The blockchain folk theorem*

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Abstract
Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. If reliable and stable, they could offer a new, cost effective, way to record transactions and asset ownership, but are they? We model the blockchain as a stochastic game and analyse the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners. We show that mining the longest chain is a Markov perfect equilibrium, without forking on the equilibrium path, in line with the seminal vision of Nakamoto (2008). We also clarify, however, that the blockchain game is a coordination game, which opens the scope for multiple equilibria. We show there exist equilibria with forks, leading to orphaned blocks and also possibly to persistent divergence between different chains.

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1 Introduction

Blockchains are decentralised protocols for recording transactions and asset ownership. The blockchain design was the main innovation underlying the digital currency network Bitcoin [Nakamoto, 2008], but its potential benefits in terms of cost-efficiency, speed and security, for a variety of assets and contracts, have attracted interest from a broad range of institutions and businesses. Blockchain experiments, and in some cases limited deployments, have been conducted by the Australian Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq, BHP Billiton and major banks around the globe. As blockchains are being embedded into major transaction platforms, we propose to investigate the stability of the protocol: how efficient is a blockchain at building a stable consensus among participants about the history of past transactions? This question is particularly relevant when blockchains are public, that is when participants are anonymous and there is no formal authority to coordinate their behaviour in last resort. We take a game-theoretic approach that captures the key features of a blockchain design and allows to pin down the tradeoffs faced by the key players (the “miners”) in the blockchain’s decentralised certification process.

[Nakamoto (2008)] (Section 5) gives the following description of the blockchain’s functioning.

"The steps to run the network are as follows:

1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
2. Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.

1The blockchain is cost effective in that the administrative costs of running it are limited compared to those incurred within older technologies and institutions, such as notaries, banks or depositories.

2Bitcoin and Ethereum are best-known examples of public blockchains. There also exist private blockchains, which use the same technology, but whose participants are selected and which can have specific coordination devices. Our paper focuses on public blockchains.
6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.

The nodes conducting the above mentioned tasks are called “miners”, as they “mine” to solve proof-of-work problems[^3] and get rewarded for this in bitcoins. When mining, a miner sets a computer capacity that performs trials to find a hash value lower than a given threshold. Each trial is independent: past failures do not affect the probability of success of a future trial. Once a trial is successful, the winning miner sends the block with the solution to other participants. If participants accept this block as the new consensus, they take it as the parent of the new block they start mining. In that case (unless the consensus is altered), the miner who solved the block gets a reward[^4]. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: The Blockchain](image)

At \( t = 0 \), there is an initial block \( B_0 \) and a stock of transactions included in a block \( B_1 \), chained to \( B_0 \). Miners work on a cryptographic problem until a miner solves \( B_1 \) at \( t_1 \). \( B_1 \) is broadcast to all. Nodes check proof-of-work and transactions validity, and express acceptance by chaining the next block to \( B_1 \).

Ideally, there is only one chain, to which all miners attach their blocks. One of the major questions about blockchain is whether such an outcome will arise. The alternative outcome is one in which miners do not all attach their block to the same chain. Suppose, e.g., that the last block solved is \( B_n \), but miner \( m \) chains his next block to the parent block of \( B_n \), i.e., \( B_{n-1} \). This starts a fork, as illustrated in Figure 2. If some miners follow \( m \),

[^3]: The problem to be solved by the miners is a purely numerical problem, completely unrelated to the economic nature of the transactions in the block. Once found, the solution to this problem is easy to verify.

[^4]: This includes rewards given by the blockchain system plus transaction fees which the originators of trade can choose to offer for the validation of their transactions.
while others continue to attach their blocks to the original chain, there are competing versions of the ledger. This reduces the credibility and reliability of the blockchain, especially if the fork is persistent. Even if, eventually, all miners agree to attach their blocks to the same chain, the occurrence of the fork is not innocuous. The blocks in the chain eventually abandoned are orphaned. They have been mined in vain, and the corresponding computing power and energy have been wasted. Moreover, the transactions recorded in the orphaned blocks may be called in question.

Blockchain networks did experience major forks in the past. One of the most significant was the fork occurred on Bitcoin in March 2013: Due to a bug in a software upgrade, two competing branches started. It took more than 8 hours for miners to identify the fork and abandon one of the branches. Another example is the July 2016 fork on Ethereum, the major smart contract network. Following the hack of TheDAO, a large venture capital fund operating through smart contracts, members of the Ethereum community suggested to roll back the blockchain in order to cancel the transactions that diverted the fund’s money. Other members defended the principle that the history of the ledger should not be altered in any way, for the sake of the network’s credibility. Ethereum eventually split in two branches that still exist today, giving rise to two different cryptocurrencies. The possibility of major forks is still lurking. The Bitcoin community is currently divided on which technical solution to adopt to address the limitation of the network.
transaction throughput\(^5\). Two main solutions, Segregated Witness (SegWit) and Bitcoin Unlimited (BU), are supported by different Bitcoin community members, with the threat of some to fork in an attempt to impose their preferred solution. As of May 2017, it is not clear which solution will be adopted, nor whether it will lead to a fork.

How do forks happen? The above coordination issues, which can arise following a technological change or an unpredictable event (like the hacking of TheDAO) have been overlooked and it is a contribution of the present paper to underscore and analyse them. Coming from a different angle, an often mentioned potential cause of forks is “double-spending.” Suppose miner \(m\) from the example above buys an object from some party \(Y\) and the transfer of \(m\)’s bitcoins to \(Y\) is recorded in \(B_n\). This could give an incentive for miner \(m\) to mine from \(B_{n-1}\), trying to attract miners to his chain, to orphan \(B_n\) and void the transfer of his bitcoins to \(Y\). \(m\) would then be able to spend his bitcoins again, i.e., would “double spend.”

Non-instantaneous dissemination of information through the network is another potential reason why forks, i.e., competing versions of the ledger, could arise. [Nakamoto 2008] identified that problem and suggested it would be solved if miners always chained their blocks to the longest chain:

“Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof-of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one.”

In the present paper, we abstract from these two problems, assuming miners do not attempt to double spend and also that information is instantaneously disseminated in the network. In this frictionless world, it is commonly argued, in particular by the blockchain community, that blockchains should give rise to a single and stable consensus, and thus offer a reliable way

\(^5\)Precisely, the protocol sets the maximum size of a block of transactions to one megabyte, which slows down the speed of transactions validation and hinders the development of the network itself.
to record transactions and ownership. We examine the validity of that “folk theorem” and analyse how consensus can emerge from miners’ interactions.

To do so, we rely on a theoretical model, capturing the key features of the blockchain technology. We model the blockchain as a stochastic game, we analyse miners’ best responses and beliefs, and we characterise the properties of the corresponding equilibria. Explicitly writing down the blockchain as a game, and explicitly writing down the action space, states, beliefs and strategies of the miners, is necessary to pin down precisely the economic forces at play in that environment, the tradeoffs faced by the miners, and the mechanisms pushing towards stability or instability of the distributed ledger.

Our analysis uncovers two important economic forces at play in the blockchain.

First, because the value of the rewards for mining a block in a given blockchain depends on the credibility of that chain and correspondingly on the number of miners active on that chain, the blockchain game is a coordination game: If I anticipate all the others to mine a given chain, this increases my incentives to mine that chain. As often in coordination games, there can be multiple equilibria and instability. We show that there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium involving a single chain and in which the longest chain rule (hereafter LCR) suggested by Nakamoto (2008) holds (Proposition 1). In that equilibrium, miners do not want to deviate because they rationally anticipate that if they did, the other miners would not follow them, so that the blocks they would solve on forks out of the equilibrium path would carry no reward. On the other hand, we also show that the same coordination effects can give rise to Markov perfect equilibria involving forks (Proposition 2). In such equilibria, a sunspot variable realises, suggesting miners to fork. No miner wants to deviate from forking for the same reason as above: each miner rationally anticipates that any block solved out of the equilibrium path will not be accepted by the others, and will have no value. The possibility of these forks creates uncertainty about the allocation of property rights and undermines the stability and reliability of the distributed ledger.

Second, we identify another force which we refer to as “vested interest.” When a miner solves blocks on a chain, he is rewarded with units of the cryptocurrency associated with that chain. As long as the miner has not sold this cryptocurrency, he has a vested interest in that chain becoming the consensus. Now, miners cannot immediately sell the cryptocurrency they receive as reward for the blocks they hold. They must keep them until
sufficiently many blocks have been attached to that chain (this is the so-called “\(k\)-blocks rule”). This can lead miners working on different chains to continue to do so, in order to beat the competing chain. This can contribute to the emergence of persistent forks (Proposition 3).

While the persistent forks result hinges on the strategic behaviour of miners, who anticipate their strategy will affect the value of their rewards, the emergence of forks, making the previously longest chain orphan, relies only on coordination effects, and would also arise in a competitive environment.

In the last section of the current paper, we discuss how integrating frictions in our model, such as attempts to double-spend or non-instantaneous dissemination of information, could provide further insights into the blockchain’s stability. We also suggest to endogenise the computing capacity that each miner installs on the network. In the Bitcoin protocol, total computing capacity determines the difficulty to solve blocks. Because each miner does not take into account the impact of his computing capacity on the difficulty of the cryptographic problem faced by other miners, we conjecture that an arms race can occur, leading to over-investment in computing power (not unlike the over-investment in financial expertise noted by Glode, Green and Lowery (2012)). This provides a roadmap for our future research.

**Literature:** Most existing literature on blockchains is in computer science, with the notable exceptions of Harvey (2016), who discusses the pros and cons of blockchains and Yermack (2017) who discusses their implications for corporate governance.

Computer science papers offer insightful analyses of potential strategic problems, but usually do not rely on the same type of formalism as in economics. Bonneau et al. (2016) analyse how mining pools (i.e., groups of miners) controlling a large fraction of the computing power could attack the chain. Eyal and Sirer (2014) show how colluding miners can obtain a larger revenue than their fair shares. Teusch, Jain and Saxena (2016) study how a strategic miner can fork and attack the blockchain to double spend. The paper to which our analysis is the closest is Kroll, Davey and Felten (2013). They note that the interaction between miners should be analysed as a game. They argue that the LCR is a Nash equilibrium. While their analysis offers interesting economic intuition, it does not offer a formal analysis and proof of equilibrium. Another difference between our analysis and theirs is our analysis of forks on the equilibrium path.
Several papers (e.g., Evans [2014]) note that an additional problem with the Bitcoin mining incentive scheme is that miners are paid with bitcoins, which have a volatile value. In our analysis, the only source of variation in the value of rewards to a given block is the extent to which the chain including that block is actively mined. We analyse how these variations affect incentives. Schrijvers et al. (2016) study a different type of incentive problems than that we consider. They study the behaviour of miners in a pool, assuming that the pool organiser does not observe when miners solve blocks nor the computing power they dedicate to that task. They analyse how to incentivise miners to reveal that they have solved a block as soon as they have done so.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 develops our equilibrium analysis and contains our main results. Future extensions of the model are provided in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2 Model setup

In line with the above description of the blockchain technology, we consider the following model.

Miners and pools: There are $M \geq 2$ risk-neutral miners, indexed by $m \in M = \{1, \ldots, M\}$. While, in our model, we refer to each $m$ as a miner, in practice miners work in pools, which coordinate the efforts of their miners, in particular as regards which blocks they mine. For example, on https://www.bitcoinmining.com/bitcoin-mining-pools/ one can read:

“If you participate in a Bitcoin mining pool then you will want to ensure that they are engaging in behavior that is in agreement with your philosophy towards Bitcoin...Therefore, it is your duty to make sure that any Bitcoin mining power you direct to a mining pool does not attempt to enforce network consensus rules you disagree with.”

Thus, we can think of $M$ as the number of pools. Figure 3 presents the distribution of computing power of the pools operating on Bitcoin in April 2017: 14 mining pools represented about 93% of the total hash capacity.
Thus, a reasonable order of magnitude for $M$ is around 15. Because the number of pools is finite, it is appropriate to take a game theoretic approach, in which each of the $M$ players behaves strategically. In the discussion below, we will highlight which results rely on this strategic behaviour and which would also obtain in a competitive environment.

Figure 3: Hashrate distribution of Bitcoin mining pools on April 20, 2017. Source: blockchain.info. AntPool servers are located in China. The other three main pools have servers in China, Japan and the US.

Mining technology: There is a continuous flow of transactions sent for confirmation by end-users. For the moment, for simplicity, we assume all miners perfectly and instantaneously observe this flow, which they include in the blocks they mine. The time it takes a miner to solve his block depends on the difficulty of the cryptographic problem and the miner’s computing

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6For simplicity we take the flow of transactions to be exogenous, while in practice it can actually be endogenous. In fact, we don’t model the transactions and model the blockchain process directly at the level of the blocks.
power. The difficulty is set by the blockchain protocol to keep the average duration between two blocks close to a target (10 minutes on Bitcoin and between 10 and 20 seconds on Ethereum). Correspondingly, as long as the total computing power in the network does not change, the difficulty of the cryptographic problem does not change. If the total computing power increases (e.g., due to the entry of new miners and new pools), the difficulty is scaled up so that average duration between two blocks remains equal to the desired level. Thus, on Bitcoin every 2,016 blocks, i.e., approximately every 2 weeks, the difficulty is rescaled to ensure that the average time between blocks remains at 10 minutes. In the present paper we consider a stationary environment, in which the number of miners and the difficulty of the task are constant.

As explained in Nakamoto (2008), the time it takes miner $m$ to solve a block problem is exponential with parameter $\theta_m$. For a given computational power, the greater the difficulty, the lower the intensity $\theta_m$. A key property of the exponential distribution is that it is memoryless: at each point in time, the distribution of the waiting time until the miner finds a solution is independent from how long the miner has been working on the problem.\footnote{Another key property of the exponential distribution is that the minimum of two exponentials, with parameters $\theta$ and $\theta'$, is also exponential, with parameter $\theta + \theta'$. Thus, when interpreting the $M$ players in our game as $M$ pools, we interpret the intensity of pool $m$, $\theta_m$, as the sum of the intensities of all the miners active in that pool.}

An important feature of the blockchain is that this waiting time is also independent of which block $m$ is mining, and also from the blocks the other miners are mining. These properties have important strategic consequences. For example, suppose $m$ has been mining block $B$, and another miner solves a block (possibly $B$ or possibly another one). At this point, the duration until the next time at which $m$ solves a block is independent of whether $m$ continues to mine $B$ or any other block. We denote by $N_m$ the Poisson process jumping each time miner $m$ solves a block. Thus, the number of blocks solved by miner $m$ between time 0 and time $t$, is

$$N_m(t) = \int_{s=0}^{t} dN_m(s).$$

For simplicity we assume (in line with what happens in practice) that miners do not update the set of transactions defining the block they mine until they have solved the hash problem (transactions that flow in mean-
While are stored in a buffer. Relaxing that assumption would not alter the economic mechanism we analyse below.

We assume that at time $z_m$, exponentially distributed, with parameter $\lambda_m$, miner $m$ is hit by a liquidity shock. At time $z_m$ the miner must leave the game and sell the cryptocurrencies he earned previously to a new miner who also inherits his beliefs and preferences. Thus, exits are compensated by entries and the environment is stationary.

**Blockchain:** At time 0, there is an initial state of the ledger, encoded in $B_0$, and a set of transactions. Starting from $B_0$, miners start working on the first block, $B_1$, which contains the initial set of transactions. Once $B_1$ is solved, miners must choose to which parent block to chain the next block ($B_2$) they mine. If miners choose $B_1$ as a parent block, they continue the first chain. Alternatively, miners can choose to disregard $B_1$ and attach $B_2$ to $B_0$. In that case, miners start a fork and there are two competing chains, one including $B_0$ and $B_1$, the other $B_0$ and $B_2$.

As the game unfolds, a tree of blocks develops. In the above example, once $B_2$ is solved, the tree has three vertices: $B_0$, $B_1$ and $B_2$. If miners continue the first chain, by attaching $B_2$ to $B_1$ the two edges (or branches) of the tree are ($B_0$, $B_1$) and ($B_1$, $B_2$). In contrast, if miners start a fork, the two edges are ($B_0$, $B_1$) and ($B_0$, $B_2$). At each vertex $B_k$, the tree also includes a label, identifying the miner who solved the corresponding block, $m(B_k)$. The indices of the blocks give the order in which they have been solved. That is, if $k < n$, then block $B_k$ was solved before block $B_n$.

In general, at any time $t$, one can observe a tree of solved blocks $C_t = \{B^t, E^t, I^t\}$, where $B^t = (B_0, ..., B_n)$ is the set of all blocks that have been solved by time $t$, $E^t = \{(B_0, B_1), ..., (B_k, B_{k'}), ...\}$, with $0 \leq k < k' \leq n$, is the set of edges chaining these blocks, and $I^t = (m(B_1), ..., m(B_n))$ is the set of identities of miners who solved blocks. Within a tree, a chain is a sequence of connected blocks in which each block is connected to at most one subsequent block. Thus, each fork starts a new chain. More formally, we define a fork as follows:

**Definition 1 Fork:** There is a fork at time $t$ if and only if there exists $(B_i, B_k, B_{k'})$ included in $B^t$ such that $(B_i, B_k)$ and $(B_i, B_{k'})$ belong to $E^t$.

It is also useful to define the original chain for a given tree $C^t$, as follows:

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8We explain below the process through which miner $m$ accumulates cryptocurrencies.
Definition 2 **Original Chain:** Suppose $E^t$ contains $(B_i, B_k)$ and $(B_i, B_{k'})$. A chain that includes $(B_i, B_k)$ preexists a chain that includes $(B_i, B_{k'})$ if and only if $k < k'$. We call the original chain the chain that preexists all other chains in $C^t$.

Note that the original chain is well defined since the “preexist” relation provides a complete ranking of all chains (as all chains have at least one common block, $B_0$).

**Stopping times:** We assume miners make decisions at different points in time, corresponding to a sequence of stopping times. Whenever a block is solved or a miner is hit by a liquidity shock, all miners make a decision. Miners can also make a decision, after a time interval of length $\Delta$, if no block is solved and no liquidity shock has occurred during that interval. $\Delta$ can be arbitrarily small to approximate a continuous time environment.\(^9\)

Thus, the sequence of stopping times at which miners make decisions is $T = \{0, \ldots, \tau_j, \tau_{j+1}, \ldots\}$ where the next stopping time after $\tau_j$, $\tau_{j+1}$, is equal to $\tau_{j+1} = \min[\tau_j + \Delta, \tau^l(\tau_j), \tau^b(\tau_j)]$, $\tau^l(\tau_j)$ being the first time a liquidity shock occurs after $\tau_j$ and $\tau^b(\tau_j)$ the first time a block is solved after $\tau_j$.

**Action space:** At any time $\tau \in T$, miners observe the set $B^\tau$ of all the blocks that have been solved previously. A miner’s action is the choice of which block in $B^\tau$ to attach his current block to. All miners $m \in M = \{1, \ldots, M\}$ face the same action space.

**Payoffs:** When miner $m$ solves a block in a given chain, he receives a reward, included in the block he mined, and expressed in the cryptocurrency corresponding to that chain.\(^{10}\) We assume that miner $m$ consumes the rewards he earned throughout the game at time $z_m$. That is, we assume that, until time $z_m$, the miner keeps the units of cryptocurrency he earned. In

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\(^9\)This discretisation enables us to avoid technical issues regarding the definition of strategies in continuous time games.

\(^{10}\)For example, when a miner solves a hash problem on Bitcoin or Ethereum, he is rewarded in bitcoins (BTC) or ethers (ETH). On Bitcoin, miners receive in 2017 12.5 BTC for each block, on Ethereum they receive 5 ETH per block. For simplicity, we neglect further fees offered by final traders to reward the certification of their transactions, since we do not model explicitly transactions.
practice, miners do not sell their reward immediately after they have earned it. In particular, the so called “k-blocks rule” implies that the cryptocurrency obtained by \( m \) for solving a block will be accepted by others only after sufficiently many blocks have been chained to that block.

At time \( z_m \), the payoff from each solved block depends on the credibility of the chain that contains the block. Consider two polar cases: In the first case, a block solved by a miner becomes orphaned, i.e., no further blocks are attached to it, so that no miner expresses acceptance of that block and the transfer of cryptocurrency it encodes. In the second case there is a single chain to which all blocks belong, reflecting consensus on the blocks in that chain. The value of a reward in the first case, is likely to be zero, and is bound to be smaller than in the second case. Next, consider an intermediate case, in which the block is included in a chain competing with another one. As long as a significant fraction of the miners are working on each of the chains, the value of rewards included in the blocks of the two chains, while uncertain, can remain positive.

More formally, we assume that the payoff for miner \( m \) from solving \( B \) is an increasing function, \( G(\cdot) \), of the number of miners active at time \( z_m \) in the chain including \( B \). For example, suppose there are two active chains at time \( z_m \). If there are \( K \) miners active in the chain including \( B \), and \( M - K \) in the other, the payoffs from solving blocks are the following: The miner who solved block \( B \), which we denote by \( m(B) \), earns \( G(K) \) for block \( B \). A miner who solved a block in the other chain earns \( G(M - K) \) for that block. If a miner solved a block that belongs to both chains, he earns \( G(M - K) + G(K) \).\footnote{One must also specify what happens if \( z_m \) occurs just after a fork starts, after a block \( B_n \) has just been solved. The probability of this event is very small, and in practice it is not a very relevant consideration, but, for completeness, we need to specify the value of the reward earned by \( m(B_n) \) when \( K \) miners chain the block they currently mine to \( B_n \), while \( M - K \) chain their block to \( B_{n-1} \). Suppose there was a single chain up to and including \( B_n \). Three alternative hypotheses are possible. First, one could posit that the not yet realised fork does not reduce the credibility of the current chain. In that case, \( m(B_n) \) earns \( G(M) \) for \( B_n \). Second, one could posit that, irrespective of how many miners fork, the attempt to fork reduces the overall credibility of the chain, reducing the reward for \( B_n \) to some arbitrary \( g < G(M) \). Third, one could posit that the reward for \( B_n \) is worth \( G(K) \). We will highlight in the proofs the extent to which these alternatives affect our construction.} We assume that \( G(0) = G(1) = 0 \) since, when there is only one or no miner on a chain, the associated cryptocurrency has no value. Finally, we assume that when several chains compete, the total value of a
unit of cryptocurrency that belongs to the competing chains is weakly lower than if it belonged to a single chain that was the consensus of all miners. To ensure this we assume that \( G(M - K) + G(K) \leq G(M), \forall K \).

Our assumption that the value of the virtual currency is reduced by forks is illustrated by Figure 4, which plots the decline in bitcoin value during the March 2013 fork. The first vertical line indicates the time (around 22:00) at which miners started working on two different chains. Chats between miners realising there was a fork, started around 23:30.\(^{12}\) At 1:30 am, a message posted on Bitcointalk asked miners to stop mining one the two branches of the chain (the 0.8 branch). The second vertical line (approximately at 6:20) indicates the time at which the 0.7 branch caught up the 0.8 branch. By 7:30, miners had stopped mining the 0.8 branch, which became orphaned, so that the fork was no longer active. The figure illustrates that, when the market realised that miners worked on different branches this triggered a 25% drop in the value of the virtual currency (from around 48 at 1:00 am to around 36 at 3:00).

**States:** At time \( \tau \in T \), a state \( \omega_\tau \) includes three elements:

- First, \( \omega_\tau \) includes the tree of solved blocks \( C^\tau = \{ B^\tau, E^\tau, I^\tau \} \). The entire set of previously solved blocks, \( B^\tau \), is relevant for the miners, since they can chain a new block to any of these previously solved blocks. For each miner, the set of blocks he solved, measurable with respect to \( I^\tau \), determines his payoff, and therefore influences his actions.

- Second, \( \omega_\tau \) includes the number of miners active on branches stemming from each of the previously solved blocks\(^{13}\) \( A^\tau = (A^\tau(B_1), .. A^\tau(B_k), .. A^\tau(B_n)) \), where \( A^\tau(B_k) \) is the number of miners mining at time \( \tau \) a block directly chained to \( B_k \), determines the value of each miner’s reward if he’s hit by a liquidity shock.


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\(^{13}\)In practice, miners cannot directly observe the current distribution of the computing power across the different branches of the chain, but estimate it based on the observed frequency of block resolutions. In our analysis, equilibrium strategies only depend on \( A^\tau \) via miners’ payoffs at \( z_m \).
assume that at each time $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$, the realisation of a sunspot random variable $r^\tau$ is observed by all, and we include it in the state. $r^\tau$ is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ and i.i.d. over time.

Thus, we define $\omega_\tau = (C^\tau, A^\tau, r^\tau)$ and denote by $\Omega$ the set of states of the world.

**Strategies:** Miner $m$ chooses his strategy to maximise his expected payoff at time $z_m$. At each time $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$, miners observe the whole history of the game, that is, the state $\omega_\tau$, as well as, e.g., the exact timing of blocks resolution and the previous mining choices. In the spirit of Markov perfection,
we only consider strategies that are measurable with respect to $\omega$.

A pure strategy for miner $m$ is a function $\sigma^*_m$ mapping each possible state of the blockchain $\omega \tau \in \Omega$, into an element of the action space $B^\tau$. We denote the strategy of miner $m$ throughout the entire history of the game by $\sigma_m$ and the profile of strategies for the $M$ miners by $\sigma = \{\sigma_m\}_{m \in M}$. $\sigma$, combined with the random variables $\{z\}_{m \in M}$ and $\{N_m\}_{m \in M}$, yield the transition probabilities from one state of the blockchain to the next.

**Equilibrium:** The above elements define our stochastic game. Our equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium, i.e., Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with strategies restricted to depend only on the current state $\omega \tau$.

### 3 Equilibrium analysis

To analyse equilibrium strategies, it is useful to first note that an upper bound on the lifetime payoff miner $m$ can earn is

$$G^\text{max}_m = \left[ \int_{s=0}^{s=z_m} dN_m(s) \right] G(M),$$

minus the price he paid for the cryptocurrency if he was not there at time 0. This sunk cost does not affect his strategies and we neglect it hereafter. $G^\text{max}_m$ is an upper bound because i) the total number of blocks solved by $m$ before $z_m$ is $\int_{s=z_m}^{\infty} dN_m(t)$, whatever his mining strategy, and ii) $m$ cannot earn more than $G(M)$ each time he solves a block. At time $t$, the expectation of $G^\text{max}_m$, conditional on $z_m \geq t$, is

$$E_t \left[ \int_{s=0}^{t} dN_m(s) + \int_{s=t}^{z_m} dN_m(s) | z_m \geq t \right] G(M) = \left\{ N_m(t) + E \left[ \int_{s=t}^{z_m} dN_m(s) | z_m \geq t \right] \right\} G(M) = \left\{ N_m(t) + \frac{\theta_m}{\lambda_m} \right\} G(M).$$

Does there exist a natural strategy enabling miners to achieve this maximum expected payoff? The definition of $G^\text{max}_m$ implies that, to obtain the maximum expected payoff, all miners should be on the same chain, when any

\[\footnote{Indeed, the timing of previous block resolutions, as well as previous mining choices, are payoff irrelevant.} \]
of them is hit by the liquidity shock. This is the case if all miners stick to the original chain at any time $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$. If they do so the longest chain rule (LCR) trivially holds. Our first proposition states that there exists an equilibrium in which miners follow this strategy.

**Proposition 1** There exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which, on the equilibrium path there is a single chain and all miners follow the LCR, thus obtaining their maximum expected payoff, $E[G_{m}^{\text{max}}]$.

The intuition for Proposition 1 is the following. When all miners up to $\tau$ attach their blocks to the original chain, thus following the LCR, there is a single chain at $\tau$. If the others abide to this strategy, then $m$ can obtain his maximum possible expected payoff, $E[G_{m}^{\text{max}}|\omega_{\tau}]$, by also abiding to it. Hence there is no profitable one shot deviation from the strategy which consists in extending the original (and thereby longest) chain. Precisely, each miner rationally anticipates that if he deviates and solves a block, the other miners would not follow him, and the block solved out of the equilibrium path would have no value.

In the context of the strategic interaction characterised in Proposition 1, miners are not really competing to solve their block before the others. That another miner solves his block before $m$ does not, in itself, reduce $m$’s gains. The only thing that matters for miners to obtain the maximum payoff they get in Proposition 1 is that they coordinate well and all work on the same chain.

It is also noteworthy that the result in Proposition 1 does not depend on the number of miners $M$. The economic mechanism involved in Proposition 1 does not hinge on strategic behaviour. It is purely driven by coordination effects, which would also be at play in a competitive environment.

Proposition 1 emphasises that attaching blocks to the original chain is a simple way for miners to coordinate their actions, and results in a single chain with no fork. There might, however, be other ways for miners to coordinate in our stochastic game. In particular they could rely on the sunspot variable $r^\tau$. We now exhibit an equilibrium in which conditioning actions on $r^\tau$ leads to equilibria with forks.

Intuitively, suppose miners follow the original chain until the realisation of the sunspot variable is such that miners anticipate a fork. As shown below, because of coordination effects, this anticipation is self fulfilling.
More precisely, set a threshold $\varepsilon$, which can be arbitrarily small, consider the first time, $\tau^f$, at which the sunspot variable is above $1 - \varepsilon$ and denote by $B_{n(\tau^f)}$ the last block in the chain at that time ($n(\tau)$ denotes the index of the last block solved by $\tau$). In the sunspot equilibrium of our next proposition, at $\tau^f$ all participants fork and mine a new block whose parent is $B_{n(\tau^f) - f}$. This fork becomes the only active chain. Since it does not include blocks $B_{n(\tau^f) - f + 1}$ to $B_{n(\tau^f)}$, miners do not earn any reward for these blocks.\footnote{This might also eliminate some of the underlying transactions included in blocks $B_{n(\tau^f) - f + 1}$ to $B_{n(\tau^f)}$.}

We now state our next proposition:

**Proposition 2** Consider an arbitrary integer $f$. There exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which, on the equilibrium path, the following occurs: As long as $r^\tau \leq 1 - \varepsilon$, or $f \geq n(\tau)$, there is a single chain and all miners chain their current block to $B_{n(\tau)}$. At the first time $\tau$ such that $r^\tau > 1 - \varepsilon$ and $f < n(\tau)$, each miner chains his current block to $B_{n(\tau) - f}$. Afterwards, miners chain their current block to the last solved block on the chain including the edge $(B_{n(\tau) - f}, B_{n(\tau) + 1})$.

In the statement of the proposition we focus on what happens on the equilibrium path. In the proof in the appendix, we characterise the equilibrium strategy profile for any state. The intuition of Proposition 2 is the following: If I expect all to fork to $B_{n(\tau) - f}$, and if I choose to deviate and not fork, any block I solve will not be followed by the other miners, and I will earn no reward for this block. Rationally anticipating this, the rewards I obtain on the new chain become more valuable, therefore I choose to do like the others and fork.

The March 12, 2013 Bitcoin fork illustrates the strength of coordination issues in shaping miners’ strategies. On March 11 some miners upgraded to a new version of the software, referred to as 0.8. There turned out to be a bug so that the miners operating in the 0.7 version rejected as invalid one block solved by the 0.8 miners (and consequently the subsequent ones). From that point on, the 0.8 miners worked on a chain stemming from that block, while the 0.7 worked on a competing chain, stemming from its parent. After a while participants became aware that a fork had occurred and had to decide on which branch to coordinate. Narayanan (2015) reports the following discussion, among miners and developers, from the log of the #bitcoin-dev IRC channel:
“Gavin Andresen: the 0.8 fork is longer, yes? so majority hashpower is 0.8 ... first rule of bitcoin: majority hashpower wins

Luke Dashjr: if we go with 0.8 we are hard forking

BTC Guild: I can single handedly put 0.7 back to the majority hashpower. I just need confirmation that that’s what should be done.

Pieter Wuille: that is what should be done, but we should have consensus first"

As illustrated by the above quoted discussions, miners faced a dilemma. Should they follow the longest chain rule and continue mining the 0.8 chain which had attracted the majority of the computing power? Or should they fork from it, reverting to a different version of the blockchain? The above discussion shows that the overarching concern of the miners was that they wanted to follow the consensus. BTC Guild, which was one of the largest pools at the time, eventually chose to downgrade to the 0.7 version. This resulted in the 0.7 chain becoming the longest, and all miners coordinating back to it. Consequently more than 24 blocks, solved on the 0.8 chain, became orphaned, and their miners (including BTC Guild) lost the corresponding rewards. Commenting on this situation, [Narayanan 2015] wrote:

“One way to look at this is that BTC Guild sacrificed revenues for the good of the network. But these actions can also be justified from a revenue-maximising perspective. If the BTC Guild operator believed that the 0.7 branch would win anyway (perhaps the developers would be able to convince another large pool operator), then moving first is relatively best, since delaying would only take BTC Guild further down the doomed branch.”

This illustrates the behaviour of miners in Proposition 2 if one miner expects all the others to fork, then he is better off following them. Similarly to the 0.7 chain in the 2013 Bitcoin fork, in Proposition 2, the fork stemming from $B_{n(\tau)-f}$ becomes the only active chain. Since it does not include blocks $B_{n(\tau)-f+1}$ to $B_{n(\tau)}$, the miners who solved these blocks lose their rewards. Consequently, these miners earn less than $G^\text{max}_m$, while the other miners do not earn more than $G^\text{max}_n$. Thus the forking equilibrium in Proposition 2 is Pareto dominated by the single chain equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Observe that, like Proposition 1, Proposition 2 does not depend on the number of miners $M$. Both propositions hinge on coordination effects, which also arise in a competitive environment.

While in the previous proposition, in spite of forking, there was eventually a single chain, we now show that forking can lead to the persistent coexistence of different branches. The Ethereum network offers an example of a persistent fork. In response to the TheDAO hacking, on July 20, 2016 80% of the nodes moved to a new, forked chain, that kept the name Ethereum. It was believed that the remaining 20% would follow. Instead, the initial blockchain continued to be mined and took the name Ethereum Classic, which gave rise to a new currency, denoted ETC. Today, two networks coexist: As of May 2017, Ethereum Classic represented about 10% of the hash capacity of Ethereum, and the price of ETC was about 10% of the ETH price.

As in Proposition 2, we consider the possibility that, at any time $\tau^f$, the realization of the sunspot can suggest that some miners fork to a new chain. This can, for instance, give rise to two coexisting chains at time $\tau > \tau^f$, the original chain, including the blocks linked by the sequence of edges

$$(B_0, B_1), \ldots (B_{n(\tau^f)}, B_{n(\tau^f)}-f+1), \ldots$$

and a new chain, including the blocks linked by

$$(B_0, B_1), \ldots (B_{n(\tau^f)}-f, B_{k}), \ldots$$

with $k \geq n(\tau^f)$.

The number of blocks solved by $m$ after $B_{n(\tau^f)}-f$ on any of these two chains defines the vested interest of $m$ on that chain. We denote the vested interests of miner $m$ at time $\tau$ on the original and the new chain by $v^o(m, \tau)$ and $v^n(m, \tau)$ respectively. For example, suppose miner $m$ keeps mining the original chain. The vested interest of that miner on the original chain at time $\tau$ is equal to $v^o(m, \tau) = N_m(\tau) - N_m(\tau(B_{n(\tau^f)}))$ (where $\tau(B_{n(\tau^f)}$ is the stopping time at which $B_{n(\tau^f)}$ is solved), while his vested interest on the new chain is $v^n(m, \tau) = 0$. Alternatively, consider miner $m'$ who mines the new chain from time $\tau^f$ on. The vested interest of that miner on the original chain at time $\tau$ is $v^o(m', \tau) = N_{m'}(\tau) - N_{m'}(\tau(B_{n(\tau^f)}))$, while his vested interest on the new chain is $v^n(m', \tau) = N_{m'}(\tau) - N_{m'}(\tau^f)$. For miners switching between the original chain and the new one, vested interests are a bit more intricate, but follow the same logic.
In our model miners hold their rewards until $z_m$ and therefore have vested interests. In practice, miners cannot sell their rewards immediately after solving blocks, due to the $k$-blocks rule. Our model takes a simplified view of this situation by assuming that the vesting period lasts until $z_m$. Our next result illustrates the consequences of vested interests. To state that result, rank the miners by their vested interest in the original chain at time $\tau_f$ as follows

$$\frac{\Pr(z_m = \tau')}{\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau_f) = 1)} \nu^o(m, \tau_f) \leq \frac{\Pr(z_{m+1} = \tau')}{\Pr(N_{m+1}(\tau') - N_{m+1}(\tau_f) = 1)} \nu^o(m+1, \tau_f),$$

where $\Pr(z_m = \tau')$ is the probability that at the next stopping time $\tau'$, miner $m$ is hit by a liquidity shock, and $\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau_f) = 1)$ is the probability that he solves his block at $\tau'$.

Other things equal, miners with larger vested interest $\nu^o(m, \tau_f)$ (and correspondingly ranked high) have more to lose if the original chain is orphaned and therefore are less inclined to fork. This issue was raised during the resolution of the March 2013 fork. The tradeoff faced by miners is explicit in the following discussion (also quoted in Narayanan (2015)):

“Luke Dashjr: it’s either lose 6 blocks [mined on 0.8] or hard-fork [to 0.8]
Pieter Wuille: all old miners will stick to their old chain regardless of the mining power behind the other
BTC Guild: I’ve lost so much money in the last 24 hours from 0.8"

In spite of the vested interests expressed in this discussion, miners eventually agreed on a single chain and the fork disappeared. The presence of vested interests, however, could lead to persistent forks in equilibrium. Consider the following condition.

**Condition 1** For any $M$ and any $K < M$, $G(K) + G(M - K) = G(M)$, and $\omega_f$ is such that there exists $K \in \{\text{Int}(\frac{M}{2}) + 2, \ldots M\}$ (where Int denotes the integer part) such that

$$G(M - K) \leq \frac{G(M - K - 1) + G(M - K + 1)}{2}$$

(1)
and for $m > K$

$$\frac{\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)}{\Pr(z_m = \tau')} (G(K) - G(M - K)) < v^o(m, \tau')(G(M - K) - G(M - K - 1))$$

(2)

while for $m \leq K$

$$\frac{\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)}{\Pr(z_m = \tau')} (G(K) - G(M - K)) > v^o(m, \tau')(G(M - K + 1) - G(M - K))$$

(3)

The assumption that for any $M$ and any $K < M$, $G(K) + G(M - K) = G(M)$, simplifies the presentation of Condition 1. However, Proposition 3 below also holds in the more general case where $G(K) + G(M - K) \leq G(M)$.

Consider an arbitrary integer $f$. Let $\tau_f$ be the first time at which $r^\tau > 1 - \varepsilon, f < n(\tau)$ and Condition 1 holds.

**Proposition 3** For $\varepsilon$ sufficiently small, there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which, on the equilibrium path, the following occurs: As long as $\tau < \tau_f$ there is a single chain and all miners chain their current block to $B_n(\tau)$. At $\tau_f$, all miners $m \leq K$ (defined in Condition 1) chain their current block to $B_n(\tau_f - f)$ and follow that chain afterwards, while the other miners chain their current block to $B_n(\tau_f)$ and follow that chain afterwards.

The intuition for this result is the following. First note that for some miners to fork, we must have that the left-hand-side of (3) be non negative, which implies that $K \geq \frac{M}{2} + 1$. That is, in Proposition 3, persistent forks can occur only if a majority of miners choose to fork and this is expected by all.

Now, suppose all miners expect that a majority will fork and this will result in two coexisting chains and consider the choice of miner $m$ between forking and remaining on the original chain. For $m$, the benefit from forking is that the blocks he will mine on the new chain will be worth $G(K)$, which is larger than the value of blocks mined on the original chain, $G(M - K)$. This benefit is large if the probability that $m$ solves a block in any given period, $\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)$, is large relative to the probability that $m$ leaves

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16 In addition to notational changes, it would require imposing an (arbitrarily large) upper bound on miners’ vested interests.
the game because of a liquidity shock, \( \Pr(z_m = \tau') \). Note that the ratio of these probabilities increases with the ratio of the mining intensity \( \theta_m \) to the liquidity shock intensity, \( \lambda_m \). This benefit is captured in the left-hand-side of equations (2) and (3) in Condition 1.

On the other hand, the cost of mining the new chain is that it reduces the value of the blocks already mined on the original chain. For instance, if miner \( m > K \) deviates from the equilibrium strategy and mines the new chain, he reduces the value of all the blocks he solved on the original chain from \( G(M - K) \) to \( G(M - K - 1) \). This cost is large if \( m \) has large vested interests in the original chain, that is, if \( v^o(m, \tau) \) is large. This cost is captured in the right-hand-side of equations (2) and (3) in Condition 1.

Overall, Proposition 3 shows that the endogenous sorting between miners who prefer to stick to the original chain and those who fork is driven by two forces: the number of blocks that a miner expects to solve in the future, \( \frac{\theta_m}{\lambda_m} \), and his vested interest in the original chain, \( v^o(m, \tau) \). A miner is more likely to fork when the former is higher, and the latter is lower.

Last, inequality (1) ensures that the set of miners who choose to stick to the original chain has no intersection with the set of miners who prefer to fork. Figure 5 represents the competing chains sustained at the equilibrium of Proposition 3.

![Figure 5: Equilibrium of Proposition 3](image)

Unlike Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the conditions in Proposition 3 depend on the number of miners. More precisely, the tradeoffs faced by the miners involve the effect of their mining strategy on the value of their
rewards. If miners were competitive and their choice had no impact on the value of their rewards, this strategic effect would not arise.

Finally note that the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 3 is Pareto dominated by that in Proposition 1. Again, forking reduces the total gains of the miners, and yet it can arise in equilibrium.

4 Extensions (work-in-progress)

So far we have considered the case in which i) there are no frictions, and ii) computing capacity is given and constant. In future research, we will work on relaxing some or all of these assumptions and examine to what extent the economic mechanisms we already identified are still at play and what new effects arise. We will also endeavour to distill the implications of our theoretical analysis.

4.1 Frictions

4.1.1 Information transmission delays

One way to introduce frictions is to consider delays in the dissemination of information through the network. Such delays could induce short term forks. As mentioned above, (Nakamoto, 2008) considered that possibility and conjectured that miners would follow the LCR and that this would resolve short term forks. We explore below how delays can give rise to forks and multiplicity of equilibria.

To model information transmission, we introduce the following modification of our framework: To keep things as simple as possible, we assume that a delay in information transmission can happen only once. Thus, as long as all miners have observed when all previous blocks were solved, each time a new block $B_n$ is solved there is a probability $\eta$ that one (and only one) of the miners does not observe that event. In that case each of the $M-1$ miners has an equal chance of not observing the block solved by the other miner. (when this happens all miners don’t have the same stopping times.) As soon as the next block ($B_{n+1}$) is solved, the miner who did not observe that $B_n$ was solved learns that information.

Proposition 4 When miners can observe solved blocks with a delay, there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium such that on the equilibrium path miners
always mine the chain that they perceive as the longest. After a fork, they can continue mining the original chain or the forking branch.

At the equilibrium presented in Proposition 4, either there is a fork leading to abandon the last block solved on the original chain, or there is no fork, and the last block forming a chain as long as the original chain is orphaned. This is due to the fact that when two chains have the same length, miners continue mining the chain on which they were active before they observed the fork. When one chain becomes longer, miners apply the LCR. This is in line with the conjecture of [Nakamoto (2008)]. The equilibrium described in Proposition 4 therefore corresponds to the LCR equilibrium of Proposition 1 in the presence of observation delays. Yet coordination issues can still arise in that setting. In particular, miners may not choose to continue mining the chain on which they were active when they observe a fork. This point is illustrated in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5** When miners can observe solved blocks with a delay, there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium such that on the equilibrium path miners always mine the chain that they perceive as the longest. After a fork, they always continue mining the forking branch.

In Proposition 5, miners follow the LCR on the equilibrium path, but, when the information delay causes a fork, they abandon the chain on which they were active and follow the fork. Hence even without sunspots, miners can coordinate on a fork. In our example, the fork is only one-block-long because the delay can only affect the observation of one block. By extension, longer forks could be sustained if delays affect more blocks. Note that delays are not necessarily due to network latency. In the case of the Bitcoin March 2013 Fork, a delay in the observation of several blocks occurred, because one block was mistakenly rejected by computers using one version of the mining software.

### 4.1.2 Double spending

Another important potential issue outlined in Nakamoto (2008) is double spending. Double spending refers to one party’s ability to send a transaction \( t' \) that uses money already spent in a previous transaction \( t \). This requires that i) miners first chain their blocks to the block containing \( t \), and ii) miners later choose to mine blocks chained to the block that contains \( t' \), thereby
forking to abandon the block that includes $t$. We study below whether double spending can be sustained at equilibrium. In the spirit of the modelling of delays above, assume that after each block is solved, there is a probability $\eta'$ that one miner can divert the payment $S$ from a transaction included in the last solved block. To earn $S$, the miner needs to create a fork from the parent of the last solved block, that becomes the only active chain. Assume that this opportunity to double spend occurs only once.

**Proposition 6** When miners can double spend $S$, there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium such that on the equilibrium path miners always mine the longest chain except the miner who has the opportunity to double spend. A fork can occur on the equilibrium path.

4.2 Computing capacity

We now endogenise computing power in the network. $\theta_m$ is determined by the individual computing power installed by miner $m$, $h_m$ and the difficulty of the mining task set by the network protocol, $D$:

$$\theta_m = \frac{h_m}{D}. \quad (4)$$

The difficulty is set so that the expected time between two blocks is equal to a constant, $X$ (on Bitcoin $X = 10$ minutes)

$$X = \frac{1}{\sum_m \theta_m}. \quad (5)$$

Substituting $4$ into $5$

$$X = \frac{1}{\sum_m \frac{h_m}{D}}. \quad (5)$$

That is

$$D = X \sum_m h_m.$$  

Therefore

$$\theta_m = \frac{1}{X \sum_m h_m}. \quad (6)$$

We now analyse the optimal choice of $h_m$ by miner $m$. To perform this choice the miner needs to anticipate how his computing power will affect his
continuation game payoff. To do so, the miner needs to form a conjecture on the equilibrium that will prevail in the mining game. For simplicity, we assume all miners rationally anticipate the single chain equilibrium described in Proposition 1 will prevail.

The program of miner $m$ is

$$\max_{h_m} \frac{\theta_m}{\lambda_m} G(M) - c_m(h_m),$$

where $c_m(h_m)$ is the cost of acquiring and using $h_m$ until the miner is hit by a liquidity shock. Substituting this is

$$\max_{h_m} \frac{\sum_{i \in M} h_i}{\lambda_i X} G(M) - c_m(h_m).$$

The first order condition is

$$\frac{\sum_{i \in M} h_i}{\lambda_m X} \frac{G(M)}{\lambda_m X} = c_m'(h_m).$$

It is reasonable to assume that the cost function is linear

$$c_m(h_m) = c_m h_m.$$ 

In this case the first order condition simplifies to

$$\frac{\sum_{i \in M} h_i}{\lambda_m X} = c_m.$$ (7)

A Nash equilibrium of the computing power acquisition game is a vector $\{h^*_m\}_{m=1,...,M}$ such that $h^*_m$ is the optimal choice of miner $m$ when he anticipates the others will choose $h^*_{-m}$.

Evaluated at equilibrium, (7) yields

$$\left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right) - \frac{\lambda_m X}{G(M)} \left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right)^2 = c_m.$$ (8)
Summing over miners

\[ M \left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right) - \left( \sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i \right) \frac{X}{G(M)} \left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right)^2 = \left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right) \]

\[ (M - 1) \left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right) = \left( \sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i \right) \frac{X}{G(M)} \left( \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i \right)^2 \]

\[ \frac{(M - 1)}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \frac{G(M)}{X} = \sum_{i \in M} h^*_m \]

\[ \sum_{i \in M} h^*_i = \frac{G(M)}{X} \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \] (9)

Substituting 9 into 8

\[ h^*_m = \left( \frac{G(M)}{X} \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \right) - \left( \lambda_m c_m \right) \frac{X}{G(M)} \left( \frac{G(M)}{X} \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \right)^2 \]

\[ h^*_m = \left( \frac{G(M)}{X} \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \right) \left( 1 - \left( \lambda_m c_m \right) \frac{X}{G(M)} \frac{G(M)}{X} \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \right) \]

\[ h^*_m = \frac{G(M)}{X} \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \left( 1 - \left( \lambda_m c_m \right) \frac{M - 1}{\sum_{i \in M} \lambda_i c_i} \right) \cdot \frac{1}{2} \] (10)

Equilibrium computing power is increasing in reward for mining \((G(M))\), decreasing in the average duration between blocks \((X)\). In the special case in which all miners have the same cost and the same liquidity shock intensity, 10 simplifies to

\[ h^*_m = \frac{G(M)}{\lambda c X} \frac{M - 1}{M^2} \]

Thus, in this simple case, equilibrium computing is decreasing in \(\lambda c\).

If all miners could collude, they would choose computing powers to maximise their joint profit. The corresponding maximisation problem (in the case in which all miners are the same) is

\[ \max_h M \left( \frac{1}{X \sum_m h} G(M) - ch \right) \]
This is decreasing in $h$. So the planner chooses the smallest possible value of $h$, $h = \varepsilon$. By doing this he drives difficulty to 0, and there is still a block discovered every $X$ minutes.

So there is overinvestment in computing power. Note that, in our framework, hashing and difficulty are useless, because by assumption there is no double spending or malevolent manipulation.

5 Conclusion

Our analysis suggests that mining in a blockchain is a coordination game. Coordination games usually have multiple equilibria, some of which are Pareto dominated. Our first results illustrate that this can be the case in the blockchain, and raise an important point in the policy debate on blockchains: when record keeping is decentralised, efficient decentralisation requires coordination, while coordination problems can lead to inefficient equilibria. It would be interesting to study if and how inefficient equilibria could be avoided. Maybe cheap talk could play a role in this context. This might provide a rationale for communication channels among miners and developers, such as IRC channels and forums. Another communication device used in practice by miners is flags attached to blocks to convey messages to other miners, such as, e.g., support for an upgrade, which might then lead to or help avoid a fork. It would also be interesting to identify the main drivers of blockchain instability. For example, one could analyse if concentration of computing power can be dangerous. One could also study if other reward schemes than that currently used in blockchains could generate better outcomes. For example, while Bitcoin does not reward orphaned blocks, Ethereum does, to some extent. Should one expect the latter reward scheme to generate better outcomes than the former?

We also conjecture that, with endogenous computing power there can be negative externalities and excess investment. Could such inefficiencies be corrected by appropriate regulation or taxation? More generally, it would be useful to better understand the social costs and benefits of having more computing power in the network and to examine if policy intervention is called for.
Appendix

Throughout the proofs we will use the following lemma:

**Lemma 1**  Our blockchain game is continuous at infinity.

**Proof of Lemma 1**  Denote by $J(\sigma_m)$ the expected payoff of miner $m$ if he follows strategy $\sigma_m$. Consider an alternative strategy, $\sigma'_m$, that prescribes the same actions as $\sigma_m$ until time $T$ and differs afterwards. The difference between the two expected payoffs can be written as

$$J(\sigma_m) - J(\sigma'_m) = \Pr(z_m \leq T) E[J(\sigma_m) - J(\sigma'_m) | z_m \leq T] + \Pr(z_m > T) E[J(\sigma_m) - J(\sigma'_m) | z_m > T].$$

Now, by definition,

$$E[J(\sigma_m) - J(\sigma'_m) | z_m \leq T] = 0.$$ 

Moreover

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \Pr(z_m > T) = 0,$$

and $J(\sigma_m) - J(\sigma'_m)$ is bounded, since $G_m^{max}$ is finite. Hence,

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} J(\sigma_m) - J(\sigma'_m) = 0,$$

which ensures that our game is continuous at infinity.

QED

**Proof of Proposition 1**  By Lemma 1 a strategy profile forms a sub-game perfect equilibrium if and only if there is no profitable one shot deviation from that strategy at any stage in the game.

Our candidate equilibrium, $\{\sigma^*_m\}_{m \in M}$, is that, for any $\omega_{\tau}$, miners chain their block to the most recent block in the original chain.

To prove that this is a Markov perfect equilibrium we now show that, in any state $\omega_{\tau}$, any miner prefers to follow the equilibrium, and chain his block to the most recent one in the original chain, rather than engaging in a one shot deviation, chaining his block to another block, $B$, at time $\tau$, and then reverting to the equilibrium strategy.

To do so, consider three cases, whose probabilities are independent of the miners’ actions (since they reflect the distributions of independent Poisson processes whose intensities are exogenous):
The first case is when the next event is $z_m$. The equilibrium strategy prescribes that all miners mine the original chain at $\tau$. Therefore if $m$ follows the equilibrium strategy, he earns $G(M)$ for each previously solved block on that chain and 0 on any block potentially solved on another chain. If instead $m$ deviates, his payoff from his previously solved blocks cannot be larger:

- If he continues a previous fork, he does not increase the payoffs of his previously mined blocks on that fork, since he is the only one mining it (and $G(1) = 0$), and he cannot increase his payoff from his other solved blocks.
- If he starts a new fork, under the first two assumptions in Footnote 11, which block $m$ was mining is irrelevant, while under the third assumption $m$ earns less if he deviates than if he follows the equilibrium.

The second case is when the next event is that a block is solved by another miner than $m$. Then, again, which block $m$ chose as a parent block is irrelevant. Observe first that the choice of parent block by $m$ at $\tau$ does not affect which chain is the original one after $\tau$. Therefore it does not affect future actions and $m$’s expected payoff from future blocks. It does not affect either the payoff $m$ expects from previously mined blocks, since that payoff depends only on what happened before $\tau$ and on the (equilibrium) actions that will be chosen in the future.

The third case is when the next event is that $m$ solves $B_{n(\tau)+1}$ (where $n(\tau)$ is the index of the last block solved by time $\tau$). If $m$ had deviated by chaining $B_{n(\tau)+1}$ to $\tilde{B}$, since all other miners play the equilibrium strategy going forward, and $m$ himself reverts to equilibrium after solving $B_{n(\tau)+1}$ (one shot deviation), $m$ anticipates that no miner will chain to $B_{n(\tau)+1}$ (since the $B_{n(\tau)+1}$ is not in the original chain). Hence, as above, which block $m$ chose as a parent block at $\tau$ does not affect the payoff $m$ expects from previously mined blocks or from future blocks. Consequently, $m$’s payoff in any one shot deviation differs from his equilibrium payoff only in the reward he obtains for $B_{n(\tau)+1}$. He anticipates that reward to be $G(0) = 0$ for any one shot deviation.

Overall, there is no state $\omega_{\tau}$ at which a one shot deviation gives $m$ a strictly higher expected payoff than $\sigma^*_m$. Consequently, $\{\sigma^*_m\}_{m \in M}$ is a Markov perfect equilibrium.

QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Denote by \( n(\tau) \) the index of the last block solved by time \( \tau \), by \( B_{n(\tau)} \) the corresponding block and by \( \tau^f \) the first time at which the sunspot variable is above \( 1 - \varepsilon \) and \( f < n(\tau) \).

Our candidate equilibrium strategy profile, \( \sigma^* \), specifies the following:

a) Before the fork: If \( \tau < \tau^f \), miners chain their block to the most recent block in the original chain.

b) At the fork inception: If \( \tau = \tau^f \), or \( \tau > \tau^f \) and \( \omega_t \) does not include an edge \((B_{n(\tau^f)} - f, B_{k+1})\), with \( k \geq n(\tau) \), miners chain their block to \( B_{n(\tau^f)} - f \).

c) After the fork: If \( \tau > \tau^f \) and \( \omega_t \) includes an edge \((B_{n(\tau^f)} - f, B_{k+1})\), with \( k \geq n(\tau^f) \), miners chain their block to the most recently solved block in the chain including \((B_{n(\tau^f)} - f, B_{k+1})\), (with \( k^* = \min\{k \geq n(\tau^f) \text{ s.t. there exists an edge } (B_{n(\tau^f)} - f, B_{k+1})\} \)), whose index is the index of its parent plus one or, if such a block does not exist, to \( B_{k^*+1} \).

Note that if all miners follow \( \sigma^* \), their behaviour on the equilibrium path is as described in Proposition 2. To prove that this is a Markov perfect equilibrium, we need to prove that a miner does not have a profitable one shot deviation from \( \sigma^* \). We hereafter consider the three cases a), b) and c) in turn.

a) Before the fork: Bearing in mind that miner’s actions don’t affect the occurrence of the sunspot, at all times before \( \tau^f \) the proof of a) operates along the same line as the proof of Proposition 1.

b) At the fork inception: Compare \( m \)'s expected gain if he follows the equilibrium strategy (chaining his block to \( B_{n(\tau^f)} - f \)) to his expected gain from deviating once by chaining his block to \( B 
eq B_{n(\tau^f)} - f \) and then reverting to the equilibrium strategy. As earlier, the only relevant case is when the next event is that \( m \) solves \( B_{n(\tau)+1} \). If he had chained \( B_{n(\tau)+1} \) to \( B \), then he expects that at later stages no miner (including himself) will chain any block to \( B_{n(\tau)+1} \), since he anticipates the equilibrium strategy to be followed. Consequently, his reward for mining \( B_{n(\tau)+1} \) attached to \( B \) is 0 (and therefore less than his gain if he had followed the equilibrium). Moreover, as before, his expected payoff from previously solved blocks as well as from future blocks, is unaffected by which block he has just mined.
c) After the fork: The proof follows the same arguments as in cases a) and b).

QED

Proof of Proposition 3:

Preliminary steps

As mentioned in the text, we call “new chain” the chain created by the fork. Formally, for every $\tau > \tau_f$, the new chain, if it exists, is the chain containing $(B_{n(\tau_f)-f}, B_{k^*+1})$ that preexists all other chains containing $(B_{n(\tau_f)-f}, B_{k^*+1})$, where $k^* \equiv \min\{k \geq n(\tau_f), (B_{n(\tau_f)-f}, B_{k+1}) \in \omega_r\}$. We let $v^o(m, \tau)$ denote miners’ vested interest in that chain, that is, the number of blocks solved by $m$ on the new chain after $\tau_f$.

To define our equilibrium strategies, we need to introduce the following condition, which we will derive explicitly in the proof:

**Condition 2** For $\tau \geq \tau_f$, $\omega_r$ is such that for $m > K$

\[
v^o(m, \tau)(G(M - K) - G(M - K - 1)) - v^n(m, \tau)(G(K + 1) - G(K)) \geq \frac{Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)}{Pr(z_m = \tau')} (G(K) - G(M - K)), \tag{11}
\]

while for $m \leq K$

\[
v^o(m, \tau)(G(M - K + 1) - G(M - K)) - v^n(m, \tau)(G(K) - G(K - 1)) \leq \frac{Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)}{Pr(z_m = \tau')} (G(K) - G(M - K)). \tag{12}
\]

We turn now to our candidate equilibrium strategy profile, $\sigma^*$, which specifies the following:

a) Before the fork: If $\tau < \tau^f$, miners chain their block to the last block on the original chain.

b) At the fork inception: If $\tau = \tau^f$, or if $\tau > \tau^f$, Condition 2 holds and the new chain does not exist, miners $m \leq K$ chain their block to $B_{n(\tau_f)-f}$, while miners $m > K$ chain their block to the last block on the original chain.
c) After the fork: If $\tau > \tau^f$, Condition 2 holds and the new chain exists, then miners $m \leq K$ chain their block to the last block on the new chain, while miners $m > K$ chain their block to the last block on the original chain.

d) After the fork off-path: Suppose $\tau > \tau^f$ and Condition 2 does not hold. Let $\Delta \omega \equiv \omega^\tau \setminus \omega^\tau f$ (i.e., $\Delta \omega$ contains the history of the game between $\tau^f$ and $\tau$). Then for every $\tau' \geq \tau$, all miners play the strategy prescribed after history $\omega^{\tau'} \setminus \Delta \omega$ that is defined in b) and c). In playing strategies defined in b) and c), miners consider that the original and the new chain are defined with respect to history $\omega^{\tau'} \setminus \Delta \omega$.\[17\]

As will become explicit below, the specification of the equilibrium strategy in states described in d) is useful to rule out certain types of deviations.

We need to prove that a miner does not have a profitable one shot deviation from $\sigma^\ast$. We hereafter consider each of the cases above in turn.

a) Before the fork:
If miner $m$ goes for a one shot deviation from equilibrium at time $\tau < \tau^f$ it has two effects on his expected payoff. First, $m$'s deviation can affect the distribution of vested interests on the original chain at future times $\tau$ such that $r^\tau > 1 - \varepsilon$. Second, as in the proof for Proposition 2 it can impact the value of the block $m$ chooses to mine. These two effects materialise only if the next event is that $m$ solves his block.

Consider the first effect. The occurrence of a fork reduces the payoff that participants receive from the block they will mine after $\tau^f$, as well as some of the blocks they have mined before $\tau^f$, namely, the $f$ blocks between the last block solved before the sunspot, $B_n(\tau^f)$ and the first block on the original chain after the fork, $B_{n(\tau^f)} - f + 1$ (or in other words, the miners’ vested interests in the original chain). For each of these blocks, as well as for the blocks solved after $\tau^f$, the maximal loss for miner $m$ is $G(M)$. In addition $m$’s deviation has an impact on the materialisation of this loss only if the sunspot occurs before $m$’s liquidity shock when $m$ plays the equilibrium strategy. Hence, an upper bound on this loss, or equivalently, on the gain from reducing the likelihood of a fork via a deviation is

$$\Pr(\tau^f < z_m | \omega_\tau)[f + \frac{\theta_m}{\lambda_m}]G(M).$$

\[17\] In words, miners play as if the blocks solved between $\tau^f$ and $\tau$ do not exist.
Now,
\[ \Pr(\tau^f < z_m | \omega_\tau) = \int_{z_m = \tau}^{\infty} (P(\tau^f < z_m | \omega_\tau, z_m)) \lambda_m e^{-\lambda_m z_m} dz_m. \]

Observe that
\[ \Pr(\tau^f < z_m | \omega_\tau, z_m) < \Pr(\exists \tau < z_m, r^\tau > 1-\varepsilon | \omega_\tau, z_m) = 1 - \Pr(\forall \tau < z_m, r^\tau \leq 1-\varepsilon | \omega_\tau, z_m). \]

Moreover,
\[ \Pr(\forall \tau < z_m, r^\tau \leq 1-\varepsilon | \omega_\tau, z_m) = E[(1-\varepsilon)\nu(\tau, z_m) | \omega_\tau, z_m], \]
where \( \nu(\tau, z_m) \) is the number of stopping times between \( \tau \) and \( z_m \). Now, for small \( \varepsilon \), a Taylor expansion yields
\[ (1-\varepsilon)^{\nu(\tau, z_m)} \approx 1 - \nu(\tau, z_m)\varepsilon. \]
Hence, for small \( \varepsilon \),
\[ \Pr(\forall \tau < z_m, r^\tau \leq 1-\varepsilon | \omega_\tau, z_m) \approx 1 - E[\nu(\tau, z_m)]\varepsilon. \]

Hence, one can set \( \varepsilon \) so that \( \Pr(\tau^f < z_m | \omega_\tau, z_m) \), and correspondingly the gain from reducing the likelihood of a fork via a deviation, is arbitrarily close to 0.

Next consider the second effect. If miner \( m \) solves \( B_{n(\tau)+1} \) but this block is not on the original chain, no further block will be chained to it, since all miners henceforth will follow \( \sigma^* \). Hence the expected payoff for this block is 0. If instead \( m \) was following the equilibrium strategy when he solved \( B_{n(\tau)+1} \), the expected payoff from this block is strictly positive.

Overall, the first effect, which reflects the maximum gain from a one shot deviation can be set arbitrarily close to 0, while the second effect, which reflects the cost of a one shot deviation, is bounded away from 0. Hence, there is no profitable one shot deviation.

b) c) At or after the fork:

1) Consider first a deviation by a miner \( m > K \).

Any deviation other than chaining to the last block on the new chain is ruled out by similar arguments as in Proposition \[1\]. Hence we just have to check that \( m \) prefers to chain his block to the last block on the original chain, rather than to the last block on the new chain. As in the previous proofs, this one shot deviation affects \( m \)'s payoff only if the next stopping time \( \tau' \), corresponding to two possible events: either \( m \) solves his block, or \( z_m \) occurs.
(i) Suppose miner $m$ solves a block at $\tau'$, i.e., $N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1$. If Condition 2 is still true at $\tau'$, since every miner, including $m$, reverts to the equilibrium strategy from $\tau'$ on, the only impact of the deviation is that $m$ earns $G(K)$ for block $B_{n(\tau')}$ instead of $G(M - K)$ under the equilibrium strategy. If Condition 2 is not true at $\tau'$, the only impact of the deviation is that $m$ earns 0 for block $B_{n(\tau')}$ instead of $G(M - K)$ under the equilibrium strategy. Indeed both under the equilibrium strategy and the deviation, his expected payoff at $\tau'$ is his expected payoff at $\tau$ plus the reward he receives for block $B_{n(\tau')}$, which is 0 under the deviation when Condition 2 does not hold since from d) no miner will ever chain a block to $B_{n(\tau')}$. 

(ii) Suppose miner $m$ is hit by a liquidity shock at $\tau'$, i.e., $z_m = \tau'$. Then his payoff under the deviation is

$$v^o(m, \tau)G(M - K - 1) + v^n(m, \tau)G(K + 1) + N_m(\tau(B_{n(\tau')-f}))G(M)$$

instead of

$$v^o(m, \tau)G(M - K) + v^n(m, \tau)G(K) + N_m(\tau(B_{n(\tau')-f}))G(M)$$

under the equilibrium strategy. It follows that there is no profitable deviation if

$$\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)(G(K) - G(M - K)) \leq \Pr(z_m = \tau')(v^o(m, \tau)(G(M - K) - G(M - K - 1)) - v^n(m, \tau)(G(K + 1) - G(K))),$$

which is exactly inequality (11) in Condition 2.

2) Consider next a deviation by a miner $m \leq K$. A symmetric reasoning yields that there is no profitable deviation if

$$\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1)(G(K) - G(M - K)) \geq \Pr(z_m = \tau')(v^o(m, \tau)(G(M - K + 1) - G(M - K)) - v^n(m, \tau)(G(K) - G(K - 1))),$$

which is exactly (12) in Condition 2.

\footnote{Note that we used the assumption that $\forall K, G(M) = G(M - K) + G(K)$ to write down miner $m$’s payoff from blocks solved before $\tau(B_{n(\tau')-f})$.}
Next, see that at $\tau = \tau_f$, $v^n(m, \tau_f) = 0$ for all miners. Inequality (11) is then written:

$$\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau_f) = 1) \frac{(G(K) - G(M-K))}{\Pr(z_m = \tau')} < v^o(m, \tau_f)(G(M-K) - G(M-K-1)),$$

which is exactly inequality (2) in Condition 1. Similarly, inequality (12) is then written:

$$\Pr(N_m(\tau') - N_m(\tau) = 1) \frac{(G(K) - G(M-K))}{\Pr(z_m = \tau')} > v^o(m, \tau)(G(M-K+1) - G(M-K))$$

which is exactly inequality (3) in Condition 1.

Furthermore, if miners adhere to the equilibrium strategy, then miners $m \leq K$ always mine the new chain so that inequality (3) in Condition 1 implies that inequality (12) in Condition 2 is true at any $\tau \geq \tau_f$. Symmetrically, given that miners $m > K$ stick to the original chain, Condition 2 is always verified after $\tau_f$. Hence, given that Condition 1 holds at $\tau_f$, then for $\tau > \tau_f$, Condition 2 holds on the equilibrium path.

Last, see that inequality (1) in Condition 1 guarantees that (2) and (3) cannot be satisfied jointly for the same miner $m$.

d) After the fork off-path

Suppose $\omega_f$ is as described in d). Then given that all other players play the equilibrium, $m$’s payoff from adhering to the equilibrium strategy is as in b) and c) above. Following the same logic as in the proof of b) and c), other deviations can be ruled out. QED

**Proof of Proposition 4:** Statement of equilibrium strategies:

A) If a miner solved a block outside the original chain thereby creating a one-block-long fork as long as the original chain, that miner chains his next block to the block he just solved.

B) Otherwise, each miner chains his current block to the last block solved on the original chain, except if there is a fork starting with two blocks consecutively solved by the same miner, longer than the original chain. In that case, each miner chains his block to the longest chain, which miners consider to be the original chain from that point on.\(^{37}\)

\(^{37}\)This is to define equilibrium strategies if a second fork occurs off the equilibrium path.
Equilibrium strategies imply that there can be a transient fork created by one miner who did not observe in time the actual state of the original chain. If another miner is hit by a liquidity shock precisely when the fork is being formed, the blocks previously solved by that other miner, which with certainty will not become orphaned, are worth at the time of the fork $G(M - 1) + G(1)$. The same blocks will be worth $G(M)$ just after the fork is resolved. To simplify the analysis, we assume that these blocks have the same value at and after the fork, that is, $G(M - 1) + G(1) = G(M)$. We specify below when this assumption is used.

Proof of A): Denote by $B_n$ the last block solved on the original chain. Consider the strategy of miner $m$ who has just created a one-block-long fork as long as the original chain, i.e. who has just solved $B_{k+1}$, with $k \geq n$ chained to the parent of $B_n$, denoted $p(B_n)$\footnote{Since the equilibrium strategies are defined for all states, including those which are not on the equilibrium path, we cannot exclude that out of equilibrium, some blocks are solved outside the original chain before or after $B_n$ is solved: $p(B_n)$ is not necessarily $B_{n-1}$, and $B_{k+1}$ is not necessarily $B_{n+1}$.}

Following the same reasoning as above, the relevant choice for $m$ is between chaining his next block to $B_{k+1}$ (which is the equilibrium strategy) and chaining it to $B_n$ (which is the only relevant deviation). After the miner made this choice, three events can take place, whose probabilities are independent of the miners’ actions:

- The first case is when the next event is $z_m$: In that case, if $m$ deviated and chained his block to $B_n$ his payoff is

$$G(0) + N^o_m(\tau_{B_n})G(M),$$

where $G(0)$ is his reward for block $B_{k+1}$ (since no miner, even himself is chaining to that block), while $N^o_m(\tau_{B_n})$ is the number of blocks he solved up to $\tau_{B_n}$ on the original chain, and $G(M)$ is the reward for each of these blocks, reflecting that the other miners are following the equilibrium strategy. If, instead, $m$ followed the equilibrium strategy and chained his block to $B_{k+1}$ his payoff is

$$G(1) + N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})[G(M - 1) + G(1)] + (N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) - N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)}))G(M - 1),$$

where $G(1)$ is his reward for block $B_{k+1}$ (because he is the only one who chains to $B_{k+1}$), while $N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})[G(M - 1) + G(1)]$ is his reward
for the blocks he solved up to $\tau_{p(B_n)}$ on the original chain (because the value of these blocks reflects that there is a fork with one miner chaining to $B_{k+1}$ and $M - 1$ miners chaining to $B_n$), and the last term is the reward for $B_n$. Since by assumption $G(M - 1) + G(1) = G(M)$ and $G(1) = 0$, the deviation is not strictly profitable.

- The second case is when the next event is that a block is solved by another miner than $m$. Then, again, which block $m$ chose as a parent block is irrelevant.

- The third case is when the next event is that $m$ solves $B_{k+2}$.

a) In that case, if $m$ had chained his block to $B_n$, all miners chain their blocks to the original chain, which includes $B_n$ and $B_{k+2}$, so that $B_{k+1}$ becomes orphaned. From that point on, $m$’s expected gain is

$$N_m^o(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt|z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}] - L(\tau_{B_{k+2}}),$$

where the first term is the reward for the blocks he solved up to $\tau_{B_n}$ on the original chain, the second term is the reward for $B_{k+2}$, and the last terms reflect the continuation value of the miner. The conditional expectation is his expected reward for the blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ if no block becomes orphaned. $L(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$ is the expected loss due to one of the blocks solved by $m$ after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ becoming orphaned. On the equilibrium path, orphaned blocks occur iff a miner observes a block with delay and creates a successful fork.

b) If instead $m$ had chained his block to $B_{k+1}$, the chain including $B_{k+1}$ and $B_{k+2}$ becomes the longest one, and all miners hereafter chain their blocks to it. Thus $m$’s expected gain is

$$N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})G(M) + 2G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt|z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}] - L(\tau_{B_{k+2}}),$$

where the second term is the reward for $B_{k+1}$ and $B_{k+2}$.

Note that $N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}) \leq 1$, and that the continuation payoff of $m$ after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ is the same whether $m$ chose the equilibrium strategy or deviated. Therefore, $m$ prefers to chain his block to $B_{k+1}$.

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21 As before, if $z_m$ occurs when a fork starts, these previously solved blocks are worth $G(M - 1) + G(1)$ which is equal to $G(M)$ by assumption in that case.
Proof of B):

Denote by $B_k$ the last block solved and by $B_n$ with $n \leq k$ the last block solved on the original chain.

1) First consider the case in which there is no fork of two consecutive blocks solved by the same miner and longer than the original chain. For any miner $m$ (who has not started a fork), the only two relevant choices are i) to follow the equilibrium strategy, i.e. to chain his block to $B_n$, and ii) to try to create a fork by solving two blocks in a row (the other deviations are ruled out by the same reasoning as in Proposition [1]). As above there are three possible cases: i) The next event is that $m$ is hit by a liquidity shock. ii) The next event is that another miner solves his block. iii) The next event is that $m$ solves his block. As above, in case ii) $m$’s strategy does not affect his payoff. In case i), if $m$ followed the equilibrium strategy, his payoff is $N^o_m(z_m)G(M)$ (if there is no fork), or $N^o_m(z_m)(G(M - 1) + G(1)) = N^o_m(z_m)G(M)$ (if a fork has started). If $m$ deviated, his payoff is at most equal to $N^o_m(z_m)G(M)$: precisely, if there is no fork, $m$’s payoff is smaller than or equal to $N^o_m(z_m)G(M)$ (depending on which assumption is made from Footnote 11). If there is already a fork, $m$’s payoff is at most $N^o_m(z_m)(G(M - 2) + G(2))$, which is lower than $N^o_m(z_m)G(M)$.

In case iii) (in which $m$ solves $B_{k+1}$), there are two possible continuations: Either another miner does not observe that $m$ solved $B_{k+1}$ or all miners observe that $m$ solved $B_{k+1}$. The probabilities of these two events are independent of $m$’s action. We consider the two cases in turn.

a) If all miners observe that $m$ solved $B_{k+1}$, $m$’s expected gain if he followed the equilibrium strategy, i.e., chained $B_{k+1}$ to $B_n$, is:

$$ (N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) + 1)G(M) + E\left[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+1}}}^{\tau_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}\right] - L(\tau_{B_{k+1}}). $$

The first term is the reward for blocks solved up to $\tau_{B_n}$ plus the reward for mining $B_{k+1}$ when the latter remains on the original chain. The conditional expectation is $m$’s expected reward for solving blocks after $\tau_{B_{k+1}}$. The last term $(L(\tau_{B_{k+1}}))$ is the expected loss due to one of $m$’s blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+1}}$ becoming orphaned (which on the equilibrium path happens iff a miner observed a block with delay and created a successful fork). $m$’s expected gain
if he deviated and started a fork by chaining $B_{k+1}$ to $p(B_n)$ is

$$
(N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}) + (N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})) \Pr(B_n = p(B_{k+2})) + \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2})) \right) G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+1}}}^{\tau_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt|z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}] - L(\tau_{B_{k+1}}).
$$

The first term reflects that $m$ earns

- a reward $G(M)$ on all blocks solved on the original chain up to $\tau_{p(B_n)}$,
- a reward for $B_n$ if he solved that block and it remains on the active chain (that is, $B_{k+2}$ is attached to $B_n$),
- and a reward for $B_{k+1}$ if it is included in the active chain. The latter can happen only if $m$ solves $B_{k+2}$.

The second term is the continuation payoff for all blocks solved after $B_{k+1}$ if they are not orphaned afterwards. That term does not depend on which block $m$ chains $B_{k+1}$ to. The third term is the expected loss due to one of $m$’s blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+1}}$ becoming orphaned. This expected loss does not depend on which block $m$ chained $B_{k+1}$ to. See that

$$
N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) \geq N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}) + (N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})) \Pr(B_n = p(B_{k+2})).
$$

Hence, if all miners observe that $m$ solved $B_{k+1}$, $m$’s expected payoff is larger if he followed the equilibrium strategy than if he deviated.

b) If one miner ($m'$) did not observe that $m$ solved $B_{k+1}$, $m$’s expected gain if he followed the equilibrium strategy is:

$$
(N_m^o(\tau_{B_n})+1-\Pr(m' = m(B_{k+2}) = m(B_{k+3}))) G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+1}}}^{\tau_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt|z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}].
$$

The first term is $m$’s expected reward for solving blocks up to $B_{k+1}$, reflecting the risk that $B_{k+1}$ become orphaned if $m'$ solves $B_{k+2}$ and $B_{k+3}$. The second

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22 Clearly, this is the only relevant deviation since $m$ cannot obtain more if he chained $B_{k+1}$ to $B_k$ if $B_k$ started a fork: $B_{k+1}$ will never be on the active chain given the equilibrium strategies, even if $m$ solves $B_{k+2}$. A fortiori, $m$ cannot obtain more if he decides to chain $B_{k+1}$ to any block $B_i$ with $i < k$ outside the original chain.

23 A fork can happen if one miner does not observe $B_{k+2}$, but even in that case $B_{k+1}$, as well as all previously solved blocks, will be on the active chain and yield $G(M)$ or $G(M+1) + G(1) = G(M)$ depending on when $z_m$ occurs.
term is \( m \)'s continuation payoff, reflecting that \( m \) will be mining on the single active chain (be it the original one or a fork that becomes the consensus). If \( m \) deviated by chaining \( B_{k+1} \) to \( p(B_n) \) to earn his reward on \( B_{k+1} \), \( m \) needs to solve \( B_{k+2} \) so his expected gain is

\[
(N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}) + (N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})) \Pr(B_n = p(B_{k+2})) + \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2}))) G(M) \\
+ \mathbb{E}[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+1}}}^{\tau_m} dN_m(t) G(M) dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}].
\]

As above

\[
N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) \geq N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}) + (N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})) \Pr(B_n = p(B_{k+2})).
\]

Consequently, there is no profitable deviation if

\[
1 - \Pr(m' = m(B_{k+2}) = m(B_{k+3})) \geq \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2})).
\]

That is

\[
1 \geq \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2})) + \Pr(m' = m(B_{k+2}) = m(B_{k+3}),
\]

which holds because

\[
1 \geq \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2})) + \Pr(m' = m(B_{k+2}) \geq \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2})) + \Pr(m' = m(B_{k+2}) = m(B_{k+3})).
\]

This completes the first part of the proof of the optimality of the strategy stated in B).

2) Second, consider the case in which there is a fork starting with two blocks consecutively solved by the same miner and longer than the original chain. We now prove that, in that case, each miner finds it optimal to chain his block to the longest chain.

If that fork occurred because one miner observed a block with delay, we are in the same situation as in Proposition 1 and there is no profitable deviation from mining the longest chain.

Off the equilibrium path, however, that fork could have occurred for other reasons, and a new fork could still occur because of a delay in the future. In that case there is no profitable deviation (in particular, trying to create a fork by solving two blocks in a row is dominated by the equilibrium strategy), as shown in the first part of B).

QED

\[24\text{As above, this is the only relevant deviation.}\]
Proof of Proposition 5: Statement of equilibrium strategies:

A) If a miner solved a block outside the original chain thereby creating a one-block-long fork as long as the original chain, all miners chain their next block to the fork, which miners consider to be the original chain from that point on.

B) Otherwise, each miner chains his current block to the last block solved on the original chain.

Proof of A): Denote by $B_n$ the last block solved on the original chain, and suppose that block $B_{k+1}$ with $k \geq n$, is chained to $p(B_n)$. Consider the strategy of any miner $m$. Following the same reasoning as above, the relevant choice for $m$ is between chaining his next block to $B_{k+1}$ (which is the equilibrium strategy) and chaining it to $B_n$ (which is the only relevant deviation). After the miner made this choice, three events can take place, whose probabilities are independent of the miners’ actions:

- The first case is when the next event is $z_m$: In that case, if $m$ deviated and chained his block to $B_n$ his payoff is
  \[ \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_{k+1})\}} G(M-1) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_n)\}} G(1) + N_m^0(\tau_{p(B_n)}) G(M), \]
  where $G(M-1)$ is his reward if he solved block $B_{k+1}$, and $G(1)$ his reward if he solved $B_n$. If, instead, $m$ followed the equilibrium strategy and chained his block to $B_{k+1}$ his payoff is
  \[ \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_{k+1})\}} G(M) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_n)\}} G(0) + N_m^0(\tau_{p(B_n)}) G(M). \]
  Since by assumption $G(M-1) \leq G(M)$ and $G(1) = G(0)$, the deviation is not strictly profitable.

- The second case is when the next event is that a block is solved by another miner than $m$. Then, again, which block $m$ chose as a parent block is irrelevant.

- The third case is when the next event is that $m$ solves $B_{k+2}$.

  a) In that case, if $m$ had chained his block to $B_n$, given equilibrium strategies, $B_{k+2}$ becomes orphaned. From that point on, $m$’s expected gain is
  \[ N_m^0(\tau_{p(B_n)}) G(M) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_{k+1})\}} G(M) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_n)\}} G(0) + G(0) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_{k+1})\}} G(M) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_n)\}} G(0) + G(0) \]
  \[ + E \left[ \int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{\tau_{B_{k+2}}} dN_m(t) G(M) dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}} \right] - L(\tau_{B_{k+2}}), \]
since blocks $B_n$ and $B_{k+2}$ are orphaned and earn $G(0)$. As before, $L(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$ is the expected loss due to one of the blocks solved by $m$ after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ becoming orphaned.

b) If instead $m$ had chained his block to $B_{k+1}$, $m$’s expected gain is

$$N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})G(M) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_{k+1})\}}G(M) + \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_n)\}}G(0) + G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{\tau_{B_{k+1}}} dN_m(t)G(M)dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}] - L(\tau_{B_{k+2}}),$$

since now $m$ earns $G(M)$ for solving $B_{k+2}$.

Clearly, any miner $m$ prefers to chain his block to $B_{k+1}$.

Proof of B): Denote by $B_n$ the last block solved on the original chain, and $B_k$, $k \geq n$, the last block solved. Assume that there is no one-block-long fork of the same length as the original chain. The only relevant deviation to consider is for miner $m$ to try and start a one-block-long fork by chaining his current block to $p(B_n)$. Again if $z_m$ occurs, or if another miner solves the next block, $m$’s payoff is not affected by which block he currently mines. The only case to consider is if $m$ solves the next block, $B_{k+1}$. If $m$ chained $B_{k+1}$ to $p(B_n)$, his payoff is:

$$N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})G(M) + G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{\tau_{B_{k+1}}} dN_m(t)G(M)dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}] - L(\tau_{B_{k+1}}),$$

since all miners chain their future blocks to the chain that contains $B_{k+1}$: therefore $m$ earns $G(M)$ for $B_{k+1}$. Clearly, if $m$ chained $B_{k+1}$ to $B_n$, he obtains the same payoff, since he earns $G(M)$ for $B_{k+1}$ as well. Therefore there is no profitable deviation.

QED

Proof of Proposition 6: Statement of equilibrium strategies:

A) If a miner has the opportunity to double spend, he mines a block chained to the parent of the last block solved on the original chain.

B) If a miner solves a block that creates a one-block-long fork as long as the original chain, that miner chains his next block to the block he just solved, except if he spots an opportunity to double-spend, in which case he plays according to A).
C) Otherwise, each miner chains his current block to the last block solved on the original chain, except if there is a fork starting with two blocks consecutively solved by the same miner, longer than the original chain. In that case, each miner chains his block to the longest chain, which miners consider to be the original chain from that point on.

As before, if a miner is hit by a liquidity shock precisely when the fork is being formed, his previously mined blocks are worth as much as after the fork is resolved: \( G(M - 1) + G(1) = G(M) \). We also clarify that the miner who earns the reward \( S \) is the one who completes a double-spending fork before being hit by his liquidity shock \( z_m \). In particular, a miner who initiates a double-spending fork but is hit by a liquidity shock before the fork is resolved does not earn \( S \). By contrast, a miner who successfully completes a double-spending fork initiated by the miner he replaced does earn \( S \).

Proof of A):

Denote by \( B_n \) the last block solved on the original chain, and by \( B_k \) with \( k \geq n \) the last block solved. Consider the strategy of miner \( m \) who spots the opportunity to double spend.

Following the same reasoning as above, the relevant choice for \( m \) is between chaining his next block to \( p(B_n) \) (the equilibrium strategy) and chaining it to \( B_n \) (the only relevant deviation). After the miner made this choice, three events can take place, whose probabilities are independent of the miners’ actions:

- The first case is when the next event is \( z_m \): In that case, if \( m \) deviated and chained his block to \( B_n \) his payoff is \( N^o_m(\tau_{B_n})G(M) \). If, instead, \( m \) followed the equilibrium strategy and chained his block to \( p(B_n) \) his payoff is

\[
N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})[G(M - 1) + G(1)] + (N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) - N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)}))G(M - 1),
\]

where \( N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})[G(M - 1) + G(1)] \) is his reward for the blocks he solved up to \( \tau_{p(B_n)} \) on the original chain, and the last term is the reward for \( B_n \). Since by assumption \( G(M - 1) + G(1) = G(M) \) and \( G(1) = 0 \), the deviation is not strictly profitable.

- The second case is when the next event is that a block is solved by another miner than \( m \). Then, again, which block \( m \) chose as a parent block is irrelevant.

- The third case is when the next event is that \( m \) solves \( B_{k+1} \).

To analyse this case, it is useful to condition the payoffs on event \( F = (z_m > \tau_{B_{k+2}}) \cap (m = m(B_{k+2})) \), which probability is independent from \( m \)'s
strategy. If $m$ follows the equilibrium strategy, then $m$ earns $S$ if and only if $F$ is true, that is, if $m$ solves $B_{k+2}$ before being hit by a liquidity shock.

1. Suppose $F$ is true.

If $m$ deviated by chaining his block to $B_n$, his payoff is

$$N^o_m(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + 2G(M) + E \left[ \int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M) dt \mid z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}} \right].$$

$m$ earns $G(M)$ for all the blocks solved on the original chain up to $\tau_{B_n}$, $m$ earns $G(M)$ for solving $B_{k+1}$ and $B_{k+2}$ which belong to the original chain, and for all the future blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$, since $m$ knows that on the equilibrium path, no other double spending opportunity will be spotted.

If $m$ played the equilibrium strategy by chaining $B_{k+1}$ to $p(B_n)$, his payoff is

$$N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})G(M) + 2G(M) + E \left[ \int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M) dt \mid z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}} \right] + S.$$

$m$ earns $G(M)$ for all the blocks he solved before the fork (up to $p(B_n)$), $G(M)$ for $B_{k+1}$ and for $B_{k+2}$, and for all the future blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$, since on the equilibrium path all miners chain their new blocks to $B_{k+2}$. In addition, $m$ earns $S$ from double-spending.

Hence, the net benefit of following the equilibrium strategy rather than deviating is $S - \mathbb{1}_{\{m=m(B_n)\}}G(M)$.

2. Suppose $F$ is not true: either $z_m$ occurs before $\tau(B_{k+2})$ or $z_m$ occurs after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ but $m$ does not solve $B_{k+2}$. To write $m$’s payoff, we will distinguish the two events when needed.

If $m$ deviated by chaining his block to $B_n$, his payoff is

$$N^o_m(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + G(M) + \Pr(z_m > \tau_{B_{k+2}})E \left[ \int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M) dt \mid z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}} \right].$$

$m$ earns $G(M)$ for all the blocks solved up to $\tau_{B_n}$, for $B_{k+1}$ (since $B_{k+1}$ is on the original chain), and for blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ if $z_m > \tau_{B_{k+2}}$. 

(13)
(Note that if $F$ is not true, $m$ never solves $B_{k+2}$ before the next liquidity shock $z_m$.)

If $m$ played the equilibrium strategy by chaining $B_{k+1}$ to $p(B_n)$, his payoff is

- if $z_m$ occurs first:

$$N_{m}^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}))(G(M - 1) + G(1) + \mathbb{1}(m=m(B_n))G(M - 1) + G(1).$$

In that case, $m$ has created a one-block-long fork as long as the original chain when he is hit by his liquidity shock. Therefore, he earns $G(M - 1) + G(1)$ for all the blocks he solved on the original chain up to $\tau(p(B_n))$. He also earns $G(M)$ for $B_n$ if he solved it and $G(1)$ for $B_{k+1}$.

- if $B_{k+2}$ is solved by another miner before $z_m$:

$$N_{m}^o(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + G(0) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt|z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}].$$

In that case, $m$’s fork fails. Therefore, he earns $G(M)$ for all the blocks he solved on the original chain up to $\tau(B_n)$ and for the blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$.

To streamline the exposition, we assume that $G(M - 1) = G(M)$\footnote{Allowing for $G(M - 1) < G(M)$ only makes the condition under which the equilibrium exists more intricate.} As a result, gains earned by $m$ on all blocks solved up to $\tau(B_n)$ are the same in the two events above. Hence $m$’s payoff if he played the equilibrium strategy when $F$ is not true is:

$$N_{m}^o(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + \Pr(z_m > \tau_{B_{k+2}})E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt|z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}].$$

(14)

Hence, the net benefit of following the equilibrium strategy rather than deviating when $F$ is not true is the difference between (14) and (13), that is, $-G(M)$.
Overall, $m$ always follows the equilibrium strategy (including when he solved $B_n$) iff

$$p(F)[S - G(M)] - (1 - p(F))G(M) > 0 \iff S > \frac{G(M)}{p(F)}$$

Proof of B):

Suppose miner $m$ built a fork $(p(B_n), B_{k+1})$ as long as the original chain, where $B_n$ is the last block on the original chain, and $B_{k+1}$ is the last block solved. Suppose also that $m$ has not spotted a double spending opportunity after $B_{k+1}$ was solved. The reasoning is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4 part A, hence we only sketch it here.

As earlier, the relevant choice for $m$ is between chaining his next block to $B_{k+1}$ (the equilibrium strategy) and chaining it to $B_n$ (the only relevant deviation).

- Suppose the next event is $z_m$.

If $m$ deviated and chained his block to $B_n$, the original chain remains the only active chain and $m$’s payoff is

$$G(0) + N_m^o(\tau_{B_n})G(M),$$

where the first term is the reward for $B_{k+1}$.

If, instead, $m$ followed the equilibrium strategy and chained his block to $B_{k+1}$ his payoff is

$$G(1) + N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)})[G(M - 1) + G(1)] + (N_m^o(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^o(\tau_{p(B_n)}))G(M - 1),$$

where the first term is again, the reward for $B_{k+1}$. The assumptions $G(M - 1) + G(1) = G(M)$ and $G(1) = 0$ imply this deviation is not strictly profitable.

- Suppose the next event is that a block is solved by another miner than $m$. Then which block $m$ chose as a parent block is irrelevant.

- Suppose the next event is that $m$ solves $B_{k+2}$.

If $m$ chains his block to $B_n$, the original chain remains the only active chain and $B_{k+1}$ becomes orphaned. Therefore, $m$’s expected payoff is

$$N_m^o(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}] + S(\tau_{B_{k+2}}) - L(\tau_{B_{k+2}}),$$
where the second term is the reward for $B_{k+2}$. As earlier, $L(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$, is the expected loss due to one of $m$’s blocks solved after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$ becoming orphaned. $S(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$ is the expected benefit from $m$ spotting a double-spending opportunity after $\tau_{B_{k+2}}$. Note that both $L(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$ and $S(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$ are conditional on $m$’s information at $\tau_{B_{k+1}}$. For instance, if $m$ already had a double-spending opportunity, then $L(\tau_{B_{k+2}}) = S(\tau_{B_{k+2}}) = 0$.

If instead $m$ had chained his block to $B_{k+1}$, the chain including $B_{k+1}$ and $B_{k+2}$ becomes the longest one, and all miners hereafter chain their blocks to it. Thus $m$ expected payoff is at least equal to

$$N_m^0(\tau_{B_n})G(M) + E\left[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+2}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt\mid z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+2}}\right] + S(\tau_{B_{k+2}}) - L(\tau_{B_{k+2}})$$

where the second term is the reward for $B_{k+1}$ and $B_{k+2}$. This payoff is higher by $S$ if $m$ has the double-spending opportunity (the only case on the equilibrium path).

Since $N_m^0(\tau_{B_n}) - N_m^0(\tau_{p(B_n)}) \leq 1$, $m$ prefers following the equilibrium strategy.

Proof of C):

The reasoning is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4, part B, we only sketch it here. Denote by $B_k$ the last block solved and by $B_n$ with $n \leq k$ the last block solved on the original chain.

1) First consider the case in which there is no fork of two consecutive blocks solved by the same miner and longer than the original chain. For any miner $m$ who does not have the double-spending opportunity, the only two relevant choices are i) to follow the equilibrium strategy by chaining his block to $B_n$, and ii) to try to create a fork by solving two blocks in a row:

- Suppose the next event is that $m$ is hit by a liquidity shock. If $m$ followed the equilibrium strategy, his payoff is $N_m^0(z_m)G(M)$ (if there is no fork), or $N_m^0(z_m)(G(M-1)+G(1)) = N_m^0(z_m)G(M)$ (if a fork has started). If $m$ deviated, his payoff is at most equal to $N_m^0(z_m)G(M)$.

- Suppose the next event is that another miner solves a block. Then which block $m$ was mining is irrelevant.
• Suppose the next event is that $m$ solves $B_{k+1}$

If $m$ followed the equilibrium strategy, i.e., chained $B_{k+1}$ to $B_n$, his expected payoff is

$$
(N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) + 1)G(M) + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+1}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}] + S(\tau_{B_{k+1}}) - L(\tau_{B_{k+1}}),
$$

$m$’s expected gain if he deviated and started a fork by chaining $B_{k+1}$ to $p(B_n)$ is

$$
(N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)}) + (N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) - N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})) \Pr(B_n = p(B_{k+2})) + \Pr(m = m(B_{k+2})))G(M)
\quad + E[\int_{\tau_{B_{k+1}}}^{z_m} dN_m(t)G(M)dt | z_m \geq \tau_{B_{k+1}}] + S(\tau_{B_{k+1}}) - L(\tau_{B_{k+1}}).
$$

Since

$$
N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) \geq N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)}) + (N^o_m(\tau_{B_n}) - N^o_m(\tau_{p(B_n)})) \Pr(B_n = p(B_{k+2})),
$$

$m$’s expected payoff is larger if he followed the equilibrium strategy than if he deviated.

2) Consider the case in which there is a fork starting with two blocks consecutively solved by the same miner and longer than the original chain. If that fork occurred because one miner exploited a double-spending opportunity, we are in the same situation as in Proposition [1] and there is no profitable deviation from mining the longest chain.

If that fork occurred for other reasons (off the equilibrium path), a new fork could still occur because of a delay in the future. In that case there is no profitable deviation (in particular, trying to create a fork by solving two blocks in a row is dominated by the equilibrium strategy), as shown in C).

QED

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References


