ECO 403H1F
TOPICS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND POLICY

Department of Economics
University of Toronto

Fall 2019

Meetings: Wednesday 2:10 pm - 4:00 pm; Friday 11:10 am - 12:00 pm

Locations:
(Wed): Myhall Centre for Engineering Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Room 315 (MY 315),
(Fri): Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work, Room 720 (SK 720)

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course will examine a variety of issues and policy problems pertaining to current international development challenges. Topics will include human capital development, financial markets, governance and institutions, industrial and international trade policies. We will study how well current domestic and foreign policies achieve stated objectives and discuss current proposals for improvements in international development policy.

The course will have an emphasis on the use of economic theory and quantitative empirical methods for policy analysis and evaluation. Students will apply tools such as poverty measurement and program evaluation methodologies to concrete questions in the current development policy agenda.

PREREQUISITES

Microeconomic Theory – ECO200Y/204Y/206Y
Macroeconomic Theory – ECO202Y/208Y/209Y
Quantitative Methods in Economics – ECO220Y/227Y/STA(247H,248H)/(250H, 255H)/(257H, 261H)

Note: Prerequisites are strictly checked and enforced and must be completed before taking this course. By taking this course you acknowledge that you will be removed from the course at anytime if you do not meet all requirements set by the Department of Economics. Please talk to Ms. Hala Larizza-Ali (Undergraduate Administrator, Department of Economics) if you have any doubt about whether you meet the requirements.

I expect that you will be able to perform basic calculus (i.e., take simple partial derivatives) and have a basic understanding of game theory. The TA will offer brief reviews of the more advanced background material.

REQUIREMENTS

Graded Material and Grade Allocation

The final grade for the course is based on the following:

Percentage	Component	Date(s)	
22%	Three (3) assignments (5%, 6%, 11%)	Assignment 1: Assignment 2: Assignment 3:	25 September 18 October 15 November
20%	One (1) in-class term test	Midterm:	25 October
25%	One (1) class presentation and paper		29 Nov, & 4 Dec (Paper: 11 December)
33%	Final Exam	TBD	
Bonus 5%	Class participation	n/a	

COURSE POLICIES

Examinations (Midterm and Final):

The centerpiece of the tests will be the theoretical and empirical analysis of economic development issues in the context of the course readings and class discussions. **The final examination will be cumulative**.

Appeals Policy:

Appeals will be conducted according to the following procedure:

- For any test, if a student wishes to appeal a grade, he/she must provide a **written explanation** of why they believe their grade is mistaken and submit it to me *within one week of being returned to the class*.
- Conditional on this argument being found persuasive by the instructor, it is likely that the *entire* exam will be re-graded, and the appealed grade can be lower or higher than the original grade. Note: This does not apply to trivial appeals such as points being added incorrectly.

Policy on Missed Tests

Midterm Exam: A grade of zero will be given to students who do not write the midterm test, unless an **appropriate** note is received **within one week** of the missed test (explaining why the test was missed).

If the student misses a term test due to illness:

- The note must be provided using the UofT Verification of Illness or Injury Form, Student Health or Disability Related Certificate, a College Registrar's Letter, or an Accessibility Services Letter. No other documentation will be accepted.
- Only original notes will be accepted. I will not accept photocopies or emailed certificates.
- The note must clearly state that on the date of the test, the student was too sick to write the test. Notes that simply state that a doctor saw the student on the date of the midterm will not be accepted. Illness before the test is not sufficient grounds for missing the test. Nor will I accept notes that indicate that the student would have performed "sub-optimally".
- To comply with these requirements, it is expected that the student will have met with the doctor on the date of the test.

- **The student must email me the day of the test to indicate that they will not be able to write the test.**
- I will review each sick note to determine whether there are sufficient grounds for a student to be excused from a test. Part of this review process may include meeting with the student.
- It is an academic offense to feign illness to avoid a test.

If the student misses a term test due to another excused absence (e.g., funeral, car accident):

- The note must be accompanied by a noted from a responsible third party that I can verify *in order for excusal to even be considered*. The validity of the excuse will also be evaluated by academic staff in the Department of Economics.

If a student has been excused from a midterm exam, he or she will be permitted to write the make-up test. The make-up test will be held on Friday, November 1st, 2:10p - 3:00p.

- Consistent with university policy, there is no "make-up test" for the make-up test. No medical excuses will be accepted, and a grade of zero will be applied if a student fails to write the make-up test.

Final: The final will be governed by the University's rules for missing final examinations.

Group Project Assignments

In order to develop skills in quantitative statistical methods (of various empirical strategies), and to interpret and discuss theoretical concepts and empirical evidence, students must complete three related assignments. Details will be announced throughout the semester.

- Term Assignments 1 and 2: Students will be provided data and assigned a set of questions based on those data and asked to conduct an analysis of it in the context of a specific policy question. The assignment is expected to be (maximum) *six* pages in length (double spaced), plus tables (if appropriate).

- Term Assignment 3: Research Project Review - students will select a research project from a short pre-determined list and hand in a short piece that will:
  - establish a (policy) research question;
  - briefly survey an existing literature that addresses it;
  - describe a planned research project to address the question (data; design).

- Term Assignment 4: Presentation and Paper – the first component will be comprised of a short (20-25 minute) class presentation (with time at the end for questions and discussion) built around 10-12 slides. The presentation will:
  - establish the (policy) research question;
  - *briefly* survey an existing literature that addresses it;
  - describe a research project conducted to address the question (data; methodology);
  - present an analysis of data to help answer this (policy) question.

  The policy paper will incorporate feedback from Assignments 3 (the Project Review) and 4 (the Presentation) to elaborate on its details. Specifically, you should discuss the following:

  - What is the main question?
  - How does the project contribute to the literature?
  - What is the research design and the empirical strategy?
  - What are the main results?
  - What are the (policy) implications of the project?
  - What are some of the drawbacks of the research design / project?
  - Are there alternative explanations for the empirical results?

Other administrative details:

- All groups must meet with me to discuss the research project by Friday, November 8th (end of Week 9).
- Presentation slides are due by *midnight* (12:00am), the night before class presentations. No medical notes will be accepted for the slides.
- The due date for the paper is Wednesday, December 11th at 4:00 pm.
- Further details of the Group Assignments will be provided during the semester.
- Concerning late penalties for other components: assignments handed in after 2:10pm of their due date will be penalized by 10 percentage points per calendar day. I will not accept assignments after 4:00pm seven (7) days following the due date.
- Extensions to the deadline for the assignments will not be granted for any reason.

Class Participation (Bonus)

Students will be evaluated on class participation. The performance will largely be based on students having read required readings prior to class and being prepared to engage in a meaningful discussion on the articles during class time.

Practice Questions

I will periodically assign questions and problem sets on the webpage. While these questions will not be collected for grading, you are expected to complete them. If you have any problems with the questions from a particular section, please see me about them as soon as possible during office hours.

COURSE WEBSITE

The course website is on the UofT Quercus Portal.

The website is an important means by which I make announcements to the class, as well as distribute readings and practice questions. We will be using Blackboard to manage class communications, so it is vital that you log on to Quercus and provide an email address that you check regularly.

E-MAIL POLICY

I will do my best to respond to e-mail within 24 hours on a weekday, 48 hours on a weekend, according to the following policy:

a) I will only respond to e-mails posing questions that can be answered in a sentence or two. For detailed questions, please see me in office hours.

b) I will not reply to e-mails that request information that can be found on the website or the syllabus, so you should check those places first.

c) I will not reply to e-mails regarding the results of graded material – for that, please see me in office hours.

ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT

Students should note that copying, plagiarizing, or other forms of academic misconduct will not be tolerated. Any student caught engaging in such activities will be subject to academic discipline ranging from a mark of zero on the assignment, test or examination to dismissal from the university as outlined in the academic handbook. Any student abetting or otherwise assisting in such misconduct will also be subject to academic penalties.

As a student it is your responsibility to ensure the integrity of your work and to understand what constitutes an academic offence. If you have any concerns that you may be crossing the line, always ask your instructor. Your instructor can explain, for example, the nuances of plagiarism and how to use secondary sources appropriately; he or she will also tell you what kinds of aids -- calculators, dictionaries, etc. – are permitted in a test or exam. **Ignorance of the rules does not excuse cheating or plagiarism.** For more information regarding the Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters please visit (http://www.governingcouncil.utoronto.ca/policies/behaveac.htm).

OFFICE HOURS

Thursday 3:30p – 4:30p

CLASS SCHEDULE – FALL 2019 (APPROXIMATE)

Section 1: Development, Social Welfare, and Growth

1.0	Sept 6 (M)	Overview
1.1	Sept 11 (W)	Development and Social Welfare
1.2	Sept 13 (F)	Development and Social Welfare
2.1	Sept 18 (W)	Social Welfare, Poverty, and Growth *Assignment 1 Distributed*
2.2	Sept 20 (F)	Social Welfare, Poverty, and Growth (2)

Section 2: Households, Investments, Human Capital Accumulation

3.1	Sept 25 (W)	Households and Investment Decisions – Capital Market Imperfections *Assignment 1 Due*
3.2	Sept 27 (F)	Households and Investment Decisions – Capital Mkt Imperfections (2)
4.1	Oct 2 (W)	Households and Investment Decisions – Capital Mkt Imperfections (3)
4.2	Oct 4 (F)	Households and Investment Decisions – Capital Mkt Imperfections (4)
5.1	Oct 9 (M)	Human Capital (Education)
5.2	Oct 11 (F)	Human Capital (Education) *Assignment 2 Distributed*

6.1	Oct 16 (W)	Human Capital – Health (Gender, Ethnicity/Race)
6.2	Oct 18 (F)	NO CLASS *Assignment 2 Due*

<u>Section 3: Role of the State and Governance</u>

7.1	Oct 23 (W)	Democracy and Development I: Representation, Responsiveness, and Accountability (1)
7.2	Oct 25 (F)	Midterm Test
8.1	Oct 30 (W)	Democracy and Development I: Representation, Responsiveness, and Accountability (2) *Presentation of Group Projects* *Assignment 3 Distributed*
8.2	Nov 1 (F)	Democracy and Development I: Representation, Responsiveness, and Accountability (3)
9.1	Nov 6 (W)	NO CLASS – Fall Break
9.2	Nov 8 (F)	NO CLASS – Fall Break
10.1	Nov 13 (W)	Distributive Politics, Capture and Clientelism, and Autocracy
10.2	Nov 15 (F)	Distributive Politics, Capture and Clientelism, and Autocracy *Assignment 3 Due*

<u>Section 4: International Macroeconomics and Policy</u>

11.1	Nov 20 (W)	Conflict, Institutions, and State Capacity
11.2	Nov 22 (F)	Conflict, Institutions, and State Capacity (2)
12.1	Nov 27 (W)	Industrial and (International) Trade Policy, [Foreign Aid / Long-Term Growth: Geography and History]
12.2	Nov 29 (F)	Presentations (*Assignment 4*)
13.1	Dec 4 (M)	Presentations (*Assignment 4*)

READING MATERIAL

Most of the course material will consist of detailed lecture notes, which will be posted on Blackboard before the start of each class. There will also be some required readings (to be announced). Students should aim to complete the readings for each week before the start of lecture. Articles and book chapters listed in the Course Outline and Readings Section will be linked to the course website as necessary.

General References (Recommended Books)

Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. New York, NY: Public Affairs. 2011.

Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1998.

(The books are available at the Short-Term Loan Service at the Robarts Library (4th Floor) in a very limited number (one copy).) Because these are not new books, you should be able to find used copies online (e.g., www.chapters.indigo.ca, www.amazon.ca) at substantial discounts.

Reference on Empirical Methods

Angrist, J., and J. S. Pischke. Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2008.

READINGS:

Section 1: Development, Social Welfare, and Growth

Weeks 1-2: Overview – Development, Social Welfare, and Growth

*Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2006). "The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and … Convergence, Period." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(2), 351-397.

*Deaton, Angus (1997). The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to Development Policy, Section 3.1 ("Welfare, Poverty, and distribution"), pp. 133-161.

*Acemoglu, Daron, et al (2008). "Income and Democracy." *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.

*Jones, Charles I., and Peter J. Klenow (2016). "Beyond GDP? Welfare across Countries and Time." American Economic Review, 106(9), 2426-57.

Ray, Chapter 6 ("Economic Inequality") and Chapter 8.2.2 ("Poverty Measures"), pp. 169-193, 249-292 (esp. 253-256, 290-292)

Sen, Amartya. "The Perspective of Freedom." (Chapter 1) and "Poverty as Capability Deprivation." (chapter 4) in Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999.

Stiglitz, Joseph E., Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. 2009. Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/.

Banerjee and Duflo, Chapter 2 ("A Billion Hungry People?"), pp. 19-40.

Ray, Chapter 3 ("Economic Growth"), pp. 47-90.

Easterly, Chapter 3 ("Solow's Surprise: Investment is Not the Key to Growth"), pp. 47-69.

Section 2: Households, Investments, Human Capital Accumulation

Weeks 3-4: Households and Investment Decisions – Capital Market Imperfections

*Bardhan, Pranab, and Chris Udry (2000). *Development Microeconomics*, Chapter 2, "Household Economics", 7-19.

*de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff (2008). "Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment", *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 123(4), 1329-72.

*Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo (2010). "Giving Credit Where It Is Due." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24(3), 61-80.

*Karlan, Dean, and Jonathan Zinman (2009). "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Assymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment." *Econometrica,* 77(6), 1993-2008.

*Jayachandran, Seema (2006). "Selling Labor Low: Wage Responses to Productivity Shocks in Developing Countries", *Journal of Political Economy*, 114(3), 537-575.

*Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cunthia Kinnan (2015). "The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,* 7(1), 22-53.

*Townsend, Robert M. (1995). "Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income Economies" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3), 83-102

*Paxson, Christina (1992). "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand", *American Economic Review*, 82(1), 15-33.

*Udry, Christopher (1991). "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy", *World Bank Economic Review*.

Banerjee and Duflo. Chapter 6 ("Barefoot Hedge-Fund Managers") and Chapter 7 ("The Men from Kabul and the Eunuchs from India: The (Not So) Simple Economics of Lending to the Poor"), pp. 133-155, 157-181.

Ray, Chapter 14.3 ("Theories of informal credit markets"), Chapter 14.5.2 ("Microfinance"), pp. 420-445, 543-561, 578-584.

Banerjee, Abhijit, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman (2015). "Six Randomized Evaluations of Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 7(1), 1-21.

Burgess, Robin, and Rohini Pande (2005). "Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Baking Experiment." *American Economic Review*, 95(3), 780-95.

Weeks 5-6: Human Capital – Education; Health (Gender, Ethnicity/Race)

*Banerjee and Duflo, Chapter 4 ("Top of the Class"), pp. 71-101.

*Duflo, Esther (2001). "Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment", *American Economic Review*, 91(4), 795-813.

*Glewwe, Paul, and Karthik Muralidharan (2016). "Improving Education Outcomes in Developing Countries: Evidence, Knowledge Gaps, and Policy Implications." Chapter 10 in Hanushek, Eric A., Stephen Machin, and Lugder Woessmann (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Education, Volume 5, 653-743.

*Bobonis, Gustavo J., and Frederico Finan (2009). "Neighborhood Peer Effects in Secondary School Enrollment Decisions." Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(4), 695-716.

Easterly, Chapter 4 ("Education for What?"), pp.71-85.

Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil. (1992). "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107(2), 407-437.

Jacoby, Hanan, and Emmanuel Skoufias (1998). "Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a Developing Country." *Review of Economic Studies*, 64(3), 311-335.

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*Duflo, Esther (2012). "Women Empowerment and Economic Development", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 50(4), 1051-79.

*Munshi, Kaivan, and Mark Rosenzweig (2006). "Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy." *American Economic Review* 96(4), 1225-52.

*Duflo, Esther (2003). "Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pension and Intra-Household Allocation in South Africa." *World Bank Economic Review*, 17(1), 1-25.

*Dupas, Pascaline, and Edward Miguel (2017). "Impacts and Determinants of Health Levels in Low-Income Countries." Chapter 1 in Banerjee, Abjijit V., and Esther Duflo (eds.), Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, Volume 2.

Banerjee and Duflo, Chapter 3 ("Low-Hanging Fruit for Better (Global) Health"), pp. 41-70.

Section 3: Role of the State and Governance

Weeks 7-8: Democracy and Development I (Representation, Responsiveness, and Accountability)

*Acemoglu, Daron, et al (2008). "Income and Democracy." *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.

*Banerjee and Duflo, Chapter 10 ("Policies, Politics"), pp. 235-265

*Fujiwara, Thomas (2015). "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica*, 83(2), 423-64.

*Besley, Timothy. 2006. Chapter 3 ("Political Agency and Accountability") in Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. (2008). "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), 703-745.

Fisman, Raymond and Edward Miguel. (2007). "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets", *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6), 1020-1048.

Bobonis, Gustavo J., Luis R. Camara-Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe (2016). "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians." *American Economic Review*, 106(8), 2371-405.

Ray, Appendix 1 ("Elementary Game Theory"), pp. 757-775.

Acemoglu, Daron, et al (2008). "Income and Democracy." *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.

Week 9: Distributive Politics, Capture and Clientelism, and Autocracy

*Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan (1996). "The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics", *Journal of Politics*, 58(4), 1132–55.

*Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal (2015). "Clientelism in Indian Villages." *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1780-1816.

*Bobonis, Gustavo J. et al (2017). "Vulnerability and Clientelism." NBER Working Paper #23589.

*Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi (2015). "How is Power Shared in Africa?", *Econometrica*, 83(2), 465-503.

Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Priya Mukherjee, and Andreas Stegmann (2017). "The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia." *Econometrica*, forthcoming.

Week 10: Conflict, Institutions, and State Capacity

*Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2011). Chapter 1 of *Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development*. Princeton University Press.

*Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2011). "The Logic of Political Violence." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126, 1411-45.

*Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan F. Vargas (2013). "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia." *Review of Economic Studies*, 80, 1384-1421.

*Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon (2011). "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3221-52.

Ray, Debraj, and Joan Esteban (2017). "Conflict and Development." *Annual Review of Economics*, 9, 263-93.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2014). "The Causes and Consequences of Development Clusters: State Capacity, Peace, and Income." *Annual Review of Economics*, 6, 927-49.

Finan, Frederico, Benjamin A. Olken, and Rohini Pande (2017). "The Personnel Economics of the Developing State." Chapter 6 in Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Esther Duflo (eds), Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, Volume 2.

Section 4: International Macroeconomics and Policy

Week 11: Industrial and (International) Trade Policy

*Feenstra, Robert C., and Alan M. Taylor, Chapter 4 ("Trade and Resources: The Heckscher-Ohlin Model") in International Economics. New York, NY: Worth Publishers.

*Ray, Chapter 17 ("Trade Policy"), pp. 647-705.

*Feyrer, James D. (2018). "Trade and Income – Exploiting Time Series in Geography." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, forthcoming.

*Hausmann, Ricardo, Jason Hwang, and Dani Rodrik (2007). "What You Export Matters." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(1), 1-25.

Verhoogen, Eric (2008). "Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 73(2), 489-530.

Atkin, David, Ben Faber, and Marco Gonzalez-Navarro (2018). "Retail Globalization and Household Welfare: Evidence from Mexico." *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(1), 1-73.

McMillan, Margaret, Dani Rodrik, and Claudia Sepúlveda (2017). "Structural Change, Fundamentals, and Growth: A Framework and Case Studies." NBER Working Paper #23378.

Week 12: Long-Term Growth: Geography and History

*Nunn, Nathan (2009). "The Importance of History for Economic Development." Annual Review of Economics, 1, 65-92.

*Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development; An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.

*Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (2000). “Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(3), pp. 217-232.

*Banerjee, Abhijit, V. and Esther Duflo (2014). “Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action”, *Annual Review of Economics*, 6(1), pp. 951-71.

Week “13”: Foreign Aid Policy

*Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2003). “Halving Global Poverty”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(3), pp. 3-22.

*Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2005). “The Development Challenge”, *Foreign Affairs*, 84(2), 78-90.

*Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar (2000). “Aid, Policies, and Growth” *American Economic Review*, 90(4), 847-68.

*Duflo, Esther (2017). “Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Economist as Plumber.” *American Economic Review*, 107(5), 1-26.

*Muralidharan, Karthik, and Paul Niehaus (2017). “Experimentation at Scale.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(4), 103-124.

*Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock (2012). “Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA).” Center for Global Development Working Paper #299.

Sanchez, Pedro, et al (Sachs, Jeffrey D.) (2007). “The African Millenium Villages.” PNAS, 104(43), 16775-16780.

Clemens, Michael, and Gabriel Demombynes (2013). “The New Transparency in Development Economics: Lessons from the Millenium Villages Controversy.” Center for Global Development Working Paper 342.

Deaton, Angus (2010). “Instruments of Development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to economic development.” NBER working paper #14690.