output, capital stock, and measured aggregate TFP in the non-state sector, given a labor supply \(N\). Without loss of generality we normalize the number of potential entrepreneurs to unity, \(M = 1\).

---

12 Hopenhayn (1992) proposes an alternative model of entry barriers. He assumes an infinite supply of potential entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur who considers entering must first pay a fixed cost of obtaining a stochastic draw of firm TFP and the cost is incurred before the TFP is realized. The predictions of our model differ qualitatively from Hopenhayn (1992) in the effect of labor supply \(N_j\). In Hopenhayn (1992) changes in \(N_j\) have no effects on allocations and wages. However, as we discuss below, in our model an increase in labor supply will lower equilibrium wages and TFP.

13 See Appendix C for details.
Market clearing in the labor market requires that \((1-\psi) \int_{z^*}^{\infty} n(z) f(z) \, dz = N\). The assumption that \(f\) is Pareto then implies that the cross-sectional average TFP is given by \(\int_{z^*}^{\infty} z f(z) \, dz = \bar{z}^{\xi} (z^*)^{1-\xi} \xi/ (\xi - 1)\).

Imposing labor market clearing and using the optimal firm behavior in equations (3)-(4), we solve analytically for the equilibrium wage, stated as a proposition.

**Proposition 1** The equilibrium wage in a location is given by

\[
\ln w = \mu (1-\eta) \ln \left[ \frac{(1-\psi)\bar{z}^{\xi}}{N} \right] + \mu \xi (1-\tau_y) - \mu (1-\alpha) \xi \eta \ln [(1 + \tau_k) (r + \delta)] + \Omega(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu),
\]

where \(\mu \equiv \frac{1}{1-\eta + \frac{\alpha\eta}{\xi}} > 0\) and

\[
\Omega(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu) = \ln(\alpha) + \mu (1-\eta + \xi \eta) \ln \eta + \mu (1-\eta) \ln \left( \frac{\xi}{\xi - 1} \frac{1-\alpha}{\eta} \left( \frac{1-\eta}{\nu} \right)^{\xi - 1} \right). \tag{5}
\]

The equilibrium wage is falling in \(N, \tau_y, \tau_k, \) and \(\psi\).

The equilibrium wage in a location depends on the output wedge, the capital wedge, and the entry barrier. The analytical characterization of \(w\) allows us to obtain sharp comparative statics, which we return to below.

Our empirical analysis focuses on wages and aggregate TFP across locations. Given the wage rate \(w\) we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate TFP in each location. We measure aggregate TFP as the Solow residual, following a standard growth accounting procedure (as we did in Section 2.2). In particular, we impose an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function with a weight \(\alpha\eta\) on labor and \(1-\alpha\eta\) on capital, \(\ln Z = \ln Y - \alpha\eta N - (1-\alpha\eta) K\). Using the equilibrium wage \(w\) to calculate \(z^*\) and aggregating over firms’ optimal choices allows us to determine the implied Solow residual as a function of the wedges,

\[
\ln Z = \mu \alpha \eta (1-\eta) \ln \left[ \frac{(1-\psi)\bar{z}^{\xi}}{N} \right] - \mu (1-\eta) \ln (1-\tau_y) + \mu (1-\eta) \ln \left( \frac{\xi}{\xi - 1} \frac{1-\alpha}{\eta} \left( \frac{1-\eta}{\nu} \right)^{\xi - 1} \right) + \tilde{\Omega}(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu), \tag{6}
\]

where

\[
\tilde{\Omega}(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu) = -\mu (1-\eta) [1 + (\xi - 1) \alpha \eta] \ln [(1 - \alpha) \eta] + \mu \alpha \eta (1-\eta) \ln \left( \frac{\xi}{\xi - 1} \left( \frac{1-\eta}{\nu} \right)^{\xi - 1} \right).
\]

Note that aggregate TFP is increasing in \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\) and decreasing in \(\psi\) and \(N\). Moreover, the term \(\tilde{\Omega}(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu)\) does not interact with the wedges.

It is useful to lay out the theoretical predictions for firm entry, namely the measure of firms entering the location, denoted \(\Gamma = Pr (z \geq z^*)\). This is given by

\[
\ln \Gamma = \ln [(1-\psi) \int_{z^*}^{\infty} z^{\xi-1} \, dz] = \mu (1-\eta) \ln \left[ (1-\psi)\bar{z}^{\xi} \right] + \mu \alpha \eta \ln(N) + \mu \xi (1-\tau_y) - \mu \xi \eta (1-\alpha) \ln [(1 + \tau_k) (r + \delta)] + \tilde{\Omega}(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu), \tag{7}
\]

where \(\tilde{\Omega}(\alpha, \eta, \xi, \nu)\) is a constant. It follows immediately that the number of firm entrants is rising in \(N\) and falling in \(\tau_y, \tau_k,\) and \(\psi\).
3.4 Comparative statics: The mechanism behind the effects of wedges and labor supply on wages, TFP, and firm entry

It is convenient to summarize the comparative statics of the wedges and of labor supply on the endogenous outcomes we will study in the empirical analysis, i.e., wage rates, aggregate TFP, and firm entry.

Consider the effect of the various wedges on the equilibrium allocations and prices. As is clear from equations (5)-(6), increasing $\tau_y$ and $\tau_k$ will lower the equilibrium wage and increase the aggregate TFP. The mechanism is that increasing these wedges will lower profits and distort the optimal size and optimal use of capital in the firm. This makes it less attractive for potential entrepreneurs to enter. The result is that the TFP cutoff $z^*$ increases, thereby inducing positive selection among entrants: only the most productive entrepreneurs will enter when there are large distortions to capital and output, i.e., when $\tau_y$ and $\tau_k$ are large. Lower entry in turn lowers the demand for labor, inducing a lower equilibrium $w$. The key insight is that capital wedges and output wedges cause the wage rate and the aggregate TFP to move in opposite directions.

While $\tau_y$ and $\tau_k$ have similar qualitative effects on wages, aggregate TFP, and firm entry, they have different effects on the aggregate labor income share and on the aggregate capital-wage-bill ratio. This is what identifies these wedges. We return to this below.

Consider now varying the entry barrier. A larger $\psi$ will lower the number of potential entrants. If the productivity cutoff $z^*$ was held constant there would be fewer entrants and less demand for labor. To clear the labor market the wage must fall in order to induce each firm to hire more workers and to attract more entrants. The TFP cutoff $z^*$ falls in response to the lower wages: firms with lower productivity are able to operate since labor is cheaper. This induces negative selection which in turn lowers the aggregate TFP. The result is that an increase in the entry barrier $\psi$ will lower firm entry, wages, and aggregate TFP. Thus, aggregate TFP, firm entry, and wage rates all move in the same direction in response to movements in $\psi$ (cf. Table 3).

Table 3: Comparative statics of varying the wedges ($\tau_y, \tau_k, \psi$) and aggregate labor supply $N$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$1 - \tau_y$</th>
<th>$1 + \tau_k$</th>
<th>$1 - \psi$</th>
<th>$N$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>wage rate $w$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solow residual $Z$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry $\Gamma$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor income share $wN/Y$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage bill/capital ratio $wN/K$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{Y}{N}$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, consider the comparative statics for varying labor supply $N$. A larger $N$ requires a
lower equilibrium wage in order to clear the labor market. The lower wage induces a lower TFP cutoff $z^*$ which in turn implies both more firm entry and a lower aggregate TFP (due to negative selection). Thus, a larger labor supply $N$ causes lower aggregate TFP, lower wage rate, and more firm entry (cf. Table 3).

### 3.5 Heterogeneity in other parameters

In our analysis we have held the parameters $(\eta, \xi, \nu, z)$ constant across locations. We could in principle have allowed geographical variation in any of these parameters. There are several reasons why we have ignored such variation.

Consider first $\xi$, the Pareto parameter for $f$, the distribution of firm-specific TFP. Recall that all firm selection rests on variation in the TFP cutoff $z^*$. From eq. (3) the firm size is linear in $z$ so the firm-size distribution inherits the distribution of $z$ above $z^*$. Due to heterogeneity in $z^*$ driven, say, by the other wedges, the lower tail of the firm-size distribution should differ across locations. However the upper tail of the firm-size distribution and the firm TFP distribution should be identical across locations so long as the $f$ distributions share the same parameter $\xi$ across locations. Namely, even though there are few productive entrants in low-performing locations (where $z^*$ is low), the distribution of the most productive firms should, according to the model, be identical.

To investigate this theoretical implication we sort the prefectures according to their aggregate TFP. High-TFP (low-TFP) prefectures have aggregate TFP above (below) the median aggregate TFP in 1995. For each group we plot the distribution of firm-specific TFP conditional on their TFP being above the 90th percentile in the overall distribution.

We first conduct this analysis for all firms. We then repeat the analysis for new firms only, i.e., for the subset of firms established after 1993. Figure 7 plots, in log scales, the complementary cumulative distribution functions for $z$, in low and high TFP prefectures, respectively, for firms in the top 10% of the overall productivity distribution. The two distributions are remarkably similar, consistent with our assumption that the distributions are the same and also consistent with our model mechanism through which the wedges affect the lower tail of the firm size distribution but not the upper tail. We conclude that it is plausible to abstract from geographical heterogeneity in the Pareto parameter $\xi$. Incidentally, the implied Pareto parameter for the firm size distribution in our sample of non-state manufacturing firms in China is 1.055. This is remarkably similar to the corresponding Pareto tail value that Axtell (2001) reports for the United States, 1.06.

The model assumes that the parameter capturing the fixed operating cost $\nu$ is identical across locations. We could alternatively have assumed heterogeneity in $\nu$ instead of modeling heterogeneity in $\psi$. However, we find it more intuitive to let differences in locations, over and above capital and output frictions, to be captured by heterogeneity in $\psi$.

Finally, consider the lower bound for the distribution of firm TFP, $z^\xi$. Note that the terms $(1 - \psi)$ and $z^\xi$ enter multiplicatively in equations (5)-(6). Thus, variation in $z^\xi$ would have the same effect on wages, aggregate TFP, and firm entry as would variation in the entry barrier $(1 - \psi)$. This equivalence is due to the Pareto distribution assumption: shifting the distribution of potential entrepreneurs down (i.e., lower $z^\xi$) is equivalent to lowering the effective number of potential entrepreneurs. We prefer to restrict our analysis to geographic heterogeneity in the entry barrier (as opposed to heterogeneity in the distribution of entrepreneurs) because we find it – in the Chinese context – more natural to envision differences across prefectures in government policies rather than differences in the distribution of potential entrepreneurs.
4 A Political Economy Model of Wedges

This section provides a version of the benchmark model extended to incorporate the presence of SOEs alongside private firms. The purpose of the extension is to develop a simple political economy model for the determination of the wedges. The aim is to provide a theoretical motivation for the empirical drivers of the wedges, including the tight relationship between the observed entry barriers and the size of the SOE sector, which we document in Section 5.\(^\text{14}\)

Assume that there is a unit measure of potential SOEs with the same production function as NSOEs, eq. (1). For simplicity we abstract from wedges on output and capital for SOEs (i.e., \(\tau_{SOE}^y = \tau_{SOE}^k = 0\)). We model the labor market the same way as Song et al. (2011), where the SOEs hire workers in competition with the NSOE sector.\(^\text{15}\)

We assume that the three wedges for private firms, \((\psi, \tau_y, \tau_k)\), are set by the local government in the prefecture. We label the decision maker as the local cadre. Before discussing the objective function of the local cadre, we impose two sets of constraints on the choice of wedges. First, the wedges must be non-negative, \(\psi \geq 0, \tau_y \geq 0, \text{ and } \tau_k \geq 0\).\(^\text{16}\) Second, the local cadre must ensure that the equilibrium state employment in the prefecture meets an exogenous target \(\Lambda_{SOE} = \bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}\). See, for example, Brandt and Zhu (2000) and Wang (2017) for possible political-economy motivations for such a requirement on state employment. This target employment is imposed exogenously on the local cadre by, say, the central government and can differ across locations. As we shall see, the cadre can meet this requirement by choosing an appropriate mix of wedges for NSOE firms. The mechanism is that larger distortions on NSOEs make it easier for SOEs to compete for workers. This in turn increases SOE employment until the employment requirement is satisfied.

\(^{14}\)Note that, conditional on labor supply \(N\), this extension does not affect the measurement of the wedges.

\(^{15}\)For simplicity we assume that SOEs and NSOEs pay the same wages. Forcing SOEs to pay an exogenous wage premium for workers would not affect the qualitative results. The key assumption is that SOEs compete with private firms for some factor in short supply, be it workers, high-skilled workers, managers, land, or other input factors.

\(^{16}\)The constraint \(\psi \geq 0\) is natural. The constraints \(\tau_y \geq 0\) and \(\tau_k \geq 0\) can be motivated by limited government funds ruling out outright subsidies.
Following the analysis in Section 3, the aggregate labor demand of SOEs is given by

$$\Lambda_{SOE} = \frac{\xi z}{\xi - 1} \left( \frac{1 - \eta}{\nu} \right)^{\xi - 1} \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha) \eta}{r + \delta} \right)^{\xi(1-\alpha)\eta \frac{1-\eta}{(1-\eta)^{\xi - 1}} \left( \frac{\alpha \eta}{w} \right)^{\xi \frac{(1-\alpha)\eta}{1-\eta}}. \right)$$

We focus on the case where $\bar{\Lambda}_{SOE} > 1/2$ to ensure that the SOE employment constraint is relevant, in the sense that state firms need to be favored relative to non-state firms in order to satisfy the SOE hiring constraint. When normalizing the aggregate labor supply to unity, market clearing requires that non-state labor demand is $N = 1 - \bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}$. Substituting NSOE labor demand and the equilibrium wage rate into this market-clearing condition yields a condition linking the wedges to the hiring requirement,

$$\frac{1 - \bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}}{\bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} = (1 - \tau_y) \frac{1}{\tau_k} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_k} \right)^{\xi \frac{(1-\alpha)\eta}{1-\eta}}.$$

(8)

It follows that the (target) state employment $\bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}$ is increasing in each of the wedges, $(\psi, \tau_k, \tau_y)$. The reason is that an increase in any of the wedges lowers NSOE demand for workers and, hence, equilibrium wages. This affects SOE employment along both the extensive and the intensive margin: with lower wages less efficient SOE firms can operate (i.e., more SOE entry), and the lower wages make it optimal for each SOE firm to hire more workers.

Consider now the objective of the local cadre. We assume that the cadre wants to maximize profits for an entrepreneur, conditional on obtaining a licence and their TFP, $z$. This captures the notion of crony capitalism, i.e., that the cadre may want to help a friend (crony) who is a potential NSOE entrepreneur (see e.g. Bai, Hsieh and Song (2018) for a motivation for this assumption), but that the cadre has limited instruments for achieving this goal. On the one hand, the cadre can subsidize the entrepreneur by choosing low capital or output wedges (although all firms will benefit from these subsidies). On the other hand, the cadre can restrict entry for anonymous potential entrepreneurs by setting a large $\psi$, while at the same time guarantee that their entrepreneur friend will be allowed to operate.

Conditional on operating the firm the entrepreneur’s profits – net of the implicit taxes on capital and output – are given by:

$$\Pi(z) = \frac{1}{1 - \psi} \left( \frac{1 - \bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}}{\bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}} \right) \left( \frac{1 - \eta}{\xi - 1} \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha) \eta}{r + \delta} \right)^{\xi - 1} \left( \frac{\alpha \eta}{w} \right)^{\xi \frac{(1-\alpha)\eta}{1-\eta}} \right).$$

The profits $\Pi(z)$ are increasing in the entry barrier. The reason is that entrepreneurial talent is a scarce resource, and with fewer potential entrepreneurs the profits are higher conditional on $z$. However, note that the entrepreneur’s expected profits are independent of the output and capital wedges. This is due to the fact that profits $\Pi(z)$ can be expressed as a function $z$, $\psi$, and the right-hand side of equation (8). Thus, conditional on $\psi$ and $\bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}$, any combination of $(\tau_k, \tau_y)$ that satisfies equation (8) will give rise to the same profits. A lower $\tau_k$ will therefore have to be offset by a higher $\tau_y$ in order to satisfy the hiring constraint, rendering profits invariant.

Under these assumptions about the local cadre’s problem, we find that the optimal way to satisfy the hiring requirement is to set the capital and output wedges to zero and set $\psi$ so as to satisfy equation (8). This implies a high correlation between SOE employment $\Lambda_{SOE}$ and entry barriers $\psi$. We state this result as a formal remark.

**Remark 2** The constrained optimal choice of wedges $(\psi, \tau_y, \tau_k)$ is to set $\tau_k = \tau_y = 0$ and $\psi > 0$. Moreover, an exogenous increase in $\bar{\Lambda}_{SOE}$ implies a larger entry barrier $\psi$. 

19
In the empirical work of Section 6 we propose two drivers (instrumental variables) for $\Lambda_{SOE}$. First, the central and provincial government may want the local government to maintain the current level of SOE employment, thereby upholding the legacy of the state sector. In this case the historical level of state employment in the prefecture should be expected to influence $\Lambda_{SOE}$. Second, as we discuss in detail below, the 1997 SOE reform, which was imposed by the central government, involved large-scale reductions in state employment in industries deemed to be non-strategic from the point of view of national security. We interpret this as an exogenous reduction in $\Lambda_{SOE}$. The implication of Remark 2 and our choice of instruments for the hiring constraint $\Lambda_{SOE}$ is that the entry barrier should be larger in areas with historically large state employment and should fall more in the areas where state employment was more scaled back after 1998. We explore these empirical predictions later in the paper.

5 Measuring the Wedges

We now use the benchmark model to estimate the wedges using data from the Industrial Census. This exercise is in the spirit of Chari et al. (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The purpose is to study the drivers of the correlation structure and the regional convergence of economic performance documented in Section 2. Recall from Table 3 that the entry barrier is the only wedge that on its own would give rise to positive correlation between wages, aggregate TFP, and firm entry, as documented above. We shall argue below that the entry barrier emerges as the quantitatively most salient factor in accounting for the changes over time and, hence, the convergence in wages and aggregate TFP that motivated our analysis.

5.1 Log gross output and capital wedges

Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009) we use the first-order conditions for $k_i$ and $n_i$ from the firm’s problem (2) to identify the wedges $\tau_y$ and $\tau_k$:

$$1 - \tau_y = \frac{1}{\alpha \eta} \frac{w_i n_i}{y_i},$$

$$1 + \tau_k = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{w_i n_i}{(r + \delta) k_i}.$$

In our main analysis we abstract from dispersion in firm-specific wedges within prefectures. This choice makes the analysis robust to measurement error in the firm-level data. In Section 7 we extend the analysis to allow firm-specific wedges.

Using equation (9) we compute the gross output wedge and the gross capital wedge in a given prefecture. In deriving the wedges, we take into account that the technological labor-income share differs across industries and that the industrial structure differs across prefectures. Let $Y_{j,p} = \sum_{i \in (j,p)} y_i$ be the total value added for all firms in industry $j$ in prefecture $p$, and let $Y_p = \sum_{j=1}^{J} Y_{j,p}$ be the total value added in prefecture $p$. The gross output wedge in prefecture $p$, $\Delta y_p$, is measured as the weighted average labor-income share for each firm in that prefecture, weighted by the firm’s

\textsuperscript{17}Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2017) argue that measurement error is pervasive in Chinese firm-level data. To infer distortions at the firm level in the presence of measurement error they assume that the distortions are constant over time, using a balanced panel of firms. This approach is not feasible for us because our focus is precisely on changes in distortions over time. Besides, very few firms can be linked over time in our data because of changes in the assignment of firm IDs.
relative value added:

\[ \Delta y_p = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_j \eta} \sum_{i \in (j,p)} w_i n_i \frac{y_i}{Y_{j,p}} \right) \frac{Y_{j,p}}{Y_p}, \]  

(10)

where \( \alpha_j \eta \) is the technological labor share of industry \( j \). We take these shares from Hsieh and Klenow (2009).

Similarly, the gross capital wedge in prefecture \( p \), \( \Delta k_p \), is computed as the weighted average wage bill per unit of capital for each firm in that prefecture, weighted by the firm’s relative capital stock. Let \( K_{j,p} = \sum_{i \in (j,p)} k_i \) be the total capital for all firms in industry \( j \) in prefecture \( p \), and let \( K_p = \sum_{j=1}^{J} K_{j,p} \) be the total capital in prefecture \( p \). Then:

\[ \Delta k_p = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha_j}{\alpha_j} \sum_{i \in (j,p)} \frac{w_i n_i}{k_i} \frac{k_i}{K_{j,p}} \right) \frac{K_{j,p}}{K_p}. \]

(11)

Finally, we calculate \( \alpha \eta \) in each prefecture as the weighted average of the technological labor income shares, weighted by the value added of each industry, \( \alpha \eta (p) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} (\alpha \eta)_j Y_{j,p}/Y_p \).

For each firm in the Chinese Industrial Census we have data on the wage bill \( (w_i n_i) \), on the firm’s value added \( (y_i) \), and on the firm’s capital stock \( (k_i) \).\(^{18}\) We use the information on the labor shares of 2-digit industries \( (\alpha_j \eta) \) used in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and a decreasing returns to scale parameter of \( \eta = 0.85 \) as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). Figure 8 plots the results for the gross output and gross capital wedges in each prefecture in 1995.\(^{19}\)

Figure 8: Gross Output and Gross Capital Wedges, 1995, All Firms, NSOE Sector.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture. The left (right) panel plots the gross output (capital) wedge in the NSOE sector in 1995. The SOE output share in 1995 in each prefecture is on the horizontal axis.

The left panel in Figure 8 shows the gross output wedge in 1995 for each prefecture as a function of the 1995 SOE output share in that prefecture. The gross output wedge is increasing in \( s \), where \( s \) denotes the 1995 SOE output share in the prefecture. This implies that in 1995 non-SOE firms in

\(^{18}\)See Appendix A for a discussion of the procedure to construct the real capital stock at the firm level.

\(^{19}\)Appendix B shows the results for 2004 and 2008. We compute the gross output and gross capital wedges using all firms in a given cross-section. The results based on the sample of new entrants are very similar and are provided in Appendix B.
some of the high-s prefectures are receiving subsidies while non-SOE firms in the low s prefectures are being significantly taxed. The right panel in Figure 8 shows the gross capital wedge in 1995 for each prefecture as a function of the 1995 SOE output share in that prefecture. The gross capital wedge is slightly increasing with s.

A gross output wedge, $\Delta y_s$, that is strongly increasing with s implies that in the high s prefectures, as compared to the low s prefectures, we should observe higher wages for non-SOE firms. This pattern is the exact opposite of the empirical evidence presented in Section 2. The (slightly) increasing capital wedge is a force for wages to fall in s. However, the effect of $\tau_y$ dominates. This suggests that the entry barrier is crucial for accounting for the cross-sectional patterns in the data.

### 5.2 Log gross entry barrier, $\ln(1 - \psi)$

The theoretical framework outlined in Section 3 allows us to measure the entry barrier for each prefecture. Using the expression for the equilibrium wage in a prefecture (5), we derive an analytical expression for the log gross entry barrier in a prefecture:

$$
\ln(1 - \psi_p) = \frac{1 - \eta + \xi \alpha \eta}{1 - \eta} \ln w_p - \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \ln \Delta y_p + \frac{\xi \eta (1 - \alpha)}{1 - \eta} \ln \Delta k_p 
$$

$$
+ \ln N_p + \bar{\Omega}(\alpha(p), \eta, \xi, \bar{z}, \nu),
$$

where $\bar{\Omega}$ is a constant. $\psi_p$ can then be identified using data on the average wage in each prefecture $w_p$, combined with our measurements of $\Delta y_p$, $\Delta k_p$, and $\alpha(p)$. Remember that we have normalized the number of potential entrepreneurs to unity. We interpret this as assuming that the number of potential entrepreneurs is proportional to total employment in manufacturing in the prefecture. Consequently, we measure non-SOE employment in year t, $N_t$, as the fraction of workers in manufacturing employed in the non-SOE sector relative to total manufacturing employment in 1995 in that prefecture.

The remaining parameters, which are common across all prefectures, are chosen as follows. The Pareto parameter $\xi$ is obtained by exploiting the theoretical implication that the upper tail of the firm TFP distribution is the same in all prefectures. The Pareto assumption implies that $E(z|z \geq z^*)/z^* = \xi/(\xi - 1)$. Focusing on the 30% most productive firms implies $\xi = 1.05$.\(^{21}\)

Finally, using equation (12), we compute the log gross entry barrier $\ln(1 - \psi_p)$ for all prefectures in the economy. Figures 9 and 10 present the results for each prefecture in 1995, 2004, and 2008. The figures reveal a strong negative relationship between the entry barrier $1 - \psi$ and the 1995 output share of SOE firms s: a higher barrier $\psi$ is associated with a larger s. In 1995 s explains 51% of the variance in $\ln(1 - \psi)$. Moreover, over time there is some convergence in $\psi$ across prefectures.

We conclude that the measured wedges line up reasonably well with the predictions of the simple political economy model of Section 4: there is large dispersion in entry barriers and these barriers tend to be larger in prefectures with historically large SOE employment. Moreover, the dispersion in capital wedges is relatively small. However, the dispersion in measured output wedges is larger than that predicted by the political economy model.

---

\(^{20}\bar{\Omega} = \ln[\xi - \xi \nu^{\xi - 1}] - \left(\frac{1 - \alpha \xi}{1 - \eta}\right) \ln \alpha \eta - \left(\frac{1 - \alpha \xi}{1 - \eta}\right) \ln (1 - \alpha) + (1 - \xi) \ln (1 - \eta).

\(^{21}\)The parameters $\nu$ and $\bar{z}$ do not matter for the wedges beyond normalizing the average level because these parameters do not interact with any of the wedges in equations (5), (6), (7), (10), and (11). We normalize the fixed cost of operating a firm, $\nu$, so that the smallest optimal size for a firm with TFP at the threshold $z = z^*$ is one worker: $n^*(z^*) = 1$. Moreover, we normalize the lower bound for the distribution of potential TFP, $\bar{z}^\xi$, so that all potential entrepreneurs get a licence in a location without barriers, i.e., when $\psi = 0$. 

---

22
5.3 Accounting for convergence in TFP and wages

A central objective of our paper is to explain the strong regional convergence in aggregate TFP and wages rates, documented in Section 2. As the model laid out in Section 3 is, by construction, consistent with the aggregate allocations and the wage rate in each prefecture, we use our model as a measurement device to account for the convergence.

According to our model there are five possible sources of changes over time in aggregate allocations and prices in a prefecture: changes in the three wedges, growth in labor supply (i.e., increased...
employment in non-SOE manufacturing), and changes in the prefecture-specific production function (i.e., the weight on labor supply in the production function, $\alpha \eta$). The latter is motivated by the fact that changes in the industrial structure — for example growth in the relative preponderance of labor-intensive industries — can be expected to induce changes in the aggregate labor intensity. See also the discussion in Section 3.5 motivating why the remaining parameters of the model are held constant across prefectures.

Table 4 reports the annualized rate of $\beta$-convergence for aggregate TFP and wages under various counterfactual model scenarios. Since the model by construction matches the wages and the aggregate allocations, the model also replicates the empirical rate of convergence when all sources of change are embedded. The first line in Table 4 is therefore consistent with Table 1.

To decompose the overall rates of convergence into each of the five possible sources of change, we use equations (5) and (6) to compute aggregate TFP and wages in 2004 if the only (prefecture-specific) change between 1995 and 2004 was in the (i) average labor share, (ii) available labor force, (iii) capital wedge, (iv) output wedge, and (v) entry barrier. We then repeat the exercise for the 2004-2008 period. The main message from the first two columns of Table 4 is that changes in the entry barrier account for the lion’s share of the convergence in aggregate TFP: if the only change between 1995 and 2004 had been the estimated change in the entry barrier, the annual rate of convergence would have been 3.5%, accounting for more than 92% of the overall convergence. This reflects the fact that the dispersion in entry barriers fell sharply over time, and more so in areas with low initial TFP and wages. We will return to this point in Section 6.

The other factors play a smaller quantitative role in accounting for the convergence in aggregate TFP. The second most important factor is the output wedge, accounting for about 26% of the convergence in aggregate TFP. This is because the dispersion across prefectures in the output wedge fell and $\tau_y$ increased more in areas where aggregate TFP was low in the first place.22

The findings for wages echo the results for aggregate TFP: the entry barrier emerges as the main explanatory factor for the convergence of wages, accounting for a large fraction of the convergence over the entire 1995-2008 period. Changes in the capital wedge and in the technological labor share also contribute to explaining parts of the convergence in wages, although these factors play quantitatively smaller roles than the entry barrier. However, note that while changes in the output wedge could explain some of the convergence in aggregate TFP, this factor contributes negatively to the convergence in wages. This reflects the fact that changes in the output wedge have opposite effects on aggregate TFP and wages (cf. Proposition 1). Recall from Table 2 that the empirical aggregate TFP and empirical wages are positively correlated, both in levels and in changes. Therefore, the output wedge cannot have a positive contribution to observed convergence in TFP without at the same time contributing negatively to observed convergence in wage rates.

Interestingly, changes in labor supply play only a minor quantitative role in accounting for the convergence in wages and TFP, despite its potential to move wages and aggregate TFP in the same direction (cf. Table 3). On net, the growth in private manufacturing employment was slightly larger in prefectures with initially high wages, and this explains why employment changes – which incorporates migration – accounts for a positive albeit small share of the convergence in wages. However, the contribution is quantitatively small because private employment increased almost everywhere and not just in the places where wages and TFP were initially high (cf. Figure 2).

22To see this, consider Figures B-5 and B-6 in the appendix. As is clear from the figures, the dispersion across prefectures in the measured gross output wedge $1 - \tau_y$ is decreasing over time, and it is prefectures with a large SOE sector (i.e., a large SOE share) which on average experience the largest decline in $1 - \tau_y$ and, hence the largest decline in implicit subsidies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TFP</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αη</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 + τ_k)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 − τ_y)</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 − ψ)</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the annual rate of convergence in TFP and wages across prefectures for the 1995-2004 and 2004-2008 time periods. The β-convergence coefficient for prefectures p between times t_0 and t_0 + T is estimated from the regression
\[
\left(\frac{1}{T}\right) \ln \left(\frac{y_{p,t_0+T}}{y_{p,t_0}}\right) = a - \left(1-e^{-\beta T}\right) \ln(y_{p,t_0}) + u_{p,t_0+t_0+T},
\]
where \(u_{p,t_0+t_0+T}\) represents an average of error terms, \(u_{p,t}\), between times \(t_0\) and \(t_0 + T\). Each row in the table reports what the convergence in TFP and wages would have been had only one of the listed variables changed. The row “all” allows all factors to change and captures by construction the estimated empirical convergence rate.

5.4 External validation of the entry barriers

Given the salience attributed to the entry barriers in Section 5.3, we now try to verify, using external evidence, that our imputed entry barriers do indeed capture actual barriers to entry for private firms. To this end, we perform two exercises: (1) relate our measurements to the World Bank’s measures, and (2) study the implications of the wedges and barriers for entry rates of new firms.

The 2008 costs of starting a business in China. The “Doing Business in China 2008” report produced by the World Bank (2008) provides various measures of the extent to which government activity affects private business activity. The report outlines differences in various regulations in the capital cities of 26 Chinese provinces and 4 centrally administered municipalities. We focus on the following reported indicators on how easy it is to start a business: (i) a rank computed in the report based on all available information on how easy it is to start a business, (ii) the number of days it usually takes to start a business, and (iii) the cost of starting a business, as a percent of GDP per capita. The results, reported in Figure 11, indicate that in localities where the measured entry barriers in our analysis in 2008 are higher are also the localities where the report finds high costs of starting a business. The correlations of our entry barrier \(\ln(1 - \psi)\) with each of the World Bank’s three measures of start-up costs are respectively -0.77, -0.55, and -0.64, implying that the correlation with \(\psi\) is positive for all measures. These results provide a valuable external validation for our estimates.

Entry rates and wedges. The benchmark model has predictions for how the three wedges should influence firm entry. As discussed in Section 5.2, increases in \(\psi\), \(\tau_y\), and \(\tau_k\) should all
Figure 11: “Doing Business in China” and Entry Barriers, 2008.

Notes: Each dot represents a provincial capital city or a centrally administered municipality. Each panel shows a scatter plot of the estimated log gross entry barrier $\ln(1 - \psi)$ against a World Bank measure of the cost of doing business in China in 2008: rank (top panel), days to start a business (bottom left panel), and cost of starting a business (bottom right panel). The solid red line is the fitted regression line.

contribute to reduced firm entry (cf. equation (7)). Recall that we did not target firm entry rates when estimating the wedges ($\psi, \tau_y, \tau_k$). Therefore, the model will not necessarily be consistent with the empirical patterns for firm entry. It follows that data on entry provides an auxiliary test on the model.

To measure the entry rate we define the rate of entry of private firms in prefecture $p$, $\Gamma^e_{p,t}$, as the share of employment in young NSOE firms – established during the last two years – relative to employment in all firms:\footnote{Our empirical measure of new firm entry differs slightly from the notion of entry in our static theoretical model, where all firms in principle would be entrants. However, the empirical measure of entry is consistent with a straightforward extension of our model to a standard dynamic Hopenhayn model incorporating firm survival and exit.}

$$\Gamma^e_{p,t} = \frac{N^e_{p,t}}{N_{p,t} - N^e_{p,t}},$$

where $N^e_{p,t}$ is employment in new non-SOE firms while $N_{p,t}$ is total employment. We define as new those firms that were started in year $t$, $t - 1$, or in $t - 2$. The top panel in Table 5 reports the

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Prefecture} & \textbf{Rate of Entry} \\
\hline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
results from the following regression in levels:

$$\ln \Gamma_{e, p,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln (1 - \tau_{y,p,t}) + \beta_2 \ln [(1 + \tau_{k,p,t})(r + \delta)] + \beta_3 \ln (1 - \psi_{p,t}) + \epsilon_{p,t},$$

while the bottom panel reports the results from the same regression in growth rates:

$$\Delta \ln \Gamma_{e, p,t} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \Delta \ln (1 - \tau_{y,p,t}) + \gamma_2 \Delta \ln [(1 + \tau_{k,p,t})(r + \delta)] + \gamma_3 \Delta \ln (1 - \psi_{p,t}) + \epsilon_{p,t}.$$  


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ln(1 - τ&lt;sub&gt;y&lt;/sub&gt;)</th>
<th>ln(1 + τ&lt;sub&gt;k&lt;/sub&gt;)</th>
<th>ln(1 - ψ&lt;sub&gt;p&lt;/sub&gt;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>1sd</td>
<td>β&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.253&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>-0.278&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.382&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>-0.223&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.202&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>-0.172&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Δ ln(1 - τ&lt;sub&gt;y&lt;/sub&gt;)</th>
<th>Δ ln(1 + τ&lt;sub&gt;k&lt;/sub&gt;)</th>
<th>Δ ln(1 - ψ&lt;sub&gt;p&lt;/sub&gt;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>γ&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>1sd</td>
<td>γ&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-2004</td>
<td>0.544&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>-0.624&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>0.061&lt;sup&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the results from a regression of log gross entry rates on log gross output, capital, and entry rates in 1995, 2004, and 2008. The table also reports the percentage change in the log entry rate as a result of a one standard deviation in the variable. *** — statistically significant at 1%; ** — statistically significant at 5%; * — statistically significant at 10%.

Equation (7) predicts \( \beta_1 > 0, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 > 0, \gamma_1 > 0, \gamma_2 < 0, \) and \( \gamma_3 > 0. \) As is clear from the table, the data on entry rates are consistent with the predictions of the model, both in levels and in growth rates. In particular, entry barriers (higher \( \psi \)) significantly lower entry rates (\( \beta_3 > 0 \) and \( \gamma_3 > 0 \)). Moreover, the effect of changes in the entry barrier is quantitatively large: a one standard deviation change in \( \ln (1 - \psi) \) induces a 35% change in the entry rate. Also capital and output wedges influence entry rates in the predicted direction. We interpret this as an external validation of our model and a confirmation of the mechanism through which the measured entry barriers influence the economy. The findings also corroborate the finding that the entry barrier is quantitatively important.
6 The Entry Barriers and the Size of the State Sector

The previous section established that the entry barrier is the most important factor for understanding the dispersion and the dynamics of aggregate TFP and wages across prefectures in China. Given the salience of this factor, we now examine what empirical factors are behind the measured changes in the entry barrier.

Since the entry barrier is measured at the prefecture level, we can in principle use prefecture-level data to apply standard empirical analysis to investigate the drivers of the entry barrier. The analysis so far is suggestive of a strong positive relationship between the size of the SOE sector and the size of the entry barriers in a prefecture. However, this was interpreted as a mere correlation. In this section, we argue that there is a causal relationship between the size of the SOE sector and the entry barriers in a prefecture – large SOE sectors in a prefecture are associated with large entry barriers in the cross section, and prefectures that experienced larger declines in their SOE sector shares saw larger decreases in their entry barriers. We further establish that large entry barriers are also associated with lower SOE profitability and smaller fiscal revenues per government worker in a prefecture.

We start with the cross section. In order to examine the effect of the size of the state sector on entry barriers at the prefecture level, we estimate equation (13) in the cross section for each of the years 1995, 2004, and 2008, where \( \ln(1 - \psi)_{p,t} \) is the log gross entry barrier in prefecture \( p \) in year \( t \), \( e_{SOE}^{p,t} \) is the employment share of the state sector in prefecture \( p \) in year \( t \), \( X_{p,t} \) is a vector of prefecture characteristics that might also influence entry barriers, and \( \epsilon_{p,t} \) is an idiosyncratic error term:

\[
\ln(1 - \psi)_{p,t} = \beta_0 + \beta e_{SOE}^{p,t} + X_{p,t} \gamma + \epsilon_{p,t}.
\]  

(13)

For 1995, we have information on the profitability of SOE firms in each prefecture, as well as fiscal revenue per government worker in each prefecture. For 2004, we also have fiscal data, but do not have information from the enterprise census on profitability. Note that the number of government workers is determined exogenously – set by a centrally determined policy rule – as a percentage of the registered population. Since registered migration is limited, the differences in fiscal revenue per worker must therefore largely reflect differences on the revenue side.

Because of potential concerns of endogeneity in the share of the state sector, we also estimate equation (13) using three cross-sectional IV variable specifications. \( IV_{lag} \) uses as an instrument the lagged value, \( e_{SOE}^{p,t-1} \), of the SOE employment share of prefecture \( p \), where the lagged value refers to the SOE employment share in prefecture \( p \), observed in the previous Chinese Industrial Census (CIC). For example, the SOE share in the 1995 CIC is used as an instrument for the 1995 data, the 1995 CIC is used as an instrument for 2004, etc.

The next two instruments exploit information on the size of the state sector in 1978. As argued earlier, the share of the state sector in a province (and thus a prefecture) heavily reflects historical factors, most notably, the 3rd Front policies in the 1960s under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Naughton (1988)), and the decision of the National People’s Party (KMT) to move industrial capacity inland during the Sino-Japanese War (1936-1945) and the Civil War (1945-1949) (Brandt, Ma and Rawski (2017a)). Reflecting these policies, coastal provinces had less manufacturing activity per capita and also a smaller role of the state sector in manufacturing than the interior provinces when reforms began in the late 1970s. We construct the \( IV_{1978} \) instrument by using the 1995 Chinese Industrial Census\(^{24}\), restricting the sample to firms established in or before 1978, and using this sample to compute an SOE employment share for prefecture \( p \). Finally,

\(^{24}\)The results are similar if we were to use the 1992, 2004, or 2008 CIC.
we run the analysis at the province level and construct the $IV_{prov}$ instrument at the province level using 1978 provincial data on SOE output shares in industry.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\ln(1 - \psi)$</th>
<th>$e^{soe}$</th>
<th>$e_{soe}$</th>
<th>$IV_{lag}$</th>
<th>$IV_{1978}$</th>
<th>$IV_{prov}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-11.50***</td>
<td>-13.94***</td>
<td>-12.62***</td>
<td>-12.37***</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-9.66***</td>
<td>-13.79***</td>
<td>-16.14***</td>
<td>-17.33***</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-7.10***</td>
<td>-8.55***</td>
<td>-11.65***</td>
<td>-11.40***</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First stage:

|          | $IV$ coefficient | 0.73***   | 0.97***   | 0.92***    | (0.04)      | (0.05)      | (0.20)      |
|          | st. error        | 0.74      | 0.73      | 0.74       |
|          | $R^2$            |           |           |            | 0.43        | 0.37        | 0.60        |

Notes: The table reports the OLS and IV results from a regression of the log gross entry barrier on the SOE employment share ($e^{soe}$), fiscal revenues per government worker ($FREV$), and SOE profitability ($PROF^{soe}$) in a prefecture in 1995, 2004, and 2008. $e^{soe}$ available in all years, $FREV$ – in 1995 and 2004, and $PROF^{soe}$ in 1995. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** – statistically significant at 1%; ** – statistically significant at 5%; * – statistically significant at 10%.

We report the cross-sectional results in Table 6. Consider first the OLS results. In the individual cross-sections for 1995, 2004 and 2008, the OLS coefficient on the size of the state sector is consistently negative and highly significant, and declines slightly over time. These results suggest
that prefectures with the largest (smallest) state sectors had the highest (lowest) entry barriers. Consider now the first-stage results of the IV regressions. In all regressions the instrument is highly significant and the $R^2$ is high. Finally, consider the IV (second stage) regressions. The IV results suggest slightly larger effects of SOE employment on measured entry barriers, and less attenuation in these effects over time. Overall, the effect of the size of the state sector on entry barriers is highly robust to the inclusion of additional prefecture controls.\textsuperscript{25}

We also find for 1995 that entry barriers were lower in prefectures in which the state sector was more profitable, and lower in prefectures in which fiscal revenue per government worker was larger. For 2004 we do not have information on SOE profitability. Nevertheless, we find that fiscal revenue continues to be important. These effects could be working through a number of alternative channels. In prefectures where SOEs were less profitable, local governments may have been more concerned about competition from non-state firms that could have reduced SOE profitability. Fewer rents in the SOEs may have also made local officials more predatory towards the non-state sector. More fiscal resources, some of which came from SOEs, may have had the same effect, and made it easier for local governments to make complementary investments. There is obvious endogeneity here as more entry of dynamic non-state firms would have also likely increased local fiscal revenue.

A potential concern for the cross-section results in Table 6 is that our estimates of the effect of the state sector are contaminated by the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. There are several possible solutions. To eliminate any potential time-invariant fixed effects at the prefecture level that might be correlated with $e_{it}^{SOE}$, we can exploit the panel dimension of the data and estimate Equation (13) in first differences, or Equation (14).

\[
\Delta \ln(1 - \psi)_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta e_{it}^{SOE} + \Delta X_{it}\gamma' + \Delta \epsilon_{it}. \tag{14}
\]

Conditional on prefecture fixed effects, changes in the share of SOEs in a prefecture are still potentially endogenous: Unobserved shocks may affect both the share of the state sector in a prefecture and entry barriers. We also cannot rule out totally the possibility of reverse causality, namely that changes in entry barriers influence the employment and output of SOEs.

To address these concerns, we take advantage of the major 1997 policy reform embedded in the Ninth Five-Year plan to restructure the state sector. The program was to close down loss-making state-owned firms under the slogan “Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small” (Zhuada Fangxiao). In addition to reducing the size of the state sector in terms of the number of firms and workers, a major objective of this reform was to concentrate state industry activity in sectors identified as strategic or pillar. Typically, these were more capital and skill-labor intensive sectors that were often upstream in the value chain. We construct Bartik (1991) instruments for the changes in the size of the state sector using national-level data on the changes between 1995 and 2004 in SOE employment at the sector level. At the prefecture level, a weighted average of changes at the national level in SOE sector employment, where the weights, $S_{1995,k}$, are sector $k$’s share of SOE employment in the prefecture, should be a good predictor of changes in SOE employment in the prefecture. We do not have a good IV for the changes in the size of the state sector between 2004 and 2008. We therefore limit our estimation to the changes between 1995 and 2004.

In Table 7, we report the results from the fixed effects regression using the data for 1995 and 2004, along with the first stage regressions for the change in the size of the state sector. Results for the simple first-differences reported in columns (1) and (2) continue to indicate that the entry

\textsuperscript{25}For all three years, we also have prefecture-level information on average educational attainment of the working age population, the percentage of the population of working age, and the percentage of the labor force working in agriculture. We use this information to control for unobserved heterogeneity that could influence our measure of the entry barrier and which might be correlated with the size of the state sector and entry barriers.
barriers fell more in areas where state employment declined. However, the magnitude of the effect is significantly smaller – only one-third to one-quarter – than that suggested by results in Table 6. Columns (3) and (4) report IV results, with first-stage results reported in the lower panel. Changes at the national level in SOE employment by sector are a very good predictor of changes in the share of the SOEs by prefecture. The IV coefficient on the size of the state sector is also significantly larger than the OLS estimates in (1) and (2), and the magnitude of the coefficients is now about half that of our estimates from the cross-sections. These estimates imply that the size of the state sector has causal and economically significant effects on entry barriers at the prefecture level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>IV_{ind}</th>
<th>IV_{ind}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ ln(1 – ψ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δe_{soe}</td>
<td>-2.92</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
<td>-5.19**</td>
<td>-5.68**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(2.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ ln FREV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.16***</td>
<td>0.87**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**First stage:**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV coefficient</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
<td>0.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>st. error</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the OLS and IV results from a regression of the change in the log gross entry barrier on the change in the SOE employment share (e_{soe}) and in the log fiscal revenues per government worker (ln FREV) in a prefecture between 1995 and 2004. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** – statistically significant at 1%; ** – statistically significant at 5%; * – statistically significant at 10%.

6.1 Discussion: Why do SOEs matter for new private start-ups?

In this section we elaborate further on how the presence of state-owned firms inhibits entry of private firms, and the important role played by local cadres for explaining this link.

The political-economy model of the determination of wedges in Section 4 assumes that the local government faces pressure to meet an exogenous target for state employment, N_{SOE}. We motivate this assumption as follows. Local officials, e.g. party secretaries and mayors, are appointed by higher levels of government and are tasked with multiple objectives. Much of the focus in the literature – see e.g. Li and Zhou (2005) and Xu (2011) – is on the high-powered incentives local leaders have to promote economic growth, but equally important through the nomenklatura system is their role in supporting state-owned enterprises.

The performance of SOEs is important for Communist Party and for officials at all levels. Indeed, state-owned firms themselves have multiple mandates. As a major source of employment in the cities, SOEs have been perceived as instruments for maintaining social stability, especially during economic downturns (Wang (2017)). Although the aggregate share of state-sector employment has fallen over time, it remained in upwards of forty-five percent through the mid-1990s, and the absolute level of state employment in industry has been highly persistent (Brandt and Zhu (2000)). Endowed with the best human resources and capabilities, SOEs also take on leading roles
in sectors identified by the state as “pillar and strategic.” Included here are upstream sectors such as electricity and telecommunications, newly emerging sectors in high-tech, as well as sectors tied to the military-industrial complex.

Local cadres are beneficiaries of the success of SOEs in meeting the objectives of higher levels of government and of the Communist Party. SOEs are also potentially important sources of local government revenue and rents for local officials, often in the form of valuable jobs for family members and relatives as well as through highly lucrative business relationships with these same firms.

A key premise of our paper is that local government has access to policy instruments that may suppress the entry of private firms, and that local cadre often apply such policies, especially in areas where the state sector is prevalent.

Market liberalization and easier entry for new private firms arguably pose threats to the position of the SOEs through pressures in the product market, and more importantly, through the competition for local scarce factors. Thus, by mitigating the growth of private firms, local cadre can prevent the flight of the most capable managers and workers (and other scarce factors) from the SOEs to the private sector. In Section 4 we presented a formal model for how private sector growth can be curtailed by directly suppressing firm entry or by distorting the factor demand of NSOE (by for example imposing distortions on capital and output). Whiting (2006) documents that local officials erect various forms of barriers to entry and argues that the motivation for engaging in such behavior is that they seek to protect firms owned by local governments. This behavior manifests itself in the form of making it more difficult to obtain access to land, electricity and other scarce intermediate inputs, over which local governments have some discretion and control. In a similar vein, Bai et al. (2018) argue that local governments use their leverage to favor some selected firms (crony capitalists). In addition, in newly emerging sectors, ministries have often restricted entry by issuing few licences and by allocating these licenses to SOEs (Huang (2003)). More generally, local cadre can use their discretion over granting business licenses and influence over access to critical inputs to enrich family and friends in their networks, and thus themselves.

Barriers to entry in environments in which SOEs are dominant also take more indirect forms. Suppliers to state-owned firm must typically go through a lengthy certification process. On paper, this certification is to ensure that the supplier has the capabilities to meet the requirements laid out by the SOE. However, in practice the purpose of this process is to limit the access to act as a supplier to the SOEs to firms linked through personal networks either to officials in the state sector or local government (Interviews, 2017).

7 Extension: Heterogeneity of Wedges across Firms

In the model we have analyzed so far we assumed that the capital and output wedges were the same for all firms in a prefecture. In this section we extend our benchmark model to allow capital and output wedges to be firm-specific. Namely, we assume that there is heterogeneity in $\tau_{ik}$ and $\tau_{iy}$ across firms not only across locations but also across firms within each prefecture. We maintain the assumption that all prefectures have the same distribution $f$ of potential $z$. However, due to selection in participation, there will be, in equilibrium, a correlation between $z$ and wedges among firms that choose to operate.

Each potential entrepreneur can observe both her potential TFP, $z_i$, and her potential wedges, $\{\tau_{ik}, \tau_{iy}\}$, before deciding to enter. As we shall see, the entry decision of the potential entrepreneur depends on the entrepreneur’s realized wedges $\{\tau_{ik}, \tau_{iy}\}$. Therefore, the equilibrium distribution of observed TFP will be correlated with the wedges, even though the distribution of potential TFP is, by assumption, independent of the wedges. In order to ensure that the problem is analytically
tractable we assume that the distribution of potential wedges is jointly log-normal across firms in each prefecture. Denote the density function as \( g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \), and let the moments be given by:

\[
E(\ln \tau_k) = \ln (1 + \bar{\tau}_k) - \frac{\sigma_k}{2},
\]

\[
E(\ln \tau_y) = \ln (1 - \bar{\tau}_y) - \frac{\sigma_y}{2},
\]

\[
\text{var}(\ln \tau_k) = \sigma_k
\]

\[
\text{var}(\ln \tau_y) = \sigma_y
\]

\[
\text{cov}(\ln \tau_k, \ln \tau_y) = \sigma_{ky}.
\]

(15)

Note that the dispersion in wedges are mean-preserving spreads, implying that \( E(\tau_k) = 1 + \bar{\tau}_k \) and \( E(\tau_y) = 1 - \bar{\tau}_y \). Moreover, this extended model nests our benchmark model when \( \sigma_k = \sigma_y = 0 \).

Conditional on the individual state \( s_i = \{z_i, \tau_{ik}, \tau_{iy}\} \), the optimal firm choices are still given by equations (3)-(4). Note in particular that the cutoff threshold \( z^* (\tau_{ik}, \tau_{iy}, r, w) \) now differs across firms. Given the distributional assumptions it is possible to solve analytically for the wage that clears the labor market and for the associated aggregate Solow residual. We summarize these results in the following proposition.\(^{26}\)

**Proposition 3** The equilibrium wage rate in the economy that has within-prefecture heterogeneity in capital and output wedges is given by

\[
\ln w = \mu (1 - \eta) \ln \left[ \frac{(1 - \psi) \xi}{N} \right] + \mu \xi \ln (1 - \tau^y) - \mu \xi \eta (1 - \alpha) \ln \left( (1 + \tau^k) (r + \delta) \right) + \Omega
\]

\[
+ \mu \xi \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} - 1 \right) \sigma_y + \mu \xi \eta (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\xi \eta (1 - \alpha)}{1 - \eta} + 1 \right) \sigma_k - \mu \xi^2 (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \sigma_{ky},
\]

Moreover, the Solow residual is given by,

\[
\ln Z = \mu \alpha \eta (1 - \eta) \ln \left[ \frac{1 - \psi}{N} \xi \right] - \mu (1 - \eta) \ln (1 - \bar{\tau}_y)
\]

\[
+ \mu (1 - \eta) (1 - \alpha \eta (1 - \xi)) \ln (1 + \bar{\tau}_k) + \hat{\Omega}
\]

\[
- (\xi - (1 - \eta)) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} + \mu \right) \frac{\sigma_y}{2}
\]

\[
- [2 (1 - \eta) (1 - \alpha \eta) + \alpha \xi \eta (2 - \eta (1 + \alpha))] \frac{\mu (1 - \eta + (1 - \alpha) \xi \eta) \sigma_k}{(1 - \eta) (1 - \alpha \eta + 1 + \alpha \eta^2 (1 - \alpha) \xi)}
\]

\[
+ (1 - \eta) (1 - \alpha) + (\xi - 1) \alpha \eta + 1) + \alpha \eta^2 (1 - \alpha) \xi \frac{\mu \xi}{1 - \eta} \sigma_{ky}.
\]

The Solow residual is falling in \( \psi, \sigma_y, \sigma_k, \) and \( -\sigma_{ky} \), while it is increasing in \( \bar{\tau}_k \) and \( \bar{\tau}_y \). The equilibrium wage is falling in \( \psi, \bar{\tau}_k \), and \( \bar{\tau}_y \), while it is increasing in \( \sigma_y, \sigma_k, \) and \( -\sigma_{ky} \).

Note first that if there is no heterogeneity in wedges (i.e., \( \sigma_y = \sigma_k = \sigma_{ky} = 0 \)), then the equilibrium wage rate and Solow residual will be equal to their counterparts in the model without cross-sectional dispersion (cf. eq. (5) and (6)). Therefore, the effects of \( \psi, \bar{\tau}_k, \) and \( \bar{\tau}_y \) are the same as before (see Proposition 3).

\(^{26}\)See Appendix D for details.
Consider now the effect of the second moments. As is clear from equation (16), a mean-preserving spread of the wedges – represented by an increase in the variance of \(\ln(1 + \tau_k)\) or \(\ln(1 - \tau_y)\) – will increase the wage rate. Similarly, an increase in the correlation between \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\), i.e., a smaller covariance \(\sigma_{ky}\), will also increase the wage rate. The reason is that larger dispersion in firm-specific wedges and a tighter link between \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\), will increase aggregate labor demand. On the one hand, the large firms will become larger, which obviously increases demand for workers. On the other hand, while the small firms become smaller (or drop out), this will not lower much the demand for workers since they already hired few workers.

Consider now the expression for the aggregate TFP in a prefecture (equation (17)). Note that the comparative statics for the cross-sectional dispersion in \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\) (i.e., a smaller covariance \(\sigma_{ky}\)) will increase aggregate TFP. The reason is negative selection: low-TFP firms with capital and output subsidies (i.e., negative \(\tau\)) will also fall in response to a mean-preserving spread in capital and output wedges (i.e., increases in the variances of \(\ln(1 + \tau_k)\) and \(\ln(1 - \tau_y)\)). Moreover, TFP will also fall in response to a higher correlation between \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\) (i.e., a smaller \(\sigma_{ky}\)).

Consider now the expression for the aggregate TFP in a prefecture (equation (17)). Note that the comparative statics for the cross-sectional dispersion in \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\) (i.e., a smaller covariance \(\sigma_{ky}\)) will increase aggregate TFP. The reason is negative selection: low-TFP firms with capital and output subsidies (i.e., negative \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\)) will be large while high-TFP firms with large capital and output wedges will be small or maybe even induced to drop out.

We conclude that the comparative statics for the cross-sectional dispersion in \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\) (i.e., comparative statics of \(\{\sigma_y, \sigma_k, -\sigma_{ky}\}\) are qualitatively similar to the comparative statics for the prefecture-specific gross output wedge \(1 - \bar{\tau}_y\) which we listed in Table 3. In particular, changes in the dispersion have opposite effects on wages and aggregate TFP.

We now revisit measurement of the wedges when incorporating cross-sectional dispersion in output and capital wedges. To this end, we must identify the wedges while taking into account the equilibrium distribution of observed allocations and wedges. Proposition 4 outlines a strategy for estimating the entry barriers based on the first and second moments of the observed wedges.

**Proposition 4** The parameters of the joint log-normal distribution of potential wedges, \(\{\bar{\tau}_k, \bar{\tau}_y, \sigma_k, \sigma_k, \sigma_{ky}\}\), can be identified by the following cross-sectional first and second moments for observed wedges.

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\text{std} \{(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)(r + \delta) | z \geq z^*\}}{E \{(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)(r + \delta) | z \geq z^*\}} &= \sqrt{\exp(\sigma_k) - 1} \quad (18) \\
\frac{\text{std} \{(1 - \bar{\tau}_y) | z \geq z^*\}}{E \{(1 - \bar{\tau}_y) | z \geq z^*\}} &= \sqrt{\exp(\sigma_y) - 1} \quad (19) \\
\frac{\text{cov} \{(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)(r + \delta), (1 - \bar{\tau}_y) | z \geq z^*\}}{E \{(1 - \bar{\tau}_y) | z \geq z^*\} \cdot E \{(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)(r + \delta) | z \geq z^*\}} &= \exp(-\sigma_{ky}) - 1 \quad (20) \\
E \{(1 - \bar{\tau}_y) | z \geq z^*\} &= \exp \left( \ln(1 - \bar{\tau}_y) + 2 \frac{\xi - \sigma_y}{1 - \eta} \right) - \left( \xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) \sigma_{ky} \quad (21) \\
E \{(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)(r + \delta) | z \geq z^*\} &= \exp \left( \ln[(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)(r + \delta)] + 2 \xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) \sigma_{ky} \left( 1 - \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \sigma_k \quad (22)
\end{align*}
\]

The proposition implies that even though there is selection in which firms choose to enter (namely, firms with low \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_y\) will be more likely to enter) the prefecture-specific moments for the distribution of wedges can still be identified by using a suitable empirical strategy. In particular, equations (18)-(22) show that the prefecture-specific means \(\bar{\tau}_y\) and \(\bar{\tau}_k\) and the variance-covariance matrix of the wedges can be identified using the coefficient of variation of the observed firms, i.e., the firms that were selected to enter.

---

27 The comparative statics for the Solow residual echo the theoretical finding of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). However, they did not study the comparative statics on the equilibrium wage rate.

28 See Appendix D for details.
Given the prefecture-specific moments \( \{ \bar{\tau}_y, \bar{\tau}_k, \sigma_y, \sigma_k, \sigma_{ky} \} \) and the wage rate \( w \), we can identify the entry barrier \( \psi \) by inverting equation (16), as we did in Section 5. Several results are worth pointing out. First, the entry barriers in the heterogeneous-wedge model are highly correlated with the entry barriers in the benchmark model. Figure 12 plots them – for 1995, 2004, and 2008 – against the entry barriers in the benchmark model. The correlation is high: 0.88 in 1995, 0.86 in 2004, and 0.82 in 2008. Moreover, the entry barriers decline over time and tend to be higher in prefectures with a high SOE output share. Second, when accounting for convergence in wages and TFP over time, as presented in Table B-1, the entry barriers continue to account for a large share of the convergence. Overall, the dispersion in the capital wedges has no effect on wage and TFP convergence while the dispersion in the output wedges affects only the convergence in wages. The covariance between the output and capital wedges, however, affects both the convergence in wages and TFP. Finally, as presented in Table B-2, a decline in a prefecture’s SOE share over time leads to a decline in its entry barrier, with both the OLS and Bartik instruments estimates being large and negative, although the Bartik instrument results are estimated with less precision.\(^\text{29}\)

Figure 12: Log Gross Entry Barriers, Benchmark Model and Model with Wedge Heterogeneity.

\(^{29}\)Due to what we perceive as severe measurement error in the data, we drop the top and bottom 15\% of the firms in terms of output and capital wedges in each prefecture. Thus, although the results from the heterogeneous-wedge model are insightful, we consider our benchmark model as our preferred choice.
8 Conclusion

This paper studies regional economic growth in China. Using firm-level data from the Chinese Industrial Census, we construct prefecture-level aggregate data for manufacturing. We document that China experienced a remarkable regional convergence in wages, TFP, productivity, and capital per worker in non-state manufacturing firms during the period 1995 to 2008. The main aim of the paper is to analyze the factors behind the initial dispersion and subsequent regional convergence in wages and TFP. To this end we propose a tractable version of the Hopenhayn (1992) model of firm heterogeneity and new firm creation, extended to incorporate three distortions: standard capital and output wedges, common for all firms in a prefecture, and a novel entry barrier. The general equilibrium model is solved analytically. It features endogenous aggregate TFP and allows us to measure the three wedges using data on aggregate allocations for wages, output, employment, and capital.

Using the model as an accounting device, we then exploit the aggregate prefecture-level data to measure these distortions for each prefecture. We document that entry barriers are salient in accounting for the regional dispersion and subsequent convergence in China. In contrast, the capital and output wedges play only a limited role in explaining the empirical regional convergence.

Finally, given the preponderance of the entry barriers in accounting for economic performance, we investigate the empirical drivers of these distortions. We find that the presence of state-owned firms give rise to larger entry barriers for non-state firms. Moreover, based on a Bartik instrumental variable approach exploiting the major 1997 SOE reform and the ensuing decline in the role of state-owned firms in many industries, we argue that the presence of state firms have had a causal effect on increasing the entry barriers for non-state firms. We provide a political economy model of distortions to motivate the empirical link between SOEs and entry barriers for non-state firms.

Our analysis has made a number of simplifying assumption, often dictated by data limitations. For example, to minimize the role of measurement error we have focused on prefecture-level distortions and abstracted from firm-level distortions within a prefecture. However, our main findings turn out to be robust to allowing firm-level dispersion in capital and output wedges. Following a standard assumption in the misallocation literature, we have assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function on the firm level, with capital and labor as the only inputs. We do not have data on input prices. This precludes an interesting avenue of research, investigating the potential role of heterogeneity in input prices. We leave this for future research.

We conclude that the gradual removal of entry barriers has been a major driver of aggregate growth and regional convergence in China. It follows that the 1997 SOE reform may have inadvertently contributed to regional convergence, to the extent that the decline in SOE presence induced by this reform contributed to scaling back the entry barriers. Moreover, in the context of the recent marked slowdown in economic growth in China, our analysis provides a potential mechanism for the recent slowdown in economic growth, namely that the resurgence in the state sector following the Global Financial Crisis may have contributed to larger entry barriers for non-state firms and, hence, lower non-state sector growth.
References


A Data Description

A.1 Dataset

Our main data source is the 1995, 2004, and the 2008 Chinese Industrial Census (CIC) carried out by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The CIC covers all of the manufacturing sector and provides rich firm-level data on gross output, value added, employment, the gross capital stock, depreciation, total wages, as well as information on firm year of establishment, ownership type, and main sector of business. For these three years, we have firm-level records on 0.53, 1.37 and 2.08 million firms, respectively.

In order to make these data comparable across the three census years, we needed to address a number of issues related to changes that occurred in China’s industrial classification system, ownership categories, and prefecture boundaries. We draw on concordances described in Brandt et al. (2012) for ownership types and industrial sectors, and extend the concordance on prefecture boundaries in Baum-Snow et al. (2017) to cover all prefectures. We also utilize deflators developed by Brandt et al. (2012) for the purposes of constructing real measures of industrial output, and estimates of the real capital stock.

A.2 Defining non-state-owned enterprises

The NBS provides a detailed breakdown of firm type by ownership for firms in the CIC. In 1995, there are 12 ownership categories, of which one covers state-owned firms. On the basis of the slightly more detailed classification in use in 2004 (and 2008), we define state owned to include firms listed as state-owned, state solely-funded limited liability companies, and shareholding companies. Shareholding companies during this period are largely state-controlled, but a subset of these firms is not. Non-state-owned enterprises are then defined as all enterprises that are not state-owned.

A stricter definition of state-owned would exclude the shareholding companies. In addition, for each firm we have a breakdown of equity in the firm between state, collective, private, legal person, and foreign. Alternative definitions of SOE and NSOE ownership can be constructed on the basis of these variables, as well as using a combination of the categorical ownership variables and data on ownership equity. The latter information is especially helpful for identifying state-controlled shareholding companies.


We use a procedure similar to the one in Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017b) and Hsieh and Song (2015). We use the 1980 and 1985 Industrial Census in order to obtain the nominal capital stock, $\tilde{k}$, at the original purchase price, in a 2-digit industry in a given province. Then, we compute the annual growth in $\tilde{k}$ for each 2-digit industry/province cell between 1980 and 1985 using the information from the 1980 and 1985 Manufacturing Census:

$$g_k = \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_{1985}}{\tilde{k}_{1980}} \right)^{\frac{1}{5}} - 1 \quad (A-1)$$

We further use the 1995, 2004, and 2008 Industrial Census to compute the annual growth in $\tilde{k}$ for each 2-digit industry/province cell between 1985 and 1995, 1995 and 2004, and 2004 and 2008. For each firm in 1995, we infer its initial level of capital, $\tilde{k}_0$, in the year when the firm was established using the imputed above $g_k$:

$$\tilde{k}_{t-1} = \frac{\tilde{k}_t}{1 + g_{k,t-1}} \quad (A-2)$$

Therefore, for each year from its establishment until 1995 we have $\tilde{k}_t$. We compute the real capital stock in the year of birth of the firm as:

$$k_0 = \frac{\tilde{k}_0}{p_{k,t}} \quad (A-3)$$

---

30 We also draw on firm-level data for 1992 on all independent accounting units (0.39 million), which covers a slightly smaller subset of firms than the census and has information on a smaller set of variables.

31 The 2004 and 2008 Census also provide data for the service sector, but unfortunately similar information was not collected in 1995.

32 The firm-level records are not exhaustive, but cover in upwards of 90 percent of industrial activity.
where \( p_{k,t} \) is the capital price deflator from Brandt and Rawski (2008). Finally, the real capital stock for the firm in year \( t \) is computed as:

\[
k_t = (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + \frac{k_{t-1}g_{k,t-1}}{p_{k,t}}. \tag{A-4}
\]

B Figures and Tables

Figure B-1: Convergence in the NSOE sector, 2004-2008.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture, and the solid red line is the fitted regression line.
Figure B-2: Characteristics of NSOE Firms in 1995.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture, and the solid red line is the fitted regression line. The 1995 SOE output share in a prefecture is on the horizontal axis.

Figure B-3: Output per Worker Growth: 2004-2008.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture. The left panel in the figure plots the annualized growth rate in output per worker in the non-state sector in 2004-2008, and the solid red line is the fitted regression line. The right panel plots the corresponding annualized growth rates: overall (blue short-dash), state sector (green dash), and non-state sector (solid red). The 1995 SOE output share in a prefecture is on the horizontal axis.
Figure B-4: Value Added per Worker Growth: 1995-2004 and 2004-2008.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture. The left panels in the figure plot the annualized growth rate in value added per worker in the non-state sector in 1992-1995 (upper panel) and 1995-2004 (lower panel), and the solid red line is the fitted regression line. The right panels plot the corresponding annualized growth rates: overall (blue short-dash), state sector (green dash), and non-state sector (solid red). The 1992 (1995) SOE output share in a prefecture is on the horizontal axis for the 1992-1995 (1995-2004) period.
Figure B-5: Gross Output and Gross Capital Wedges, 1995, 2004 and 2008, All Firms, NSOE.

Figure B-6: Gross Output and Gross Capital Wedges, 1995, 2004 and 2008, Entrants, NSOE.

Notes: Each dot represents a prefecture. The panels plot the gross output and gross capital wedges for all firms in the NSOE sector in 1995, 2004, and 2008. The SOE output share in 1995 in each prefecture is on the horizontal axis.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TFP</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha \eta$</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1 + \bar{\tau}_k)$</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1 - \bar{\tau}_y)$</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1 - \psi)$</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_k$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_y$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{ky}$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the annual rate of convergence in TFP and wages across prefectures for the 1995-2004 and 2004-2008 time periods. The $\beta$-convergence coefficient for prefectures $p$ between times $t_0$ and $t_0 + T$ is estimated from the regression

\[
\left( \frac{1}{T} \right) \ln \left( \frac{y_{p,t_0+T}}{y_{p,t_0}} \right) = a - \left( 1 - e^{-\beta T} \right) \ln(y_{p,t_0}) + u_{p,t_0} + u_{p,t_0+T},
\]

where $u_{p,t_0+T}$ represents an average of error terms, $u_{p,t}$, between times $t_0$ and $t_0 + T$. The table reports what the convergence in TFP and wages would have been had only one of the listed variables changed.

Table B-2: Change in the Entry Wedge, 1995-2004, Heterogeneous-Wedge Model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>IV$^{ind}$</th>
<th>IV$^{ind}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \ln(1 - \psi)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta e^{soc}$</td>
<td>-6.25***</td>
<td>-6.61**</td>
<td>-4.60</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(3.23)</td>
<td>(3.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \ln FREV$</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First stage:

|                        |       |       |              |              |
| IV coefficient         | 0.71*** | 0.69*** |              |              |
| st. error              | (0.07) | (0.08) |              |              |
| $R^2$                  | 0.25  | 0.27  |              |              |

Notes: The table reports the OLS and IV results from a regression of the change in the log gross entry wedge on the change in the SOE employment share ($e^{soc}$) and in the log fiscal revenues per government worker ($\ln FREV$) in a prefecture between 1995 and 2004. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** – statistically significant at 1%; ** – statistically significant at 5%; * – statistically significant at 10%.
C The Firm’s Problem

Conditional on having chosen to operate, the firm’s objective is given by
\[ \Pi = \max_{k,w} \left\{ (1 - \tau^y) y - wn - \left(1 + \tau^k\right) (r + \delta) k \right\}. \]

The first-order conditions are given by
\[ \begin{align*}
(1 - \tau^y) \alpha y &= wn, \quad \text{(C-1)} \\
(1 - \tau^y) (1 - \alpha) \eta y &= \left(1 + \tau^k\right) (r + \delta) k. \quad \text{(C-2)}
\end{align*} \]

The capital and output wedges can then be expressed as
\[ \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \eta y = \left(1 + \tau^k\right) (r + \delta) k. \]

Plugging this back into the production function yields an expression for output in terms of \( z \) and wedges only:
\[ y^* = z \left( (1 - \tau^y) \eta \right) \frac{a}{1 - \eta} \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{(1 + \tau^k)(r + \delta)} \right) \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right) \frac{\alpha_k}{y^*} \approx z \cdot g \left( \tau^y, \tau^k, r, w \right). \]

The optimal allocations for capital, labor, and profits in equation (3) then follow directly from the first-order conditions.

D Proofs of Propositions in Section 7

D.1 Proof of Proposition 3

Assume that within each prefecture there is dispersion across firms in the output and capital wedges. It is immediate that the optimal choices of each firm is still given by equations (3) and (4), although the wedges are now specific to each firm.

The joint cross-sectional distribution of the wedges is assumed to be log normal with the moments given by equation (15). We start by providing a useful lemma.

**Lemma 5** For any constants \( a \) and \( b \) the following cross-sectional expectation holds across firms in a location,
\[ E \left\{ \left( (1 + \tau_k) (r + \delta) \right)^a (1 - \tau_y)^b \, | \, z \geq z^* \right\} = \exp \left( (by_y + a\mu_k) + \left( b^2 + 2b \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_y}{2} + \left( a^2 + 2a\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_k}{2} - \left( b\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} + a\frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} + ab \right) \sigma_{ky} \right) \]

**Proof.**
\[ E \left\{ \left( (1 + \tau_k) (r + \delta) \right)^a (1 - \tau_y)^b \, | \, z \geq z^* \right\} = \frac{\int \int_{z^*} \left[ ((1 + \tau_k) (r + \delta))^a (1 - \tau_y)^b \right] f(z) \, dz \, d\tau_y \, d\tau_k \, d\tau_y}{\int \int_{z^*} f(z) \, dz \, d\tau_y \, d\tau_k \, d\tau_y} \]
\[ = \frac{\int \int_{z^*} \left[ ((1 + \tau_k) (r + \delta))^a (1 - \tau_y)^b \right] g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k \, d\tau_y}{\int \int_{z^*} g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k \, d\tau_y} \]
\[ = \exp \left( \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} + b \right) \mu_y + \left( a - \xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) \mu_k \right) \]
\[ \exp \left( \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} + b \right)^2 \frac{\sigma_y}{2} + \left( \xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} + a \right)^2 \frac{\sigma_k}{2} - \left( \xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) ^2 \frac{\sigma_{ky}}{2} \right) \]
\[ = \exp \left( b\mu_y + a\mu_k + \left( b^2 + 2b \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_y}{2} + \left( a^2 + 2a\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_k}{2} - \left( b\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} + a\frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} + ab \right) \sigma_{ky} \right) \]
The second equation follows from the assumption that the distribution function \( f \) (of potential \( z \)) is identical across locations. The third equation uses the fact that
\[
\int_{z^*}^{\infty} z f(z) \, dz = \frac{\xi}{\xi - 1} \xi (\nu)^{1-\xi} (1-\eta)^{-(1-\xi)} \eta^{-\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\xi)} (1-\alpha)^{-(1-\alpha)} \frac{\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{w^{(1-\xi)\frac{\alpha}{\eta}}}{(1-\tau_y)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1+\tau_k)(r+\delta))^{(1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}}}}.
\]

We now solve for the equilibrium wage rate and the measured Solow residual. Given a wage \( w \) and the entrepreneurial entry decision in equation (4), the aggregate labor demand per potential entrepreneur in a prefecture is given by
\[
\int \left( \int_{z^*}^{\infty} n(z,s) f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
\]
\[
= \int \left( \int_{z^*}^{\infty} z\alpha (1-\tau_y) w \cdot (1-\tau_y) \eta^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1+\tau_k)(r+\delta))^{(1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}}} \right) \left( \frac{(\alpha)}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
\]
\[
= \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} \eta^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}) \int \left( (1-\tau_y) \left( (1+\tau_k)(r+\delta) \right)^{(1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}} \left( \frac{(\alpha)}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
\]
\[
= \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} \eta^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}) \int \left( (1-\tau_y) \left( (1+\tau_k)(r+\delta) \right)^{(1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}} \left( \frac{(\alpha)}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
\]
\[
= \exp(\mu_k)^{\frac{\xi}{1-\eta}} \exp(\mu_k)^{-\xi \eta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} \exp \left( \left( \frac{\xi}{1-\eta} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_y}{2}} + \left( \frac{\eta(1-\alpha)}{1-\eta} \right)^{2} \sigma_k \right) \frac{(\xi}{1-\eta} \eta(1-\alpha) \sigma_k)
\]

Consider now the equilibrium in the labor market. The wage rate must equate labor supply \( N \) to the aggregate labor demand (in a prefecture);
\[
N = (1-\psi) \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} \eta^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1-\alpha)(1-\xi)^{1-\xi}} \left( \frac{\xi}{1-\eta} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_y}{2}} + \left( \frac{\eta(1-\alpha)}{1-\eta} \right)^{2} \sigma_k \right) \frac{(\xi}{1-\eta} \eta(1-\alpha) \sigma_k)
\]
\[
\exp(\mu_k)^{\frac{\xi}{1-\eta} \eta(1-\alpha)} \exp(\mu_k)^{-\xi \eta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} \exp \left( \left( \frac{\xi}{1-\eta} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_y}{2}} + \left( \frac{\eta(1-\alpha)}{1-\eta} \right)^{2} \sigma_k \right) \frac{(\xi}{1-\eta} \eta(1-\alpha) \sigma_k)
\]
It follows immediately that the equilibrium wage is given by equation (16).

Consider now the Solow residual \( Z \). Given the expression for \( w \) we can calculate the expressions for the
prefecture-specific aggregate allocations of $K$, $Y$, and the Solow residual $Z$. $Y$ is given by

$$
\frac{Y}{1 - \psi} = \int \left( \int_{z^* (s)}^{\infty} g(z, s) f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
$$

$$
= \int \left( \int_{z^* (s)}^{\infty} \left[ z ((1 - \tau_y) \eta)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \tau_k} (r + \delta) \right)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \eta}} \right] f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
$$

$$
= \frac{\eta}{\xi - 1} \xi (\nu)^{1 - \xi} (1 - \eta)^{-(1 - \xi)} \left( 1 - \alpha \right)^{\frac{\xi - 1}{1 - \eta}} \left( \frac{\eta}{\xi - 1} \right) \frac{\eta}{\xi - 1} \frac{w}{\alpha}
$$

Now compute aggregate capital,

$$
\frac{K}{1 - \psi} = \int \left( \int_{z^* (s)}^{\infty} k(z, s) f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
$$

$$
= \int \left( \int_{z^* (s)}^{\infty} \left[ z ((1 - \tau_y) \eta)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \tau_k} (r + \delta) \right)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \eta}} \right] f(z) \, dz \right) g(\tau_k, \tau_y) \, d\tau_k d\tau_y
$$

$$
= \left( \eta \right)^{1 - \eta} \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta} \left( \frac{\alpha}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \eta}} \left( \frac{\xi}{\xi - 1} \right) \frac{\xi}{\xi - 1} \frac{w}{\alpha}
$$

$$
\exp (\mu_y) \frac{1 - \eta}{\xi - 1} \frac{w}{\alpha}
$$

$$
\exp (\mu_k) \frac{1 - \eta}{\xi - 1} \frac{w}{\alpha}
$$

Now compute aggregate capital,
The Solow residual can then be calculated as

\[ \ln Z = \ln \left( \frac{Y}{1 - \zeta} \right) - (1 - \alpha \eta) \ln \left( \frac{K}{1 - \zeta} \right) - \alpha \eta \ln \left( \frac{N}{1 - \zeta} \right) \]

\[ = \ln \left( \frac{\xi - 1 - \eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^{\eta - 1} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1 - \xi} \left( 1 - \eta \right) \eta \frac{\sigma}{\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right)^{\eta - 1} \left( \frac{w}{\alpha} \right) - \frac{\alpha \eta}{1 - \eta} \]

\[ + \frac{\xi - 1 + \eta}{1 - \eta} - \eta \frac{\mu_y - \eta \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta} + \mu_k}{1 - \eta} + \left( \xi - 1 + \eta \right)^{1 - \xi} \eta \frac{\sigma_y^2}{2} + \left( \xi - 1 - \alpha \eta \frac{2}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1 - \xi} \eta \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} - \frac{\xi \eta}{1 - \eta} \left( 1 - \eta \right)^2 \sigma_{ky} \]

\[ - (1 - \alpha \eta) \ln \left( \frac{\xi - 1 - \eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^{\eta - 1} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1 - \xi} \left( 1 - \eta \right) \eta \frac{\sigma}{\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right)^{\eta - 1} \left( \frac{w}{\alpha} \right) - \frac{\alpha \eta}{1 - \eta} \ln \left( \frac{N}{1 - \zeta} \right) \]

\[ - (1 - \alpha \eta) \left( \frac{\xi - 1 - \eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^{\eta - 1} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1 - \xi} \left( 1 - \eta \right) \eta \frac{\sigma}{\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right)^{\eta - 1} \left( \frac{w}{\alpha} \right) - \frac{\alpha \eta}{1 - \eta} \ln \left( \frac{N}{1 - \zeta} \right) \]

Substituting in the wage expression from equation (16) and simplifying yields equation (17) in the text. This concludes the proof of Proposition 3

D.2 Proof of Proposition 4

Consider now the cross-sectional moments of the observed wedges within a prefecture. Note that we are observing a truncated distribution of firms, i.e., those with \( z \geq z^* \). Using Lemma 5 the variance of the observed \((1 - \tau^y)\) is given by

\[ E \left\{ (1 - \tau^y)^2 | z \geq z^* \right\} - (E \{ (1 - \tau^y) | z \geq z^* \})^2 \]

\[ = \exp \left( 2 \mu_y + 4 \left( 1 + \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_y^2}{2} - 2 \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_k}{1 - \eta} \right) \]

\[ - \exp \left( 2 \mu_y + 2 \left( 1 + 2 \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_y^2}{2} + 2 \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_k}{1 - \eta} \right) \exp (\sigma_y - 1), \]

and the mean is

\[ E \{ (1 - \tau^y) | z \geq z^* \} \]

\[ = \exp \left( \mu_y + \left( 1 + 2 \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_y^2}{2} - \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\sigma_k}{1 - \eta} \right) \]

It follows immediately that \( \sigma_y \) can be identified by the observed coefficient of variation, stated in equation (19). A similar argument establishes the variance and mean of \( 1 + \tau^k \) is given by

\[ E \left\{ \left( 1 + \tau^k \right)^2 | z \geq z^* \right\} - (E \{ (1 + \tau^k) | z \geq z^* \})^2 \]

\[ = \exp \left( 2 \left( \mu_k + \left( 1 + 2 \xi \left( 1 - \eta \right) \right) \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} - \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \sigma_{ky} \right) \right) \exp (\sigma_k - 1) \]

\[ E \{ (1 + \tau^k) | z \geq z^* \} \]

\[ = \exp \left( \mu_k + \left( 1 + 2 \xi \left( 1 - \eta \right) \right) \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} - \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} \sigma_{ky} \right), \]

implying that \( \sigma_k \) can be identified from equation (18). Finally, the observed covariance is calculated as follows,
\[ \text{cov} \{(1 + \tau_k)(r + \delta), (1 - \tau_y)|z \geq z^*\} \]
\[= (\exp(-\sigma_{ky}) - 1) \exp(\mu_y + \mu_k) \]
\[+ \left(1 + 2\frac{\xi}{1 - \eta}\right) \frac{\sigma_y}{2} + \left(1 + 2\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta}\right) \frac{\sigma_k}{2} - \left(\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} + \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta}\right) \sigma_{ky} \]
\[E \{(1 + \tau_k)(r + \delta)(1 - \tau_y)|z \geq z^*\} \]
\[= \exp((\mu_y + \mu_k) \]
\[+ \left(1 + 2\frac{\xi}{1 - \eta}\right) \frac{\sigma_y}{2} + \left(1 + 2\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta}\right) \frac{\sigma_k}{2} - \left(\xi (1 - \alpha) \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} + \frac{\xi}{1 - \eta} + 1\right) \sigma_{ky} \}.
\]
It follows that \(\sigma_{ky}\) can be identified from equation (20). This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.