

ECO2701H1F – Development Economics
Department of Economics
Fall 2025
SYLLABUS (PRELIMINARY)

Instructor:	Prof. Gustavo J. Bobonis	Office:	Rm 304, Max Gluskin House
E-mail:	gustavo.bobonis@utoronto.ca	Office hours:	11:30-12:30 on Mondays

Description: This is a graduate course in development economics, appropriate for graduate students in the Department of Economics and other students with preparation in microeconomic theory and econometrics. The focus is on the application of economic theory, and especially econometrics, to a variety of questions important for understanding household and government behavior in developing countries. A further purpose is to demonstrate how the analytic techniques used in applied microeconomics can be used to inform public policy in these countries. The material covered draws on (calculus-based) microeconomic theory and econometrics; it is suitable for both MA and PhD students. The emphasis of the course is on the interpretation and evaluation of empirical evidence relevant for the conduct of public policy in developing countries.

Lectures: Thursdays 1-3 p.m. **LA 248 (Gerald Larkin Building)**

TA: Larasati (Lara) Wulandari (lara.wulandari@mail.utoronto.ca)

Meetings

The delivery model for this course is in person. Students are expected to attend all sessions and actively participate in discussions and activities. In-class discussions and activities are designed to help students assimilate key concepts, connect ideas, and build their ability to engage with arguments and evidence about social phenomena. In doing so, attendance and participation will help students achieve the learning objectives for this course.

Course Requirements:

- **Assignments (5 assignments, 7% each):** There will be five assignments. These will be a mix of theoretical exercises and empirical interpretations or exercises on relevant papers that we will not discuss (in detail) during the lectures. You will need to use the statistical package Stata (or R) to complete the assignments.
- **Research paper/proposal or policy brief (25%):** The research paper may be a first draft of some original work or a research proposal on empirical development economics that outlines the steps you would take to produce original work. The purpose of the research paper is to get you started thinking about how empirical research is actually done. You must submit a brief paragraph on at least one potential research topic (and hopefully a paragraph each on a couple of backup ideas) by October 31st at 11:59pm on Quercus; we will set up meetings to discuss your idea(s) for the week of November 3rd. MA students can choose a paper and write a policy brief as the ones on the VoxDev or J-PAL website. The paper/proposal/brief is due November 27th at 11:59 pm.
- **Final exam (40%):** The final exam will be in person; we will discuss it in class closer to the end of the semester. The centerpiece will be the theoretical and empirical analysis of economic development issues in the context of the course readings and class discussions. The final examination will be cumulative.

● **Class attendance and participation (Bonus 5%):** To earn full bonus marks for participation, you will be expected to participate in class discussions. An essential requirement of the class is the mandatory paper readings. You must read these papers extremely carefully. We will discuss these papers at length in class. I will assume you have read them, so please be prepared. All papers are available on Quercus.

Below you will find the key dates of assessments in this course.

Date	Assignment	Material covered	Weight
Sept. 18 th	Assignment 1 due (Welf)	Weeks 1-2	7%
Sept. 25 th	Assignment 2 due (Cred)	Weeks 3-4	7%
Oct. 2 nd	Assignment 3 due (Educ)	Weeks 4-5	7%
Oct. 23 th	Assignment 4 due (Insur)	Weeks 6-7	7%
Nov. 6 th (Week of)	Proposals/Briefs Ideas	N/A	5%
Nov. 20 th	Assignment 5 due (PE)	Weeks 7-9	7%
Nov. 27 th	Proposals/Briefs	N/A	20%
TBD	Final Exam	Weeks 1-12	40%

Course Materials

General Readings

Not required reading for this class, but you will find them useful and probably you will want to read them at some point if you are planning to work in this field.

Books

- Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton University Press, 1998.
Available online via the library: <http://go.utlib.ca/cat/8839558>
- Bardhan, Pranab and Christopher Udry. Development Microeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics. Public Affairs, 2011.

Methods (not required but suggested):

- Angrist, Josh and Stephen Pishke. Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Imbens, Guido and Donald Rubin. Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. Handbook of Field Experiments. North Holland, 2017.

We will also rely heavily on journal articles. You can access online articles for this class by browsing the links on Quercus. There are many readings for this class. You are not expected to read every single article in detail, but you are expected to understand the methods used by the authors to reach their conclusions. Required readings have stars. Lecture notes/slides will be posted on Quercus. Slides are not a substitute for attending/watching the lectures, but rather a study aide. The Reading List will be updated throughout the course. Please check it regularly.

Course Topics and Schedule (Preliminary/Aspirational)

Week	Date	Topic
1	Sept. 4 th	Introduction: Growth and Development
2	Sept. 11 th	Capital, Investment, and Credit
3	Sept. 18 th	Education
4	Sept. 25 th	Labor
5	Oct. 2 nd	Health (or)
6	Oct. 9 th	Risk, Vulnerability, and Insurance
7	Oct. 16 th	Land*
8	Oct. 23 rd	Social Insurance
	Oct. 30 th	Reading Week
9	Nov. 6 th	Democracy and Development
10	Nov. 13 th	Malfunctioning Democracies
11	Nov. 20 th	TBD
12	Nov. 27 th	State Capacity and Effectiveness*

Communication and E-mail Policy

The preferable method of communication is to attend my office hours. However, I understand that students might prefer email for some queries. Please keep in mind the following policies for its use in the course.

- Please include “[ECO2701]” in the subject heading of your e-mail.
- Email is not the appropriate medium for discussing course materials if the response requires more than one sentence. If it takes longer, class time or office hours are the more suitable venues.
- In conformance with university policy, students are advised ONLY to use their utoronto email addresses.
- While I endeavor to respond to emails within 24 hours (except on weekends), if you do not get a response to your email, please get in touch after class or during office hours.

Required Readings and Topics (Starred are required and one star means skim through)**

We will rely heavily on journal articles. You can access online articles for this class by browsing the links on the course Quercus page. You are not expected to read every single article in detail, but you are expected to understand the methods used by the authors to reach their conclusions. Required readings have double stars and those with one star means skim through. Lecture notes/slides will be posted on Quercus. Slides are not a substitute for attending the lectures, but rather a study aide. The Reading List will be updated throughout the course. Please check it regularly.

I. Introduction: Growth and Development

**Banerjee, Abhijit (2008). "Big Answers for Big Questions: The Presumption of Growth Policy", Working paper, MIT.

**Jones, Charles I., and Peter J. Klenow (2016). "Beyond GDP? Welfare across Countries and Time", *American Economic Review*, 106(9), 2426-57.

*Chancel, Lucas, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. *World Inequality Report 2022*. World Inequality Lab, 2021. Executive Summary, Chapter 1, and Chapter 2.

*Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2011). Chapter 1 of Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development. Princeton University Press.

World Bank. "World Development Indicators Report."
<https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/>

Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil (1992). "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107(2), 407-437.

Caselli, Francesco (2005). "Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences", in Aghion, Philippe, and Steven Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, North-Holland.

Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2006). "The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and... Convergence, Period", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(2), 351-397.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo (2007). "The Economic Lives of the Poor", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21 (1): 141-168.

II. Capital, Investment, and Credit

**Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo (2010). "Giving Credit Where It Is Due", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24(3), 61-80.

**de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff (2008). "Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(4), 1329-72.

**Karlan, Dean, and Jonathan Zinman (2009). "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment", *Econometrica*, 77(6), 1993-2008.

*Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan (2015). "The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 7(1), 22-53.

*Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2014) "Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program", *Review of Economic Studies* (2014) 81 (2): 572-607.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Andrew F. Newman (1993). "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development", *Journal of Political Economy*, 101(2), 274-298. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138820>

Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter J. Klenow (2009), "Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(4): 1403-1448.

Bau, Natalie, and Adrien Matray (2023). "Misallocation and Capital Market Integration: Evidence from India", *Econometrica*, 91(1), XX-XX.

“Capital market integration can reduce misallocation: Evidence from India, VoxEU, 16 Mar 2020. <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/capital-market-integration-can-reduce-misallocation-evidence-india>

III. Education

**Duflo, Esther (2001). “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment”, *American Economic Review*, 91(4), 795-813.

**Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2024). "The Impact of Secondary School Subsidies on Career Trajectories in a Dual Labor Market: Experimental Evidence from Ghana", Working paper, MIT.

**Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2011). “Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya”, *American Economic Review*, 101(5), 1739-74.

*Glewwe, Paul, and Karthik Muralidharan (2016). “Improving Education Outcomes in Developing Countries: Evidence, Knowledge Gaps, and Policy Implications”, Chapter 10 in Hanushek, Eric A., Stephen Machin, and Lugder Woessmann (eds), *Handbook of the Economics of Education*, Volume 5, 653-743.

*Card, David (1999). “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings”, Chapter 30 in Ashenfelter, Orley, and David Card (eds.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Volume 3, 1801-61.

Krueger, Alan and Mikael Lindahl (2001). “Education and Growth: Why and for Whom?”, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 39(4), 1101-1136.

Munshi, Kaivan, and Mark R. Rosenzweig (2006). “Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy”, *American Economic Review*, 96(4), 1225-1252.

Jensen, Robert (2010). “The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(2), 515-548.

Jacoby, Hanan, and Emmanuel Skoufias (1998). “Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a Developing Country”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 64(3), 311-335.

Galor, Oded, and Joseph Zeira (1993). “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 60(1), 35-52. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2297811>

IV. Labor

**Jayachandran, Seema (2006). “Selling Labor Low: Wage Responses to Productivity Shocks in Developing Countries”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 114(3), 537-575.

****Bryan, Gharad, Shyamal Chowdhury, and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (2014). “Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh”, *Econometrica*, 82(5): 1671–1748.**

***Abebe, Girum, A. Stefano Caria, Marcel Fafchamps, Paolo Falco, Simon Franklin, and Simon Quinn (2021). “Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing African City”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 88(3), 1279–1310.**

Benjamin, Dwayne (1992). "Household Composition, Labor Markets, and Labor Demand: Testing for Separation in Agricultural Household Models", *Econometrica*, 60(2): 287–323.

LaFave, Daniel and Duncan Thomas (2016). “Farms, Families, and Markets: New Evidence on Completeness of Markets in Agricultural Settings”, *Econometrica*, 84(5): 1917-1960.

Young, Alwyn (2013). “Inequality, the Urban-Rural Gap, and Migration”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(4): 1727-1785.

Bazzi, Samuel, Arya Gaduh, Alexander D. Rothenberg, and Maisy Wong (2016). “Skill Transferability, Migration, and Development: Evidence from Population Resettlement in Indonesia”, *American Economic Review*, 106(9): 2658–2698.

Alfonsi, Livia, Oriana Bandiera, Vittorio Bassi, Robin Burgess, Imran Rasul, Munshi Sulaiman, and Anna Vitali (2020). “Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labor Market Experiment in Uganda”, *Econometrica*, 88(6), 2369-2414.

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Tsviandis, Nick (2023). “Evaluating the Impact of Urban Transit Infrastructure: Evidence from Bogotá’s TransMilenio”, *American Economic Review* ([forthcoming](#) / conditionally accepted).

Ulyssea, Gabriel (2018). "Firms, Informality, and Development: Theory and Evidence from Brazil", *American Economic Review*, 108(8): 2015-47.

Amodio, Francesco, Pamela Medina-Quispe, and Monica Morlacco (2025). “Labor Market Power, Self-Employment, and Development”, *American Economic Review*, [forthcoming](#).

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Alessandra L. González, and David Yanagizawa-Drott (2020). “Misperceived Social Norms: Women Working Outside the Home in Saudi Arabia”, *American Economic Review*, 110(10), 2997–3029.

V. Health

****Miguel, Edward, and Michael Kremer (2004). “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities”, *Econometrica*, 72(1), 159-217.**

****Bleakley, Hoyt (2010). "Malaria Eradication in the Americas: A Retrospective Analysis of Childhood Exposure", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2(2), 1-45.**

*Jayachandran, Seema and Adriana Lleras-Muney (2009). “Life Expectancy and Human Capital Investments: Evidence from Maternal Mortality Declines”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(1), 349–397, <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.349>

Dupas, Pascaline, and Edward A. Miguel (2017). “Impacts and Determinants of Health Levels in Low-Income Countries”, Chapter 6 in Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo (eds.) *Handbook of Economic Field Experiments*, North Holland.

Dasgupta, Partha, and Debraj Ray (1986). “Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment: Theory”, *Economic Journal*, 96(384), 1011-1034.

Thomas, Duncan, et al (2006). “Causal Effect of Health on Labor Market Outcomes: Experimental Evidence”, unpublished manuscript, UCLA.

Baird, Sarah, Joan Hamory Hicks, Michael Kremer, and Edward Miguel. (2016). “Worms at Work: Long-run Impacts of a Child Health Investment”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131(4), 1637-1680.

Bleakley, Hoyt (2006). “Disease and Development: Evidence from Hookworm Eradication in the American South”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(1), 73-117.

Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson. (2007). “Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6), 925-985.

Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Aakash Mohpal, and Karthik Muralidharan (2016). “Quality and Accountability in Health Care Delivery: Audit-Study Evidence from Primary Care in India”, *American Economic Review*, 106 (12): 3765-99.

Bhalotra, S., R. Rocha, and R. R. Soares (2020). “Can Universalization of Health Work? Evidence from Health Systems Restructuring and Expansion in Brazil.” Instituto de Estudos para Políticas de Saúde Working Paper No. 3. <https://ieps.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/WPS3.pdf>

VI. Risk, Vulnerability, and Insurance

**Paxson, Christina (1992). “Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand”, *American Economic Review*, 82(1), 15-33.

- Jacoby and Skoufias (1998)
- Jayachandran (2006)
- Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2014)

**Townsend, Robert (1994). “Risk and Insurance in Village India”, *Econometrica*, 62(3), 539-61.

*Maccini, Sharon and Dean Yang (2009). “Under the Weather: Health, Schooling and Economic Consequences of Early Life Rainfall”, *American Economic Review*, 99(3), 1006-36.

Townsend, Robert M. (1995). “Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income Economies”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3), 83-102.

Morduch, Jonathan (1994). “Poverty and Vulnerability”, *American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings*, 84(2), 221-225.

Munshi, Kaivan, and Mark Rosenzweig (2016). “Networks and Misallocation: Insurance, Migration, and the Rural-Urban Wage Gap”, *American Economic Review*, 106(1), 46-98.

Rose, Elaina (1998). “Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India”, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81(1), 41-49.

Ligon, Ethan, and Laura Schechter (2003). “Measuring Vulnerability”, *Economic Journal*, 113(486), C95-C102. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3590050>

VII. Social Insurance / Anti-Poverty Policy

****Haushofer, Johannes, and Jeremy Shapiro (2016).** “The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131 (4), 1973–2042.

****Egger, Dennis, Johannes Haushofer, Edward Miguel, Paul Niehaus, and Michael Walker (2022).** “General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence from Kenya”, *Econometrica*, 90(6), 2603–2643.

- Walker, Michael, N. Shankar, E. Miguel, D. Egger, G. Killeen (2025). “Can Cash Transfers Save Lives? Evidence from a Large-Scale Experiment in Kenya”, NBER working paper 34152. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w34152>

***Banerjee et al. (Esther Duflo, Nathanael Goldberg, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry) (2015).** “A multifaceted program causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evidence from six countries”, *Science*, 348(6236).

Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler (2011). “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(4), 1709–1753.

Bandiera, Oriana, Robin Burgess, Narayan Das, Selim Gulesci, Imran Rasul, Munshi Sulaiman (2017). “Labor Markets and Poverty in Village Economies”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(2), 811–870.

- Banerjee, Abhijit, Dean Karlan, Roberto Osei, Hannah Trachtman, and Christopher Udry (2022). “Unpacking a Multi-Faceted Program to Build Sustainable Income for the Very Poor”, *Journal of Development Economics*, 102781.
- Barker, Nathan, Dean Karlan, Christopher Udry, and Kelsey Wright (2024). “The Fading Treatment Effects of a Multi-Faceted Asset-Transfer Program in Ethiopia”, *AER Insights*, 6(2), 277-294.

VIII. Democracy and Development

****Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2011).** Chapter 1 of Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development. Princeton University Press.

****Besley, Timothy.** 2006. Chapter 3 (“Political Agency and Accountability”) in Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

****Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, and Frederico Finan** (2018). “Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(5), 1912-1964.

***Fujiwara, Thomas** (2015). “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil”, *Econometrica*, 83(2), 423-64.

***Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel** (2015). “The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya”, *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1817–1851.

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. (2008). “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), 703-745.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008). “Income and Democracy”, *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, 2000, “Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4), 1167-1199.

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson (2019). “Democracy Does Cause Growth”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(1), 47-100.

- Mulligan, Casey, B., Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004). "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1), 51-74.
- Barro, Robert. (1999). “Determinants of Democracy”, *Journal of Political Economy*.

Pande, Rohini (2020). “Can Democracy Work for the Poor?” *Science*, 369(6508), 1188-1192.

Chattopadhyay, Raghendra and Esther Duflo (2004). “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India”, *Econometrica*, 72(5), 1409-1443.

- Beaman, Lori, Raghendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova (2009). “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4), 1497–1540.

Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi (2015). “How Is Power Shared in Africa?” *Econometrica*, 83, 465-503.

- Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu. (2007). “Making Autocracy Work”, Working paper, London School of Economics. <http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf>

IX. Malfunctioning Democracies

****Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal (2015). “Clientelism in Indian Villages”, *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1780-1816.**

****Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2011). “The Logic of Political Violence”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(3), 1411-45.**

***Bobonis, Gustavo J., Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter (2022). “Vulnerability and Clientelism”, *American Economic Review*, 112(11), 3627-59.**

- Bobonis et al. (2025). “Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?” *Economic Journal* (forthcoming).

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan (2025). “Malfunctioning Democracies: Understanding Accountability Failures in Developing Countries”, Chapter in Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson (eds). *Handbook of Political Economy*, Elsevier (forthcoming).

Padró-i-Miquel, Gerard (2007). “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 74(4), 1259-1274.

Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan F. Vargas (2013). “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia”, *Review of Economics Studies*, 80(4), 1384-1421.

Rivera, Eduardo, Enrique Seira, and Saumitra Jha (2024) “Democracy Corrupted: Apex Corruption and the Erosion of Democratic Values”, Working Paper, Stanford University.

Easterly, William, and Ross Levine (1998). “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Ethnic Divisions”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), 1203-1250.

- Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou (2016). “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa”, *American Economic Review*, 106(7), 1802–48.
- Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou (2013). “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”, *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113-152.

X. State Capacity and Effectiveness

****Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar (2016). “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India”, *American Economic Review*, 106(10), 2895–2929.**

****Bloom, Nicholas, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen (2015). “Does Management Matter in schools?”, *Economic Journal*, 125(584), 647–674.**

***Chemin, Matthieu (2021). “Can Judiciaries Constrain Executive Power? Evidence from Judicial Reforms”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 199, 104428.**

Deserrano, Erika, Diana Moreira, Eduardo Teso, and Guo Xu (2023). “Bureaucracy” *VoxDevLit*, 8(1), 18pp.

Jensen, Anders D., and Jonathan L. Weigel (2025). “No Taxation without Administration: Bringing the State Back into the Public Finance of Developing Countries”, *Journal of Economic Literature*, forthcoming.

Gordon, Roger and Wei Li (2009). “Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 93(7-8): 855-866.

Finan, Frederico, Benjamin Olken, and Rohini Pande (2017). “The Personnel Economics of the State”, in *Handbook of Economic Field Experiments*, 2, 467-514.

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Late Submissions

- Late assignments will be subject to a late penalty of 10% per day (including weekends) of the total marks for the assignment. Assignments submitted five calendar days beyond the due date will be assigned a grade of zero. No extensions will be allowed.
- Assignments handed in AFTER the work has been returned to the class cannot be marked for credit. Accommodations due to late registration into the course will NOT be approved.
- It is every student’s responsibility to ensure that their online submission is submitted successfully by the due date. Accommodations will not be made for unsuccessful submissions due to, but not limited to, i) the system timing out, ii) submitting the incorrect document(s), iii) poor internet connection / no internet connection etc.

Missed Assignments

Students who miss an assignment because of circumstances beyond their control (e.g. illness or an accident) can request that the Department grant them special consideration. The following steps must be completed in order to be considered for academic accommodation for any missed quiz/test/assignment.

- Your absence must be declared on ACORN on the day of the missed test / due date, or by the day after, at the latest.
- You must notify your professor by e-mail the day of the missed test / deadline.
- Complete an online Special Consideration Request within one week of the missed test / due date. The University is temporarily suspending the need for a doctor’s note or medical certificate for any absence from academic participation if you are experiencing COVID-19 symptoms. However, this policy may change at any point during the course. If you missed your test for a reason connected to your registered disability, the department will accept documentation supplied by Accessibility Services. If you visited a Dentist, Nurse/Nurse Practitioner, Physician/Surgeon, Psychologist, Psychotherapist or Social Worker registered and licensed in the Province of Ontario, have them fill out the University’s Verification of Student Illness or Injury form. In other cases, a Verification of Extenuating Circumstances form is acceptable. Other documentation can include, but is not limited to, automobile collision or police reports, death certificates, and supporting documentation from employers, lawyers and other related personnel. Please email your form to ECO Grad Assistant gr.assistant.economics@utoronto.ca and the course instructor.
- Consult the Office of the Registrar should your absence be lengthy or affect multiple courses.
- The written explanation and documentation that you submit represents an appeal from you, requesting the opportunity to account for that portion of your grade in some other manner.

If an appeal is not received, or if the appeal is deemed unacceptable, you will receive a grade of zero for the item you missed. If the appeal is granted – that is, your reason for missing the item is considered acceptable by the professor – then the other assignments' average will be assigned to the missed item.

- Note that it is your responsibility to ensure that your email account is working. Claims that a Departmental decision was not received will NOT be considered as a reason for further consideration.
- Note that holidays and pre-purchased plane tickets, family plans, your friend's wedding, lack of preparation, or too many other tests/assignments are not acceptable excuses for missing an item of term work or exam.

Regrade Requests

- Graded assignments will be posted on Quercus.
- Assignments may be submitted for regrades to correct grading errors.
- Regrade requests are due no later than one week after the material is returned.
- Regrade requests must be clearly written and attached to the assignment.
- Regrade requests are intended to correct grading errors, NOT for negotiating a higher grade.
- When work is submitted for regrade, the entire work may be regraded, which may result in a lower grade.

Student Conduct

It is your responsibility as a student at the University of Toronto to familiarize yourself with, and adhere to, The Code of Student Conduct, which is a University policy that sets out expectations for student behavior, and prescribes processes for dealing with prohibited behaviour.

The Student's Companion to the Student Code of Conduct is a set of frequently asked questions and the responses about the Code of Student Conduct. It aims to simplify and clarify Code usage for the University's community members.

Academic Integrity

Academic integrity is essential to the pursuit of learning and scholarship in a university, and to ensuring that a degree from the University of Toronto is a strong signal of each student's individual academic achievement.

The University of Toronto's Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters outlines behaviours that constitute academic dishonesty and the process for addressing academic offences. Potential offences include, but are not limited to:

In papers and assignments:

- Using someone else's ideas or words without appropriate acknowledgement.
- Submitting your own work in more than one course without the permission of the instructor.
- Making up sources or facts.
- Obtaining or providing unauthorized assistance on any assignment.

In academic work:

- Falsifying institutional documents or grades.

- Falsifying or altering any documentation required, including (but not limited to) doctor's notes.

I do encourage you to pay close attention to these sections on Perils and Pitfalls (<http://academicintegrity.utoronto.ca/perils-and-pitfalls>) and Smart Strategies (<http://academicintegrity.utoronto.ca/smart-strategies>).

All suspected cases of academic dishonesty will be investigated following procedures outlined in the Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters. If you have questions or concerns about what constitutes appropriate academic behaviour or appropriate research and citation methods, you are expected to seek out additional information on academic integrity from your instructor or from other institutional resources.

Students may use artificial intelligence tools, including generative AI, in this course as learning aids or to help produce assignments. However, students are ultimately accountable for the work they submit.

- Students must submit, as an appendix with their assignments, any content produced by an artificial intelligence tool, and the prompt used to generate the content.
- Any content produced by an artificial intelligence tool must be cited appropriately. Many organizations that publish standard citation formats are now providing information on citing generative AI (e.g., MLA: <https://style.mla.org/citing-generative-ai/>).
- Students may choose to use generative artificial intelligence tools as they work through the assignments in this course; this use must be documented in an appendix for each assignment. The documentation should include what tool(s) were used, how they were used, and how the results from the AI were incorporated into the submitted work.
- Note that some generative AI applications may require a subscription fee. Students may opt-out of using a system if they have concerns about the cost, privacy, security or other issues related to this technology.

Student Well-Being and Academic Accommodations

Well-Being

University of Toronto aims at giving you an enriching learning experience, and has resources to help you stay healthy and be well: <http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/bewell>

However, sometimes things do not go as planned. In case of emergency, call 911. For ongoing injury, illness, or personal/family problems, or if you feel you are falling behind in your courses, you must contact your College Registrar immediately. The earlier you do, the easier it is to find solutions.

There are also a number of resources in case you are feeling distressed:

<http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/feeling-distressed>

Once again, the earlier you reach out, the easier it is to remedy the situation and find solutions. Do not wait until the end of the academic year.

Ongoing Learning Disability or Accommodation Requirement

Students with diverse learning styles and needs are welcome in this course. If you have an ongoing disability issue or accommodation need, you should register with Accessibility Services (AS)

(<http://accessibility.utoronto.ca>) at the beginning of the academic term. (Without registration, you will not be able to verify your situation with your instructors, and instructors will not be advised about your accommodation needs.)

AS will then assess your medical situation, develop an accommodation plan with you, and support you in requesting accommodation for your course work. Remember that the process of accommodation is private: AS will not share details of your condition with any instructor, and your instructors will not reveal that you are registered with AS.

For more information on services and resources available to instructors and students, please contact accessibility.services@utoronto.ca; Accessibility services: <http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/as/>

Accommodations for Religious Observances

As a student at the University of Toronto, you are part of a diverse community that welcomes and includes students and faculty from a wide range of backgrounds, cultural traditions, and spiritual beliefs. For my part, I will make every reasonable effort to avoid scheduling tests, examinations, or other compulsory activities on religious holy days not captured by statutory holidays. Further to University Policy, if you anticipate being absent from class or missing a major course activity (like a test) due to a religious observance, please let me know as early in the course as possible, and with sufficient notice (at least two to three weeks), so that we can work together to make alternate arrangements.