

ECO2101: Advanced Microeconomic Theory II

Winter 2017

Instructor: [Martin J. Osborne](#)

This course covers formal theories of political behavior, a subject known to economists as "political economy". It discusses both the foundational models in the field and topics of current research. It assumes a knowledge of microeconomic theory and game theory at the level of ECO2020 and ECO2030.

The topics covered are listed below. In addition to the material listed for each topic, the following books may be useful.

- Mueller, Dennis, *Public choice III*, Cambridge University Press, 2003. A monumental book covering a huge range of material, with a lot of excellent discussion.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. and David Austen-Smith, *Positive political theory I*, University of Michigan Press, 1999, and *Positive political theory II*, University of Michigan Press, 2005. The first volume focuses on the aggregation of known preference relations and the second volume studies strategic behavior in collective choice and electoral competition. The style is very detailed and precise.
- Gehlbach, Scott, *Formal models of domestic politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2013. Discusses simple versions of models relevant to many of the topics I cover.
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, *Political economics*, MIT Press, 2000. Differs from this course in emphasizing economic problems, including macroeconomic ones.

Class schedule

Class M2-4 in GE100 ([Martin J. Osborne](#)).

I will post slides for each class by the morning of the day of the class. The *compact* versions are best for printing, the *complete* ones best for viewing on a screen.

In each lecture I will present versions of the main models and results for the topic. The sources of these models and results are listed under the heading "Core material". In some cases, earlier work that I will not discuss provided foundations; this work is listed under the heading "Foundations". The papers listed under the heading "Recent work" are the ones from which you can choose to write the reports required for the evaluation.

Week 1 (January 9)

Collective choice with known preferences

Topics

Two alternatives: majority rule and May's theorem. Three of more alternatives: nonexistence of collective choice rule with desirable properties.

References

Core material

May, Kenneth O., "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision", *Econometrica*, **20** (1952), 680–684

Moulin, Hervé, *Axioms of cooperative decision making*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, Sections 9.1, 9.2, and 11.1

Dasgupta, Partha and Maskin, Eric S., "On the robustness of majority rule", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, **6** (2008), 949–973

Further reading

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S., *Positive political theory I*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999

Moulin, Hervé, *Axioms of cooperative decision making*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988

Foundations

Arrow, Kenneth J., *Social choice and individual values* (Second edition), Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1963

Recent paper

Krishna, Vijay and Morgan, John, "Majority rule and utilitarian welfare", *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, **7** (2015), 339–375

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Week 2 (January 16)

Strategic voting

Topics

Single-peaked and single-crossing preferences. Multidimensional alternatives. Strategy-proofness of collective choice rules. Costless voting: Nash equilibrium and weak domination. Costly voting: pure Nash equilibria.

References

Core material

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S., *Positive political theory I*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999 (Discusses single-peaked preferences in Section 4.1 and order-restricted preferences (closely related to preferences satisfying the single-crossing property) in Section 4.5. The presentation is very formal.)

Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido, *Political economics*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000, Sections 2.1 and 2.2 (single-peaked preferences and the single-crossing property)

Gans, Joshua S. and Smart, Michael, "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences", *Journal of Public Economics*, **59** (1996), 219–237 (single-crossing property)

Enelow, James M. and Hinich, Melvin J., *The spatial theory of voting*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, Chapter 3 (multidimensional alternatives)

Mueller, Dennis C., *Public Choice III*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, Sections 5.1–5.5

Moulin, Hervé, *Axioms of cooperative decision making*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, Section 10.2

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard, "A strategic calculus of voting", *Public Choice*, **41** (1983), 7–53

Foundations

Black, Duncan, *The theory of committees and elections*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1958

Further reading

Spenkuch, Jörg L., "(Ir)rational voters?", Unpublished paper, 2015 (empirical)

Recent papers

- Bouton, Laurent, "A theory of strategic voting in runoff elections", *American Economic Review*, **103** (2013), 1248–1288
- Bouton, Laurent and Gratton, Gabriele, "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis", *Theoretical Economics*, **10** (2015), 283–314
- Fisher, Stephen D. and Myatt, David P., "Strategic voting in plurality rule elections", Unpublished paper, 2016
- Myatt, David P., "On the theory of strategic voting", *Review of Economic Studies*, **74** (2007), 255–281
- Martinelli, César, "Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters", *Social Choice and Welfare*, **19** (2002), 901–919

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Week 3 (January 23)

Voting

Topics

Costly voting: models with individual uncertainty and aggregate uncertainty. Turnout. Group-based model. Ethical voters.

References

Core material

- Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard, "Voter participation and strategic uncertainty", *American Political Science Review*, **79** (1985), 62–78
- Chamberlain, Gary and Rothschild, Michael, "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **25** (1981), 152–162
- Myatt, David P., "A theory of voter turnout", Unpublished paper, 2015

Foundations

- Good, I. J. and Mayer, Lawrence S., "Estimating the efficacy of a vote", *Behavioral Science*, **20** (1975), 25–33

Further reading

- Ledyard, John O., "The paradox of voting and candidate competition: a general equilibrium analysis", in *Essays in contemporary fields of economics*, eds. Horwich, George and Quirk, James P., Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, Indiana, 1981, 54–80
- Myerson, Roger B., "Population uncertainty and Poisson games", *International Journal of Game Theory*, **27** (1998), 375–392, Section 7
- Abramson, Paul R. and Aldrich, John H. and Paolino, Phil and Rohde, David W., "'Sophisticated' voting in the 1988 presidential primaries", *American Political Science Review*, **86** (1992), 55–69 (empirical)
- Kawai, Kei and Watanabe, Yasutora, "Inferring strategic voting", *American Economic Review*, **103** (2013), 624–662 (empirical)
- Blais, André, *To vote or not to vote?*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2000
- Downs, Anthony, *An economic theory of democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1957
- Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., "A theory of the calculus of voting", *American Political Science Review*, **62** (1969), 25–42
- Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P., "The paradox of not voting: a decision theoretic analysis", *American Political Science Review*, **68** (1974), 525–536

Ujhelyi, Gergely and Chatterjee, Somdeep and Szabó, Andrea, "'None of the above' votes in India and the consumption utility of voting", Unpublished paper, 2016 (empirical)

Recent papers

Pogorelskiy, Kirill, "Correlated equilibria in voter turnout games", Unpublished paper, 2015 (job market paper, 2014)

Börger, Tilman, "Costly voting", *American Economic Review*, **94** (2004), 57–66

Krasa, Stefan and Polborn, Matthias K., "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?", *Games and Economic Behavior*, **66** (2009), 275–291

Krishna, Vijay and Morgan, John, "Voluntary voting: costs and benefits", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **147** (2012), 2083–2123

Cho, Seok-Ju, "Voting equilibria under proportional representation", *American Political Science Review*, **108** (2014), 281–296

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Week 4 (January 30)

Voting: Group-based model. Ethical voters. Voting with asymmetric information.

References

Core material

Shachar, Ron and Nalebuff, Barry, "Follow the leader: theory and evidence on political participation", *American Economic Review*, **89** (1999), 525–547 (mainly empirical; theory in Section III)

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Sandroni, Alvaro, "A theory of participation in elections", *American Economic Review*, **96** (2006), 1271–1282 (considers an example)

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Sandroni, Alvaro, "The calculus of ethical voting", *International Journal of Game Theory*, **35** (2006), 1–25 (shows existence and uniqueness in general model)

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "The swing voter's curse", *American Economic Review*, **86** (1996), 408–424

Osborne, Martin J. and Turner, Matthew A., "Cost benefit analyses versus referenda", *Journal of Political Economy*, **118** (2010), 156–187

Further reading

Morton, Rebecca B., "A group majority voting model of public good provision", *Social Choice and Welfare*, **4** (1987), 117–131

Uhlener, Carole J., "Rational turnout: the neglected role of groups", *American Journal of Political Science*, **33** (1989), 390–422

Morton, Rebecca B., "Groups in rational turnout models", *American Journal of Political Science*, **35** (1991), 758–776

Filer, John E. and Kenny, Lawrence W. and Morton, Rebecca B., "Redistribution, income, and voting", *American Journal of Political Science*, **37** (1993), 63–87

Feddersen, Timothy J., "Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **18** (2004), 99–112

Herrera, Helios and Martinelli, César, "Group formation and voter participation", *Theoretical Economics*, **1** (2006), 461–487

Coate, Stephen and Conlin, Michael, "A group rule-utilitarian approach to voter turnout: theory and evidence", *American Economic Review*, **94** (2004), 1476–1504 (empirical)

Levine, David K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., "The paradox of voter participation? A laboratory study", *American Political Science Review*, **101** (2007), 143–158 (experimental evidence)

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "Voting behavior and informative aggregation in elections with private information", *Econometrica*, **65** (1997), 1029–1058

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences", *American Political Science Review*, **93** (1999), 381–398

Recent papers

Levine, David K. and Mattozzi, Andrea, "Voter participation with collusive parties", Unpublished paper, 2016

Goertz, Johanna M. M. and Maniquet, François, "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **146** (2011), 1464–1480

Martinelli, César, "Would rational voters acquire costly information?", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **129** (2006), 225–251

Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo and Nunnari, Salvatore, "Turnout across democracies", *American Journal of Political Science*, (2016), 607–624

Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo and Palfrey, Thomas R., "Turnout and power sharing", *Economic Journal*, **124** (2014), F131–F162

Herrera, Helios and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and McMurray, Joseph C., "The marginal voter's curse", Unpublished paper, 2016

McMurray, Joseph C., "Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses", *Review of Economic Studies*, **80** (2013), 277–312

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Week 5 (February 6)

Electoral competition

Topics

One-dimensional issue. Multidimensional issues. Candidates uncertain of citizens' preferences.

References

Core material

Davis, Otto A. and DeGroot, Morris H. and Hinich, Melvin J., "Social preference orderings and majority rule", *Econometrica*, **40** (1972), 147–157

Calvert, Randall L., "Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence", *American Journal of Political Science*, **29** (1985), 69–95

Duggan, John, "A survey of equilibrium analysis in spatial models of elections", Unpublished paper, University of Rochester, 2014

Roemer, John E., *Political competition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001, Section 5.3

Foundations

Hotelling, Harold, "Stability in competition", *Economic Journal*, **39** (1929), 41–57 (pp. 54–55)

Downs, Anthony, *An economic theory of democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1957 (PhD thesis)

Wittman, Donald, "Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **14** (1977), 180–189

Further reading

Roemer, John E., "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case", *Social Choice and Welfare*, **14** (1997), 479–502

Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Lewis, Jeffrey B., "Beyond the median: voter preferences, district heterogeneity, and political representation", *Journal of Political Economy*, **112** (2004), 1364–1383 (empirical)

Recent papers

Bernhardt, Dan and Duggan, John and Squintani, Francesco, "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates", *Games and Economic Behavior*, **58** (2007), 1–29

McMurray, Joseph C., "Polarization and pandering in a spatial model of common-value elections", Unpublished paper, 2016

Kartik, Navin and Van Weelden, Richard and Wolton, Stephane, "Electoral ambiguity and political representation", Unpublished paper, 2016

Ogden, Benjamin G., "The imperfect beliefs voting model", Unpublished paper, 2016 (job market paper)

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Week 6 (February 13)

Electoral competition

Topics

Ideological candidates. Three or more candidates. Electing a legislature. Citizen-candidates. Dynamics.

References

Core material

Wittman, Donald, "Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **14** (1977), 180–189

Calvert, Randall L., "Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence", *American Journal of Political Science*, **29** (1985), 69–95

Duggan, John, "A survey of equilibrium analysis in spatial models of elections", Unpublished paper, University of Rochester, 2014

Roemer, John E., *Political competition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001, Section 5.3

Osborne, Martin J., "Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition", *Games and Economic Behavior*, **5** (1993), 133–151

Osborne, Martin J. and Slivinski, Al, "A model of political competition with citizen-candidates", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **111** (1996), 65–96

Besley, Timothy and Coate, Stephen, "An economic model of representative democracy", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **112** (1997), 85–114

Further reading

Austen-Smith, David, "Two-party competition with many constituencies", *Mathematical Social Sciences*, **7** (1984), 177–198

Roemer, John E., *Political competition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001

Roemer, John E., "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case", *Social Choice and Welfare*, **14** (1997), 479–502

Brusco, Sandro and Dziubiński, Marcin and Roy, Jaideep, "The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting", *Games and Economic Behavior*, **74** (2012), 447–469

Fujiwara, Thomas, "A regression discontinuity test of strategic voting and Duverger's law", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, **6** (2011), 197–233 (empirical)

Recent papers

Buisseret, Peter, "Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules", Unpublished paper, 2016

Solow, Benjamin, "Aggregate uncertainty in runoff elections", Unpublished paper, 2016 (job market paper)

Forand, Jean Guillaume, "Two-party competition with persistent policies", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **152** (2014), 64–91 (job market paper)

Gul, Faruk and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, "Policy competition in real-time", Unpublished paper, 2016

Grosser, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R., "Candidate entry and political polarization: an antimedial voter theorem", *American Journal of Political Science*, **58** (2014), 127–143

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Week 7 (February 27)

Redistributive politics

References

Core material

Meltzer, Allan H. and Richard, Scott F., "A rational theory of the size of government", *Journal of Political Economy*, **89** (1981), 914–927

Lindbeck, Assar and Weibull, Jörgen W., "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition", *Public Choice*, **52** (1987), 273–297

Further reading

Romer, Thomas, "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax", *Journal of Public Economics*, **4** (1975), 163–185

Roberts, Kevin W. S., "Voting over income tax schedules", *Journal of Public Economics*, **8** (1977), 329–340

Roemer, John E., "The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation", *Econometrica*, **67** (1999), 1–19

Bénabou, Roland, "Unequal societies: income distribution and the social contract", *American Economic Review*, **90** (2000), 96–129

Roemer, John E., "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb", *Journal of Public Economics*, **70** (1998), 399–424

Campante, Filipe R., "Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions", *Journal of Public Economics*, **95** (2011), 646–656

Austen-Smith, David, "Redistributing income under proportional representation", *Journal of Political Economy*, **108** (2000), 1235–1269

Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David, "Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: why some democracies redistribute more than others", *American Political Science Review*, **100** (2006), 165–181

Dixit, Avinash and Londregan, John, "Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **113** (1998), 497–529

Londregan, John, "Political Income Distribution", in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, eds. Weingast, Barry R. and Wittman, Donald A., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 84–101

Johansson, Eva, "Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities", *Journal of Public Economics*, **87** (2003), 883–915 (empirical)

Ansolabehere, Stephen and Snyder, James M., "Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures", *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, **108** (2006), 547–569 (empirical)

Recent papers

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Gul, Faruk, "Polarization and income inequality: a dynamic model of unequal democracy", Unpublished paper, 2013

Vlaicu, Razvan, "Inequality, participation, and polarization", Unpublished paper, 2016

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Week 8 (March 6)

Campaign finance

References

Core material

Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan, "Electoral competition and special interest politics", *Review of Economic Studies*, **63** (1996), 265–286

Wittman, Donald, "How pressure groups activate voters and move candidates closer to the median", *Economic Journal*, **119** (2009), 1324–1343

Prat, Andrea, "Campaign advertising and voter welfare", *Review of Economic Studies*, **69** (2002), 999–1017

Further reading

Coate, Stephen, "Pareto-improving campaign finance policy", *American Economic Review*, **94** (2004), 628–655

Coate, Stephen, "Political competition with campaign contributions and informative advertising", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, **2** (2004), 772–804

Ashworth, Scott, "Campaign finance and voter welfare with entrenched incumbents", *American Political Science Review*, **100** (2006), 55–68

DellaVigna, Stefano and Gentzkow, Matthew, "Persuasion: empirical evidence", *Annual Review of Economics*, **2** (2010), 643–669, section 2.2 (empirical)

Spenkuch, Jörg L. and Toniatti, David, "Political advertising and election outcomes", Unpublished paper, 2016 (empirical)

Recent papers

Snyder, James M. and Ting, Michael M., "Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians", *Journal of Public Economics*, **92** (2008), 482–500

Carter, Jennifer and Patty, John W., "Valence and campaigns", *American Journal of Political Science*, **59** (2015), 825–840

Li, Hao and Li, Wei, "Misinformation", *International Economic Review*, **54** (2013), 253–277

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Week 9 (March 13)

Dynamic models: political agency

References

Core material

Duggan, John and Martinelli, César, "The political economy of dynamic elections: a survey and some new results", Unpublished paper (shorter version to appear in *Journal of Economic Literature*), 2015

Maskin, Eric S. and Tirole, Jean, "The politician and the judge: accountability in government", *American Economic Review*, **94** (2004), 1034–1054

Precursors

Barro, Robert J., "The control of politicians: an economic model", *Public Choice*, **14** (1973), 19–42

Ferejohn, John A., "Incumbent performance and electoral control", *Public Choice*, **50** (1986),

Further reading

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K., "Optimal retention in agency problems", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **82** (1998), 293–323

Bernhardt, Dan and Dubey, Sangita and Hughson, Eric, "Term limits and pork barrel politics", *Journal of Public Economics*, **88** (2004), 2383–2422

Besley, Timothy, *Principled agents?*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, Chapters 3 and 4

Besley, Timothy and Case, Anne, "Does economic accountability affect economic policy choice? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **110** (1995), 769–798 (empirical)

Recent papers

Bernhardt, Dan and Campuzano, Larissa and Squintani, Francesco and Câmara, Odilon, "On the benefits of party competition", *Games and Economic Behavior*, **66** (2009), 685–707

Bernhardt, Dan and Câmara, Odilon and Squintani, Francesco, "Competence and ideology", *Review of Economic Studies*, **78** (2011), 487–522

Van Weelden, Richard, "Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives", *Review of Economic Studies*, **80** (2013), 1622–1651 (job market paper)

Duggan, John, "Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections", Unpublished paper, 2016

Kartik, Navin and Van Weelden, Richard, "Reputation, term limits, and incumbency (dis)advantage", Unpublished paper, 2016

Bils, Peter and Duggan, John and John, Gleason, "Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections", Unpublished paper, 2016

Acemoglu, Daron and Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, "A political theory of populism", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **128** (2013), 771–805

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Week 10 (March 20)

Legislative bargaining and vote buying

References

Core material

Baron, David P. and Ferejohn, John A., "Bargaining in legislatures", *American Political Science Review*, **83** (1989), 1181–1206

Eraslan, Hülya, "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **103** (2002), 11–30

Groseclose, Tim and Snyder, James M., "Buying supermajorities", *American Political Science Review*, **90** (1996), 303–315

Dekel, Eddie and Jackson, Matthew O. and Wolinsky, Asher, "Vote buying: general elections", *Journal of Political Economy*, **116** (2008), 351–380

Dekel, Eddie and Jackson, Matthew O. and Wolinsky, Asher, "Vote buying: legislatures and lobbying", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, **4** (2009), 103–128

Further reading

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, "A bargaining model of collective choice", *American Political Science Review*, **94** (2000), 73–88

Cho, Seok-ju and Duggan, John, "Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **144** (2009), 851–868

Recent papers

Ali, S. Nageeb and Bernheim, B. Douglas and Fan, Xiaochen, "Predictability and power in legislative bargaining", Unpublished paper, 2014

Baron, David P. and Bowen, T. Renee, "Dynamic coalitions", Unpublished paper, 2015

Hanusch, Marek and Keefer, Philip and Vlaicu, Razvan, "Vote buying or campaign promises? Electoral strategies when party credibility is limited", Unpublished paper, 2016

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Week 11 (March 27)

Franchise extension and regime change

References

Core material

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A., "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **115** (2000), 1167–1199

Lizzeri, Alessandro and Persico, Nicola, "Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain's 'Age of Reform'", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **119** (2004), 707–765

Fearon, James D., "Self-enforcing democracy", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **126** (2011), 1661–1708

Further reading

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A., "A theory of political transitions", *American Economic Review*, **91** (2001), 938–963

Bourguignon, François and Verdier, Thierry, "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality, and growth", *Journal of Development Economics*, **62** (2000), 285–313

Przeworski, Adam, "Conquered or granted? A history of suffrage extensions", *British Journal of Political Science*, **39** (2009), 291–321

Recent papers

Acemoglu, Daron and Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, "Political economy in a changing world", *Journal of Political Economy*, **123** (2015), 1038–1086

Barberà, Salvador and Jackson, Matthew O., "A model of protests, revolution, and information", Unpublished paper, 2016

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Evaluation

Your grade in the course will be based on **reports you write on papers** (50%), a **presentation of a paper** (25%), and an original **paper proposal** (25%).

Reports: A report on one of the papers in the "Recent papers" category on the [SCHEDULE](#) page for the previous two classes will be due in each of weeks 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11. Each report should be 2–3 pages long (with 1.5 line spacing). It should explain the main idea of the paper in your own words (don't paste from the paper!), ideally with a simple example or basic version of the model that illustrates the main point. An excellent report will also highlight any weaknesses in the paper.

Presentation: In one of the last two classes, you will make a 30-minute presentation, with slides, of a paper in the "Recent papers" category for any week (different from those on which you have written reports), or another paper, subject to my approval. The presentation should be like the one an author would give at a conference. It should explain the main idea of the paper without getting lost in technical details and should relate the contribution to previous work. You should meet with me to go over your slides by the Friday before your presentation, at the latest.

Paper proposal: Your paper proposal should outline a novel project in the field of political economy. A good proposal will describe an idea and give at least an example to show how the idea works, and provide conjectures about what might be demonstrated more generally. You'll need to search the literature to be sure that the idea is indeed novel. I expect good proposals to be 5–10 pages long. I encourage you to meet with me to discuss your ideas well before the proposal is due.

In summary, here is the schedule.

January 23

First report, on a "recent paper" for classes 1 or 2, due; 10%.

February 6

Second report, on a "recent paper" for classes 3 or 4, due; 10%.

February 27

Third report, on a "recent paper" for classes 5 or 6, due; 10%.

March 13

Fourth report, on a "recent paper" for classes 7 or 8, due; 10%.

March 27

Fifth report, on a "recent paper" for classes 9 or 10, due; 10%.

March 27 or April 3

Presentation; 25%.

April 10

Paper proposal due; 25%.