ECO 426 (Market Design) - Lecture 8

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Revenue equivalence

- Model:
 - N bidders
 - Bidder *i* has valuation *v_i*
 - Each v_i is drawn independently from the same distribution F (e.g. U[0, 1])
- Theorem In any auction such that in equilibrium:
 - the winner with the highest valuation wins, and
 - the bidder with the lowest possible valuation pays nothing,

the average revenue are the same, and the average bidder profits are the same.

- DP, SP, FP and AP share the properties that
 - equilibrium outcome is efficient (i.e. the highest value bidder wins the auction)
 - a bidder with a 0 valuation pays nothing.

Envelope theorem

• Consider a maximization problem

 $\max_{b} u(b, v)$

where u() is differentiable in b and v

• The solution $b^*(v)$ is a function of v and satisfies the FOC

$$u_b(b^*(v),v)=0$$

• The value of the maximization problem is $U(v) \equiv u(b^*(v), v)$ and by the chain rule of differentiation

$$U'(v) = u_b(b^*(v), v)b^{*'}(v) + u_v(b^*(v), v)$$

The envelope theorem says that

$$U'(v) = u_v(b^*(v), v)$$

Envelope theorem and auctions

- A bidder with valuation v choosing to submit a bid b solves $\max_{b} vPr(win|b) - \mathbb{E}[Payment|b]$
- In an auction the objective function is
 u(b, v) = vPr(win|b) E[Payment|b]
 u_v(b, v) = Pr(win|b)
- If b*(v) is the equilibrium bidding strategy, the envelope theorem says that the bidder expected profit U(v) satisfies
 U'(v) = Pr(win|b*(v)) = Eq. Prob. value-v bidder wins

Integrating

$$U(v) = U(0) + \int_0^v Pr(win|\tilde{v}) \mathrm{d}\tilde{v}$$

Revenue equivalence theorem

$$U(v)_{=}U(0) + \int_{0}^{v} Pr(win|\tilde{v}) \mathrm{d}\tilde{v}$$

- A bidder expected profit only depends on
 - his probability of winning as function of his valuation (i.e. $Pr(win|\tilde{v})$)
 - his expected profit when he has the lowest possible valuation (i.e. U(0))
 - Both are identical across the four auction formats we considered
- Critical assumptions
 - bidder know their own values (their values do not depend on others private information)
 - values are statistically independent
 - bidders only care about their profit (i.e. payoff equals valuation minus price paid)

Using the Revenue equivalence theorem

- The revenue equivalence theorem implies that: in any auction where, in equilibrium, the highest valuation bidder wins the object
 - the expected revenue to the seller is constant
 - the expected surplus to each bidder is constant
- In a second price auction:
 - the highest value bidder wins the object
 - equilibrium strategies are easily characterized (dominant strategy)
 - bidders expected surplus and sellers revenue are easily characterized
- Can use the bidder expected revenue characterization in a second price auction to derive the (less obvious) equilibrium strategies of other auctions

First price auction

- Two bidders valuations are independent draws from U[0,1]
- Second price auction
 - Each bidder bids his valuation
 - A bidder with valuation v
 - wins with probability v (i.e. the probability his opponent value is less than v)
 - the expected payment upon winning is v/2 (i.e. the expected valuation of his opponent, provided his opponent has a valuation smaller than v)
- First price auction
 - Suppose, in equilibrium, the highest valuation bidder wins
 - A bidder with valuation v
 - wins with probability v (i.e. the probability his opponent value is less than v)
 - by the revenue equivalence theorem, his expected payment upon winning must be the same as in a SP auction (i.e. v/2)
 - since the payment of the winner in a FP auction equals his own bid, the equilibrium bid of a bidder with valuation v must be v/2 (i.e. the equilibrium bidding strategy is b(v) = v/2.)

- Each bidder submits a sealed bid
- Bids are open
 - Bidder who submitted the highest bid wins the object
 - Each bidder pays a price to the seller equal to his own bid
- What should bidders do?
- Suppose there is an equilibrium where the highest valuation bidder wins
 - use the revenue equivalence theorem to solve for the candidate equilibrium bidding strategies
 - ex-post verify that the strategies constitute an equilibrium (i.e. no bidder has any incentive to deviate)

All pay auction

- Two bidders valuations are independent draws from U[0,1]
- Suppose, in equilibrium, the highest valuation bidder wins
- A bidder with valuation v
 - wins with probability v (i.e. the probability his opponent value is less than v)
 - pays his own bid, b(v), regardless of whether he wins or not
 - his expected profit is then

$$Prob(win|v) * v - b(v) = v^2 - b(v)$$

• in a second price auction has an expected profit of

$$v(v-v/2)=v^2/2$$

• from the revenue equivalence theorem

$$v^2 - b(v) = v^2/2$$

• the equilibrium bidding strategy in an all pay auction must be

$$b(v)=v^2/2$$

- A reserve price is a price below which the seller is not willing to give up the object
- Second price auction with a reserve price r
 - the highest bidder wins the object if bid > r
 - the winner pays a price equal to the largest between the second highest bid and the reserve price *r*
 - Example 1: Two bids, 0.3 and 0.6, and reserve price r = 0.4. The high bidder wins and pays 0.4.
 - Example 2: Two bids, 0.5 and 0.6, and reserve price r = 0.4. The high bidder wins and pays 0.5.
 - Example 1: Two bids, 0.3 and 0.36, and reserve price r = 0.4. Nobody wins, object remains with seller.

Second price auction with reserve price

- Two bidders valuations are independent draws from U[0,1]
- It is a dominant strategy to:
 - bid own valuation when v > r
 - not bid when $v \leq r$ (or bid own valuation)
- A bidder with valuation v > r
 - wins with probability v
 - when winning pays a price equal to:
 - opponent value, \hat{v} , if $\hat{v} > r$ (happens with probability (v r)/v)
 - reserve price , r, if $\hat{v} \leq r$ (happens with probability r/v)
 - expected payment when winning

$$(r/v) * r + ((v-r)/v) * (v+r)/2 = r + (v-r)^2/(2v)$$

- Two bidders valuations are independent draws from U[0,1]
- Suppose, in equilibrium, the highest valuation bidder wins
- A bidder with valuation v
 - does not bid if $v \leq r$ (dominant strategy)
 - bids $b(v) = r + (v r)^2/(2v)$ if v > r (by the revenue equivalence theorem)
- note that $r + (v r)^2/(2v)$ is strictly increasing in v, so in equilibrium the highest value bidder wins

Optimal reserve price

- What reserve price maximizes the seller's revenue?
- Suppose there is just one bidder, with U[0,1] valuation
 - reserve price is just a posted price
 - sell at price equal r if v > r
 - do not sell otherwise
- Expected revenue is


$$Prob(v > r) * r = (1 - r) * r$$

• monopolist's revenue with demand function Q(p) = 1 - p• revenue maximizing reserve price r = 1/2

same as monopolist price

Optimal reserve price

- Two bidders independent U[0, 1] valuations
- Compare the revenue from marginally increasing the reserve price r to r + ε, across all possible pairs of valuations v_l < v_h



- $v_l < v_h < r$ no impact on re
- $r + \epsilon < v_l < v_h$

• $v_l < r < v_h < r + \epsilon$

• $v_l < r < v_h$

- no impact on revenue
 - no impact on revenue
 - R increases by ϵ (probability 2r(1-r))
 - R decreases by r (probability $2\epsilon r$)
- Expected revenue change: $\Delta Revenue = \epsilon 2r(1-r) r2\epsilon r$
- must be zero at the optimal reserve price $r^* = 1/2$

Optimal reserve price

- With N > 2 bidders same argument applies
 - The revenue only depends on the highest two bids
 - Similar calculation of impact on revenue
 - Optimal reserve price remains $r^* = 1/2$
- First price, second price, ascending price and descending price auctions all have the same optimal reserve price
- Optimal reserve price in an all pay auction?
 - Use the revenue equivalence theorem
 - Bidders with valuation below r^* bid nothing
 - For $v \ge r^*$, solve for bidding strategy, b(v), using the revenue equivalence theorem
 - Reserve price must be equal to $b(r^*)$
 - if it higher, the allocation rule is not the same as in the second price auction
 - if it is lower a bidder with value r^* would have an incentive to lower its bid
 - Homework: calculate the optimal reserve price with two bidders