Microeconomic Theory II (ECO2030), unit 1
Department of Economics, University of Toronto
instructor Martin J. Osborne
schedule The class meets MW9-11 in BA2185. Most weeks there will be a tutorial W2-4 in LM123.

During the week starting February 13, the schedule will be different:

  • there will be no meeting on Monday February 13
  • there will be two classes on Wednesday February 15, one at the normal class time (9:10–11) and one at the normal tutorial time (2:10–4), but in WB130, not the usual tutorial room (WB is the Walberg building, on the north of College Street just east of St. George)
  • there will be a tutorial on Friday February 17 from 10:10am to noon in OI 3-331. (OI is OISE, at 252 Bloor Street West.)
outline Course outline
ta The TA for the course is Kevin Fawcett. He holds weekly office hours on Tuesdays 3–5 in GE40 (up to and including February 14). He will hold extra office hours on Thursday February 16, 11:30–1:30 in GE72 and on Sunday February 26, 11–2 in GE72. (If you do not have access to the economics building outside normal hours, email Kevin to arrange a time when he can let you into the building on Sunday.)
tutorial I will hold a tutorial session every Wednesday 2:10pm–4pm in LM123 up to February 8. In the week starting February 13, the tutorial session will be on Friday (February 17), at a time and location to be arranged.
exam The final exam for this unit (= midterm for 2030) will be held on Monday 2/27 in HA 401 (note: not the regular classroom!) from 9:10am to 11am. (HA is the Haultain Building, behind 170 College St..)
office hours Thursday February 9, 1:30–3:30. I will also hold office hours on Friday February 17 at a time to be arranged and during Reading Week at a time to be arranged.
schedule
Class 1
Nash equilibrium (Sections 2.1–2.3 of "A Course in Game Theory"). Slides. Problem Set 1; solutions.
Class 2
Nash equilibrium continued (Section 2.4); introduction to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Section 3.1). [Section 2.5 will be omitted; I will return to the material in Section 2.6.] Slides. Problem Set 2; solutions.
Class 3
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium continued. [Read Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will be omitted.] Slides. Problem Set 3; solutions.
Class 4
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium example. Bayesian games. Slides. Problem Set 4; solutions.
Class 5
Auctions. Slides. Problem Set 5; solutions.
Class 6
Extensive games with perfect information: strategies, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, the one deviation property (Sections 6.1, 6.2). Slides. No problem set.
Class 7
Extensive games with perfect information: backward induction; Stackelberg games; ultimatum game; holdup game; adding chance moves and simultaneous moves (Section 6.3). Slides. Problem Set 6; solutions.
Class 8
Chain-Store game (Section 6.5.1). Bargaining theory: bargaining game of alternating offers (Chapter 7, omitting the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 122.1 and Section 7.4.3). Slides. Problem Set 7; solutions.
Class 9
Properties of subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining game of alternating offers. Bargaining game of alternating offers with risk of breakdown. Nash bargaining solution (Sections 15.1, 15.2 (using the approach on pp. 308–309), 15.3). Slides. Problem Set 8, solutions; Problem Set 9, solutions.
Class 10
Relation between Nash solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining game of alternating offers (Section 15.4) Outside options in the bargaining game of alternating offers. Repeated games (Sections 8.1–8.3 (preferences with discounting only)). Slides. No problem set.
Class 11
Repeated games: Strategies and Nash equilibrium (Sections 8.4 and 8.5). Slides. No problem set.
Class 12
Repeated games: Subgame perfect equilibrium (Section 8.8). Slides. Problem Set 10.
finals Note that in 2005–2007 the course covered more material than it did in the other years.
Page last modified 2012-2-9. All material copyright © Martin J. Osborne 1996–2012