Corrections and updates for seventh printing of Osborne and Rubinstein's "A Course in Game Theory" (MIT Press, 1994)

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Corrections

Page, Line	Correction
xv	Ariel Rubinstein's email address is now `rariel@tauex.tau.ac.il`, his website is `https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il`, and his second address is Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA.
7, −13	Insert "nonempty" before "disjoint".
23, 14	Replace the sentence "Note that . . ." with "Note that by part (c), the players' Nash equilibrium strategies may be found by solving the problems $\max_x \min_y u_1(x, y)$ and $\max_y \min_x u_2(x, y)$."
30	Add, at the start of line 5, "The result in Exercise 20.4 is due to Nash (1951)."
45, 7	Replace "he" with "she".
50, −2	Replace "$0 \le \gamma \le 1$" with "$0 < \gamma \le 1$".
55, −10	Replace "$\mu_3^2(A)$" with "$\mu_3^2(B)$".
56, −9	Replace "the following exercises" with "Exercises 56.4 and 56.5".
60, 22	Replace "player 1" with "player i".
60, 23	Replace "$U_i(a_{-i}, a_i^*)$" with "$u_i(a_{-i}, a_i^*)$".
68, −2	Add "infinite" before "decimal". (A number has a unique infinite decimal expansion.)
99, 3	Replace "the longest" with "a longest".
99, 4	Replace $\Gamma(h^*)$ with $\Gamma(h', h^*)$ on this line and on lines 6, 8, and 10.
104, −9, −8	Replace "she" with "he".
122	Add to A3 the requirement that the Pareto frontier of X be connected.
123	In the first display $(M_i(G_i))$ replace "a SPE" with "an SPE".
123	Replace the second sentence of the proof of Step 1 with "By A3 and the continuity of the preference relations, the domain of ϕ is an interval and ϕ is continuous, one-to-one, and decreasing."

138, 1 (except printings 1–3) Change upper limit of sum from T to ∞.

138, 9 Replace t with T (twice).

143, −6 In printings 4 and later replace "A payoff profile w" with "A feasible payoff profile w of G". (Note that, according to our definitions, a feasible payoff profile may not be a payoff profile.)

144 In Proposition 144.1, replace "an enforceable payoff profile of G" with "an enforceable convex combination of payoff profiles of G". [The coefficients in the convex combination are not necessarily rational.]

159–160 The sketch of the proof of Proposition 160.1 is flawed. It has been replaced. (The text has been rewritten, moving the result to page 159, where it appears as Proposition 159.1.)

200, −11 Replace "after the history h" with "after the history h if $P(h) \in N$ and chance if $P(h) = c$."

215, 5 Replace "the sets of actions" with "the sequences of actions".

216, −6 Replace the mathematical expression with $p^2 \cdot 0 + p \cdot (1-p) \cdot 1 + (1-p) \cdot 0 = p(1-p)$.

229 In the sixth line of Exercise 229.1, replace "S" with "s".

260 After "for all coalitions S and T" on the last line add ", where $v(\varnothing) = 0$".

263 On line 12, insert "for all $S \in \mathcal{C}$" before "by the left-hand inequality", and replace the last sentence of this paragraph with "Thus $x(N) = v(N)$, so that the payoff profile x is in the core."

274 Add, between lines 7 and 8, the following paragraph. "Now, for every agent i we have $x_i - \omega_i + \varepsilon \in Q$ for every $\varepsilon > 0$, so that $p(x_i - \omega_i + \varepsilon) \geq 0$. Taking ε small, we conclude that $px_i \geq p\omega_i$ for all i. But x is an allocation, so $px_i = p\omega_i$ for all i."

307, 7–8 Replace $\succsim_1', \succsim_2$ with $\succsim_i', \succsim_j$ (twice).

307, 15 Replace $p \cdot x \succsim_j x^*$ with $p \cdot x \succ_j x^*$.

327 Replace "Recherce" with "Recherche" on line −10.

335, 3 Replace "[85]" with "[84]".

336, 3 Replace "[115]" with "[114]".