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The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games
Jingang Zhao*
Date: 2010-05-22 2:30 pm – 3:00 pm
Last modified: 2010-05-17
Abstract
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This paper studies the duality between the blocking power and producing ability of all sub-coalitions in coalitional TU and NTU games, and it establishes three main results: 1) the usual TU (NTU) core is empty if and only if (if) sub-coalitions can produce a higher payoff than the grand coalition’s payoff; 2) the new core is always non-empty; and 3) optimal (efficient) coalitions will form in coalitional TU (NTU) games in a manner determined by their shadow values.