

**Corrections and updates for version 5 (2005-10-7) of the
manual of publicly-available solutions for Osborne's
"An Introduction to Game Theory"
(Oxford University Press, 2003)**

2012/4/7

I thank the following people for pointing out errors and improvements: Buddy Chang, Xiaohua Fang, Jochen Konemann, Zhanna Zhanabekova.

Corrections

Exercise Correction

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- 34.3 The equations " $12 + 21.8 = 33.8$ " and " $22 + 12 = 34$ " in the second paragraph should be interchanged.
- 120.2 The strategy $(0, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$ does not satisfy the inequalities and thus does not strictly dominate T ; replace it with $(0, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$.
- 224.1 If both firms are active in period t_1 then firm 2's profit in that period is $-ck_2 = -200$, not $(100 - t_1 - c - k_1 - k_2)k_2$, because the price is zero, given that $k_1 + k_2 > 50$.
- 227.1 The paragraph following the description of the game should say "... an offer x of player 1 is accepted with probability either 0 or p if $x = 0$... is accepted with probability either p or 1 if $x = \frac{1}{3}$...". In addition, the two cases in the description of the equilibria in the next paragraph should be interchanged.