Conferences at Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2025

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Dating and Divorce

Hao Li, Sergei Severinov*, Yujing Xu

Building: HEC Montréal - Édifice Hélène-Desmarais
Room: HEC
Date: 2025-05-04 9:30 am – 10:00 am
Last modified: 2025-04-19

Abstract


<div>We introduce dating and divorce in a search and matching model of marriage under incomplete information.  While initially uninformed, a party finds out the partner's type upon marriage, and then decides whether to incur the cost of divorce and re-enter the market, or to remain married. The parties can partially reveal private information to each other through informative communication while dating, which makes them more selective in their marriage decision.</div><div>Communication while dating improves the future prospects after divorce.</div><div><p style="margin: 0px;">Consequently, the parties become more willing to end less desirable</p> <p style="margin: 0px; line-height: 100%;">marriages. So dating can cause both a decrease in the long-run marriage rate and an increase in the divorce rate.</p><p style="margin: 0px; line-height: 100%;">A lower cost of divorce can make all parties weakly worse off.</p><p style="margin: 0px; line-height: 100%;">However, the class structure of marriage becomes less rigid when dating and divorce are introduced.</p></div>

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