ECO 426 (Market Design) - Lecture 6

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minimal chains and strategy proofness

- minimal chain and remove tail kidney is strategy proof
 - A patient *t_i* misreporting preferences in a round matters if it changes the allocation. After misreporting *t_i* can
 - be part of a cycle and receives k_j. Telling the truth leaves k_j and other kidneys available for later rounds. Telling the truth would give t_i a kidney at least as good as k_j;
 - be the lead patient of a *w*-chain. The wait list option is available to the patient in later rounds. Telling the truth would give an outcome at least as good as *w* to t_i.
- minimal chain and keep tail kidney is NOT strategy proof

$$k_{j} \leftarrow t_{1} \leftarrow k_{1}$$

$$t_{3} \leftarrow k_{3}$$
TB priorities: $t_{2} \succ t_{3} \succ t_{1}$

$$t_{3}$$
's preferences: $k_{1} \succ k_{j} \succ k_{2}$

- telling the truth the outcome for t_3 is k_2
- by misreporting preferences t_2 can get k_j

- Allocating students to schools, three type of problems
 - College Admission:
 - Students have preferences over schools **and** schools have preferences over students, both sides are strategic
 - "Welfare" of both schools and students matter
 - Many to one matching (Gale and Shapley 1962 paper)
 - Student Placement:
 - Only students have preferences
 - Schools are not "strategic players" they simply "rank" students according to objective test scores (e.g. standardized tests)
 - Students are the only "economic agents" (i.e. "welfare" of schools does not matter)
 - School Choice:
 - Only students have preferences
 - Schools are non strategic assign priorities (exogenous) to students, rather than ranks (endogenous)
 - Students are the only "economic agents"

Student Placement

- Model:
 - A set of **students**, *I*, with (strict) preferences over a set of **schools** *S*
 - For each school, *s*, a "**quota**" *q_s* of students (maximum number of students to take)
 - A set of **categories**, C, and for each school $s \in S$, a category $c_s \in C$ (e.g. medicine, engineering, law, management etc.)
 - An exam score profile {eⁱ_c}_{i∈I,c∈C}(i.e. eⁱ_c is the exam score of student *i* in category c) such that in each category all students are strictly ranked (i.e. no ties in any given category)
- Describing "preferences" of a school *s* by the students' exam scores in the school's category, *c_s*, one obtains an **associated college admissions**

Student Placement

• Objective: Find an assignment of students to schools such that no school exceeds its quota

 $\mu: I \to S \cup \emptyset$ s.t. no school has more students than its capacity

the notation \emptyset stands for the "no school option"

- Desirable properties:
 - **Individual rationality:** no student prefers the no school option to the school she is assigned to.
 - No justified envy: whenever a student *i* prefers another student *j*'s assignment, μ(*j*), to her own (i.e. *i* envies *j*), *i* ranks worse than *j* in school μ(*j*)'s category (i.e. the envy is not justified, *j* deserves more than *i* being in school μ(*j*).)
 - No waste: Whenever a student *i* prefers another school *s* to the one she is assigned to, school *s* has no empty slot.
 - **Pareto efficiency:** There is no assignment that makes no **student** worse off and some **student** better off.


- Individual rationality + no justified envy + no waste coincide with a stability requirement
- Proposition. A school placement matching is individually rational and eliminates waste and justified envy, if and only if it is stable in the associated college admission problem.

• One category serial dictatorship

- Assign to each student a priority equal to her test score rank
- Let students choose their school sequentially, following the priority ordering
- When there is just one category, the serial dictatorship mechanism induced by the category's ranking is the only mechanism that
 - is Pareto eficient; and
 - eliminates justified envy.
- no-waste and individual rationality follow from Pareto efficiency

Mechanisms for student placement: multi-category

- Multi-category serial dictatorship.
 Example: Six students {*i*₁, *i*₂,..., *i*₆} two categories M and E four schools (two per category) *s*₁, *s*₂ and *s*₃, *s*₄. School 1 and 3 have quota 1, school 2 and 4 have quota 2. Student ranking in each category: {1,2,3,4,5,6} and {1,3,5,2,4,6}.
- run the serial dictatorship separately in each category
- if a student is assigned to more than one school, change her preferences so that all school worse than best assigned school are not acceptable
- run the SD algorithm again
- repeat until no student is assigned to more than one school



Mechanisms for student placement: multi-category

- The multi-category serial dictatorship mechanism is used in Turkey in the centralized college student placement.
- Proposition: The multi-category serial dictatorship is equivalent to the DA **school optimal** mechanism.
- Limits: Pareto-efficiency is not guaranteed
 - Schools have no "preferences" only student welfare matter for pareto optimality
 - Some unstable matching might improve the welfare of some students without damaging any Example: Three students {*i*₁, *i*₂, *i*₃} and three schools {*s*₁, *s*₃}

and $\{s_2\}$. Student ranking is $\{1, 3, 2\}$ and $\{2, 1, 3\}$ respectively. Preferences of students

i_1	s 2	<i>s</i> 1	s 3
i ₂	s_1	s ₂	S 3
i ₃	s_1	s ₂	S 3

Unique stable matching is $(i_1, s_1)(i_2, s_2)(i_3, s_3)$ Pareto dominated by $(i_1, s_2)(i_2, s_1)(i_3, s_3)$

- If a mechanism eliminates justified envy it cannot be Pareto efficient (i.e. the mechanism cannot guarantee that the outcome will be Pareto efficient).
- DA student optimal mechanism guarantees
 - no justified envy (multi-category SD: yes)
 - the outcome is Pareto efficient among those that satisfy no-justified envy (multi-category SD: NO)
 - no-justified envy is equivalent to stability
 - student optimal matching is favorite by all students among stable matchings
 - Strategy proof (multi-category SD: NO)

- Historically children go to neigborhood schools
- School choice programs were introduced to give family more flexibility and also introduce competition between schools (i.e. eliminating the "monopoly" of schools over students in their neighborhood)
- In school choice programs factors other than the students' place of residence are considered to determine school attendance eligibility

- Model:
 - A set of **students**, *I*, with (strict) preferences over a set of **schools** *S*
 - For each school, *s*, a **"quota"** *q_s* of students (maximum number of students to take)
 - Each school ranks students according to **priorities**. Multiple students might be assigned the same priority (i.e. ranking of students is not necessarily strict.)
 - priorities (exogenous) vs. test scores (endogenous)
 - no-justified envy is less critical

Boston mechanism

- (old) Boston Public School mechanism
 - In place in Boston until 2005
 - Still widely used elsewhere
 - Schools exogenously determine priority ordering over students
 - depend on: distance from school, whether sibling already attends school, lottery draw etc..
 - Students submit preference ranking over schools
 - Assignment is determined by
 - **Only** students' top choices are considered. Students are assigned to schools according to their priority until no space is left or all students are assigned
 - Only remaining students' second choices are considered.....
 - **Only** remaining students' k^{th} choices are considered....
 - Process ends when all students have been assigned a school

- Problem: Obviously fails strategy proofness
 - Would you list as top choice a very popular school where you have low priority?
 - Preference reporting as a "coordination game"

- NYC school choice: Semi decentralized
 - Student (about 90,000 high school students) submit up to five applications
 - Schools receive applications and either accept or wait-list applicants
 - Students accept and reject offers
 - More offers from waitlist are made (up to three rounds)
 - Students unassigned at the end of mechanism (about 30,000) are administratively assigned to a school.

- Treating school priorities as preferences, a college admission problem obtains
- Could use the student proposing DA mechanism as an alternative to Boston or NYC mechanism
 - Outcome is stable
 - Optimal for students among stable matchings
 - Strategy proof
- Problem: Can be inefficient (same example as in school placement problem)

TTC

- How doe we address efficiency? We can treat priorities as "owned" by students (i.e. priorities can be traded)
- Allow students to "trade priorities" using a TTC mechanism
- School Choice TTC mechanism
 - Break priority ties through a lottery (obtain strict priorities)
 - Each student points to favorite school
 - Each school points to student with highest priority
 - Remove all students in a cycle
 - Remove all schools in a cycle if they have reached capacity
 - Repeat until all students are assigned to a school
- School choice TTC mechanism is
 - Strategy proof (DA student optimal: yes)
 - Pareto efficient (DA student optimal: no)
- Efficiency improvements come from "trading priorities"

Boston and NYC School Choice programs

- NYC adopted the DA student optimal mechanism in Fall 2003
- Boston Public School program adopted the DA student optimal mechanism starting in 2006
 - DA algorithm easier to understand
 - Experimental study shows less preference manipulation in DA than TTC
 - School boards did not like the idea of "trading priorities"
- Big improvement in outcomes over previous mechanisms
 - Number of students administratively matched in NYC dropped to 3,000 from 30,000 after change in mechanism

- Coarse priorities are broken by a lottery draw to obtain strict priority ranking (needed for the algorithm)
- Breaking of priority creates an "artificial" ranking of students and might create inefficiencies
- Example: Three students $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, three schools $\{s_1, s_2, s_3\}$. Priorities and preferences given by

Break ties everywhere with ordering $1 \succ 2 \succ 3$

- DA student optimal matching is $(i_1, s_1)(i_2, s_2)(i_3, s_3)$
- Pareto dominated by $(i_1, s_1)(i_2, s_3)(i_3, s_2)$

- How to break ties?
 - single lottery (i.e one for all schools) vs multiple lotteries (i.e. on at each school)
 - single lottery seems to do better than multiple lotteries in simulations
 - NYC adopted a single lottery protocol

improvement cycles

- Look for (ex-post) improvements to the DA student proposing outcome
 - Search for a cycle of students $i_0, i_1, \ldots, i_N = i_0$ such that
 - Each student i_n prefers the school of student i_{n+1} to own
 - Student *i_n* has the highest priority among those who would like to switch to the school of student *i_{n+1}*
 - Students $i_0, i_1, \ldots, i_N = i_0$ form a stable improvement cycle
 - Starting from a stable matching and implementing a SIC yields a Pareto improvement and a new stable matching
 - Starting at a stable matching that is **not** student optimal a SIC exists
 - A student optimal matching can be reached applying SIC repeatedly until no SIC can be found
 - Limits: SIC procedure is not strategy proof.