ECO 426 (Market Design) - Lecture 4

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Some allocation problems can be modelled as two-sided matching markets but with one side not having any preferences over the possible allocations

- Housing market (allocating houses to individuals)
 - A collection of individuals, A (agents)
 - each agent $a \in A$:
 - owns a "house," *h*_a, (*H* is the set of all houses);
 - has (strict) preferences over the set of houses in the economy
 - the initial allocation might not be efficient (i.e. Pareto efficient)
 - mutually beneficial trades might be possible

- Housing market vs. marriage market
 - one side of the market (houses) has no preferences over matches;
 - agents have an initial endowment (i.e. each agent owns a house)
 - the market starts from a default allocation where each agent is matched to his own house
 - Goal: find a matching that cannot be improved
 - it is not possible to reassign houses making some agent better off and making no agent worse off

- An allocation is an assignment (matching) of agents to houses such that
 - each agent is assigned exactly one house; and
 - each house is assigned to exactly one agent.
- An allocation in an housing market is described by a "bijection" $\mu : A \rightarrow H$.
- In a housing market, each agent is endowed (owns) one house (e.g. *a* owns *h_a*)
- What allocations would we expect to arise if agents can freely dispose of their endowment?


- Agents in a group S ⊆ A own together (in a "coalition") a subset of the houses in the market H_S
- The agents in a coalition S can "independently" distribute the houses they own, H_S , among themselves.
 - An assignment of the houses in H_S to agents in S, is an allocation in the housing market where the set of agents is S and the set of houses is H_S


$$\mu_{\mathcal{S}}: \mathcal{S} \to \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{S}}.$$


- Definition (Blocking) A coalition of agents *S* blocks an allocation μ, if there is an assignment μ_S of the houses owned by the coalition to the members of the coalition *S*, such that:
 i) some member of *S* prefers μ_S to μ; ii) no member of *S* prefers μ to μ_S.
 - A blocking coalition can find a mutually beneficial trade (i.e. an exchange of houses among members of the coalition that improves all members' welfare with respect to the allocation μ)
- Definition (Core) An allocation is in the core of the housing market if it is not blocked by any coalition.
 - At a core allocation benefits from trade are exhausted
 - In a marriage market, core matchings and stable matchings coincide

Gale's Top trading cycle algorithm

- each agent points to his/her preferred house
- each house points to its owner








• remove all cycles assigning houses to agents

• agents within a cycle exchange houses among each others

 each remaining agent points to his/her preferred remaining house



- remove all cycles assigning houses to agents
- continue until no agent/house is left

Theorem The outcome of the TTC mechanism is the unique core allocation of the housing market.

- The outcome of the TTC mechanism cannot be blocked
 - cannot make any agent matched in the first round better off (they are getting their favourite house)
 - cannot make any agent matched in the second round better off without making some of the agents matched in the first round worse off
 - cannot make any agent matched in round *n* better off without making some agents matched in earlier rounds worse off.

Theorem The TTC algorithm is a strategy proof mechanism.

- an agent matched in round n cannot, by manipulating his/her preferences, break any of the cycles that form before round n
 - preference manipulation cannot give the agent a house that was assigned earlier than round *n*.
- getting an house that was assigned in a round later than *n* does not make the agent better off.

- An House allocation problem consists of
 - A collection of N agents, A;
 - A collection of *N* houses, *H*;
 - For each agent (strict) a preference ordering over houses.
- House allocation vs. housing market
 - Same preference structure (i.e. only one side has preferences)
 - Same set of possible outcomes (i.e. assignment of a house to each agent)
 - Difference: agents do not "own" houses (i.e. there is no initial allocation of houses to agents.)
- Goal: find an efficient assignment (i.e. one that cannot be improved for all agents)

Serial dictatorship

- Agents are given a priority ordering from 1 to N;
- Agents choose houses in order of their priority.

Random serial dictatorship

- Same rules as in serial dictatorship;
- Priority ordering is chosen randomly from the set of all priority orderings of agents.

CORE from random assignment

- Randomly draw an initial assignment.
- Treat the initial assignment as an endowment.
- Use the TTC algorithm to find the unique core allocation given the initial assignment.

- Serial dictatorship, random serial dictatorship, and core from random endowment are
 - Pareto efficient; and
 - Strategy proof.

- Housing market: each agent owns a house;
- Housing allocation: no agents owns a house;
- Housing allocation with existing tenants: some agents "own" houses others do not
 - allocating student housing with upper year students having the right to keep their current residence (i.e. "own" their house)


House allocation with existing tenants

- Natural variation of the random serial dictatorship mechanism
 - Students without residence participate in a lottery determining the priority ordering;
 - Students already in residence can:
 - keep their residence; or
 - give up their residence and participate in the lottery.
 - Stock of available houses to choose from is formed by
 - empty houses; and
 - houses of students who choose to participate in the lottery.
- Many US colleges use exactly this mechanism for assigning student residences
- By participating in the lottery, a student in residence might end up with a worse house
 - this might induce some students in residence **not to participate** in the lottery
 - the outcome can be inefficient

YRMH-IGYT mechanism

Example: Existing tenants a_1, a_2, a_3 with houses h_1, h_2, h_3 ; newcomers agents a_4, a_5, a_6 ; empty houses h_x, h_y, h_z ; randomly chosen priority ordering of agents {4,2,5,6,3,1}

- assign agents their top choice in priority order
- until an agent requests an occupied house
- change the priority ordering placing the existing tenant ahead of requestor {4,2,5,3,6,1}
- ...repeat each time this happens {4,2,5,**1,3,6**}



 YRMH-IGYT stands for: "You request my house - I get your turn" Theorem The YRMH-IGYT mechanism is Pareto efficient, strategy proof, and makes no existing tenant worse off.

- Solve the participation problem
- Relation to other mechanisms
 - Coincide with Serial dictatorship when no agent has a house
 - Coincide with TTC when all agents are "tenants"
 - IRMH-IGYT is a version of TTC with all unoccupied houses pointing to the agent with the highest priority (among those remaining in the market)

Kidney Exchange

- Shortage of kidneys available for transplantation
 - Yet, the "potential" supply (i.e. the number of not strictly needed functioning kidneys) vastly exceeds the demand
- How do we reduce the shortage?
 - Increase the availability of cadaveric kidneys
 - Increase the supply of live donor kidneys
 - cannot use any "price" mechanism because of legal (and moral) constraints


- Live kidney donor must pass two compatibility tests before a transplantation is carried out
 - Blood type match
 - O-type patient can only accept O-type donor
 - A-type patient can accept A and O-type donor
 - B-type patient can accept B and O-type donor
 - AB-type patient can accept all donors
 - Tissue (HLA) compatibility
- Potential inefficiency: when a willing donor does not meet the compatibility tests the kidney is "wasted"
 - most donors are close friends/relatives, unwilling to donate to a stranger
- Possible improvements: donor could be willing to donate to stranger if that improves the chances of their close friend/relative receiving a kidney **i.e a kidney exchange**

Exchanging Kidneys

- Two types of kidney exchanges
 - Pairwise kidney exchange: exchange kidney with another patient-donor pair



• Exchange to list: donate kidney to patient at top of waiting list in exchange of top spot on waiting list



- A Kidney exchange problem consists of:
 - A set of donor-patient pairs $\{(t_1, k_1), \dots, (t_n, k_n)\}$
 - For each patient, t_i, a set of compatible kidneys
 K_i⊆K={k₁,...,k_n}
 - For each patient, *t_i*, a (strict) preference ordering over the set of compatible kidneys *K_i* and the option of exchanging own kidney, *k_i* for priority *w* on the waiting list
- Question: How do we organize a kidney exchange program such that
 - The outcome is Pareto efficient, it is not possible to improve further the welfare of **all**
 - For each patient, the outcome is never worse than not participating in the mechanism, ensures broad participation, no donor kidney is un-necessarily "wasted"
 - The mechanism is strategy proof, patients have incetive to disclose their preferences honestly