Globalization of Capital Flows, State Capacity and the (In)Disciplining of Nations

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Abstract

We analyze whether or not the lower cost of global capital mobility ‘disciplines’ governments and improves bureaucrat governance. We demonstrate that this globalization of capital affects bureaucrat governance in different ways that depends on the state capacity of a country. In the absence of creditor commitment, even with high state capacity, globalisation can adversely affect bureaucratic governance by increasing a country’s vulnerability to sudden capital flight. With low state capacity, depending on the configuration of economic fundamentals, we show that globalization can either discipline governments and improve bureaucratic governance by placing countries in a ‘golden straitjacket’ or ‘(in)discipline’ governments – resulting in a perverse impact on governmental incentives that catalyzes bureaucratic (mis)governance. Accordingly, the paper suggests a novel (and qualified) role for capital controls. Finally, we provide some evidence consistent with the predictions from our theoretical framework.

Keywords: Globalization, Governance; Capital Flight; Capital Controls, Discipline.

JEL Classification Codes: F55; F36.

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1 Introduction

The last several decades have witnessed large reductions in the cost of moving capital across countries. This has been accompanied with a dramatic increase in the degree of financial market integration (Passari and Rey, 2015). However in light of this greater globalization, it is somewhat puzzling empirical studies find that the welfare “benefits of capital flows are remarkably elusive” (Rey, 2014). In this paper we throw light on this puzzle by focusing on an unexamined aspect of the impact of the globalization of capital: namely, on the quality of a country’s governance. We ask whether the threat of capital flight constrains and ‘discipline’ bureaucrat-government sector into improving governance? In analyzing this relationship between governance and globalization, we also ask whether capital controls may have a place in the policymaker’s toolbox?

There are sharply differing views about the relationship between globalization and the actions taken by the bureaucrat-government. On the one hand we have the view exemplified by Summers (2000), Obstfeld (1998) who argue that in a globalizing world where information is freely available and capital is mobile, governments are forced to get disciplined and bureaucrat governance is improved. Indeed recent work by Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) and Mishkin (2007) suggests that the main benefits from the globalization of capital flows are ‘collateral’ such as improved market discipline and good governance. In contrast, a much more skeptical view about globalization’s impact on governance is held by Rodrik and Subramaniam (2009), Stiglitz (2010) and Krugman (1999). Indeed they argue that the globalization of capital flows may provide the wrong incentives to government and result in indiscipline and misgovernance. These two sharply differing views on the incentive effects of globalization have been hard to reconcile. In part this is because the relationship between globalization and good governance is a complex one and the empirical evidence on this issue (such as there is) is mixed. In this paper we provide a conceptual framework that throws light on these diverging viewpoints.

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1This reports results from Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) as well as Couerdaceier, Rey and Winant (2015). See Carriére et al. (2013) on related evidence linked to the role implicit barriers in preventing market integration in emerging market economies.

2Obstfeld (1998) argues that “the main potential positive role of international capital markets is to discipline policymakers.”. This view is exemplified in Thomas Friedman’s (2000) book on globalization where he argues the international capital market puts countries in a “golden straitjacket” and constrains the worst excesses of governments and enacts policies that are socially optimal, in turn rewarding them with capital inflows.

3For instance, Tytell and Wei (2004) argue that despite its theoretical plausibility it is difficult to ‘find robust and strong causal evidence’.
Our framework examines the impact of the globalisation of capital flows on the symbiotic relationship between foreign investors and the host country government of a small, open economy with an export sector. While foreign investment employs domestic factors, the government supplies a public good that in turn affects the returns to investment. The central conceptual innovation of our model is a richer framework to analyse decision making within government. We follow Tirole (1994), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) in emphasising an inefficiency that we argue, lies at the heart of all decision making within government - an inability for the government policymaker to ensure that other government actors (be it public sector managers, local governments or banking and financial regulators) precommit to enacting efficient policies. Of course, the extent of this problem differs across countries - depending on the government’s state capacity (see Besley and Persson, 2011). Besley and Persson define state capacity as the ability of the government to provide public goods that complement the functioning of markets, with a focus on fiscal and legal capacity. In our framework, we formalize a complementary notion of state capacity. Countries with high state capacity have superior instruments to ensure that bureaucrats commit to put in effort and ensure provision of high quality public goods that complement private investment by foreign investors. Such countries are less likely to be afflicted by misgovernance than are countries with relatively low state capacity.

Second, we assume that all foreign investment is carried out by a single foreign investor who invests capital into the export sector of the host country. Indeed this assumption rules out the possibility of capital flight occurring because of the possibility of coordination failure resulting in a multiplicity of equilibria. Instead we focus on a complementary mechanism that requires us to assume that this foreign investment takes place over time. This dynamic interaction allows us to capture the sensitivity of capital flows to information about the productivity of a country’s bureaucrat governance. In our framework, this arises quite naturally since foreign investors are unable to precommit to retain investment in the host country. Indeed in light of new information, investors may either keep their investment or engage in capital flight. Finally, we capture the structure and resilience of a country’s economy in a simple way by focusing on whether or not the export sector is diversified. A country with a well diversified sector will be more resilient and less vulnerable to global shocks.

Our framework illustrates that in countries with low state capacity, inefficiencies abound within
government. In particular, decision making by bureaucrat-managers is often plagued by a soft budget constraint. The government-policymaker persists in backing projects (or businesses) that are often characterised by low effort, budget overruns and low productivity - be it a bank bailout, underwriting public sector firms or guaranteeing budget overruns by a local government. Information about such budget deficits or bailouts is likely to make capital flows much more volatile in a world where the costs of global capital flows are lower.

Our first set of results examines the relationship between state capacity and the quality of governance (as captured by the bureaucrat’s effort level) in the presence of the threat of capital flight. We show that (a) the target level of bureaucrat effort set by the domestic policy-maker is itself affected by the capital flight threshold (via the bureaucrat’s participation constraint) and hence determines the target level of bureaucrat effort, (b) a country’s state capacity determines whether or not the target level of bureaucrat effort is achieved. If state capacity is sufficiently high, then the target level of bureaucrat effort is always achieved so that governance issues do not arise. Indeed under these conditions, the threat of capital flight only affects the quality of governance (i.e. bureaucrat incentives) via the bureaucrat’s participation constraint.

We, then, analyze the impact on national welfare of this globalization of capital with high state capacity, a second-best welfare benchmark. In our framework, foreign investors are unable to precommit to retain investment in the host country. Now globalization lowers the cost of capital mobility and makes country vulnerable to capital flight. We show that this inability to “capture” foreign investment at high levels of global integration, always adversely affects national welfare.

Our second set of results examines the impact of the threat of capital flight with low state capacity. With low state capacity, the target level of bureaucrat effort set by the policy-maker isn’t achieved. We demonstrate that the exacerbated threat of capital flight may constrain the set of actions taken by the government-bureaucrat. Indeed, in doing so, the globalization of capital may shackle governments in a ‘golden straitjacket’, and have a positive “incentive”effect that helps resolve inefficiency within government. This may suggest that the standard view about the disciplining role of globalization is indeed correct.

However, our analysis suggests a more nuanced view is in order and the impact of globalization on governance can go either way even with low state capacity. In particular, the globalization of capital works as a ‘discipline’ device so long as capital flight is mainly triggered off by actions taken
by bureaucrat-managers within government. In contrast, if volatility in capital flight is triggered mainly by shocks to the external environment, then this may have perverse effects. In this case, the threat of capital flight overdisciplines governments, resulting in a negative “incentive” effect and mis-governance.

We further argue that the impact of globalization on incentives for good governance, depends on the structure of the country’s economy. If the country is less sensitive to (exogeneous) external shocks in the global economy (e.g. due to a structurally diversified export sector), then globalization is likely to have a net positive incentive effect. Ironically, the prospect of overdisciplining and its attendant negative incentive effects is likely to affect countries that are more vulnerable to begin with - those with weak state capacity and a poorly diversified economy that is vulnerable to external shocks.

We then go on to describe the welfare impact of such globalization, relative to the second-best welfare benchmark, when in addition, there is inefficiency in government decision-making. We show that globalization has a distinct impact on welfare through the channel through the “incentive” effect of good governance. However, as already pointed out, this incentive effect depends on the structure of the country’s economy. Globalization is likely to improve welfare if a country is less vulnerable to random external shocks e.g. because it a diversified export sector. In other words, if this globalization makes the country vulnerable to the threat of capital flight mainly when there is inefficiency in government, then the incentive effect improves welfare. In contrast, this incentive effect has a negative impact on welfare, if the country is vulnerable to external shocks - e.g. because it specializes in exporting mining or primary goods that suffer from volatility or because it faces a weak and volatile global economy. In these situations, globalization lowers welfare by having a negative incentive effect on governance - due to the country being made vulnerable to the threat of unwarranted capital flight - i.e. independent of the actions of policymakers within government.

In a globalized world, governments are vulnerable to exogenous and sudden shifts in investor sentiment. A crisis in another country can make a country directly increase uncertainty in financial markets. We show that such an increase in global uncertainty has an unambiguously negative impact on the quality of bureaucratic governance in countries with low state capacity. We use our theoretical framework to guide our empirical analysis. In particular, we use the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 as a natural experiment which results in an increase in uncertainty in international
financial markets. A prediction of our theoretical framework is that the impact of this greater uncertainty on governance should be highest for those countries that are perceived to be ‘similar’ to Mexico and have relatively weak institutional ‘state capacity’. Indeed, we find suggestive evidence consistent with this prediction.

The issue of the appropriateness of capital controls has been central to the debate on the design of international financial architecture. The position of the IMF for most of the past two decades has been quite clear - a country would only be able to reap the gains of financial globalization, if capital controls were reduced or eliminated. This view has been echoed by economists such as Edwards (1999), Dornbusch (1998) among others. In contrast, Rodrik (1998), Bhagwati (1998), Eichengreen (1999) are much more sympathetic to the idea of imposing restrictions on capital mobility. Indeed the IMFs Staff Position Paper (2010) also suggests a turnaround in that it argues that under some conditions capital controls can well be part of a policymaker’s toolkit. This picture is further muddied by the fact that the empirical evidence does not provide us with a clean answer. We argue that the absence of consensus (both at a theoretical and empirical level) on the usefulness of capital controls is understandable as arguments made by both the proponents as well as critics of the use of capital controls may be of relevance. Given low state capacity, the important factor is vulnerability to shocks in the external economic environment of the host country. Arguments for controls are strongest perhaps when given low institutional state capacity, the country is vulnerable to capital flight arising from vulnerability to an uncertain and volatile global economic environment. We should also emphasize that our paper has identified a very distinct argument for the qualified use (and abolition) of capital controls - namely how the threat of capital flight may adversely effect (or improve) the incentives for good governance.

Related Literature: There is a small but growing literature that examines the link between the globalization of capital and financial crises and governance. Perhaps closest to our work is that of Broner and Ventura (2016) who investigate many of the same issues. Two important conceptual features of their framework are worth emphasising. First, in their framework financial globalization

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4As late as 1997, the IMF Interim Committee argued that “the liberalization of capital flows is an essential element of an efficient international monetary system in this age of globalization”. This is quoted from Rodrik (2011) who has a fascinating discussion about the debate within the IMF and the larger historical context in which it takes place. Indeed Rodrik (1999) quotes the IMF’s World Economic Outlook from October 98 to argue that “[T]he introduction by Malaysia in early September of exchange and capital controls may also turn out to be an important setback not only to that country’s recovery and potentially to its future development, but also to other emerging market economies that have suffered from heightened investor fears of similar actions elsewhere”.


allows participation in the domestic capital market by foreigners and thereby changes the mix of (foreign and domestic) investors. If domestic markets are sufficiently ‘deep’ (i.e. sufficient domestic investors), the paper shows that financial globalization disciplines governments since the incentive for opportunistic default that expropriates foreign investment disappears. Second, issues of coordination amongst investors and multiplicity of equilibria are front and central in their analysis, since there are being a large number of investors.

In contrast to Broner and Ventura (2016), the present paper emphasizes complementary mechanisms as being important. First, by assuming a single foreign investor - we rule out issues of coordination and multiplicity of equilibria. We show that even in the absence of coordination failure, financial globalisation may result in inefficient outcomes that lower welfare. The present paper emphasises how government decision making is affected by the higher volatility of capital flows in a globalized world and its impact on government incentives. By opening the black box of decision making within government, our framework complements their rich analysis. Government inefficiency (and the probability with which contracts are enforced) is a function of the volatility of capital flows. This volatility is higher under financial globalisation and makes countries with a less diversified structure more vulnerable.

Cai and Treisman (2005) examine whether or not the increased competition to attract international capital that globalization entails, disciplines governments. They argue that this ‘disciplining’ effect may lower or increase welfare - once we account for heterogeneity across countries in resource endowments, capital or infrastructure. The present paper complements their analysis and argues that the threat of capital flight may have a very different impact on governance even if countries have the same resource endowments, productivity and state capacity. We show that differences in the nature of vulnerability to the uncertainty in a country’s economic environment alone can result in lower welfare costs of international capital mobility.

In the context of fiscal federalism, Qian and Roland (1996) use an incomplete contractual structure to show that governments have a tendency to bail out failing state enterprises. In this context they show that federalism by encouraging competition may discipline regional governments by punishing corrupt governments with capital flight.

Ju and Wei (2011) emphasize the two way relationship between international capital flows and the strength of domestic institutions. However, their main focus is on the implications of global-
ization on corporate governance and the strength of the financial system rather than inefficiencies in decision making within government. Tressel and Verdier (2007) argue that the liberalization of capital is often an endogenous decision that has been carried out with the collusion of foreign banks and investors - often to the detriment of the governance of the domestic financial system. Both the scope and notion of globalization and governance is quite different from what we have in this paper. Besley and Smart (2002) show that the impact of greater competition for mobile capital depends on the ‘type’ of politician-policymaker in office. Chang (2011) examines how the globalization of short run capital mobility often interacts with elections and magnifies the impact of exogenous shocks.

While our paper is more about decision making within government, we should note that political economy considerations can exacerbate the magnitude of inefficiency in decision making within government. Mukand (2006) uses a signaling model, where a policymaker’s choice of policy to show that governments have an incentive to play the ‘confidence game’ and enact inefficient policies in order to attract mobile capital. Similarly, Bartolini and Drazen (1997) also use a signaling model to explore the implications of capital account liberalization as an indicator of future policies.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section 2 and analyze the equilibrium in Section 3. Welfare analysis and other implications of the model are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 outlines empirical evidence supporting the model and Section 6 concludes.

2 Description of the Model

Before we describe the model in detail, we begin by describing the key features of our framework. (i) There exists a symbiotic relationship between the government and foreign investors. The government supplies a public good that augments the returns to foreign investment. In turn, foreign capital by employing domestic factors, enhances national welfare.

(ii) We distinguish between the policymaker-government and the bureaucrat or public sector (or banking sector) manager, with the manager-bureaucrat being in charge of actual implementation of the public project. State capacity determines the ability of the government to commit the bureaucrat to the action that maximizes national welfare. With low state capacity, the domestic contractual structure is incomplete, ensuring that the government cannot commit the bureaucrat to choose the socially efficient action. The productivity of this public project determines the private
returns to the export sector.

(iii) We consider a small open economy, where the export sector produces a good that is sold on the world market. We are interested in capturing the resilience of the country’s economy to external shocks in a parsimonious way. Accordingly, we focus on the volatility of earnings of the export sector. For instance, if the economy specializes in exporting mining or primary products, then its export revenue is likely to be vulnerable to volatility. In contrast, if the economy is strong and well-diversified, then shocks to good prices in the world economy have much smaller impacts on the volatility of the revenue of this export sector. Therefore, countries with strong fundamentals are assumed to have well diversified export sectors and are less sensitive to random shocks to the global economy. We should emphasize that we choose this particular interpretation merely for the expositional convenience of our formal model.

(iv) A representative foreign investor invests capital in a private project in the export sector of the host country which requires two stages to set up. At the second stage, the investor has to decide whether to withdraw capital or whether to rollover the initial investment made. The investor cannot credibly commit to rollover the initial investment at the second stage. The investor observes the return from its investment in the export sector prior to the rollover decision. The observed return depends on both bureaucrat effort and external shocks. Globalization decreases the cost of withdrawing capital at the rollover stage to the foreign investor.

Governance: The Government and the Bureaucrat - The policymaker-government maximizes the return to domestic factors. Therefore, it attempts to attract foreign investment in the export sector, which through its employment of domestic factors, boosts national income. The government can choose to initiate a public infrastructure project that affects the returns to foreign investment. The infrastructure can be of varying quality - high or low. Completion of the public project requires investment at two points in time. There is an initial startup cost $C_1$ and a project completion cost $C_c$. Therefore the government’s welfare is a function of total output net of all project completion costs i.e. $W_Y = \alpha Y - (C_1 + C_c)$ where $Y$ is additional revenue generated by foreign investment in the export sector economy and $\alpha$ is the share of that revenue that accrues to

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5 By assumption we rule out outright expropriation to avoid complicating our analysis with sovereign debt issues. Not only are these issues well-understood (Eaton and Fernandez, 1995), but also outright expropriation is rarely observed. However, in our analysis, a bad realization of the public good is like an implicit tax/expropriation.
the government as public revenue.

The government delegates to a bureaucrat-regulator the actual implementation of the public infrastructure project that determines the returns to investment.\(^6\)

The government specifies a minimum level of effort \(\hat{e} \in [0, 1]\). The bureaucrat’s effort choice \(e \in [0, 1]\) is unobservable. The disutility from effort \(\psi(e)\) is increasing (higher effort is costly) and convex in \(e\). For simplicity of exposition, we assume that the bureaucrat’s choice of effort \(e\) results in infrastructure of productivity \(e\). We should emphasise that the bureaucrat could be interpreted as a banking sector regulator who needs to put in effort to screen projects (as in Dewatripont and Masking, 1995).

In addition to the disutility of effort, the bureaucrat, with a probability that is determined by state capacity, gets a private utility \(\delta\) from completion of the public project. The idea is that the bureaucrat gets some private benefit from the continuation of the project and the government cannot complete the project without the bureaucrat. As Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) point out, this gain can be in terms of additional perks or any human capital gain from increased use of the technology.

However, conditional on completion of the project, there is an opportunity for the policy-maker to confiscate this private payoff. The bureaucrat obtains this private payoff only if the government is unable, or chooses not, to confiscate this payoff.

We capture a government’s state capacity in a particularly simple way. Let \(\mu \in [0, 1]\) denote the probability that the government can confiscate \(\delta\) when \(e < \hat{e}\) only after the project is completed. Then, \(\mu\) is our measure of state capacity.

Let \(\delta > \psi(1) > 0\). Then, the bureaucrat’s utility function is given by:

\[
U_B = \begin{cases} 
\delta - \psi(e), & \text{if } e \geq \hat{e} \\
(1 - \mu)\delta - \psi(e), & \text{if } 0 \leq e < \hat{e}
\end{cases}
\]

if the public project is completed and zero otherwise where \(\psi(e)\) is a (weakly) convex function of effort with \(\lim_{e \to 0} \psi'(e) = 0\).\(^7\)

\(^6\)It is useful to keep in mind that in our analysis a low productivity outcome of the public good, is isomorphic to the case of a cost overrun in the provision of the public good, where the cost overrun and the associated deficit results in a higher marginal tax on foreign investment.

\(^7\)The incomplete contractual structure is based on Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Tirole (1994).
Investment, Capital Flight and Globalization: Foreign investment takes place in a single private firm in the export sector that requires an initial capital investment (normalized to one unit) which has to last two periods before yielding output and a return. Output is a function of the initial investment made as well as the productivity of the public good. This opportunity to invest is given to a group of identical risk neutral investors. Without loss of generality, we assume that decision-making within the group is delegated to an individual who maximizes aggregate group profits. This group of investors can raise the initial capital investment at a per unit cost $R$. While the investment is for two periods, investors do receive interim information (the revenue generated by the project), that tells them whether to liquidate and withdraw their capital from the country, or to retain it in the project.

The initial unit of capital invested in the export sector yields $Y$ units of revenue two periods later, where $Y = e^\theta$. We take $\theta$ to be an exogenous shock distributed on $[0, 1]$ that affects according to the pdf $f(\theta)$. This variable can be interpreted as a shock to global prices of the export sector good that may arise out of unexpected changes in demand or supply in the global economy. Therefore, if the investment in the export sector project lasts the entire two periods, the aggregate payoff to the investors is $(1 - \alpha)Y - R$. In contrast, if the investment is liquidated early, it will be taken out of the country yielding a (normalized) return of 1 per unit of capital initially invested. In this case if the investment is terminated early (i.e. in one period), and the capital is withdrawn and invested abroad, the aggregate group payoff is $1 - c_w - R$. Here $c_w \geq 0$ captures the short-term cost of international capital mobility when the project is terminated early.

Given enough time, capital is always movable across borders - whether or not there are explicit restrictions on capital flows. However, what is truly distinctive of the nature of capital flows over the past few decades has been the dramatic reductions in the barriers to the movement of capital across borders, especially in the short run. This globalization of capital has raised the prospect of sudden capital flight. Accordingly, we focus on the globalization arising out of a reduction in the immediate short-run cost of moving capital across international borders. This reduction in the cost $c_w$, can be driven by a combination of technological and policy related factors. For example, a policy change that results in a reduction in capital controls reduces barriers mainly to short-run

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8Our assumptions imply that investors coordinate their withdrawal decisions. Therefore, we do not consider issues of investor coordination failure because we want to focus on a different, if complementary, set of reasons why a country might want to impose capital controls.
mobility of capital. Indeed, given our focus on the impact of capital flight on ‘discipline’, our analysis focuses on the impact of changes in capital controls.

Alternatively, these changes in capital controls may work in conjunction with a combination of technological (or institutional) factors that may also affect the cost of short term capital movements. These factors would include any and all factors that affect the degree of financial integration of a country with the global economy that can in effect be treated as a parameter - from the overall availability of information, the level of development or the geographical proximity to major financial centers and so on. For simplicity, in much of what follows we interpret an increase in globalization as a reduction in $c_w$ arising out of technological changes. However, in Section 4 we will also explicitly consider the role of capital controls, when we take $c_w$ to be a choice variable of the government-policymaker. Neither formulation changes in a qualitative way the results that we highlight.

**Information and the Timing of Decisions:** Since investors care about the expected returns on their investment, any information on the productivity of the public infrastructure project would be at a premium. We assume that if there is an initial investment in the project, before deciding whether or not to rollover the project, each investor observes the expected returns to the private investment project (i.e. the export sector) $Y$ but does not observe either $e$ or $\theta$ separately.

The timing of the game is as follows:

1. The government makes the decision of whether to initiate the public infrastructure project by incurring the initial setup cost $C_1$. At this stage the government also (when it is a parameter) observes the value of $c_w$. Similarly, if it is interpreted as a choice variable, then the policymaker chooses $c_w$ (as in capital controls). The government also specifies $\hat{e} \in [0, 1]$.
2. The foreign investor group chooses whether or not to invest one unit of capital in the investment project in the export sector of the host country- that takes two periods to mature.
3. The bureaucrat then makes an (unobservable) effort choice $e$ that determines the productivity of the public project and hence, revenue from the investment project.
4. In the next stage, investors observe the overall returns of investment in the export sector project $Y$ and the representative investor decides whether or not to withdraw or retain the investment in the country.
5. The government chooses whether it wants to abandon or complete the public project by paying
the completion cost $C_c$ after observes the productivity of the public project as well as the returns to the private export sector.

6. If the project is completed, the public infrastructure productivity is realized. This determines private sector output and the returns to investment for foreign investors.

7. The government observes the bureaucrat-regulator’s effort. If this effort is observed to be below $\hat{\epsilon}$, confiscates $\delta$ with probability $\mu \in [0, 1]$. This determines the bureaucrat’s payoff.

In the following two sections, we solve the above game of incomplete information backwards. In each section, we characterize decisions that determine whether the project is initiated and not prematurely liquidated and examine the consequences of changes in the cost of suddenly withdrawing capital from a country on its national welfare. In section 3, we will characterize the link between the threat of capital withdrawal and bureaucrat’s effort choice for a fixed level of state capacity $\mu$. In section 4, we study the impact of globalization (viewed in terms of costs of withdrawing capital) on national welfare for high levels of state capacity when the government is able to comit the bureaucrat to the efficient effort level. In Section 5, we study of the impact of globalization (viewed in terms of costs of withdrawing capital) on the disciplining of nations and national welfare for low levels of state capacity.

3 State Capacity, Governance and Capital Flight: A Benchmark Result

In this section we solve for our equilibrium and highlight aspects that are of interest, focusing on the role played by state capacity. We, then, examine the role for capital controls with high state capacity when the government is able to commit the bureaucrat to the first-best level of effort.

3.1 Capital Flight and the Soft Budget Constraint

Governments often face a dilemma with regard to the financing of projects - be it public sector cost overruns or financial bail outs for the banking sector. Indeed the inability to cut-off funding of projects that are doing badly has long term adverse incentive effects. We analyze the conditions under which such inefficiency may arise in our framework. First, note that if the revenue from the export sector project is $Y$, the government will complete the public sector project if and only if the
payoff from doing so exceeds the project completion cost, i.e. if
\[ \alpha Y \geq C_c. \]

Recollect that the share of total revenue that enters the government’s payoff (e.g. weight on the domestic sector) is given by \( \alpha \). Accordingly, if \( C_c \approx 0 \), the government can never commit not to complete the project. We show that this possibility, when the cost of project completion is low, results in a soft budget constraint\(^9\).

Next, we turn to the decision of the representative investor to keep the money within the country or to withdraw it. In our model, the representative investor cannot credibly precommit to keep money within the country. If the economic environment deteriorates, the investor will pull investment out of the country and there will be capital flight. Whether or not the representative investor actually engaged in capital flight depends on whether the productivity of the investment project is high enough. We now calculate the critical threshold value such that there is capital flight if productivity is below this threshold and not otherwise.

At the time when investors have to make the decision of whether to retain or withdraw their initial investment in the private sector export project \( R \), this cost is ‘sunk’ and does not enter the private investor calculus. This implies that the representative investor will withdraw his capital iff the continuation value of capital flight, \( 1 - c_w \), is greater than the expected continuation value of retaining the investment in the project, \((1 - \alpha) Y \). In other words, on observing that the returns are \( Y \), the investor will not engage in capital flight and keep the investment in the country if and only if:

\[ (1 - \alpha) Y \geq 1 - c_w \]

\(^9\)Kornai(1980) was the first to observe the soft budget constraint in the context of socialist and transition economies. Public sector enterprises as well as the banking sector(Cho & Kim(1995) and Borensztein & Lee(1998)) have been plagued by the soft budget constraint. In this paper we have chosen a model where poor incentives for a bureaucrat generates inefficiencies. This is because of two reasons - first, it is the simplest way to emphasize the underlying incentive problem without detracting from the focus on information and second, because we can easily re-interpret the model as being applicable to a variety of economic scenarios. These include the case of a public sector plagued with cost overruns and fiscal deficits arising out of an incomplete contractual structure with a public sector manager or inefficiencies amongst various branches of government (see Alesina and Perotti (1996)). Furthermore, (with modifications) the bureaucrat can be thought of as the manager of a banking sector plagued by a soft budget constraint, which results in bad loans.
or equivalently,

\[ Y \geq \bar{Y} = \frac{1 - c_w}{1 - \alpha}. \] (1)

Therefore, the initial unit of investment will be retained in the country iff the productivity of the public sector project is higher than some threshold value - we label it the investor’s capital flight threshold\(^{10}\). Further, observe that the investor’s capital flight threshold is itself decreasing in the cost of withdrawing capital \(c_w\). In other words the higher is the short-run cost of withdrawing the capital \(c_w\), the more likely it is that foreign investors will roll over the investment and retain it in the country. At one extreme when \(c_w > 1\), the representative investor never withdraws her investment so that the threat of capital flight is an empty one. At the other extreme if the cost of withdrawing capital is very low so that \(1 - c_w > 1 - \alpha\), equivalently \(\alpha > c_w\), the investor will always withdraw: in this case, capital flight will occur with probability one.

### 3.2 State Capacity, Capital Flight and Bureaucratic Effort

We now examine how the threat of capital flight and state capacity affects both the target level of effort the government sets for the bureaucrat and the effort chosen by the bureaucrat.

In particular, for any given effort level \(e\), the bureaucrat will compute the probability that the government (suffering from a soft budget) will continue with the infrastructure project. This probability is given by,

\[ \Pr(e \theta \geq \bar{Y}) = \Pr(\theta \geq \frac{\bar{Y}}{e}) = 1 - F\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}\right) \]

i.e. for any given level of effort \(e\) the probability that the productivity of the investment project will exceed the capital flight threshold \(\bar{Y}\). Suppose the government sets first-best effort at \(\hat{e} \in [0, 1]\).

Therefore, the bureaucrat will choose \(e\) to solve

\[
\max_{e \in [0,1]} B(e, \bar{Y}, \gamma, \hat{e}) = \begin{cases} 
\left[1 - F\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}\right)\right] \delta - \psi(e), & \text{if } e \geq \hat{e} \\
(1 - \mu) \left[1 - F\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}\right)\right] \delta - \psi(e), & \text{if } 0 \leq e < \hat{e}
\end{cases}. \] (2)

\(^{10}\)Although in the remainder of the paper we focus on the case where \(C_c \approx 0\), it is instructive, to briefly consider the derivation of the capital flight threshold where \(C_c\) can be arbitrarily different from zero. Clearly, the policy-maker will only complete the project if \(Y \geq \tilde{Y} = \frac{c_c}{\alpha}\), which, in turn implies that the investor will not engage in capital flight iff \(Y \geq \max \{\bar{Y}, \tilde{Y}\}\). Our model studies the case where the threat of capital flight is a substitute for the soft budget constraint i.e. \(\bar{Y} \geq \tilde{Y} \iff \frac{(1 - c_w)\delta}{1 - \alpha} \geq C_c\) which requires that either \(C_c\) is low enough, an assumption we maintain throughout the paper.
Let $e^* \in \arg \max_{e \in [0,1]} (1 - \mu) \left[ 1 - F(\frac{Y}{e}) \right] \delta - \psi(e)$ and let $\hat{B}(\gamma)$ denote the corresponding value function.

The solution to the bureaucrat’s maximization problem stated above yields a direct relation between bureaucrat effort $e$ (via its impact on the productivity of the public infrastructure project) and the investor’s capital flight threshold $Y$ (and $c_w$) and state capacity $\gamma$ and is summarized in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1.** Under the assumptions made so far, we have the following:

(i) if $\left[ 1 - F(\frac{Y}{\gamma}) \right] \delta - \psi(1) > 0$ and $\left[ 1 - F(\frac{Y}{\gamma}) \right] \delta - \psi(1) \geq \hat{B}(0)$, then the bureaucrat’s effort $e^* = \hat{e} = 1$ for all levels of state capacity $\gamma \in [0,1]$.

(ii) if $\left[ 1 - F(\frac{Y}{\gamma}) \right] \delta - \psi(1) > 0$ and $\hat{B}(0) > \left[ 1 - F(\frac{Y}{\gamma}) \right] \delta - \psi(1) > 0$, then there exists a threshold level of state capacity $\gamma_0$, $0 < \gamma_0 < 1$, such that when $\gamma \geq \gamma_0$, $e^* = \hat{e} = 1$ and when $\gamma < \gamma_0$, $e^* < 1$.

(iii) if $\left[ 1 - F(\frac{Y}{\gamma}) \right] \delta - \psi(1) < 0$, then there exists a threshold level of state capacity $\gamma_0$, $0 < \gamma_0 < 1$, such that when $\gamma \geq \gamma_0$, $e^* = \hat{e} < 1$ and when $\gamma < \gamma_0$, $e^* < \hat{e}$.

**Proof:** See Appendix.

The above proposition examines the relationship between state capacity and the quality of governance (as captured by the bureaucrat’s effort level) in the presence of the threat of capital flight. First, it shows that the target level of bureaucrat effort is itself affected by the capital flight threshold (via the bureaucrat’s participation constraint) and hence determines the target level of bureaucrat effort. Second, it shows that whether or not the target level of bureaucrat effort is achieved depends, in the general case, on a country’s state capacity. If state capacity is sufficiently high, then governance issues do not arise. Indeed under these conditions, the threat of capital flight only affects the quality of governance (i.e. bureaucrat incentives) via the bureaucrat’s participation constraint. More interesting, is the case where state capacity is imperfect. If state capacity is not sufficiently high, governance suffers, the target level of effort isn’t achieved and the bureaucrat is likely to put in low effort lowering the quality of governance.

Accordingly, in what follows, we first characterise the welfare benchmark when the government can commit the bureaucrat to the target level of effort and in a subsequent section, describe the case where the government cannot. Indeed it is in this latter case where the threat of capital flight may (or may not) provide discipline and provide incentives for good governance by the bureaucrat.
3.3 Governance, Capital Controls with High State Capacity: Second-Best Welfare and the “Capture” Effect

We analyze the case when the policymaker is able to commit the government bureaucracy to a specific action. At the same time, we assume that investors cannot commit to retain their investment in the country, especially if the cost of international capital mobility are low.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, we describe as our welfare benchmark the second-best case, where by assumption - the bureaucracy can commit to take an action but investors cannot pre-commit to retain their capital in the country.

Accordingly, when bureaucrat effort is contractible, the policy-maker’s expected payoff $W$ is obtained by maximizing with respect to $\hat{e}, c_w$ the expected return to investment:

$$W = \alpha \left( \int_{0}^{1} \hat{e} \theta f(\theta) d\theta \right)$$

where expected returns to the investment are given by $Y = e\theta$ and $\alpha$ is the share of total output that accrues to domestic factors. It follows that the government will choose to set as high a target effort level as possible subject to the bureaucrat’s participation constraint. However, the bureaucrat’s participation constraint depends on $c_w$ (via its impact on $Y$). So consider the inequality $[1 - F(Y)] \delta - \psi(1) \geq 0$. For this inequality to be satisfied, it has to be the case that there is an upper bound on the value of $Y$ or equivalently, a lower bound on $c_w$, denoted by $\tilde{c}_w$.

As long as $[1 - F(Y)] \delta - \psi(1) \geq 0$, $\hat{e} = 1$. With high state capacity, the government is able to commit the bureaucrat to $\hat{e} = 1$. It follows that the representative investor will invest if and only if the expected payoff from investing in the country ($\tilde{R}$) is greater than the opportunity cost of doing so i.e. iff

$$\tilde{R} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \int_{Y}^{1} \theta f(\theta) d\theta \right) + (1 - c_w) F(Y) \geq R$$

The first term on the left hand side is the expected payoff to the foreign investor from not withdrawing investment out of the country (since the return on the investment project is expected to be sufficiently high). The second term is the investor’s payoff from pulling investment out of the country (this occurs with probability $F(Y)$).

The policymaker faces the decision of whether to incur the up-front cost of initiating the public

\textsuperscript{11}The only possible exception is the case, when the currency of the country in question acts a reserve currency for the foreign investor.
project. If successful, such a public project boosts private returns and may help attract foreign investment. Accordingly, the government will initiate the project if and only if the expected payoff from doing so is higher than the fixed cost of initiating project $C_1$, i.e. iff

$$W = \alpha \left( \int_{\theta}^{1} \theta f(\theta) d\theta \right) \geq C_1. \quad (5)$$

The share of the total output that accrues to the policymaker-government is given by $\alpha$ and the term within brackets is the expected project return when the bureaucrat puts in effort equal to one, conditional on the private investment being retained in the project till its maturity.

Consider the impact of a change in $c_w$ on the policy-maker’s payoff and foreign investor’s payoff respectively. As mentioned earlier we can interpret this as a change in the degree of global integration/segregation arising out of a change in capital controls or the (transactions) cost of moving capital across borders.

When a country’s state capacity is sufficiently high, the bureaucrat effort is perfectly contractible and the “incentive” effect of globalization is absent. Under these conditions, a higher cost of withdrawing capital, makes the policymaker-government less vulnerable to the adverse consequence of capital flight in case of low project return. Moreover, a higher $c_w$ results in an unambiguous increase in the government’s expected payoff as the cost of project completion goes to zero. However, this higher cost of withdrawing capital reduces the option value to the foreign investor of investing in the country. This is because the investor’s investment is likely to be captured by the host country, as the investor is unlikely to be able to exercise his option to withdraw capital when the return on the investment project is low. This “capture” effect of a higher ex-ante cost of capital withdrawal has, as we shall show, an unambiguously negative effect on the returns from investing in the project in the first place.

In other words, once capital has been invested into a country, this “capture” effect makes the host country policymaker better off precisely because it limits the ability of the investors to exercise their “option” to exit the country. Notice that there is a direct distributional aspect to the “capture” effect - since it has very different payoff implications for the investors as against the policymaker-government.

**Proposition 2.** With high state capacity when the bureaucrat effort is contractible, we have the
following characterization of foreign investor and policy-maker welfare:

(i) the foreign investor’s ex-ante payoff is decreasing in $c_w$ and there exists a cutoff value $\bar{c} \geq 0$ so that the investor invests only if $c_w \leq \bar{c}$.

(ii) the policy-maker’s expected payoff is increasing in $c_w$ and there exists a cutoff value $\hat{c} \geq 0$ so that the government is willing to start the project only if $c_w \geq \hat{c}$.

(iii) the project will undertaken iff $\hat{c} \leq \bar{c}$.

Proof: See Appendix.

Therefore, the above proposition suggests that there is a role for having capital controls even if state capacity is high (i.e. bureaucrat effort is contractible). This is because capital controls help mitigate the foreign investors commitment problem. This is because capital flight occurs as a result of a low realisation of infrastructure productivity and not as a function of bureaucrat effort.

4 Governance and Globalization with Low State Capacity: Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis

We now analyse the equilibrium of the game and work out the implications of globalization for the policymaker’s welfare with low state capacity. Observe that this being a sequential game, in what follows we analyze the equilibrium backwards. We have already described the policymaker’s project completion decision, the foreign investor’s capital flight decision. We begin by analysing the bureaucrat’s effort decision and further examine the conditions under which the government launches the public infrastructure project and foreign investors invest capital into the investment project in the first place.

4.1 Bureaucrat Effort with low state capacity

Observe that with low state capacity, the bureaucrat’s effort choice will be $e^* \in \arg\max_{e \in [0,1]} (1 - \mu) \left[1 - F\left(\frac{e}{\xi}\right)\right] \delta - \psi(e)$.

The solution to the bureaucrat’s maximization problem stated above yields a direct relation between bureaucrat effort $e$ (via its impact on the productivity of the public infrastructure project) and the investor’s capital flight threshold $Y$ (and $c_w$). This relationship between the bureaucrat’s
effort \( e \) and the investor’s capital flight threshold \( Y \) is key to our analysis, and we summarize it in the proposition below.

**Proposition 3.** Under the assumption that \(-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} < 2\) for all \( \theta \in [0, 1] \) and \( \lim_{\theta \to 1} f(\theta) > 0 \), the bureaucrat’s expected payoff \( B(e, Y) \) is concave in \( e \) and we have the following:

(i) the bureaucrat’s effort \( e^* \) is non-decreasing (increasing at an interior solution) in the investor’s capital flight threshold \( Y \) (i.e. there is complementarity between \( e^* \) and \( Y \)) if \(-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} < 1\).

(ii) bureaucrat’s effort \( e^* \) is non-increasing (decreasing at an interior solution) in the investor’s capital flight threshold \( Y \) (i.e. there is substitutability between \( e^* \) and \( Y \)) if \(-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} > 1\).

**Proof:** See Appendix.

The above proposition describes a key relationship of the paper - namely, the impact of an increased likelihood of capital flight (a lower \( \bar{Y} \)) on the quality of governance (\( e^* \)) in the host country. Differences in the ability, and willingness of foreign investors to liquidate and withdraw capital from the country can have very different effects on the bureaucrat’s incentives.

The proposition above outlines two possibilities - either the threat of capital flight helps discipline the bureaucrat and improve governance (Proposition 3(i)) or it may have an adverse impact on the quality of governance and even worsen matters (Proposition 3(ii)).\(^{12}\) We discuss each of these scenarios below:

(a) **Capital Flight, Discipline and Good Governance:** One reason why a country may have poor governance is due to the inability of the policymaker to credibly threaten the bureaucrat (in countries with imperfect state capacity). In such countries, the bureaucrat puts in low effort because he is aware that any threat by the policymaker to not complete the project is an empty one.

In the above proposition, we sketch out conditions under which the threat of capital flight helps resolve this inefficiency in government. This is because if the investor can withdraw money relatively easily then the bureaucrat will be unable to earn the rents from the continuation of the public project. Nevertheless, the above proposition emphasises an important caveat. In particular, it points out that the threat of capital flight is effective as a discipline device so long as the probability of capital flight is sensitive to changes in effort \( e \) and not too sensitive to small changes in the structural environment, \( \theta \). In other words, for capital flight to work as a discipline device

\(^{12}\)For simplicity, in the discussion that follows, we assume that bureaucrat is at an interior solution.
it is important that changes in the (probability distribution over the) productivity of the public
good should are driven by the bureaucrat’s effort and not by changes in the external economic
environment.

(b) Capital Flight, (Over)Discipline and Inefficient Governance: A striking implication of the above
proposition is that the threat of capital flight may have a negative impact on the bureaucrat’s
incentives. For the threat of capital flight to be effective as an incentive device, it should be much
more likely if the bureaucrat puts in low effort rather than high effort.

In contrast, incentives will be adversely effected if capital flight that punishes a country is
unwarranted – in that it gets triggered off despite a bureaucrat putting in high effort, due to
changes in the external environment (i.e. $\theta$). In other words, if the probability of capital flight is
not sensitive to changes in effort $e$ (or equivalently, beliefs over $\theta$ are sensitive to small changes
in $\theta$), then this (over)discipline worsens governance. So the sensitivity of governance to shocks in
a country’s external economic environment clearly depends on the structure of its economy. We
can capture this relationship in several ways, for example by examining the relationship between
governance (i.e. $e$) and the structure of the export sector (as summarized in the nature of its
density function $f(\theta)$). Alternatively, we can examine the impact of a global financial or currency
crisis in directly exacerbating uncertainty. Given its central role in our analysis, we examine this
relationship between governance and various channels through which the global economy may affect
it next.

4.1.1 Globalization and Governance: Economic Fundamentals

Here we illustrate aspects of Proposition 3, by examining various channels through which global
economy affects governance. Our framework allows us to examine the impact on the incentives
for good governance due to changes in the volatility of the overall economic environment. While
economic uncertainty may arise due to changes in a country’s revenue, foreign investment or the
prospect of capital flight - the severity and nature of this impact is going to be a function of the
structure of the economy as well as the country’s state capacity. We examine these themes below.

(i) Economic Structure, the Export Sector and Governance: We are interested in a simple way
to capture an economy that has strong economic fundamentals in that it is less vulnerable to
shocks from the global economy. Accordingly, in what follows we use a simple channel to examine the relationship between governance and the volatility of a country’s economic environment - by focusing on the structure of its export sector.

In our framework, the global economy injects uncertainty on an investor’s decision making, through its impact on the revenue stream of the country’s export sector. For instance, if a country is relatively poor and exports primary products (mining or agricultural goods), then volatility in these commodity prices can have a large impact. In contrast, as a country develops and becomes more structurally diversified, so does its export sector (Imbs and Wacziarg(2003), Rodrik(2007)). This diversification and movement into less volatile commodities, results in an export sector that is less subject to overall volatility, even if individual products remain subject to idiosyncratic shocks. These structural characteristics are important, because they restrict the shape the underlying density function $f(\theta)$ and therefore, the ratio $\frac{-\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)}$. As the above proposition points out, whether the relationship between effort $e^*$ and $\bar{Y}$ is one of a substitute or a complement depends on $\frac{-\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)}$. Accordingly, we may be interested in how the underlying density function effects this key relationship.

For instance, consider the truncated exponential restricted to $[0,1]$. Observe that $\frac{-\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} = \lambda \theta$ where $\lambda > 0$ and $\frac{1}{\lambda}$ is the ratio of mean to variance of the (unrestricted) exponential distribution. Accordingly, it follows that a country with a structurally diversified export sector will have a $\lambda$ that is sufficiently small. In other words, if $\lambda \leq 1 \iff \frac{1}{\lambda} \geq 1$ then $\frac{-\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \leq 1$ while if $\lambda > 1 \iff \frac{1}{\lambda} < 1$ then $\frac{-\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} > 1$ over non-null sets of $\theta$. In the Appendix (Example 1), we show that there exists constants $0 < k_1 < k_2$ such that if $\frac{1}{\lambda} < k_1$, bureaucrat effort is increasing in $c_w$ while if $\frac{1}{\lambda} > k_2$ bureaucrat effort is decreasing in $c_w$.

Remark 1: If shocks to the revenue from a country’s export sector is described by a (truncated) exponential distribution, then so long as the ratio of the average value of exports to their variance are (i) high enough, the bureaucrat’s effort will be decreasing in $c_w$, i.e. the threat of capital flight will discipline the bureaucrat and lead to good governance, (ii) low enough, the bureaucrat’s effort will be increasing in $c_w$, i.e. the threat of capital flight will overdiscipline the bureaucrat and lead to inefficient governance.

Indeed, in general we can show that outside of some special cases such as the uniform distri-
bution, the parameter $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)}$, and hence the elasticity of beliefs over $\theta$, can take on very different values.\footnote{For example, when $f(.)$ is the normal distribution (with mean $\mu$ and variance $\sigma^2$) restricted to $[0,1]$, by computation note that $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} = -\frac{\theta (\theta - \mu)}{2 \sigma^2}$ so that if $\mu > 1$, it follows that $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \leq 1$ while if $\mu < 1$, there exists $K > 0$ such that if $\sigma^2 \geq K$, $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} > 1$ over non-null sets of $\theta$.}

If $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} > 2$ then the bureaucrat’s expected payoff $B(e, \bar{Y})$ may be convex. Indeed in this situation, we can expect that the bureaucrat’s effort to change discontinuously in $\bar{Y}$ and hence increase discontinuously in $c_w$. If the shocks to the revenue from a country’s export sector is described by a (truncated) exponential distribution, then so long as the ratio of the average value of exports to their variance is very low the bureaucrat’s objective function will be convex in effort and will discontinuously jump up as $c_w$ is increased. We elaborate on this in an example (Example 2) in the Appendix.

\textit{(ii) External Shocks, Uncertainty and Governance:} Here we examine the impact on bureaucrat effort when there is greater uncertainty about the external environment $\theta$. In a world where there is some degree of financial globalization, a banking or financial crisis or currency crisis elsewhere in the world, can make international investors nervous and make country vulnerable to capital flight - if some investors engage in short-run withdrawal of money. For instance, while the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 exacerbated uncertainty in the global economy, it did so especially in Latin America - labeled the ‘Tequila’ effect. To model such a scenario, assume that beliefs over $\theta$ are described by two possible probability density functions $f_1(.)$ and $f_2(.)$ which satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property i.e. $\frac{f_1(\theta)}{f_2(\theta)}$ is increasing in $\theta$. In other words, the probability density functions $f_2(.)$ corresponds to a more adverse external environment (“bad news”) relative to the probability density function $f_1(.)$ (“good news”). Let $B_i(e, \bar{Y}) = (1 - \mu) \left[1 - F_i(\sum^e)\right] \delta - \psi(e)$, where $F_i(.)$ is the corresponding cumulative density function where $i = 1, 2$. The relationship between the bureaucrat’s effort $e$ and the beliefs over $\theta$ is summarized in the proposition below.

**Proposition 4.** There is an adverse impact on the quality of governance, when there is greater uncertainty about the external environment, i.e. bureaucratic performance $e^*$ is lower when beliefs over $\theta$ are described by $f_2(.)$ rather than $f_1(.)$, when $f_1(.)$ and $f_2(.)$ satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property.

**Proof:** See Appendix.
The above proposition highlights the key mechanism underlying the main results of the paper: greater uncertainty over $\theta$ unambiguously lowers the quality of governance by worsening the bureaucrat’s incentives to put in effort. The proposition above shows that with greater uncertainty over $\theta$ the probability of capital flight becomes less sensitive to changes in the bureaucrat’s effort $e$. Accordingly, we observe an unambiguous decline in the overall quality of governance. This proposition also suggests an empirical test of the key mechanism of the paper that is described in Section 5 below.

Proposition 4 has a clear implication: when there is greater uncertainty in the global economy, there will be a stoppage or slow down of the push towards globalization (i.e. capital controls will not be reduced), because of the negative impact this greater global uncertainty has on the quality of governance.

4.2 Welfare Analysis with Non-contractible bureaucrat Effort

We now describe the equilibrium and carry out the welfare analysis with low state capacity - namely, where the policymaker-government is unable to commit the bureaucrat to commit to take a specified action. The representative investor will invest if and only if the expected payoff from investing in the country ($\hat{R}$) is greater than the opportunity cost of doing so i.e. iff

$$\hat{R} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \int_{\frac{Y}{e^*}}^{1} e^* f(\theta)d\theta \right) + (1 - c_w) F \left( \frac{Y}{e^*} \right) \geq R \tag{6}$$

The interpretation of the investors ex-ante payoff is exactly the same as in the case with contractible bureaucrat effort with $e^*$ in place of $e_{\max}$.

The policymaker will initiate the project if and only if

$$W = \alpha \left( \int_{\frac{Y}{e^*}}^{1} e^* f(\theta)d\theta \right) \geq C_1.$$

The interpretation of the investors ex-ante payoff is exactly the same as in the case with contractible bureaucrat effort with $e^*$ in place of $e_{\max}$ (see equation (5)).

We want to characterize how the decision to invest and/or the decision to initiate the project is affected by changes in $c_w$. With non-contractible bureaucrat effort (i.e. zero state capacity), in addition to the capture effect, there is the “incentive” effect namely $\frac{de^*}{dc_w}$.
Consider first, the case where globalization has a positive discipline effect. Here \( \frac{de^*}{dc_w} < 0 \) and the bureaucrat’s optimal effort choice \( e^* \) is decreasing in the cost of withdrawing capital. Accordingly, the “discipline” effect and the “capture” effect, both go in the same direction so that foreign investor’s expected payoff from investing in the country increases with globalization. However, a rise in \( c_w \), makes the threat of capital flight more costly and weakens the “disciplining” effect of globalization. Indeed this can more than offset the positive impact of global segregation on the policymaker’s ability to keep investment despite a bad external shock (i.e. the “capture” effect). Accordingly, globalization (i.e. a change in \( c_w \)) may not have a monotonic impact on the government’s expected payoff.

Having discussed the impact of globalization of short term capital movements, we are now in a position to examine its impact on host country welfare. We do this by integrating the policymaker’s decision to launch the public project with the foreign investor’s investment decision. As in the preceding discussion, we capture the extent of integration of a country’s capital markets, in a particularly simple manner - a reduction in the cost of a short-run liquidation and withdrawal of capital from the host country.\(^{14}\)

The impact on overall welfare will be a combination of the impact of a change in the degree of global integration (i.e. change in \( c_w \)) on both the foreign investor’s expected payoff (i.e. \( \tilde{R} \)) and the policymaker’s payoff \( W \). Indeed, as suggested by the preceding analysis, the overall impact on host country welfare occurs through the working of the “discipline” and “capture” effects. The preferences of the foreign investor and the policymaker are aligned when it comes to the “discipline” effect. Both investors and the policymaker would like to provide the appropriate incentives to ensure good governance. However, as mentioned above, the preferences of the policymaker and the foreign investors are in conflict when it comes to the “capture” effect.

The following proposition compares investor and policy-maker welfare with non-contractible bureaucrat effort to the second-best welfare benchmark with contractible bureaucrat effort:

**Proposition 5.** Under the assumption that bureaucrat effort is non-contractible, we have the following characterization of foreign investor and policy-maker welfare:

\(^{14}\)We should point out that while our analysis does not distinguish between a change in the cost of withdrawing capital (i.e. change in \( c_w \)) that is driven by technological-environmental forces or those driven by a government’s policy choices. However, for the moment, we assume that the government can choose the value of \( c_w \) subject to a lower bound \( c_w \).
(i) If a decrease in $c_w$ improves bureaucrat effort (i.e. positive “disciplining” effect), then globalization (a smaller $c_w$) increases both national and investor welfare i.e. $\frac{dW}{dc_w} < 0$.

(ii) If a decrease in $c_w$ worsens bureaucrat effort (i.e. negative “disciplining” effect), then national welfare always worsens with globalization. Furthermore, if $\frac{dR}{dc_w}|_{c_w=0} > 0$, then a marginal increase in $c_w$ can improve both investor and national welfare. i.e. it is a Pareto improvement.

(iii) When there is a disciplining effect of the threat of capital flight on bureaucrat effort, relative to the second best benchmark, lower capital controls will improve both investor and government welfare.

(iv) When there is an overdisciplining effect of the threat of capital flight on bureaucrat effort, relative to the second best benchmark, lower capital controls will lower both investor and government welfare.

Proof: See Appendix.

The proposition above describes that the impact on welfare of a reduction in the short-run cost of withdrawing capital is due to external shocks (or other changes that are not a function of the decision of the domestic policymaker). However, our framework is equally relevant, if we are analyzing the welfare impact of a reduction in $c_w$ arising out of a policy decision - such as a reduction in capital controls. In terms of our framework, the only difference is that at stage 1 (refer back to the timing of the game in Section 2), the government chooses $c_w$ (the level of capital controls) rather than merely observe $c_w$. The fact that this choice of a $c_w$ may involve a dead-weight loss will not alter the qualitative nature of any of results summarized in the preceding Propositions.

Our results throw light on one of the most contentious issues in international economic policymaking - the role of capital controls. A variety of arguments have been put forward for the imposition (or removal) of capital controls. However, ours is the first analytical treatment which looks at a very distinct channel - namely, the impact of capital controls on the quality of a country’s governance. Our analysis suggests that if a country’s economy is vulnerable to shocks from the global economy (i.e. suffers from ‘overdisciplining’), there could be a role for capital controls. Equally, there is a strong argument in favor of reducing capital controls - the ‘disciplining’ of nations clearly works, albeit some of the time.

Given our analysis in the preceding section (Remark 1) taken together with our preceding
discussion on the impact of globalization (decrease in $c_w$) on national welfare and the payoffs of the foreign investor:

**Remark 2:** (i) Globalization (i.e. lower capital controls) will improve both investor and government welfare relative to the second-best welfare benchmark, so long as the country has a sufficiently structurally diversified export sector, i.e. if the revenue from the country’s export sector is described by a (truncated) exponential distribution and the ratio of the country’s average value of exports to their variance is sufficiently high.

(ii) Globalization (i.e. lower capital controls) will lower both investor and government welfare, relative to the second-best welfare benchmark, so long as the country’s export sector is insufficiently diversified, i.e. if the revenue from the country’s export sector is described by a (truncated) exponential distribution and the ratio of the country’s average value of exports to their variance is sufficiently low.

While our results provide ammunition for both critics as well as advocates of easing up international capital mobility, we suggest that our results be treated very cautiously and not read as policy recommendation. This is especially true since we have completely sidestepped the political economy considerations that may hijack capital control policy.

## 5 Globalization and Governance: Some Evidence

Our theoretical framework generates a rich set of predictions. In this section we provide evidence consistent with some of our predictions. At the outset we should emphasize that the evidence should be treated as suggestive and interpreted cautiously - for reasons we elaborate on later in the section. We begin by summarizing some of the key predictions:

A. Uncertainty and Governance: The quality of governance is adversely affected by greater uncertainty in the economic environment (Proposition 4). This is because with greater uncertainty over $\theta$, the probability of capital flight becomes less sensitive to changes in $e$, resulting in an unambiguous decline in the quality of governance.

B. Governance and Globalization (Capital Controls): A reduction in the cost of financial globalization $c_w$ (e.g. lowering of capital controls) should be associated with improved measures of governance. This is because globalization results in the quality of governance improving in some
countries and worsening in others. However, we should only expect a government to relax capital controls if doing so has a positive impact on governance.

In what follows, while we provide some suggestive evidence on both sets of predictions, our focus is on A. This is for two reasons. First, we do not have plausible measures of a change in the cost of moving capital across countries, \( c_w \). The only measure that is reliably available is the size of capital controls - an endogenous choice variable of the government. Second and more importantly, we focus on A, because doing so throws light on the precise mechanism emphasized in the paper - in particular, how an exogenous change in economic uncertainty (possibly caused by globalization), can worsen incentives for good governance. However, any empirical design that tries to study this issue faces several challenges. First, we should be able to identify a sudden and unexpected event that results in greater uncertainty about the economic environment in a large number of countries. Second, this change in the economic environment should be independent of the actions of the bureaucrat-policymaker in the country that we are studying.

We argue that the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 provides a possible setting for a natural experiment that can help throw light on the impact of the greater uncertainty on the quality of governance. This currency crisis increased uncertainty and raised the fear of contagion across a number of countries that were perceived by investors to be ‘similar’ to Mexico - the so called “Tequila effect” on other countries in the region (see Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2000).\(^\text{15}\) Further, it is plausible that the initial trigger for the Mexican crisis was not the actions of policymakers and bureaucrats in countries other than Mexico. \(^\text{16}\) Indeed, it is because of this that we are interested in the impact of this increased uncertainty on countries other than Mexico. Our main hypothesis is that countries that were perceived to be similar to Mexico and had low state capacity, were more likely to be affected by the increased uncertainty due to the Mexican currency crisis. It is important that we distinguish between subjective contagion and real economic contagion across this set of countries. This is because according to our theory, we should expect an impact from greater uncertainty (in this case, greater uncertainty driven by external shocks) on governance.

\(^\text{15}\) Indeed, Glick and Rose (1999) argued that following the Mexican crisis there was considerable uncertainty as "speculative attacks on ther Latin American countries occurred immediately. The most prominent targets of the ‘Tequila Hangover’ were Latin American countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela." For a good summary of the effects of the Mexican crisis and its aftermath see Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Kaminsky and Reihart (2000).

\(^\text{16}\) It matters less whether this fear of contagion (the Tequila effect) was driven by fundamentals or whether it was irrational investor perceptions.
under the following two conditions. First, that this increased uncertainty was partially due to
greater subjective (as against real economic) contagion. Second, we should only expect the increased
uncertainty to affect governance if the country had low state capacity in the first place.

Data: As a first step for our empirical analysis, we need a measure of a country’s bureaucratic
performance. We have no direct measure of the quality of bureaucratic governance available across
countries. Fortunately, we have survey data on ‘bureaucratic quality’ available for a large number of
countries from Political Risk Services for the period 1984-1997. This is an index that is increasing
in bureaucratic quality and has the range from 6 to 0.2 in our data. Second, we need an exogenous
measure of the perceived similarity of a country to Mexico. Accordingly, we use the weighted
genetic closeness of a country to Mexico as a proxy for the extent of the expected ‘contagion’
from Mexico (see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). The measure ranges from 1,835 to 14.14 in our
data. Countries which are seen as similar to Mexico are more likely to be affected by contagion
in financial markets. Contagion increases market volatility (Corsetti et al., 2010) and is therefore
likely to cause investment decisions to be less tied to bureaucrat effort. Third, a measure of a
country’s state capacity is the strength of its institutions - where a measure of Protection against
Expropriation is the most widely used measure. To facilitate interpretation we flip the index, so
that 10 represents the poorest institutions, and 0 represents the best. In order to minimize concerns
of endogeneity, following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), we use settler mortality as our
instrument for a country’s overall state capacity. 17

Empirical Specification: According to our theoretical framework, greater uncertainty in the eco-
nomic environment should worsen bureaucratic performance, in presence of an incomplete con-
tractual structure exists between the government and the bureaucrat (i.e. low state capacity).
However, since the uncertainty from the Mexican crisis is more likely to affect countries perceived
to be similar to Mexico, our empirical specification takes the following form 18

17Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson show that settler mortality correlates highly with Risk of Appropriation, so our
first stage should be similar in that respect, however, we have 2 endogenous variables because of our difference-in-
differences design. Also, we must reconsider the exclusion restriction assumption, as our second stage is different.
However, we see no reason for settler mortality to impact on bureaucratic quality other than through its impact on
institutions.

18This can be seen as a triple-difference design.
\[ e^*_{ct} = \alpha_c + \beta_1[\text{Contagion}_{ct} \times \text{SettlerMortality}_c] + \beta_2[\text{SettlerMortality}_c \times \text{Post94}_t] \\
+ \beta_3[\text{Contagion}_{ct}] + \beta_4[\text{Post94}_t] + \Gamma \text{YearFE} + \Xi \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{ct} \]

Where the subscript \( c \) denotes countries and \( t \) denotes year and otherwise standard time-invariant variables are omitted because we estimate a fixed-effects model (ie. country institutions as measured by settler mortality, genetic closeness to Mexico, and their interaction are all dropped in the fixed-effects specification). \( \text{Post94} \) is a dummy variable for observations between 1995 and 1997, inclusive. \( \text{Contagion} \) equals the interaction between genetic closeness to Mexico and \( \text{Post94} \). Furthermore in our model, the impact of uncertainty on governance is completely absent for countries with no incomplete contractual problem between the policymaker and the bureaucrat. Accordingly, in some of our specifications (column 2 onwards) we increase the flexibility of the specification by allowing countries with a perfect state capacity index \(^{19}\) to react differently to the treatment by interacting our treatment with a dummy for perfect state capacity. If this feature of our model is correct this improvement in specification should improve the precision of our estimates.

Results: The reduced form equation above is estimated with and without a number of controls - from GDP per capita, military regimes, democracy, population, trade with Mexico, and openness to trade. While the results are robust to each, our preferred specifications do not include GDP per capita, exports, debt, trade with Mexico or openness to trade, since they are arguably endogenous variables. In robustness and falsification tests we therefore omit these controls. At the same time, we want to be sure that economic fundamentals are not driving our results, so it’s important to ensure robustness to variables like imports and exports with Mexico, which measures how exposed each country was to real economic effects of the crisis. Table 1 shows the main results in a reduced form specification. The coefficient of interest is \( \beta_1 \), which corresponds to the interaction between settler mortality and the contagion variable (which equals genetic distance if the observation is post-crisis). In all the specifications that we tested, we obtain a negative coefficient, that is robust to a wide variety of controls. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that bureaucratic performance is negatively affected by the increased threat of capital flight - so long as state capacity was low.

\(^{19}\)The state capacity index we used to construct this binary variable is the sum of the PSR corruption, rule of law and bureaucracy indices.
to begin with and the country was perceived to be similar to Mexico. Furthermore, countries with high state-capacity will react very differently to a crisis. Indeed, our results are reassuring on this count, since when we allow these countries to react differently to the crisis (column 2-6), there is a dramatic improvement of the precision of our estimates. We can also discount the possibility that economic fundamentals are driving our estimates based on this table. The estimate is robust to our first of two checks on this potential issue: including the variables intended to control for the exposure to the crisis based on fundamentals; GDP per capita, openness to trade, external debt, imports and exports with Mexico and total exports.

Of course, the results above are only the reduced form estimates. So we may worry whether settler mortality is an adequate instrument for the institutional state capacity of a country. To further ensure that the settler mortality term that we use is an adequately proxy for institutional quality, we also report two-stage least squares results (see Appendix for details). Here the controls are the same as in the reduced form version of the model. In column 1, because both instruments are significant predictors of both endogenous variables, we might have an under-identification issue. However, as can be seen from columns 2-7, under-identification is no longer a concern once we correctly specify the model to treat countries with a perfect state capacity differently. Otherwise, the first stage is consistent with expectations. The instruments that are expected to predict the
endogenous variables are all highly significant with the expected signs. The second stage is also consistent with all previous results. Each correctly specified model is highly significant and with the expected sign. The coefficient of interest in the first (misspecified) model is insignificant, which is unsurprising given the potentially under-identified first stage results.

We carry out further robustness checks. One concern with this framework is that we can’t be positive that we’re picking up the effect of the crisis specifically rather than normal trend effects. In other words, this can be seen as a difference-in-differences design, which relies on the identifying assumption that the treatment and control groups are not already diverging before treatment. To alleviate this concern we run a series of placebos, moving the year of treatment to various different points in time. Observe from Table 4 that this is not a concern since each placebo is close to zero and highly insignificant.

As a further test of robustness, we examine serial correlation as suggested in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullinathian (2004). We have 56 countries in our sample, so we correct for serial correlation using the two relevant (given our sample size) suggestions: clustering and collapsing the data to fewer time periods. Table 3 shows the reduced form and 2SLS results using the two-way cluster-robust standard errors proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011). This allows for clustering in two non-nested dimensions, and we do so on countries and years. While we present results without the potentially endogenous ‘exposure’ controls, their inclusion does not change the qualitative nature of the results. We find that our results are robust to clustering, suggesting that serial correlation is not driving our results.

Despite the fact that our results seem quite robust, there are reasons to be cautious. Our first concern is that the possibility that the Mexican crisis results in adverse real economic contagion effects may result in a neighboring country’s fundamentals being affected in a way that resources available to the bureaucracy are curtailed. For example, the crisis results in a sharp drop in Mexican demand for imports or FDI towards other Latin American countries - i.e. economic contagion (Rigobon, 2006). This economic contagion may have an adverse impact on the budgetary situation.

\footnote{The third suggestion is block-bootstrapping, but as noted by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan a large number of observations is required. In fact they note in a working paper version that 50 observations would not be sufficient for the block-bootstrap to perform well and we have only 56.}

\footnote{We control for the former using controls for trade with Mexico directly in the main results, while the latter was tested in a falsification test similar to table 5, except with FDI as the dependent variable. We do not present results on the FDI falsification test, however we can rule out that a decrease in FDI occurred among our treatment group after treatment.
in these countries and result in fewer resources being devoted to the bureaucracy and institutions of governance. Accordingly, failure to control for changes in economic fundamentals due to the crisis, could represent an omitted variable, which might bias our estimates. However, any empirical strategy should account for the challenge that arises from the endogeniety of changes in the budgetary expenditure. We therefore take a two pronged approach. First, we carry out a falsification exercise by testing our model on government expenditures to see if the crisis reduced government budgets. Here, if we found a significant decrease in government budgetary resources, it could be argued that it was this drop in resources that was causing a drop in bureaucrat performance, rather than the increased uncertainty. Reassuringly, the crisis does not have any significant impact on government budgets among countries similar to Mexico with low state capacity. We report these results in Table 5 columns 5-8. Not only is the estimate not significant, if anything it has the opposite sign. This result is consistent with our previous specifications that show a country’s change in bureaucratic quality is not being driven by its direct economic exposure to the crisis. While these controls are potentially endogenous, we include them only in the last column of Table 1 to show that are results are not being driven by GDP per capita, openness to trade, imports and exports with Mexico, external debt and exports.

The second main concern that we have is that our measure of bureaucratic performance is a subjective one. In particular, while this measure is widely used, the main worry may well be that it is subject to ‘contamination’ since it based on the perceptions of managers and investors surveyed. The concern is that there may be no actual change in bureaucratic quality, and instead the crisis merely caused a change in perceptions of bureaucratic quality. Given the absence of an alternative reliable, objective measures of bureaucratic performance that are easily available for a cross section of countries, this is a difficult challenge, which we address indirectly. To assess whether this is a significant concern, we run our model through a falsification test using a variable we believe should be similarly affected by a perceptions bias, but for which there is no expected real effect. The dependent variable used is a bureaucrat corruption measure from the same survey as our bureaucratic quality measure, and generated using the same methodology. The idea is that because we expect no real change in real corruption, but we do expect perceptions of both bureaucratic quality and corruption to be highly correlated, we can attribute changes in the corruption estimate to the size of the bias. The success of this falsification design relies on the claim that a perceptions
bias will be highly correlated among all measures of how well a government functions.

The results of this falsification test can be seen in Table 5, columns 1-4. Indeed the estimates are close to 0 and insignificant. While not reported, we also run a similar exercise on perceptions from Heritage Foundation, and the results were similar. Transparency International and World Bank also have perception based measures, however they don’t include data from before the crisis, so these measures could unfortunately not be tested. However, there is no impact of the crisis on any of our falsification specifications, indicating that the concern that our results for bureaucratic quality results are driven by biased perceptions should be minimal. The fact that we do not find any significant impact of the Mexican crisis on measures of perceived corruption, increases our confidence that changes in bureaucratic quality were real changes, and not biased by false perceptions.

The results described above suggest that the unexpected increase in uncertainty in financial markets exacerbated the threat of capital flight and adversely affected governance, especially in those countries which had relatively weak institutional state capacity. This effect is robust to the inclusion of many controls, including measures of current development, and survives placebo analysis. Further, the two-stage least squares analysis is consistent with the reduced form analysis. Moreover, while the results from our falsification tests were reassuring, they were not conclusive. Accordingly, given that we lack direct measures of bureaucratic performance, we argue that the results be interpreted cautiously and treated as suggestive.

We now briefly sketch out some suggestive evidence that shows the relationship between governance and capital controls sketched out in B above. The globalization of capital can occur due to changes in the policy environment (e.g. a reduction in capital controls) or a function of technological changes (e.g. the information technology revolution). Indeed, both these factors have been responsible for the increase in the movement of international capital over the last couple of decades. However, the empirical literature on financial globalization on governance has been handicapped not just by the absence of any (exogenous) measure of the changes in (technology related) cost of moving capital across borders, but also the endogeneity of changes in the policy of capital controls. Accordingly, over here our aims are quite modest. We limit our discussion to providing some suggestive evidence in support of our claims. While suggestive, our results are no more than that - since issues of endogeneity and selection remain a concern.
As a first step, consider Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6. This provides conditional correlations that suggest that a weakening of capital controls is associated with better governance as captured by improvements in bureaucratic quality, i.e. the coefficient is negative. Of course, this correlation is likely driven by countries that do not relax capital controls because they fear the adverse impact on bureaucrat governance (i.e. selection bias). Recollect that our theoretical framework suggests that the effect on governance from a change in capital controls may on average be close to zero, as positive and negative effects are possible. In column 6 of Table 6 we attempt to control for the selection bias which may be driving columns 5 and 6. If those countries with poor institutional quality are those least likely to proceed with capital control relaxation, then the institutional quality variable will be correlated with the selection bias. If our theoretical prediction is correct, the inclusion of a variable correlated with the selection effect should drive the estimate towards zero. Indeed this is precisely what we see, as there is a reduction of the size of the estimate towards zero in column 6. While consistent with our theoretical predictions, these results are quite possibly driven by some omitted variable.

6 Conclusion

The globalization and integration of the world economy over the past few decades has led to dramatic changes in the pattern of capital flows - especially to developing countries. A number of commentators have pointed out both the promise and the perils of increased (though more volatile) capital flows. In this paper we take a first step in examining the implications of this globalization of capital on the quality of governance. Despite the simplicity of our framework, our results were quite striking. By exacerbating the threat of capital flight, globalization had the potential to ‘discipline’ errant governments into enacting efficient policies. However, this disciplining stick of the global capital market was not perfect. The threat of unwarranted capital flight could also weaken incentives and ‘indiscipline’ governments, especially so long as the government was unable to impose capital controls.

It is difficult to think of institutional mechanisms that can credibly commit governments to behaving in an efficient manner, especially in developing countries - where the state’s capacity is relatively weak. However, our analysis suggests that we should be cautious in presuming that the forces of globalization will in and of themselves provide a simple mechanism to discipline
governments and improve governance. All countries face the prospect of indisciplined governments. However, this problem in particularly acute in developing countries because as argued by North (1990, pp57), such countries lack “...a mechanism to provide the information necessary to know when punishment is required”. Our analysis suggests that while such a mechanism might end up arriving as a by-product of the process of globalization, integration and technological change - its impact may be uncertain.
References


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Appendix: Theory

Proof of Proposition 1:

We begin by examining how the target level of effort $\hat{e}$ depends on the investor’s capital flight threshold $\overline{Y}$ (and $c_w$). As the government’s ex-ante payoff is strictly increasing in bureaucrat’s effort, the government will set a target effort level that is highest possible consistent with satisfying the bureaucrat’s participation constraint. First, note that when $\left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta \geq \psi(1)$ (the bureaucrat’s participation constraint is satisfied at $e = 1$), then the government will choose $\hat{e} = 1$. Next, suppose, $\left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta < \psi(1)$. Then, necessarily $\hat{e} < 1$ and must satisfy the equation

$$\left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta = \psi(\hat{e}).$$

As $\psi(.)$ is an increasing function with $\psi(0) = 0$ and $\lim_{\hat{e} \to 0} \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta < 0$ with $\left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right]$ an increasing function of $\hat{e}$, it follows that there exists a unique solution to the preceding equation. Note that $\hat{e}$ is an increasing function of $\overline{Y}$. By duality, note that $\hat{B}(\gamma)$ is strictly decreasing in $\gamma$ with $\hat{B}(1) = 0$. Therefore: (a) if $\hat{B}(0) = \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(1) > 0$, it follows that $e^* = 1$ for all $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, (b) if $\hat{B}(0) > \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(1) > 0$, it follows that there exists $\gamma$, $0 < \gamma < 1$, such that when $\gamma \geq \gamma$, $e^* = 1$ and when $\gamma < \gamma$, by revealed preference, $1 > e^* \in \arg \max_{e \in [0, 1]} (1 - \mu) \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(e)$. When $\left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(e) < 0$, $\hat{e} < 1$. Furthermore, if $\hat{B}(0) = \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(\hat{e}) = 0$ would contradict the fact that $\hat{B}(1) = 0$ since $\hat{B}(\gamma)$ is strictly decreasing in $\gamma$. Therefore, $\hat{B}(0) > \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(\hat{e})$ so that there exists $\gamma$, $0 < \gamma < 1$, such that when $\gamma \geq \gamma$, $e^* = \hat{e}$ and when $\gamma < \gamma$, by revealed preference, $\hat{e} > e^* \in \arg \max_{e \in [0, 1]} (1 - \mu) \left[1 - F(\overline{Y})\right] \delta - \psi(e)$. ■

Proof of Proposition 2:

By computation, note that the derivative of $\tilde{R}$ with respect to $c_w$ is given by the equation

$$\frac{d\tilde{R}}{dc_w} = -F(\overline{Y}) < 0$$

and is captured by the term $-F(\overline{Y})$. In this case, the investor’s expected payoff $\tilde{R}$ attains a maximum when it is costless to withdraw short-term capital from a country, i.e. $c_w = 0$. Therefore, there exists a cutoff value $\tilde{c} \geq 0$ so that the investor invests only if $c_w \leq \tilde{c}$.
By computation, note that the derivative of $W$ with respect to $c_w$ is given by the equation

$$\frac{dW}{dc_w} = \bar{Y} f(\bar{Y}) > 0$$

The government’s expected payoff $W$ attains a maximum when short-term capital is never withdrawn from a country, i.e. $c_w = 1$. For the inequality $[1 - F(\bar{Y})] \delta - \psi(1) \geq 0$ to be satisfied, it must be the case that $c_w \geq \bar{c}_w$. Therefore, there exists a cutoff value $\hat{c} \geq 0$ so that the government is willing to start the project only if $c_w \geq \hat{c}$.

Clearly, when $0 \leq \hat{c} \leq \bar{c}^*$, the investment project will be undertaken and the government will set $c_w = \bar{c}$. ■

**Proof of Proposition 3:** Let $\tilde{\psi}(e) = \frac{\psi(e)}{1 - \mu}$. By computation, $\frac{\partial^2 B(e)}{\partial e^2} = - \left[ \left( f'(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}) \frac{\bar{Y}}{e} + 2 f\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}\right)\right) \frac{\delta}{e^2} + \tilde{\psi}''(e) \right]$ so that the bureaucrat’s objective function is (strictly) concave in $e$ if $f'(\theta)\theta + 2 f(\theta) > 0$, $\theta \in [0, 1]$ or equivalently, $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} < 2$. Further, given that the bureaucrat’s objective function is strictly concave, at an interior solution $e^*$ the following first-order condition holds:

$$\frac{\partial B(e^*, \bar{Y})}{\partial e} = f\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*}\right) \frac{\bar{Y}}{(e^*)^2} \delta = \tilde{\psi}'(e^*)$$

By taking total derivatives of the first-order condition with respect to $e$ and $\bar{Y}$, it follows that

$$\frac{de^*}{d\bar{Y}} = \frac{\frac{\partial B(e^*, \bar{Y})}{\partial e}}{\frac{\partial^2 B(e^*)}{\partial e^2}} = \frac{\left( f'(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*}) \frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*} + 2 f\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*}\right)\right) \frac{\delta}{(e^*)^2}}{\left( f'(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*}) \frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*} + 2 f\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e^*}\right)\right) \frac{\delta}{(e^*)^2} + \tilde{\psi}''(e)}$$

By computation, note that $\frac{\partial B(e, \bar{Y})}{\partial e} = \left( f'(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}) \frac{\bar{Y}}{e} + f\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}\right)\right) \frac{\delta}{e^2}$ so that bureaucrat’s effort $e$ and $\bar{Y}$ are complements (i.e. $\frac{\partial^2 B(e, \bar{Y})}{\partial e \partial \bar{Y}} > 0$) if $f'(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}) \frac{\bar{Y}}{e} + f\left(\frac{\bar{Y}}{e}\right) > 0$ which can be rewritten as $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} < 1$. On the other hand, if $-\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} > 1$, $\frac{\partial B(e, \bar{Y})}{\partial e \partial \bar{Y}} < 0$ so that bureaucrat’s effort $e$ and $\bar{Y}$ are substitutes.

■

**Example 1 (The truncated exponential)**

Let $f(\cdot)$ be the exponential distribution restricted to $[0, 1]$ so that

$$f(\theta) = \begin{cases} \frac{g(\theta)}{\theta} & \text{if } \theta \in [0, 1], \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
where

\[ g(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
\lambda \exp^{-\lambda \theta} & \text{if } \lambda > 0, \theta \geq 0, \\
0 & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases} \]

and \( \hat{g}(\theta) \) is the corresponding cumulative distribution function. By substitution we get

\[ -\frac{f'(\frac{\bar{\gamma}}{e^*})}{f\left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}}{e^*}\right)} = \frac{\lambda \bar{Y}}{e^*} \]

so that as long as \( 1 \leq \frac{\lambda \bar{Y}}{e^*} \Leftrightarrow e^* \leq \lambda \bar{Y} \) the bureaucrat’s effort is increasing in \( c_w \). As \( e^* \leq 1 \), as long as \( \frac{\lambda}{1-\alpha} \geq 1 \) or \( \frac{1}{\lambda} \leq \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \) the bureaucrat’s effort is increasing in \( c_w \).

On the other hand, if \( e^* > \lambda \bar{Y} \), the bureaucrat’s effort choice is decreasing in \( c_w \). Let \( \psi(e) = ce \). Using the fact that \( e^* \) is characterized by a FOC, by substitution, we obtain that as long as

\[ \frac{\delta \exp^{-1}}{\lambda \hat{g}(1)} > \frac{c}{1-\gamma} \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{\lambda} > \frac{c \hat{g}(1)}{(\delta \exp^1)(1-\gamma)} \]

**Example 2 (Non-concave expected payoffs \( B(e, \bar{Y}) \))**

If \( -\frac{\theta f'(\theta)}{f(\theta)} > 2 \) over a non-null set of \( \theta \), then the bureaucrats expected payoffs \( B(e, \bar{Y}) \) needn’t be concave in \( e \). In this case, first-order conditions may no longer be valid in characterizing \( e^* \). How does \( e^* \) depend on \( \bar{Y} \) (and hence, \( c_w \)) in this case?

To fix matters, we will focus on the case with corner solutions and assume that \( \psi(e) = ce \). In this case, \( e^* = 1 \) when \( \frac{\partial B(1, \bar{Y})}{\partial e} = f(\bar{Y})\bar{Y} > \frac{c}{1-\gamma} \). As \( f(\bar{Y})\bar{Y} \) is decreasing in \( \bar{Y} \) whenever \( -\frac{\bar{Y} f'(\bar{Y})}{f(\bar{Y})} > 2 \), it follows that there exists a threshold value of \( \bar{Y} \) such that whenever \( \bar{Y} \leq \bar{Y} \), \( e^* = 1 \) and \( \bar{Y} > \bar{Y} \), there is a discontinuous jump of bureaucrat’s effort from \( e^* = 1 \) to an interior value strictly less than one.

**To summarize:** that the bureaucrat’s effort could decreasing discontinuously in \( \bar{Y} \), and hence increase discontinuously in \( c_w \), when the bureaucrat’s expected utility is non-concave in own effort is a robust possibility. \( \blacksquare \)
Proof of Proposition 4

The bureaucrat will choose $e$ to solve

$$\max_{e \in [0,1]} B_i(e, Y) = \left\{ 1 - F_i(\frac{Y}{e}) \right\} \delta - \psi(e)$$

Let $\tilde{\psi}(e) = \frac{\psi(e)}{1-\mu}$. The following first-order conditions characterize the optimal effort choice of the bureaucrat for each $i = 1, 2$:

$$\frac{\partial B_i(e_i^*, Y)}{\partial e} = f_i(\frac{Y}{e_i^*}) \frac{Y}{(e_i^*)^2} \delta = \tilde{\psi}'(e_i^*)$$

As $\tilde{\psi}'(.)$ is convex, by taking the ratio of the two first-order conditions, it follows that for $e_1^* \geq e_2^*$, $\frac{f_1(\theta)}{f_2(\theta)} \geq 1$. However, observe that as the monotone likelihood ratio property is satisfied, by log supermodularity, $\frac{f_1(\theta)}{f_2(\theta)} > 1$, as required. ■

Proof of Proposition 5:

By computation, note that the derivative of $\tilde{R}$ with respect to $c_w$, taking into account the incentive effect on bureaucrat effort, is given by the equation

$$\frac{d\tilde{R}}{dc_w} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \int_\Sigma \frac{de^*}{dc_w} \theta f(\theta) d\theta \right) - F\left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right)$$

There are two distinct effects on the investor’s expected payoff $\tilde{R}$ from investing in the project as the cost of withdrawing capital increases. First, increasing the cost of withdrawing capital impacts on the bureaucrat’s incentive to put in effort - this is the “discipline” effect. The impact of this effect is captured by the term $(1 - \alpha) \left( \int_\Sigma \frac{de^*}{dc_w} \theta f(\theta) d\theta \right)$. Second, as above, the “capture” effect is captured by the term $-F\left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right)$. When $\frac{de^*}{dc_w} < 0$, $\frac{d\tilde{R}}{dc_w} < 0$. In this case, the investor’s expected payoff $\tilde{R}$ attains a maximum when it is costless to withdraw short-term capital from a country, i.e. $c_w = 0$. Therefore, there exists a cutoff value $\zeta \geq 0$ so that the investor invests only if $c_w \leq \zeta$. When $\frac{de^*}{dc_w} > 0$, the bureaucrat’s optimal effort choice $e^*$ is increasing in the cost of withdrawing capital. In this case the “discipline” effect and the “capture” effects go in opposite directions. In this case, $\tilde{R}$ may not be monotone in $c_w$. In particular, due to the fact that globalization may have a negative impact on the bureaucrat’s effort, there could be regions in $[0,1]$ where the expected return to foreign investment $\tilde{R}$, is increasing in $c_w$. Let $\zeta$ denote the minimum value of $c_w$ for
which the investor is indifferent between investing in the project or investing the money outside the country.

It follows that when \( \frac{d\theta}{dc_w} < 0, c < \bar{c} \) and when \( \frac{d\theta}{dc_w} > 0, c > \bar{c} \) so that relative to second-best welfare benchmark, the foreign investor has a lower tolerance for capital controls when there is a disciplining effect of the threat of capital flight and a higher tolerance for capital controls when there is an overdisciplining effect of the threat of capital flight.

We now turn to the payoff of the government-policymaker. By computation, note that the derivative of \( W \) with respect to \( c_w \) is given by the equation

\[
\frac{dW}{dc_w} = \alpha \left[ \left( \int \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dc_w} f(\theta) d\theta \right) - (1 - c_w) f \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} \right]
\]

Consider the impact of a change in \( c_w \). There are two effects on the expected payoff to the government-policymaker \( W \), as the cost of short-run capital withdrawal goes up. First, is the direct impact on the quality of governance as captured through the bureaucrat’s incentives - the “discipline” - this can be positive or negative. This effect is captured in the first term, \( \left( \int \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{d\theta}{dc_w} f(\theta) d\theta \right) \), in the government’s expected payoff. Second, as before, the second term, \(- (1 - c_w) f \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} \), represents the “capture” effect. We show that \( \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} < 0 \) so that \(- (1 - c_w) f \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} \geq 0 \). By computation,

\[
\frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} = \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} e^* \left( 1 - \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \frac{de^*}{dc_w} \right)
\]

If \( \frac{de^*}{dc} \leq 0 \), clearly \( \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} < 0 \). If \( \frac{de^*}{dc} > 0 \), by computation, note that

\[
\frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \frac{de^*}{dc} = \frac{\left( f' \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} + f \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \right)}{(e^*)^2} \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} \]

as in this case \( f' \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} + f \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \) so that again \( \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} < 0 \). Therefore, this second term makes the host country policymaker better off\(^{22}\) precisely because it limits the ability of the investors to exercise their “option” to exit the country.

\(^{22}\)In the appendix we show that \( \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} < 0 \) so that \(- (1 - c_w) f \left( \frac{\Sigma}{e^*} \right) \frac{d\Sigma}{dc_w} \geq 0 \).
Therefore, once we take both of these effects into account, the impact of globalization on the government’s payoff is the following. An increase in the cost of withdrawing short-term capital, results in a higher government payoff so long as the bureaucrat is being “overdisciplined”. In this case lower levels of global integration by reducing the threat of unwarranted capital flight, improve the bureaucrat’s incentives. In other words $\frac{dW}{dc_w} > 0$ whenever $\frac{dc^*}{dc_w} > 0$, since in this case both the incentive and capture effects go in the same direction. In this case, the government’s expected payoff $W$ attains a maximum when short-term capital is never withdrawn from a country, i.e. $c_w = 1$. Therefore, there exists a cutoff value $\hat{c} \geq 0$ so that the government is willing to start the project only if $c_w \geq \hat{c}$.

In contrast, if the bureaucrat’s incentives were such that he was being ‘underdisciplined’, then lower levels of global integration would have a negative effect on his incentive to put in effort. Therefore, when $\frac{dc^*}{dc_w} < 0$ a weakening of the “discipline” effect occurs when capital flight is made costly for the foreign investor. Indeed this can more than offset the positive impact of global segregation on the policymaker’s ability to keep investment despite a bad external shock (i.e. the “capture” effect). Accordingly, globalization (i.e. a change in $c_w$) may not have a monotonic impact on the government’s expected payoff. Let $\check{c} \geq 0$ denote the minimum value of $c_w$ for which the government is indifferent between starting the project and not starting the project at all.

By computation, it follows that, when $\frac{dc^*}{dc_w} > 0$, $\check{c} < \hat{c}$ and when $\frac{dc^*}{dc_w} < 0$, $\hat{c} > \check{c}$ so that relative to second-best welfare benchmark, the policymaker has a higher incentive to impose capital controls when there is an overdisciplining effect of the threat of capital flight and a lower incentive to impose capital controls when there is a disciplining effect of the threat of capital flight.■
### Table 2: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Contagion Effect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>PANEL A: First Stage (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion x Settler Mortality</td>
<td>0.454***</td>
<td>0.716***</td>
<td>0.708***</td>
<td>0.709***</td>
<td>0.611***</td>
<td>0.559***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0951)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>231.92*</td>
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<td>(95.57)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.618</td>
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<td>Contagion x Settler Mortality</td>
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<td>-0.0117</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
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<td>801.7***</td>
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<td>801.2***</td>
<td>1,001***</td>
<td>991.6***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(127.7)</td>
<td>(127.3)</td>
<td>(127.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td><strong>PANEL C: Second Stage</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion x Poor Institutions</td>
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<td>-0.834***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.139)</td>
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<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
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<td>Settler Mortality x Post94</td>
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<td>0.569***</td>
<td>0.587***</td>
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<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Debt</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>Exports</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to Trade</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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Notes: All models are estimated using IV. The time period included in the sample is restricted to 1987-1998. The second stage dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
### Table 3: Robustness check: clustered standard errors

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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Bureaucratic Quality</th>
<th>Reduced Form Estimates</th>
<th>IV estimates</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contagion x Settler Mortality</td>
<td>-0.597* (0.331)</td>
<td>-0.622* (0.321)</td>
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<td>Contagion x Poor Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
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<td>Country FE</td>
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<td>Non-interacted treatments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diff. reaction if high st.cap.</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regimes</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Debt</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
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<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to Trade</td>
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<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence with Mexico</td>
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<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-D Minimum Eigenvalue</td>
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<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
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</table>

Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The time period included in the sample is restricted to 1987-1998. The dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country and year levels. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

### Table 4: Placebo Estimates of Contagion on Bureaucratic Quality

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<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contagion x Settler Mortality</td>
<td>0.00153</td>
<td>0.0263</td>
<td>0.0439</td>
<td>0.0275</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff. reaction if high st.cap.</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Regimes</td>
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</table>

Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

### Table 5: Falsification Tests of Other Potential Explanations

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<td>Non-interacted treatments</td>
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<td>Diff. reaction if high st.cap.</td>
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<td>Military Regimes</td>
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<td>Exports</td>
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<td>Openness to Trade</td>
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Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The time period included in the sample is restricted to 1987-1998. All models include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Correlations between State Capacity/Capital Controls and Bureaucratic Quality

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<tr>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<th>(6)</th>
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Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table 7: Summary Statistics

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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