

**Corrections and updates for version 2 (2004-4-27) of the
manual of publicly-available solutions for Osborne's
"An Introduction to Game Theory"
(Oxford University Press, 2003)**

2012/4/7

I thank the following people for pointing out errors and improvements: Akihito Asano, Buddy Chang, Xiaohua Fang, Jochen Konemann, Ahmer Tarar, Zhanna Zhanabekova.

Corrections

Exercise Correction

- 34.3 The equations " $12 + 21.8 = 33.8$ " and " $22 + 12 = 34$ " in the second paragraph should be interchanged.
- 120.2 The strategy $(0, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$ does not satisfy the inequalities and thus does not strictly dominate T ; replace it with $(0, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$.
- 224.1 If both firms are active in period t_1 then firm 2's profit in that period is $-ck_2 = -200$, not $(100 - t_1 - c - k_1 - k_2)k_2$, because the price is zero, given that $k_1 + k_2 > 50$.
- 227.1 The paragraph following the description of the game should say "... an offer x of player 1 is accepted with probability either 0 or p if $x = 0 \dots$ is accepted with probability either p or 1 if $x = \frac{1}{3} \dots$ ". In addition, the two cases in the description of the equilibria in the next paragraph should be interchanged.
- 288.1 The left-hand side of the third equation in each of the first three multi-line displays should be q_h^* , not q_H^* .
- 331.2 In the first and second printings of the book this exercise is incorrect. See the corrections to the book for its replacement, and the current version of the solution manual for the solution.
- 363.3 The roles of L and R are reversed in the answer and some labels on the figure are not correct.