#### ECO 403 – L0301 Developmental Macroeconomics

# Lecture 7 Inflation, Interest Rate, and Currency Appreciation

#### Is Inflation Always "Bad"?

- What are the main *costs* of inflation? Who bears these costs?
  - > It erodes the *value* of money
  - > By creating greater *uncertainty*, it reduces investment
- The costs of *hyperinflation* are undisputable
  - For example, Germany (early 1920s), Hungary (1945), Argentina (late 1980s), Zimbabwe (2008)
- Mainstream economists have exploited people's fear of high inflation to push for excessive *anti-inflationary policies*
  - > Only zero inflation is both *low* and *stable*
- Some studies suggest that inflation rates up to 10 percent do not affect economic growth, while others suggest rates of up to 20 percent

#### What Is the Cause of Inflation?

- Orthodox economists believe that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (Friedman)
  - > Too much *money* chasing too few goods
  - Inflation is the result of excessive *demand* due to too much money in the economy
  - The solution then is to implement *contractionary* monetary policy
- Post-Keynesian economists believe that inflation is the result of cost considerations
  - It is thus *supply*-determined rather than *demand*-determined
  - Therefore, contractionary monetary policy will not necessarily have the desired effects

#### **Post-Keynesian View of Inflation**

- According to this view, *demand* plays a relatively small role in the determination of prices
- They distinguish between two main types of goods:
  - Flex-price goods (e.g., commodities) whose prices are determined by the market
  - Fixed-price goods (e.g., manufactured goods) whose prices are set by firms as a markup over production costs
- If *wages* increase, for instance, the firm can:
  - Leave the markup unchanged and pass the increase to consumers -> Cost-push inflation
  - Reduce the *markup* and absorb the higher cost (resulting in lower *profit* margins)

#### Some Comments on the Theory of Inflation (Bresser-Pereira et al)

- Theories of inflation distinguish among those factors that accelerate inflation, those that sustain inflation, and those that sanction inflation
- Factors that *accelerate* inflation include:
  - Excess demand
  - > *Monopolistic* increases in prices
  - > Wage increases above productivity
  - Changes in *relevant prices* (e.g., energy, exchange rate)
- Factors that sustain inflation include formal or informal indexation of the economy that results in inertial inflation
- Factors that sanction inflation include most particularly increases in the supply of money

# Exchange Rate, Inflation and Real Wages

- Increases in nominal *wages* above *productivity* are the main cause of *acceleration* of inflation
  - Increases in unit labour costs reduce *profit* margins and firms react by increasing their *prices*
- If nominal wages (w) and prices (p) increase in the same proportion while productivity remains constant:

Then real wages (w/p) remain constant

If *domestic* prices (*p*) and the *nominal* exchange rate (*e*) increase in the same proportion while *foreign* prices (*p*\*) remains constant:

> Then the *real* exchange rate  $(ep^*/p)$  remains constant

# Exchange Rates, Inflation and Real Wages (cont'd)

- A decrease in the *real* exchange rate (i.e., a real *appreciation* of the *currency*) implies:
  - A decrease in domestic *prices* of *tradable* goods
  - > An increase in real *wages*
  - Lower *inflation*
- This explains why currency *appreciation* is so attractive to policymakers:
  - It performs the *"miracle"* of simultaneously increasing wages and lowering *inflation*
- But lower *prices* of *tradable* goods implies lower *expected profit rates* and a decrease in *investment* in this sector

## The Link Between the Exchange Rate and Real Wages

- Consider a small open economy producing just one good using *labour* and *imported* inputs
  - This good is both a consumption and an investment good
  - $\succ$  Firms set prices (**p**) as a constant markup (**z**) over unit costs

• 
$$p = (1 + z)(wa_1 + ep^*a_0)$$

(where w = nominal wage, e = nominal exchange rate,  $p^*$  = price of imported input in foreign currency,  $a_0$  = imported input share in production, and  $a_1$  = labour share in production)

Labour *productivity* is assumed to be constant, and the good produced is also assumed to be an *imperfect substitute* for similar final goods produced abroad

(9.1)

#### The Link Between the Exchange Rate and Real Wages (cont'd)

- Let's call V = w/p the real wage and  $\theta = ep^*/p$  the real exchange rate
- A currency *devaluation* (i.e., Δ*e* > 0 and thus Δ*θ* > 0) increases the *competitiveness* of domestic firms relative to foreign firms producing similar final goods abroad
  - > Therefore, domestic firms can increase their *markups*
- The *markup* can thus be expressed as a function of  $\theta$  $z = z_0 + z_1 \theta$  (9.2)
- Since  $p = (1 + z)(wa_1 + ep^*a_0)$ , as  $\theta$  rises p increases even when z remains constant
  - $\succ$  If z rises, then p increases even more

#### The Link Between the Exchange Rate and Real Wages (cont'd)

- Let's divide equation (9.1) by p to obtain:
  - $1 = (1 + z)(Va_1 + \theta a_0)$ (9.3)
- And replacing equation (9.2) in equation (9.3) we obtain:  $1 = (1 + z_0 + z_1\theta)(Va_1 + \theta a_0)$
- And solving for V we get:  $V = \left[ (1 - a_0(1 + z_0)\theta - z_1a_0\theta^2) / [a_1(1 + z_0) + z_1a_1\theta] \right]$

• And differentiating V with respect to  $\theta$  we get:  $\frac{\partial V}{\partial \theta} = -\frac{\left[(a_0(1+z_0)+z_1(a_1V+2a_0\theta)\right]}{[a_1(1+z_0)+z_1a_1\theta]} < 0$ 

- Assume workers have a *real wage* target (*V*) that defines a value of *θ* compatible with a stable *inflation* rate
   ➢ Let's call *θ<sup>eq inf</sup>* to this real exchange rate
- Suppose  $\theta^{eq \ inf}$  is the current *real* exchange rate but it's lower than the *industrial* equilibrium real exchange rate ( $\theta_{ei}$ )
- If the government *revalues* θ (i.e., *devalues* the *currency* in real terms) to align it with θ<sub>ei</sub> then:
  - V will drop and workers will now demand higher w
  - $\succ$  Firms will transfer this higher cost to p and *inflation* will rise
  - Unions will demand further wage increases and a wageprice spiral will ensue leading to hyperinflation

The rate of change in *nominal* wages ( $\widehat{w}_t$ ) is determined by:  $\widehat{w}_t = \alpha_0(\overline{V} - V_t) + \widehat{p}_{t-1}$ where  $\widehat{p}_{t-1}$  is the inflation rate of the previous period

The *inflation* rate  $(\hat{p}_t)$  will be a weighted average between  $\hat{w}_t$  and the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate  $(\hat{e}_t)$ :

$$\widehat{p}_t = \alpha_1 \widehat{w}_t + (1 - \alpha_1) \widehat{e}_t$$

The rate of change in the *real* exchange rate  $(\hat{\theta}_t)$  is: **3**   $\hat{\theta}_t = \hat{e}_t + \hat{p}_t^* - \hat{p}_t$ where  $\hat{p}_t^*$  is the foreign inflation rate

Suppose the government gradually revalues  $\theta_t$  until it reaches the industrial equilibrium rate ( $\theta_{ei}$ )

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t = \alpha_2(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{ei} - \boldsymbol{\theta}_t)$$

- We will show below that the rate of *inflation* will be:  $\widehat{p}_t = \widehat{p}_{t-1} + \alpha_0 (\overline{V} - V_t) + [(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1})(1 - \alpha_1)](\theta_{ei} - \theta_t)$
- This equation shows that  $\widehat{p}_t$  depends on:
  - Inflationary *inertia* ( $\widehat{p}_{t-1}$ )
  - > Wage *misalignment*  $(\overline{V} V_t)$
  - > Degree of **undervaluation** of  $\theta_t$

(1) 
$$\hat{w}_{t} = \alpha_{0}(\overline{V} - V_{t}) + \hat{p}_{t-1}$$
 (3)  $\hat{\theta}_{t} = \hat{e}_{t} + \hat{p}_{t}^{*} - \hat{p}_{t}$   
(2)  $\hat{p}_{t} = \alpha_{1}\hat{w}_{t} + (1 - \alpha_{1})\hat{e}_{t}$  (4)  $\hat{\theta}_{t} = \alpha_{2}(\theta_{ei} - \theta_{t})$ 

- From (3) and assuming  $\widehat{p}_t^* = 0$ , we get:  $\widehat{e}_t = \widehat{\theta}_t + \widehat{p}_t$
- Plugging (1) and  $\hat{e}_t = \hat{\theta}_t + \hat{p}_t$  into (2), we get:  $\hat{p}_t = \alpha_1 [\alpha_0(\overline{V} V_t) + \hat{p}_{t-1}] + (1 \alpha_1)(\hat{\theta}_t + \hat{p}_t)$   $\hat{p}_t (1 \alpha_1)\hat{p}_t = \alpha_1 [\alpha_0(\overline{V} V_t) + \hat{p}_{t-1}] + (1 \alpha_1)\hat{\theta}_t$   $\alpha_1 \hat{p}_t = \alpha_1 [\alpha_0(\overline{V} V_t) + \hat{p}_{t-1}] + (1 \alpha_1)\hat{\theta}_t$

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$$\hat{w}_{t} = \alpha_{0}(\overline{V} - V_{t}) + \hat{p}_{t-1}$$
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(2)  $\hat{p}_{t} = \alpha_{1}\hat{w}_{t} + (1 - \alpha_{1})\hat{e}_{t}$  (4)  $\hat{\theta}_{t} = \alpha_{2}(\theta_{ei} - \theta_{t})$ 

Consider the equation from the previous slide:

$$\alpha_1 \widehat{p}_t = \alpha_1 [\alpha_0 (\overline{V} - V_t) + \widehat{p}_{t-1}] + (1 - \alpha_1) \widehat{\theta}_t$$

- Plugging (4) into the above equation, we get:  $\alpha_1 \widehat{p}_t = \alpha_1 [\alpha_0 (\overline{V} V_t) + \widehat{p}_{t-1}] + (1 \alpha_1) \alpha_2 (\theta_{ei} \theta_t)$
- And dividing by  $\alpha_1$ , we get:

$$\widehat{p}_t = \widehat{p}_{t-1} + \alpha_0 (\overline{V} - V_t) + [(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1})(1 - \alpha_1)](\theta_{ei} - \theta_t)$$

$$\widehat{p}_t = \widehat{p}_{t-1} + \alpha_0 (\overline{V} - V_t) + [(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1})(1 - \alpha_1)](\theta_{ei} - \theta_t)$$

- Therefore, the rate of inflation  $(\hat{p}_t)$  resulting from a currency devaluation depends on:
  - > Last period's inflation ( $\hat{p}_{t-1}$ ) which explains inflationary *inertia* (i.e., *expectations* of inflation)
  - > Any wage *misalignment* with workers' target  $(\overline{V} V_t)$
  - > Degree of *undervaluation* of  $\theta_t$  (i.e., degree of real *overvaluation* of the *currency*)
- What would happen if workers successfully resist a decrease in their *real* wages (i.e.,  $V_t = \overline{V}$ )?

$$\widehat{p}_t = \widehat{p}_{t-1} + \alpha_0 (\overline{V} - V_t) + [(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1})(1 - \alpha_1)](\theta_{ei} - \theta_t)$$

If workers resist the reduction in real wages, then  $V_t = \overline{V}$  and the rate of inflation becomes:

$$\widehat{p}_t = \widehat{p}_{t-1} + [(\alpha_2/\alpha_1)(1-\alpha_1)](\theta_{ei} - \theta_t)$$

- In this context, a continuous revaluation of  $\theta_t$  will cause a continuous *acceleration* of the inflation rate (i.e.,  $\hat{p}_t > \hat{p}_{t-1}$ )
- This *inflation* spiral is due to workers' demand for increases in *w* to offset the increase in *θ*, and firms passing these higher *costs* to *prices* to protect their *profit* margins

- If workers successfully resist any decrease in  $V_t$ , then the  $\theta_t$  cannot be revalued since  $\hat{p}_t$  also rises
  - > To increase  $\theta_t$  to the level of  $\theta_{ei}$  requires keeping  $\hat{w}_t$  increases below  $\hat{e}_t$  increases
  - This will require a temporary *reduction* in the *demand* for labour or an agreement (*social pact*) with the unions
- For  $\theta_t$  to be revalued and  $\hat{p}_t$  to remain constant, workers must be willing to accept the needed reduction in  $V_t$

Note that 
$$\theta_{ei} > \theta_t$$
 implies  $V_t > \overline{V}$ , i.e., an overvalued  $V_t$ 

If 
$$\widehat{p}_t = \widehat{p}_{t-1}$$
, then  $V_t = \overline{V} + \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_0 \alpha_1} (1 - \alpha_1) (\theta_{ei} - \theta_t)$ 

Using the Exchange Rate as an Anchor to Control Inflation

- The exchange rate is usually used to control inflation and particularly hyperinflation
- For this policy to be *successful* (and thus *credible*), the government must also:
  - Secure international *loans* to guarantee the policy
  - > Adopt a firm *fiscal policy* of expenditure reduction
- The use of the *exchange rate* as an anchor during *hyperinflation* situations may be valid
  - But not in order to simply meet the *inflation target*
  - Maintaining  $\theta_t$  around  $\theta_{ei}$  is as important as controlling  $\hat{p}_t$

# Using the Exchange Rate as an Anchor to Control Inflation (cont'd)

- In order to control *inflation*, the central bank must gain *credibility* 
  - But there is a *circular* problem: Its *credibility* depends on the *inflation target* being met
- It takes time for *interest rate* policy to control *inflation* 
  - Thus it becomes tempting to use the *exchange rate* as well
- The use of the exchange rate as an anchor to control inflation is not always admitted
  - Neoclassical economics assumes the *interest rate* to be the only legitimate instrument

# Using the Exchange Rate as an Anchor to Control Inflation (cont'd)

- But how can the domestic *currency* be appreciated in real terms when most countries have adopted a *floating exchangerate* regime?
- The simplest way is doing nothing to allow the *currency* to *appreciate* and become *overvalued* (i.e., the natural *tendency*)
- After a violent currency *devaluation* following a balance-ofpayment crisis, a short period of *"healthy"* appreciation follows and *θ<sub>ei</sub>* is reached
  - Although further *appreciation* becomes *perverse*, this is welcome by those who prioritize *inflation* control over *employment* and *growth*

High Interest Rate Levels and Currency Appreciation

- High *interest rates* used to control *inflation* also result in currency *appreciation*
- High *interest rates* attract *foreign capital* but do not promote productive *investment* 
  - Currency *appreciation* reduces *investment* opportunities
  - Opportunity cost of *investment* rises, and thus *investment* falls
  - High substitution of *foreign* for *domestic savings*
- Further, high *interest rates* increase cost of servicing government *debt* thus reducing *government spending*

#### **Carry Trade and Currency Appreciation**

*Carry trade* is defined as "a strategy in which an investor sells a certain *currency* with a relatively *low interest rate* and uses the funds to purchase a different *currency* yielding a *higher interest rate*" (*Investopedia*)

- Financial *crises* are characterized by a sharp *depreciation* of the currency (i.e.,  $\theta_{ei} < \theta_t$ )
- The combination of *high interest rates* with expectations of a gradual *appreciation* of the *currency* attracts foreign capital
   Thus investors engage in *carry trade* and the *currency* appreciates (i.e., it becomes a *self-fulfilling prophecy*)
- Eventually  $\theta_t$  falls to the level where a deficit in the current account arises and a new financial crisis ensues

## Budget Deficits and Currency Overvaluation

- Chronic and high *fiscal deficits* are not desirable
  - Public *debt* should be moderate and constant relative to GDP
  - Expansionary fiscal policy is necessary during recessions (i.e., when private sector is not spending)
- If a country neutralizes its **Dutch disease**, it should have:
  - > A moderate *current account* surplus since  $\theta_t = \theta_{ei} > \theta_{cc}$
  - > A balanced *budget* (or a small surplus)
- Policy of high fiscal (*structural*) deficits is a cause of currency overvaluation
  - $\succ Expansionary fiscal policy during economic booms causes inflation to rise and <math>\theta_t$  to fall